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ABSTRACT 
 
OVERCOMING THE EMPTY YEARS: THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
HUMANITIES IN WEST GERMANY AFTER 1945 
Nicholas E. Di Liberto 
Supervised by 
Warren Breckman 
 
The close relationships formed between teachers and students in the materially 
impoverished and politically compromised postwar universities in western Germany are 
the central focus of this dissertation. I analyze how a divided generation of politically 
overburdened intellectual youth negotiated the new possibilities opened up by the 
collapse of cultural restrictions imposed by the twelve-year dictatorship and the new 
expectations, stemming from the changing ideas and realities of the university and 
philosophy in an expanding middle-class, consumerist society. In spite of the limitations 
of their institutional and cultural environment, the younger philosophers and intellectuals 
I investigate develop highly productive models for the practice of philosophy and the 
‘human sciences’ (Geisteswissenschaften), which have relevance beyond their own 
specific historical situation, national boundaries, and interests. 
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Introduction 
 
The Problems Stated 
German scholars in philosophy and the humanities were equally affected by the material 
devastation, economic privation, and general spiritual decay that plagued the whole of 
German society with the collapse and humiliating defeat of the twelve-year National 
Socialist dictatorship at the end of the Second World War. This impoverished state 
presented the intellectual elite that remained, or who were often reinstated in their 
university positions shortly after the end of the war with a set of problems and restrictions 
that seemed to necessitate the reform, or at least, a rethinking of the traditional role 
accorded to philosophy among the sciences, the humanities in particular, and in a broader 
cultural domain beyond the university. The first focus of this dissertation is how these 
philosophers and scholars in the humanities coped with the material and human 
circumstances in the wake of defeat. I investigate the new ideas as well as the 
professional and institutional that developed from this time of initial experimentation in 
the late 1940s. 
 The circumstances of 1945 presented no “Stude null” or “zero hour” for 
philosophers any more than this situation did for the rest of German society. Yet, the 
denial of this trope of absolute rupture and new beginning remains in large part a 
determination of historians and commentators in retrospect. As historians we must 
negotiate the tension between intellectual, structural, and institutional continuities and the 
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ruptures in experience that were certainly palpable for the intellectual youth and their 
teachers. This nexus of past and future manifested itself first in the conflict between 
political expectations and demands to confront and to answer for the crimes of the recent 
past and the understandable human feeling of political exhaustion, accompanied by the 
desire to move on, or make up for time lost through war and the years of politicized 
culture and education under the Nazi Regime. Thus, along with the issue of renewing 
philosophy and humanistic university education more generally, this study will focus on 
real needs expressed in the key relationships between teachers of philosophy and their 
students, who, though weary to different degrees of severity from their war experience, 
were nonetheless earnestly committed to their studies and energized by the new openness 
and discovery of cultural knowledge previously denied to them. 
 We will trace this dynamic interplay between teachers and students through the 
initial period of cultural reopening and relatively open discussion of the political past in 
the late 1940s, through the period of greater institutional articulation and 
professionalization in the 1950s up to the early 1960s, the period in which the 
philosophical youth take up their positions within the profession and the institutions that 
their teachers’ generation created, or inherited but continued to shape. The synchronic 
development of ideas, institutions, and human relationships are difficult to narrate over 
even a period of two decades, particularly one which was characterized by the increasing 
demand for reforms in educational practices, institutions, and ideas of the instructor’s role 
to accommodate the drastic increase in university enrollments and the changing needs of 
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socially more diverse student body. Therefore, continuities in German academic culture 
and intellectual life ran up against a new set of social realities that had been developing 
since the end of the First World War, with the proliferation of ‘mass’ culture and the 
expansion in the number of professions requiring university credentials. The German 
cultural tradition needed to be reassessed not simply because the recent political 
cataclysm had called its peculiarities and provincialism into question, but also because 
West German society and culture in the decades following the Second World War were 
changing far more rapidly than ever before. What happens when philosophy and the 
humanities, the Geisteswissenschaften, by their very name, the caretakers of German 
Kultur and ‘Spirit’ (Geist), must adjust forms of education and research that were based 
on the cultural outlook of classical German idealism to new demands for expert 
knowledge and professional practice that emanate from an expanding, affluent middle-
class society? Furthermore, with the society of the Wirtschaftswunder went the increasing 
influence of a popular, ‘mass’ culture, which dealt in the commodified culture offered in 
short doses in the feuilleton pages of the quality press.  
 Certainly, the feuilleton was an invention of the nineteenth century. The 
eighteenth century had its share of Popularphilosophen and cultural dilettantes. However, 
in the 1950s and 1960s we find a tension between the elite of the academy and the 
purveyors of consumable culture that was exacerbated by the fears of academic 
philosophers that their status and relevance both inside and outside the university were in 
sharp decline. As we will see, while French existentialists and the few remaining extra-
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academic superstars like Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers permeated the cultural pages 
of the high-brow and even middle-brow newspapers and journals, the practicing 
philosophers turned more towards closed professional institutions and adopted by 
disposition or necessity an even stricter academic habitus. Put simply, I set out to explain 
and assess this divergence between “professional philosophy” and philosophy as it was 
understood, or consumed in the sphere of popular culture. Certainly, one could ask, was 
philosophy, university philosophy ever ‘popular’? However, this misses the point. The 
issue is the possible missed opportunities for institutional reform of the universities, 
reforms which could have attuned the learning process in the humanities and concerns of 
philosophers to the social changes happening around them, not simply through diagnoses 
of cultural decline and the ‘crystallization of the personality’ or human helplessness 
before social and political institutions. 
The chronological scope of this project is determined by the need to follow the 
responses of the philosophy profession to the changing concerns of the society that they 
are a part of. How did they attempt to accommodate these social pressures? Did the 
younger generation of philosophers manage to adapt to the changing needs of a more 
diverse student body? Was professionalization and ‘scientification’ 
(Verwissenschaftlichung) perhaps a short-sighted response prompted by the rise in 
importance of the natural and social sciences? Were there avenues open for the 
reassertion of the human sciences’ relevance in modern society that did not take the strict 
route of professional hierachization, institutional seclusion, and scientific formalism?    
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Problems of Approach 
An analysis of the position of the philosopher and the role of the humanities in West 
German after 1945 presents the intellectual historian with a unique set of difficulties. The 
most significant problem for the historian is that in our educational system today and, 
more generally, in our scientific culture, we continue to face the same issues and 
challenges as those academic intellectuals and cultural thinkers, who grappled with the 
reconstruction and reform of the West German universities in the first two decades 
following the Second World War. What future is there for the kind of learning and 
understanding offered by the humanities within societies that increasingly demand the 
rapid production of ‘experts’ and specialists to serve a rationally-administered, 
technological world? How can the traditional standards of research and teaching in the 
humanistic disciplines be maintained in ‘mass’ universities that seem compelled to take 
the form of bureaucratically administered institutions and of profit-driven corporations in 
order to meet the expectations of advanced capitalist, industrial society? 
 The conditions and expectations presupposed in these general questions about our 
scientific culture undoubtedly favor those disciplines that can maintain at least the 
semblance of transparency between the knowledge, skills, and credentials that they 
confer and the instrumental needs of an industrial, or a post-industrial, service-based 
economy. Here ‘relevance’ is conferred only on those sciences, whose method and form 
of reproduction matches what is valued in the broader cultural attitude towards science: 
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serviceable expertise, easily consumed and digested informational output, and the 
consistent, calculable behavior of the technician, or bureaucrat. It is telling that in this 
culture ‘science’ increasingly becomes identified with the method of the natural sciences, 
or, more specifically, a caricature of the natural sciences that is viewed as pure empirical 
research that produces positive, economical results by virtue of an imagined objectivity; 
in other words, a simplistic view of knowledge and education as historically-
unconditioned and value-free and thus compatible with a mode of production considered 
‘natural,’ or, in any case, unquestioned in society as a whole. This is simply economism 
of the educational and cultural realm. 
 These present concerns cannot and perhaps should not be bracketed off 
completely from the course of this study. Still, I have sought throughout to rely heavily 
on primary source materials from timeframe in question. The mundane sources, such as 
conference reports, scholarly journal articles and reviews, and studies undertaken of 
university philosophy and the humanities have proven invaluable in bringing to the fore 
the underlying assumptions of the field of German philosophy in a time of dynamic 
change. The familiar texts of the noteworthy thinkers find a place here too; however, 
instead of treating these works through internal exegesis alone, I seek to assess their 
reception and influence. In the case of a ‘great’ or ‘canonized’ thinker like Martin 
Heidegger, it has proven more illuminating to treat his figure not as a locus of genius 
with weighty though highly problematic intentions, but rather as a cultural signifier, or 
symbol and, for our young philosophers, a professional example, whose language, 
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behaviors, and image could be as much a liability as his intellectual output could be a 
provocative asset. Even the self-stylized solitary thinker has implications for the 
professional field; though Heidegger, and to some extent Jaspers, shunned academic 
conferences and the protocols of the profession, they still were regarded internationally as 
the chief representatives of German philosophizing, often to the consternation of their 
colleagues, who tried above all to shield the profession and their students from the errant 
behavior and mystical language of these outsiders. 
 Finally, I have found that the use of unpublished documents, letters and 
manuscripts essential for uncovering the nuances of professional philosophical practice. 
Naturally, the information in personal correspondence has a level of candidness that one 
does not find disclosed in published works. What is more, in the case of many of the 
younger thinkers, only in their correspondence and unpublished talks and lectures do they 
express their views on new teaching duties, university reforms, and often their 
disappointments with institutions and the frustration of their attempts to redefine the 
practices and ideals of the university to meet these new realities.   
 The younger philosophers, who by 1960 were taking up Ordinarius (full 
professor) positions attempted to mediate this problem of dissonance between the 
persistent, elitist forms of German academic culture and the new options for instruction 
and research in the humanities at a time when social and cultural reality no longer seemed 
to allow for the “freedom and solitude” that were the hallmarks of the traditional 
scholarly life. It can certainly be argued that younger professors of philosophy followed 
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in the footsteps of their teachers. No period saw greater academic, professional output in 
philosophy and the humanities than the 1960s, so much so that many criticized this new 
form of professional hierarchy and isolation for its business-like (betriebsam) quality. Yet 
much of the charges against academic philosophy stemmed from an erroneous view 
proffered by cultural critics that philosophical study was somehow meant to be popular 
and, further, that at some epic point in the past it had reached a wide public audience, 
which now found its professional exclusivity and its “rituals of science” uninteresting and 
off-putting.  
 Naturally, politics and the weight of the past intrudes on the sciences and the 
university regardless of the intentions of some academic practitioners and theorists to 
secure this space as the site of ‘value-free’ research, or, in the more traditional terms of 
the universitas scholarum, as a safe haven, secluded and free from the competing 
ideologies of the political sphere and the crass material demands of an increasingly 
consumerist, mass society. However, we cannot content ourselves with the summary 
conclusion that such a state of affairs could not hold out in late industrial society and in 
the bifurcated global political struggle of the Cold War, our study—and our presentist 
concerns for the humanities in our own time—depends on recreating the institutional 
environment of West German philosophy, which was in dynamic play and tension with 
external cultural pressures and socio-political intrusions. 
 Practically, the institutional context of these tensions amounted to a kind of 
“Methodenstreit” in which new disciplines, above all sociology and political science, 
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came to the fore and appeared to pose both a challenge and a new direction for the 
humanities that would allow philosophers and social theorists to reexamine not only the 
practices and “method” of the human sciences, but also the underlying “attitude” (in Fritz 
Ringer’s sense) that had directed scholarly exclusivity since the inception of the modern 
German university devoted to free research and teaching. There were indeed many 
missed opportunities for collaboration in this space of intellectual and institutional 
reformulation, often caused by the stubborn resolve to remain stuck in the supposed 
stand-off between the “two cultures”—on one side, the archaic humanism and 
purposeless knowledge of the human sciences, and on the other, the rigidity of the natural 
scientific method caught in a purely positivistic and instrumental relation to the objective 
world. However, this confrontation was not the zero-sum game it was made out to be. 
From the side of the humanities and the philosophers came a powerful reinvestigation of 
the meaning of tradition and of the historical development of science in general. We will 
investigate the efforts of important thinkers of the teachers’ generation like Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Joachim Ritter and their students to rethink the role of the humanities and 
philosophy by means of a thorough investigation and reinterpretation of the German and 
greater Western philosophical tradition. 
 Seen from the inside, the new “generation,” in the active sense of the word, of 
professional philosophers attempted to mediate the tensions between the human and 
natural sciences. They fostered efforts towards exposing the falsity of this opposition that 
was based on very idealized notions and unrealistic presuppositions about what scientific 
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research and reason was meant to achieve. Natural science as well as the humanities was 
only hurt by the illusion of objective, value-free knowledge. Neither could live up to this 
hypertrophied standard of positivist, empirical research. Younger figures like Hans 
Blumenberg, Jürgen Habermas, Dieter Henrich, Reinhart Koselleck, Odo Marquard and 
Hermann Lübbe in collaboration with their teachers, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Joachim 
Ritter, Ludwig Landgrebe, and Theodor Adorno sought ways out of this unreasonable 
standard, without turning down the blind alley of Heidegger’s supposedly post-
metaphysical thinking. They all wanted to achieve something like a new unity through 
collaboration between the sciences that also did not position philosophy in an ephemeral 
realm above praxis, but rather saw its task in reestablishing the possibility for 
understanding in scientific research and teaching that was in dialogue both with the 
present and with tradition, or, to use the German term, Überlieferung—literally: what 
was handed down to us from the past. This also meant breaking the old Mandarin 
attitude, which was structured by an idea of struggle between pure research secluded in 
the university and the purposes of the social world. This attitude seemed to deny the 
historicity of all scientific practice and the situatedness of the prevailing conservative 
structures of the university in a dynamic historical process—a timeless apoliticism that 
left the German academy vulnerable to external ideologies and Weltanschauungen 
because they had done nothing to fortify themselves or their students against them. Many 
thinkers after the Second World War recongnized the limitations and short-sightedness of 
the old Mandarin outlook. At the same time, they sought to rethink and repair the great 
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tradition of German idealism—the view that saw philosophy as critical reflection on the 
whole range of human endeavor; but this was done with the consciousness of the 
historicity of all truth claims and, more specifically, with attention to the very language, 
symbols, metaphors, and myths that registered this historical situatedness. Not one of the 
philosophers of these generation, irrespective of their political allegiances, denied the 
need for a philosophical reorientation of science as such that reached down to the very 
language and concepts through which its core assumptions were revealed. To be sure, we 
cannot blur the different positions they take towards this problem. However, it would be 
incorrect to reduce their efforts to an overtly political narrative of the gradual 
rehabilitation of German provincialism and anti-modernism through the introduction of 
‘Western’ democratic norms—as if such a transparently singular standard ever existed in 
modern political and intellectual culture. Although many of the goals set by these 
thinkers for reflective understanding in the philosophy of the humanities ran aground in 
the struggle to reform the institutions of the university in the late 1950s and 1960s,  it is 
the task of the intellectual historian to understand the motivations for their activities on 
their own merits—to reconstruct the intentions of these figures based on their most 
poignant formulations, which are often found not only in their most theoretical works, but 
in the practical efforts to make their projects understandable to a wider audience of non-
specialists, their students, and the public, even when they had every reason to believe that 
their efforts would find little resonance. The uncertainty that followed this set of figures 
from the troubled years of apprenticeship in the early years after the war to the later 
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frustrations of their professional ambitions in face of the social upheavals of the late 
1960s remains the living context for our own struggle to maintain the relevance and 
critical, reflective potential of philosophy and the humanities in a world that continues to 
resist its insights. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Generation of German Postwar Philosophy 
 
 Understandings of philosophy in the immediate postwar period are plagued by the 
problem of an apparent absence of a philosophico-political critique of National 
Socialism. Why did the postwar generation of German philosophy not generate a 
thorough-going, public critique of the Nazi dictatorship? Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich, employing a social-psychological perspective, argued in 1967 that the 
postwar German youth were a generation unable to free themselves from authority, not so 
much of their fathers but of the dictatorship and the past. 1 By failing to or being 
prevented from confronting the past trauma, the postwar youth and, primary among them, 
the academic youth suffered a collective neurosis—an “inability to mourn”—that 
paralyzed their psychic development and left them in an exposed, vulnerable position in 
relation to authority, whether it be vis-à-vis the political order, or towards persons in 
positions of power above them, such as their teachers. This would seem to explain why 
the intellectual situation of the youth in the late 1940s and the 1950s was characterized by 
a search for orientation and direction primarily within the security of individual 
 
1 Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfähigkeit zu Trauern: Grundlagen kolektiven Verhaltens 
(Munich: Piper Verlag, 1967). I will cite from the English translation, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of 
Collective Behavior, trans. Beverly R. Placzek (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1975). 
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relationships and small groups and with the goal of reconnecting with and understanding 
broken intellectual traditions. 
The influence of the Mitscherlichs’ study is just one example of how a general 
stylization of the postwar period can be appropriated for political ends. In this case, the 
postwar generation was destined to be unfavorably contrasted to that of the “1968er” 
movement; the former, a conformist and apparently ‘skeptical’ intellectual elite, became 
a useful foil for the latter political generation, whose pathos was one of rebellion and 
irreverence towards institutions like the university and the academic profession. 
However, the expectation of an academic Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the 1940s and 
1950s adopts without question the hindsight perspective of the 1960s. What is more, the 
way in which sociologists and historians have developed and employed the category of 
generation can distort our understanding of groups like the postwar German academic 
youth and, among them, young philosophers. For, as we shall see, from the concept’s 
introduction into sociological and historical research by Karl Mannheim and others in the 
1920s, and its application by older commentators after 1945 in appraisals of the postwar 
youth, the language of generations has carried with it the expectations of a clear political 
orientation and a willingness on the part of the young to assume an active, leading role in 
social and cultural life. 
Philosophical culture in postwar West Germany allows such a refinement because 
of the unique position of the intellectual, academic youth after the collapse of the 
National Socialist dictatorship in 1945. Although many German thinkers at the time and 
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subsequent intellectual historians would claim that the overall tenor of this youthful 
cohort was one of skepticism and disillusionment—a post-ideological sensibility 
completely compatible with the restorative, conservative outlook or ‘realistic’ world view 
of 1950s West Germany, upon closer historical investigation, we find no such shared 
intellectual and political tendencies among this supposed “generation” of postwar youth.  
 To be sure, the young people who sought higher education in a devastated 
Germany had experienced common traumas in the war and, after the capitulation, a 
shared reaction of betrayal and a strong desire to make up, or at least to account for the 
lost, or “stolen years” of their youth. However, when we investigate ‘youth’ closely, we 
find that its characteristics are based on the expectations of those older thinkers and 
cultural commentators for whom political and cultural radicalism and romantic pathos 
had been the determining factor for their generation, and thus, for the theoretical 
approach they would take towards the youth at any historical moment. But the intellectual 
youth after 1945 did not fit the stereotypical image of the youth movement, or 
Jugendbewegung that had apparently revolted against bourgeois social values and 
conventions with radical artistic expression before the Great War. Then, so the myth of 
youth goes, these young people, disillusioned and politically radicalized by the 
experience of defeat, was mobilized amidst the highly original, but also highly 
ideological intellectual and cultural atmosphere of the 1920s. The Marxist left would then 
label the thinking of the 1950s and 1960s as the expression and consolidation of a 
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“bourgeois worldview.”2 More moderate left-wing and socialist commentators would 
likewise fasten on to variations of what I would call the “restorative hypothesis,” the 
notion that 1950s intellectual life was characterized by a collective silence about the 
political past, and that, in the case of philosophers and academics in general, the 1950s 
represented a series of missed opportunities not only for working through the past but for 
concrete political reforms in the universities and academic culture as a whole.3 Finally, 
various neo-liberal and conservative thinkers, particularly after 1968, would adhere to the 
same view of restoration but in the “affirmative”—in other words, they would see the 
moderation and institutionally, or procedurally grounded efforts of liberal reforms as part 
of the successful process of Westernization of the German political and cultural outlook;4 
which was only hampered and misdirected by radical, extra-parliamentary forms of 
protest that in any case, could simply be explained away as the “deferred disobedience” 
 
2 See, for example, Hans Heinz Holz, “Philosophie als bürgerliche Weltanschauung: Umerziehung und 
Restauration – westdeutsche Philosophie im ersten Nachkriegjahrzehnt,” in Dialektik 11 (1986): 45-69. 
3 Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Schnädelbach have adopted this view, though certainly with marked 
differences from their teacher’s famous formulation in Theodor Adorno, “Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der 
Vergangenheit [1959],” reprinted in Eingreiffe: Neun kritische Modelle (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1963), 125-146; for the clearest statements of Habermas’ revision of Adorno’s viewpoint, not 
simply of the failure, or inability to “work off” the Nazi past, and Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialektik der 
Aufklärung, see Habermas, “Die Moderne – ein unvollendetes Projekt [1980],” in Kleine politische 
Schriften I-IV (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981),  444-64.  
4 This is admittedly a broad characterization of the Neo-conservative viewpoint beginning in the 1970s, 
represented above all by the leading intellectuals who had been members of the circle around Joachim 
Ritter, or the “Ritter-Schüle.” For the “affirmative” interpretation of the “repression” of the Nazi Past in the 
1950s see Hermann Lübbe, “Der Nationalsozialismus im Bewußtsein der deutschen Gegenwart [1983],” 
reprinted in H. Lübbe, Vom Parteigenossen zum Bundesbürger: Über beschwiegene und histroisierte 
Vergangenheit (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2007), 11-38; and on Joachim Ritter’s Collegium 
Philosophicum as incubator of  the affirmative outlook, see H. Lübbe, “Affirmationen. Joachim Ritters 
Philosophie im akademischen Kontext der zweiten deutschen Demokratie,” in Philosophie in Geschichten: 
Über intellektuelle Affirmationen und Negation in Deutschland (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2006), 
152-168. 
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of a youth spoiled by the abundance and security of the very affluent middle-class society 
against which they led their misguided revolt.5 
 Although in the late 1960s, the figures, who are the center of our study, the 
philosophers and scholars in the humanities born between 1920 and 1933, would first be 
accused of a lack of political engagement and blind conformity with restorative politics 
and cultural traditions, and then subsequently because of their own political conflicts and 
in-fighting in the 1970s and 1980s, would be claimed for various retrospective political 
projects as “intellectual founders” of the Bundesrepublik;6 we find nothing like a 
politically unified generation among these intellectuals in the first two decades after 
1945. In fact, it is the polarized, divergent politics of post-1968 political and intellectual 
landscape that distorts our view of the constructive efforts of transgenerational groups of 
philosophers and Geisteswissenschaftler to reestablish an intellectual community after the 
Second World War and, particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s, to renew and 
reform their disciplines and the university structure to accommodate the fast pace of 
social and scientific change, but also to retain elements of the German academic tradition 
that seemed to them indispensible. 
 
5 The Ritter student, Odo Marquard draws on the Freudian notion of “deferred disobedience” and “reversed 
totemism” to describe the student revolts of 1968 in “Farwell to Matters of Principle,” in Farwell to 
Matters of Principle: Philosophical Studies, trans. Robert M. Wallace (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 8-9. 
6 See most recently Jens Hacke, Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit: die liberalkonservative Begründung der 
Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006). 
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The post-1945 youth, I will argue, was quite different from at least the highly 
stylized character of the youth movements in Western Europe from the fin de siècle to the 
1920s and early 1930s. The former was a “disinherited” youth, which was separated from 
the cultural and intellectual traditions of the nineteenth century and the terrible, but 
exuberant politics and cultural flourishing before and directly following the First World 
War. Their displacement from the German cultural tradition and their inability to 
understand the political ‘adjustments’ of their elders during the Third Reich and then 
during the occupation, made the initial “years of apprenticeship” or “Lehrjahre” 
extremely difficult and also highly unique. First, we can hardly label this youth a ‘youth’ 
at all, any more than we can impose on them the traditional category of generation. The 
youngest among them knew only the values enforced during the 12-year dictatorship at 
the expense of much of the vibrant culturally legacy of the 1920s and before. After the 
collapse and defeat, they were implicated, despite their age, in the guilt born by all those 
who had blindly followed, or at least accommodated the policies of the murderous 
dictatorship. Worse than this insinuation of guilt, those intellectually inclined also were 
forced to come to the realization that they had lived a culturally deprived and morally 
reprehensible existence in the formative years of their lives. They entered the university 
by the late 1940s and early 1950s with a indomitable need to catch up (Nachholbedürfnis) 
in the light of the sudden return of suppressed cultural knowledge and imposition of new, 
alien political concepts that followed from defeat and occupation. 
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 These young people matriculated with some difficulty—a numerus clausus on 
matriculation was imposed by most universities into the early 1950s—into universities 
that had been physically and materially devastated by the war, or when not physically 
damaged, still suffered from lack of able instructors because of the forced exile of many 
professors by the Nazis, and the initially strident but always irregular attempts by the 
Occupational Authorities to ‘denazify’ German academia. Still, this youngest cohort at 
least seemed to be entering university at the ‘correct’ age; born after 1927, they could 
experience the influx of new learning and culture in the stage of late adolescence, where 
trauma was somewhat ameliorated by the excitement of discovery. This was not the case 
for those older souls, already in their late twenties and thirties, who returned to their 
studies after often much more intense war experiences. They sat on crates and huddled 
around small furnaces, in makeshift seminar rooms with their much younger ‘peers,’ who 
had the resilience of youth and were thus in a much better position to make a fresh start. 
By contrast, older students were (re)starting too late; they had a more palpable sense of 
their years of education being interrupted or cut short by war service, or, in some cases, 
because of imprisonment and impressment into labor service. Moreover, many of these 
older students and even some who reached the level of assistants or Privatdozenten (free 
lecturer or instructor) knew life before Hitler’s takeover in 1933; they likely would have 
supported the regime, and they also went into the war and experienced defeat with a 
much greater awareness of what had been lost. For some of these figures, betrayal and 
loss—not simply of a political regime they believed in, but of the millions of their age 
20 
 
group cut down in a disastrous war—was the most powerful emotion, followed by 
recognition of their failure to resist, and even some early gestures of “retroactive 
resistance,” or “nachgeholter Widerstand.” 
I will examine the divisions within this postwar ‘youth’ and the problem the 
generational approach in greater detail below; for the moment, however, it is important to 
acknowledge this early experiential divide within the intellectual youth in general as the 
background for activities and ideas of the philosophers and Geisteswissenschaftler 
(scholars in the humanities) among them during their Lehrjahre and eventually when they 
reach high positions in the academic field. Their early experiences actually brought them 
very close to the gifted instructors and mentors of the older generation—the latter born 
around 1900 and initiated into academic and intellectual life amidst the radical 
atmosphere of the 1920s and early 1930s. Under the adverse material and political 
conditions of the late 1940s and early 1950s, these teachers attempted to reintroduce the 
practices of and reconstruct the spaces for humanistic and philosophical education that 
had characterized their own experiences in the interwar period. The teachers were the 
students’ only guides to the newly rediscovered treasures of the German, and Western 
intellectual past; the former also introduced this disinherited youth to the practices and 
behavior of the scholar. However, while these reinstated forms of the academic field 
formed a basis of continuity and connection to tradition for the instructors, for the youth, 
this set of behaviors and attitudes imbedded in the academic lifestyle or ‘habitus’ of an 
older university form were not always easily assimilated and duplicated in the post-1945 
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academic environment. Age, divergent experiences of the recent political past as well as 
these more elusive, unthematized rules of academic practice embedded in institutions and 
the underlying expectations for humanistic education and scholarly behavior created 
barriers between teachers and students that had to be overcome. However, no easy 
implementation of the category of generation, or generation conflict will suffice to 
explain their relationship. The extraordinary circumstances of the immediate postwar 
period allow us to refine this traditional category as well as the assumptions that go along 
with it, not the least, those that led later political generations of in the Federal Republic to 
deem this first postwar generation skeptical and complacent. 
 
The Problem of Generations  
At least until recent attempts to complicate the category, a generation came to life 
most vividly as a political actor and/or an avant-garde cultural movement. Real 
generations have, since Mannheim’s characterization of 1928,7 required a close 
association of young people of similar background—in most cases, bourgeois, male 
intellectual elites—who are oriented towards the same historical problematic and who 
must actively “participate in common destinies.”8 The characteristics presupposed in 
Mannheim’s category of generation work better for the “retrospective self-styling” of a 
 
7 Karl Mannheim, “Das Problem der Generationen,” first published in Kölner Vierteljahrshefte 7, nos. 2-3 
(1928-1929): 157-85, 309-330; reprinted in Kurt H. Wolff, ed., Wissenssoziologie: Auswahl aus dem Werk 
(Berlin: Luchterhand Verlag 1964), 509-565. 
8 Mannheim, Wissenssoziologie, 542. 
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political, elite movement like that of 1968ers, or for the generations of the 
Jugendbewegung before and after the First World War upon which Mannheim based his 
work.9 Our study of postwar West German philosophy will be complicated by the 
constant judgments leveled against the immediate postwar intellectual youth by the 
‘political’ generations that came before and after them. Particularly, in the initial period 
between the political collapse of the so-called ‘Thousand-Year Reich’ and the ostensible 
‘restoration’ of the early 1950s, at a time when a new world of formerly suppressed 
culture and learning was suddenly opened up before them, an understandably cautious 
intellectual youth sought out role models among the few teachers and cultural figures that 
remained active to help them navigate the new cultural terrain.10 At the same time, this 
intellectually “disinherited youth,” as I will refer to them, were overburdened by the 
questions of their share of guilt for past events, their social responsibility for the future, 
and the pressure forced onto them by their elders to immediately engage in a new 
political order. If the young failed or showed reluctance in these tasks, particularly the 
last, they could suffer indictments of political apathy and suspicions of residual 
obedience to the former authorities such as the Hitlerjugend or the Wehrmacht. 
 There are further, analytical reasons to be skeptical about the usefulness and 
applicability of the traditional generation category for understanding the German 
 
9 Bernd Weisbrod, “Cultures of Change: Generations in the Politics and Memory of Modern Germany,” in 
Stephen Lovell, ed., Generations in Twentieth-Century Europe (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 
22-23. 
10 Cf. Dirk Moses’ insistence on the general importance of the “forty-fivers’ relationship with their 
teachers” in German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72.   
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intellectual youth in the first two decades after 1945. Jean-François Sirinelli has rightly 
pointed to the unavoidable consequences of using the category of generation: “It is by no 
means obvious that the intellectual milieu develops in a uniform way, the latter being 
very much the result of various different political, ‘ideological’ and cultural 
influences.”11 Sirinelli points out that the concept of generation rests on the assumption 
that the political context can be regarded as being the same for everyone. The idea that an 
event, or series of events, brings a generation or cohort into existence demands that the 
event be of considerable magnitude, which will therefore affect other age groups and 
thereby lose any claim to a specific relationship to one age group of intellectuals.12 As 
Bernd Weisbrod likewise concludes, “elite group behavior should not be mistaken for 
generational consciousness.”13 Sirinelli gives the French examples of the First World 
War generation and that of the youth movement after the Algerian war; in both cases the 
historian is hard pressed to make generalizations about an entire society, or even one age 
group within that society based on the actions and opinions of a small, intellectual avant-
garde.  
The “generation” of youth in western Germany following the war confronts the 
historian with similar empirical problems. What is more, the issue of discovering a 
“generational consciousness” is even more complicated in the German case by the fact 
 
11 Jean-François Sirinelli, “The Concept of an Intellectual Generation,” in Jeremy Jennings, ed., 
Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century France: Mandarins and Samurais (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 
85. 
12 Ibid., 86. 
13 Weisbrod, “Cultures of Change,” 25. 
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that this youth was broken off from the traditions that predated the “event of magnitude”: 
they faced the social chaos in the wake of war and dictatorship not as an intellectually 
informed, self-stylized avant-garde directed toward the future, but as a defeated and 
disoriented youth that was reluctant to take on the responsibility for the future as well as 
the past. For this reason, this youth was much more vulnerable and sensitive to the 
judgments of its elders and resentful of but powerless before the alien political forces 
placed above them.  
Hence, employing the traditional category of “generationality” (Generationalität) 
would direct us narrowly towards constructing the prosopography of a politically 
engaged elite, whose image would undoubtedly be based more on the interests of 
“retrospective self-styling” and self-promotion than it would reflect the experiences of 
generational interaction and conflict that characterized the post-1945 intellectual 
climate.14 It appears much more valuable for us to follow Sirinelli’s advice and to 
“analyze a generation from the inside, to see it in terms of the perceptions of 
contemporaries and in the context of its own day. In this way an a posteriori 
reconstruction of a generation can be avoided and there can emerge a picture drawn from 
the collective self-perceptions of the time.”15  
 
14 Wiesbrod, “Cultures of Change,” 23-24. 
15 Sirinelli, “Concept of an Intellectual Generation,” 87. 
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At the Marburg Hochschulgespräche in 1946,16 even Alexander Mitscherlich, 
then a 38-year-old Dozent posed the problem of the young generation in a very different 
way from his later psychoanalytic diagnosis of this generation’s “psycho-social 
immobilism”17 in the 1960s. Mitscherlich spoke before an international audience on 
behalf of the German academic youth, who, particularly in relation to their teachers and 
to politics in the university, “find themselves in a doubly unfortunate position.” 
Mitscherlich continued, 
Denn jede Kritik an bestehenden Zuständen, die sie laut werder läßt, wird ihr nur 
zu leicht (aus dem unbewußten, uneingestandenen Schuldgefühl der älteren 
Generation heraus wird der Vorwurf bestärkt) als verwerflich, 
gesellschaftsfeindlich, ausgelegt. Durch die Tatsache des für eine ungerechte 
Sache gerechterweise verlorenen Krieges, in dem wir unsere politische 
Mündigkeit neben der militärischen Gewalt verloren haben, sieht sie sich in eine 
Notlage manöviert, in der sie eigentlich das Schichsal eines Fürsorgezöglings 
erlebt. . . . So ist diese Jugend belastet durch Schicksalsverstrickungen, die fast 
jeder Spielbreite, jeder Zukunftsverlockung genommen haben.18 
 
Mitscherlich’s contemporary judgment reminds us of the importance of Sirinelli’s inside 
view. Here we find a much more direct explanation of that which Mitscherlich later 
called this generation’s “distant relation to politics” and “reluctance to identify” 
(Identifikationsscheu) with intellectual or social ideals.19 Analyzing the generation from 
the inside, that is, by virtue of its self-perceptions and the contesting judgments of its 
 
16 Marburger Hochschulgespräche, 12-15 June 1946. Referate und Diskussionen (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1947). 
17 Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich, Inability to Mourn, 67. 
18 Mitscherlich, “Politische Gesichtspunkte in Forschung und Leben der gegenwärtigen deutschen 
Universität,” in Marburger Hochschulgespräche, 39-40. 
19 Mitscherlich, Inability to Mourn, 218, 221. 
26 
 
                                                
contemporaries broadens the historical focus to the conflicts between generations and to 
the interaction of different groups within a generational moment. It is important to note, 
however, that in the case of the young, intellectuals of 1940s and early 1950s, we possess 
largely only later recollections from memoirs and interviews. Yet to understand the 
background and early intellectual development of this “generation,” we must rely on the 
commentary of the older generations of the 1940s and 1950s, who presumed to speak to 
or to diagnose the problems facing this war-torn and disoriented youth.  
In 1946 Mitscherlich already equated the political skepticism of German youth 
with the trauma of the “loss of the father” and of the leader. However as a young Doktor 
Dozent, who interacted closely with medical students at the University of Heidelberg, he 
provided a more nuanced view than his later social psychoanalysis would allow. Before 
his international audience of distinguished Hochschullehrer, University Rectors, and the 
representatives of the U.S. occupational authority,20 the young Mitscherlich, 
unflinchingly placed particular onus on the role of the teacher before and after 1945 as 
“Vaterfigur”: 
Sie [die Jugend] hat sich, völkersoziologisch gesehen, als asozial erwiesen—
indem sie tat, was man sie lehrte, und hiermit ist die erste prinzipielle 
Konfliktlage im Verhältnis der Generationen nochmals beleuchtet. Sie werden 
 
20 The main representative of the U.S. Military Government, Edward Y. Hartshorne convened the 
Hochschulgespräche in Marburg along with Julius Ebbinghaus, Rector and professor of philosophy. 
Hartshorne was the leading figure for educational and cultural Affairs in the American occupational zone, 
and chiefly oversaw early efforts at the denazification of German academia and the reopening and reform 
of the universities in the U.S. sector until his murder in the late Summer of 1946. On Hartshorne see Steven 
Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), 128-131; on Marburg University and Hartshorne’s contact with 
Julius Ebbinghaus see Remy, 131-132. 
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verstehen, daß das Problem auch dann nicht in der uns interessierenden Seite 
erledigt ist, wenn man dieser Jugend, wie sie es fordert, ‘Generalamnestie’ 
gewährt. Die Skepsis gegen die ältere Generation wird damit nicht aus der Welt 
geräumt. . . . Nichts würde diese jungen Menschen mehr kränken als der Hinweis 
darauf, daß sie gut daran täten, schuldbewußt zu schweigen und sich sachliches 
Wissen anzuneignen, ehe sie es wagen dürften, in politischen Fragen das Wort zu 
nehmen.21 
 
Still, in 1946 Mitscherlich had the hope that young German students would risk taking a 
position on political questions. By 1967, however, the hopes for political renewal through 
the agency of the initial postwar generation were seemingly frustrated by this 
generation’s own unwillingness to assume guilt for the past and their ostensible 
reluctance to lead the way toward national mourning and political renewal. Mitscherlich 
in this way provided the basis for the culpability of this generation, even though his own 
observations beginning in Marburg in 1946 (and indeed his retrospective social 
psychoanalysis of the mid 1960s) suggest a significant burden placed upon this youth by 
the demands of older academics and cultural commentators. As we will see throughout 
this chapter, the notion that this beleaguered youth of 1945 would accept guilt for the past 
and responsibility for the future at a time when everywhere the model promoted by many 
of their academic elders was largely “schuldbewußt zu schweigen,” has been the 
unrealistic expectation of intellectuals and historians with the ‘romantic ideal’ of political 
generations in mind, as Dirk Moses has argued in his recent study of West German 
intellectuals after 1945.22 
 
21 Mitscherlich, “Politische Gesichtspunkte,” 40.  
22 Moses, German Intellectuals, 59-65. 
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Defining Generations 
As an academic group within a generation, philosophers can be related to the 
general question of the politics of the students, the university and the issue of political 
education, but the category of generation, whether intellectual generations or otherwise, 
generally serves to link certain individuals and their personal narratives in retrospect and 
hindsight. Certainly it makes sense to talk of a “war generation” that emerged out of the 
Second World War, but the characteristics that defined these young people of different 
ages as an academic or intellectual youth do not lend themselves to a unified idea of 
generation.  
As Heinz Bude’s influential study of the Deutsche Karrieren23 brought to 
scholars’ attention, those born between circa 1910 and 1930 all had their studies 
disrupted by the Second World War but through vastly divergent levels and intensities of 
military service. Bude insists that the Flakhelfer (Anti-Aircraft Defense Auxiliary) 
cohort—those born roughly between 1926 and 1930—oriented themselves around their 
own experiences in the flack batteries late in the war and also earlier in the Hitler Youth 
and other Nazi organizations. These formative experiences differentiated them from the 
older age groups in military service, and left them with what Rolf Schörken has described 
as a “tenacious residual mentality” of obedience and belief in German’s final victory, 
 
23 Heinz Bude, Deutsche Karrieren: Lebenskonstruktionen sozialer Aufsteiger aus der Flakhelfer-
Generation (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987); Bude builds on the claims made in Rolf 
Schörken’s earlier study, Luftwaffehelfer und Drittes Reich: Die Entstehung eines politischen Bewußtseins 
(Stuttgart: Klett Verlag, 1984).  
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which distanced them from the politics of resignation and reparation after 1945.24 Bude 
argues in a later summary that the Flakhelfer ‘generation’ drew its own lessons from the 
end of the war. Although they experienced the shock of defeat and the end of the Nazi 
order, the only world they had known, the  Flakhelfer were not old enough to understand 
the demand to accept guilt, or the need to make amends.25 Rather, according to Bude’s 
view and others who follow this argument, what was significant for this age group was 
“daß sie Jugendliche waren und insofern bei allem stillen Mitleiden Abstand zum 
Schicksal der älteren Generation wahren konnten.”26  
The retrospective reproach drawn from this argument is that the initial postwar 
generation was a group willing to opportunistically avoid political engagement. However, 
it never occurs to Bude that this distance or reluctance to identify with the fate of the 
defeated could very well be in response to the example provided by the older age-groups 
that were themselves unwilling to take responsibility for defeat and renewal. The older 
figures born earlier than those most active in the war—again between 1910 and 1927—
were all too eager to project tasks of renewal and the necessity of reeducation onto ‘the 
youth,’ who always remained the ‘problem’ or ‘impediment’ to normative ‘westerniztion’ 
and ‘democratization.’ Of course, by the cunning dialectics of generational change, the 
 
24 Rolf Schorken, Jugend 1945: Politisches Denken und Lebensgeschichte (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 
1990), 145-53. 
25 Also the young in 1945 did not possess the memory of the persistant reparations question of the interwar 
period. This was not lost on some commentators after the Second World War: see, for example, “Memento 
reparare,” in Die Gegenwart 2, 21-22 (Nov. 1947): 12. 
26 Bude, Bilanz der Nachfolge: die Bundesrepublik und der Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), 86.  
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youth of 1945 are then later judged in the 1960s for their apparent unwillingness to 
challenge the older generation through denunciation or subversion. We see that even 
more recent attempts like that of Jens Hacke, to capture the self-understanding of a group 
within this generation are very much based on an accepted political identity established a 
posteriori. Hacke’s reconstruction of a “Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit” of the so-called 
“Ritter-Schule”27 is conditioned by the complex ideological polarization of leading 
German intellectuals beginning in the 1970s. It is telling that Hacke judges a figure like 
Jürgen Habermas for the latter’s reluctance to discuss the biographical details of his 
youth under the Nazi Regime until reaching a certain age.28 However, this moratorium on 
speech has not been particular to Habermas—the ‘Ritter-Schüler,’ Odo Marquard and 
Hermann Lübbe certainly produced no autobiographical work prior to the 1990s that 
dealt with their childhood in the Hitlerjugend or as Flakhelfer. Rather this appears as a 
trait common to this intellectual age group that did not really understand itself as a 
political generation until much later. Although we can agree with Hacke that this 
apparently “skeptical generation” in fact “became the first political generation of the 
Bundesrepublik,”29 it undeniably reached its most extreme period of politicization in 
response to the aftermath of 1968 and the so-called “Tendenzwende” of the mid 1970s. 
 
27 Jens Hacke, Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit: die liberalkonservative Begründung der Bundesrepublik 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, GmbH, 2006). 
28 Ibid., 29. Hacke refers, of course, to Habermas’ reluctance to say too much about his youth during the 
Nazi period in an interview with Detlef Horster from 1979. The interview is reprinted in Jürgen Habermas, 
Kleine Politische Schriften I-IV (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981), 511-32. 
29 Hacke, Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit, 35. 
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The expectation that they would begin to speak openly about their youth under the Nazi 
Regime in the politically-charged atmosphere of the early1970s seems a bit unfair. 
Ironically, it was only after the 1970s, when this generation began to break up along 
ideological lines, that it really entered into the fray with other political generations.  
As Dirk Moses has pointed out, the idea of the complicity of the “45ers” in the 
silence after the war is based on an unfair comparison to the environment of public 
discussion of the past, which the “68ers” held as the norm.30 The circumstances of the 
late 1940s and early 1950s were simply very different to those of the late 1960s. Active 
denunciation of teachers and university professors was not an avenue open to young 
students or Hochschüler. More importantly, even if such challenges were possible, they 
would have made no sense if one considers that these same teachers were the only 
conduit these eager young learners had to pre-Nazi cultural, intellectual, and political 
traditions.  
As we shall see, for the youth gifted and fortunate enough to enter university31 
and, specifically for us, to take up philosophical study in the years after the war, the first 
priority was not the opportunistic avoidance of guilt and the shallow focus on mere 
survival—according to the Brechtian “erst kommt das Fressen…” formula incessantly 
reiterated by the 68ers—but the search for good teachers and then perhaps the material 
 
30 Moses, German intellectuals, particularly p.65. 
31 In the late 1940s entering university was not merely a question of merit, but of space and materials. Most 
universities in the West had imposed the numerus clausus policy of restricted admission in response to the 
deluge of students applying for entry and the marked lack of instructors, particularly of young assistants 
and lecturers.  
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means to learn. Furthermore, not merely a micro-group or avant-garde within a 
generation, German postwar philosophy students as a whole lacked the coherence of a 
specific age and, therefore, of similar wartime experience. In the postwar Hochschulen, 
the graduate schools, students of vastly different ages and experiences found themselves 
at the same level and in the same classroom.32 
 
The Expectations for a “Generation” 
Not the least problem of viewing postwar philosophy through the generational 
lens is that contemporaries had quite distinct ideas of what they meant by the term 
generation. The theorists of generation were themselves an older cohort, who had 
developed their ideas in the 1920s in response to the very assertive political generations 
of the Jugendbewegung and what has been called the Front Generation—the generation 
of the First World War. The important theorists of generations and youth in the interwar 
and post-Second-World-War era were Karl Mannheim, who died prematurely in 1947 at 
the age of 54, but whose classic essay, “The Problem of Generations” has remained most 
influential, and Eduard Spranger (1882-1963), professor of philosophy and pedagogy at 
the University of Tübingen after 1945. Both adopted a qualitative approach to 
 
32 Excellent primary source accounts of this phenomenon based on research at the University of Göttingen 
can be found in Waldemar Krönig and Klaus-Dieter Müller, Nachkriegssemester: Studium in Kriegs- und 
Nachkriegszeit (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990), 159-63. 
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generations inspired by Wilhelm Dilthey’s version of Geistegeschichte.33 The 
determining factor, for Spranger and Mannheim, was not demographic details or the 
biological age of individuals and cohorts but the determination of what Mannheim called 
a Generationslagerung, the similar “positioning of a generation” as the potential for 
common experiences; and the Generationszusammenhang, the context, or literally, the 
“hanging-together of a generation.” Regardless of their age, the key (but also the great 
challenge) for the study of generations was the isolation of individuals or groups of 
different ages that were connected by participation in the same social and intellectual 
tendencies or forces (Strömungen) that constituted an historical moment. Dilthey had 
written of a “deep relation” between individuals, who were in the position to have the 
same “directing influences” (leitenden Einwirkungen) in their “impressionable years” 
(Jahren der Empfänglichkeit).34 For Mannheim, the connection created by similar social 
position (Lagerung) and the impressionability of late adolescence were significant 
factors.35 Robert Wohl has also observed that Mannheim at times described generations 
as   objective social formations much like social classes, or, more specifically, as “a 
 
33 The influence of Dilthey’s work on Mannheim study has been noted in Robert Wohl, The Generation of 
1914 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), 74, 257-58n.55. For general contextualization of 
Dilthey’s own use of the generational category in his intellectual histories, see the important study by Hans 
Jaeger, “Generationen in der Geschichte: Überlegungen zu einer umstrittenen Konzeption,” in Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft 3 (1977):432-33.  
34 Wilhelm Dilthey, “Über das Studium der Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der 
Gesellschaft und dem Staat [1875],” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5: 31-73 (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1957), 37. 
35 An assumption that Mannheim took not only from Dilthey but from the extremely influential work of 
Eduard Spranger, Psychologie des Jugendalters (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1924). 
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location in society that did not depend upon the consciousness of its members.”36 
However, Mannheim still insisted that the more significant level of association 
(Verbundenheit) for a generation was the participation of its members as an integrated 
group in common historical circumstances. In this way, the generation posed a broader 
social actuality as strata related by experience, whose connection could transcend class 
belonging. In a further refinement of the concept, Mannheim observed that there could 
exist differentiated groups within a Generationszusammenhang that displayed “more 
concrete” connection and unity. These Generationseinheiten (generational unities) could 
form their own distinct means of working through the experiences common to the rest of 
the generation, in much the same way that a social class distinguishes itself from others.37 
However, as Wohl has observed, “the generational mode of interpreting and organizing 
social reality was not merely like that of class; it was an alternative to it.”38 As we will 
see later, particularly in Helmut Schelsky’s stylization of the so-called “skeptical 
generation,” the generational idea could potentially be employed as a powerful 
competitor to the notion of class and of class struggle.  
Leaving aside for a moment later political appropriations of the concept of 
generation, for Mannheim and many of those thinkers of the 1920s, the appeal of 
constructing social reality in terms of generational tensions was the ability to provide an 
intellectual orientation that would transcend class interest and the crass competition of 
 
36 Wohl, Generation of 1914, 76. 
37 Mannheim, Wissenssoziologie, 543-44. 
38 Wohl, Generation of 1914, 82. 
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political parties in the chaotic atmosphere of Weimar politics. This falls in line with 
Mannheim’s famous notion, borrowed from Alfred Weber, of the “free-floating 
intelligentsia” (Die freischwebende Intelligenz).39 More than a “relatively classless 
stratum,” a generation, particularly a young generation, could form within it concrete 
bonds between different social strata around common lived experience such as 
educational background. Still, even in the case of an intellectual elite, the sociologist was 
bound to view them as part of a Generationszusammenhang, which meant historicizing 
the generational strata from their own perspective and experience as well as 
understanding the internal polarities that can form between divergent generational 
unities.40 Unsurprisingly, in the studies of Mannheim and Eduard Spranger the internal, 
sometimes competing generational unities almost always took the form of intellectual or 
cultural elites that carried with them the expectation of political engagement or cultural 
subversion, particularly in times of social upheaval like the early 1930s.41 
The qualitative emphasis on experience notwithstanding, Mannheim certainly did 
not overlook the fact that vastly different social groups lived at the same (objective) time. 
Mannheim in particular, but also Spranger, maintained a highly complex notion of time 
 
39 See Karl Mannheim, Ideologie and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, trans. Louis 
Wirth and Edward Shils (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt, Inc., 1952), 155; in this translation 
“freischwebende Intelligenz” is rendered as “socially unattached intelligentsia,” which is misleading since 
the intellectuals, for Mannheim, though able to form bonds based on education and training that may 
transcend class interest, still belong to social classes, Cf. Mannheim, “The Sociology of Intellectuals 
[1932],” trans. Dick Pels in Theory, Culture & Society 10, no. 3 (Aug. 1993): 75-76.  
40 Mannheim, Wissenssoziologie, 544. 
41 Hence Mannheim’s call to intellectuals in 1932 to take the lead in the current crisis, not as functionaries 
of a political party but as self-conscious, independent participants “who wield the capacity for sociological 
reorientation” (Mannheim, “Sociology of Intellectuals,” 80).  
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and of modern time in particular, what was commonly referred to by various Weimar 
intellectuals and scholars as the Ungleichzeitigkeit der Gleichzeitigen.42 Different 
generations lived in the same objective time but in quite different ‘subjective’ times. Put 
simply, “the times” mean different things and have different significances for different 
generations, creating in most cases great conflict over the importance of experiences and 
events. Moreover, Mannheim emphasized that “generations are in a state of constant 
interaction.”43 As a primary example for this interaction that is very relevant for our 
purposes here, Mannheim offers the example of the reciprocal relationship between 
teacher and pupil. This relationship, as will be seen, is crucial to understanding the 
generational situation of postwar German philosophy students and their instructors.  
 As both a pedagogue and a philosopher, Eduard Spranger centered his post-1945 
studies of generations on the academic youth: what he called the “studierende 
Generation.” Perhaps in excessive employment of the category, Spranger counted no less 
than five youth generations between 1900 and 1949:44  firstly, a “pre-[First World] war 
generation,” comprised of those who were already in the Hochschulen around 1900; 
secondly, a generation of particular importance to Spranger and to which he thought he 
himself belonged—the “actual [eigentliche] Jugendbewegung.”45 For Spranger and many 
 
42 Most notably in the work of art historian Wilhelm Pindar, Das Problem der Generationen in der 
Kustgeschichte Europas (Berlin, 1926). Add Ernst Bloch… 
43 Mannheim, Wissenssoziologie, 541. 
44 Eduard Spranger, “Fünf Jugendgenerationen, 1900-1949,” in Pädagogische Perspektiven: Beiträge zu 
Erziehungsfragen der Gegenwart, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1952), 25-57. 
45 Ibid., 29-30. Below, I will use some license in translating the term “eigentlich” to help evoke the multiple 
meanings Spranger has in mind. 
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others this was the generation to which the succeeding generations, especially the 
Nachkriegsgeneration of 1945, would be compared.46 Spranger favorably describes the 
“real Jugendbewegung” as a vital cultural movement leading into the First World War, 
which had the crucial characteristics of being simultaneously unpolitical, non-
conformist—calling for “kein Programm”—and highly creative. This “authentic youth 
movement” was motivated by the “spirit of free self-determination of the personality 
[Selbstbesinnung der Persönlichkeit] coming from German idealism.”47 Spranger was 
keen to distinguish this culturally oriented and non-conformist youth from the rise of the 
“bündische Generation”48 which marked the politicization and the militarization of the 
Jugendbewegung by the experiences of war, defeat, and new sense of belonging 
discovered in politically-charged youth associations.49 Fourth came the National 
Socialists, or the “Jugendgruppen der Partei,” themselves divided into three age groups: 
the Jungvolk, the Hitlerjugend, and the SS-Männer.50 Lastly, came the 
Nachkriegsgeneration, who had to study under the “tragic situation” of 1946-49. 
Although Spranger favorably depicts the post-1945 youth as “the most serious and best” 
in relation to their studies and “zeal to learn,” he laments their political reserve or 
 
46 To cite just three important examples from the work of sociologists and pedagogues, who follow 
Spranger’s comparison, see Theodor Litt, Das Verhältnis der Generationen ehedem und Heute (Wiesbaden, 
1947); Hermann Nohl, “Die geistige Lage im gegenwärtigen Deutschland,” in Die Sammlung 2 (1947):601-
606; and Georg Weippert, “Zur Soziologie der Jugend,” in Studium Generale 4, no. 10 (Dec. 1951):610-20.  
47 Spranger, “Fünf Generationen,” 32. 
48 Bündische Generation is not easily translated. It is meant to evoke the tendency of, particularly the male, 
youth after 1918 to seek security and meaning in associations and groups outside the family, which could 
be purely recreational, but mainly political and paramilitary in nature. 
49 Spranger, “Fünf Generationen,” 38f. 
50 Ibid., 47-49. 
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“Zurückhaltung” and their understandable but sometimes stubborn refusal to take up 
clear intellectual positions.51 Earlier generations, for Spranger, especially his somewhat 
mythologized “eigentliche Jugendbewegung,” formed crucial alternatives that governed 
the representation of postwar German students and their apparent philosophical-political 
outlook. Here one needs to emphasize the additional character of generations as 
discursive constructions. After 1945, Spranger and others are making observations in the 
first instance, not as sociologists of generations or of the youth, but as cultural 
commentators, who judge the youth by means of retrospective, dramatized myths and the 
sedimented characteristics that have come to embellish the image of previous 
generations. These then become the didactic examples by which older figures attempt to 
diagnose and to influence the new youth culture.  
 
Rearming the Youth with Ideas 
Spranger published several articles at the end of the war that openly discussed the 
National Socialist past. He often sought to deflect accusations that initial support for the 
National Socialists came from the universities, particularly from the ranks of the 
Hochschüler and their teachers. Moreover, although a “fanaticization of the academic 
youth” through National Socialist propaganda and suggestion did succeed in the 1930s, 
Spranger insisted that it failed to produce a youth ideology that outlasted the Third 
 
51 Ibid., 54-55. 
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Reich.52 The outlook of the postwar academic youth reflected the diffidence and loss of 
faith of all those who survived the collapse.  
Man hat wenig ungebrochenes Vertrauen zu den Lenkern der öffentlichen 
Angelegenheiten. Man ist mißtraurisch und verschlossen, sieht sich einer Lage 
gegenüber, die niemand meistern zu können scheint. Daher ein grundsätzlicher 
Rückzug in sich selbst und eine abwartende Haltung. Am wenigsten spricht man 
auf irgend eine Form von Pathos als Alle hohen Werte und Worte sind für lange 
Zeit verbraucht. Was übrig bleibt, ist eine verschwiegene, manchmal stark 
arbeitende Innerlichkeit, oder die Sorge für den eigenen Weg und den engsten 
Kreis.53 
 
For all the potential desirability of the political reserve and political sobriety of the 
postwar generation, Spranger found it astonishing that the youth’s “need for pleasure 
[Genußsucht] had not embraced the intemperate forms” as they had done so 
spontaneously after the First World War.54 He admitted that he missed the spiritual and 
intellectual initiative that prevailed after 1918. Spranger could not engage the youth in 
1945 as he could in the 1920s: 
Wenn ich meine Eindrücke mit ähnlichen Aussprachen nach dem ersten 
Weltkriege vergleiche, so fällt stark ins Auge, daß nichts mehr von der 
romantischen Verträumheit und den haltlosen Utopien der damaligen Generation 
zu spüren ist. Ein großer Ernst ist jetzt der Grundton.55 
 
What the former member of the “eigentliche Jugendbewegung” found missing in the 
West German youth was an ideology. “An ideology,” Spranger insisted, “is comparable 
 
52 E. Spranger, “Gibt es heute in Westdeutschland eine Jugendideologie?” in Kulturfragen der Gegenwart 
(Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1953), 75. 
53 Ibid., 79. 
54 Ibid., 79. 
55 Ibid., 83. 
40 
 
                                                
to an armament [Rüstung], in the domain of ideas.”56 He meant not a political ideology as 
such, but a renewed cultural morality (Sittlichkeit) and intellectual movement that would 
absorb and even constructively channel some of the natural tendencies of the post-1945 
youth to retreat into Innerlichkeit: “Es wäre zugleich die Art, die der Deutsche, der 
überhaupt geistig lebt, sich seit Alter Zeit einzustellen pflegt.”57 
In a move common to the resurgent ‘humanism’ of the time, Spranger gestured 
back to the legacy of German idealism; to the people of “Dichter und Denker” and to the 
cosmopolitan culture of Weimar and above all Goethe, albeit infused with the modern 
dynamic cultural activism of the Jugendbewegung. Such sentiments were echoed in 
postwar serial publications such as the Göttingen-based journal, Die Sammlung, edited by 
Spranger’s close colleagues, the leading voices of German pedagogy, Herman Nohl, 
Wilhelm Flitner, Erich Weniger, and Nohl’s former student, the philosopher, Otto 
Friedrich Bollnow. In Nohl’s short “Gleitwort” to the first volume, we learn the meaning 
of the journal’s title, Die Sammlung: it was the “summoning” of a renewed cultural 
strength poised towards the future; it was a trust in “the nonviolent power of the spirit” 
(die gewaltlose Macht des Geistes) for the “rebuilding of the German people.”  Spranger 
echoed this sentiment in an article titled after Goethe’s famous call “Stirb und Werde!”58 
 
56 Ibid., 85. 
57 Ibid., 86. 
58 Spranger, “Stirb und Werde,” in Die Sammlung 1, no. 4  (1945-46):389-94. See also Jost Hermand’s 
discussion of the journal and its commonality with the postwar humanistic pathos in Kultur im 
Wiederaufbau: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-1965 (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlaghandlung 
Gmbh., 1986), 72-73. 
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in which he evoked the “old truth” (alte Wahre) of “simple morality,” or “einfache 
Sittlichkeit” to which Bollnow devoted a four-part essay in the journal’s first volume.  
We will discuss how these gestures to classical German culture had limited 
resonance with the postwar youth below. For the moment, it is enough to observe how 
such cultural and intellectual sentiments carried with them high expectations for the 
youth of the postwar period. First, there are the incessant comparisons to the culturally 
aware generations before and after the First World War. To be sure, these comparisons 
did not always favor the post-1918 youth. Herman Nohl, for example, derisively 
characterized the young agitators of 1918 as “loud little Rousseaus.” In the post-1945 
youth, however, Nohl observed that “Bei aller Skepsis gegen die großen Worte und laute 
Propaganda, gegen die Theorien der Konfessionen jeder Art, ist ein ganz sicheres Gefühl 
da für die einfache Sittlichkeit, die elementare Tugend der Wahrhaftigkeit, Gerechtigkeit 
und Treue, eine tiefe Verehrung des Geistigen und der Schönheit und eine dogmenlose 
Frömmigkeit, die das Ewige sucht.”59 Indeed, despite their lack of knowledge, culture, 
and direction, in the minds and glowing eulogies of their elders, the postwar youth had 
“spirit” and could bear the burden of Germany’s cultural renewal. Thus in the late 1940s, 
we already see older figures attempting to engage and provoke the postwar youth into a 
generational consciousness—an owning up to its potential, its own “ideology.” Of course, 
this call coming from the older generation could also be deeply problematic for the youth 
themselves. Above all the formation of an “ideology” for a new generation was hindered 
 
59 Herman Nohl, “Die geistige Lage im gegenwärtigen Deutschland,” 604. 
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by the censorship of the older generation, which spoke in clichés and catchphrases that 
provided only superficial and sometimes inane representations of German intellectual 
traditions. It was one thing to laud the youth as the inheritors of these new ideological 
components and to call them “the future” in the cultural pages of the quality press and 
Feuilletons. Yet students were faced with a different reality as they entered the ill-
equipped, understaffed postwar universities and pursued academic disciplines, where 
there remained a traditional habitus that imposed limits on what was possible.60 In 
Germany the restrictions governing behavior were compounded by the unthematized 
codes of silence about the past. In spite of all the talk of new academic freedom and the 
youth’s “productive intellectual strength,” it was farfetched to expect the young students 
and Hochschüler of the 1940s to assume responsibility in the manner their teachers set 
forth and to find the energy to assume the role of the intellectual elite of their generation. 
The postwar generation often simply lacked the resources—information, intellectual role 
models, material means, and the ability to navigate the unthematized practices of 
academic life—to answer this call. 
 
 
60 Pierre Bourdieu has also pointed to how structures of the habitus can influence and restrict the range of 
experience of a generation. Generation conflicts, in this way, can also be caused by “different modes of 
generation” in the early formation of a generational cohort which then directs its “perception and 
appreciation of all subsequent experience.” Although Bourdieu tends to discount the possible polarities at 
play within a generation (Mannheim’s Generationseinheiten), the conflict between generations, particularly 
in institutional frameworks like the university, is also a result of “conditions of existence which, in 
imposing different definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the probable, cause one group to 
experience as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable or 
scandalous, and vice versa” (Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977], 78).   
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A Lost Gerneration? And the Question of Silence 
One is often too quick to interpret the silence of the postwar youth as 
complacency or indifference. The German word schweigen is a verb, and it implies an 
action. Those who had compromised themselves with the defunct dictatorship, whether 
“echte Nazis,” “Mitläufer,” “inner émigrés,” etc., were certainly deeply aware of this 
complexity as they filled in the “Fragebogen,” or political questionnaire required by the 
Occupational Authorities, where they selectively recounted their recent actions and 
inactions under the dictatorship. Actively remaining silent could have been the 
understandable response of the youth to the silence of the older generation from whom 
they expected more explanation. Hans Werner Richter pointed out in a famous article in 
Der Ruf: Unabhängige Blätter der Jungen Generation (“the independent pages of the 
young generation”) that the postwar silence of the young must be understood in the 
context of the 12-year silence of the older generation. It is thus not surprising that the call 
to political engagement or political education would be met with a pregnant silence that 
betrayed a degree of mistrust and even confusion: 
Sie schweigt aus dem sicheren Gefühl heraus, daß die Diskrepanz 
zwischen der bedrohten menschlichen Existenz und der geruhsammen 
Problematik jener älteren Generation, die aus ihrem olympischen 
Schweigen nach zwölf Jahren heraustrat, zu groß ist, um überbrückbar zu 
sein.61 
 
 
61 [Hans Werner Richter], “Warum Schweigt die junge Generation,” in Der Ruf: unabhängige Blätter der 
jungen Generation 1, no.2 (Sept. 1946): 1. 
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Neither evasive nor conformist, Richter went on, “Sie [die junge Generation] schweigt, 
weil sie mit den Begriffen und Problemen, die heute an sie herangetragen werden, nichts 
anzufangen weiß; sie schweigt, weil sie die Diskrepanz zwischen dem geschriebenen 
Wort und dem erlebten Leben zu stark empfindet.”62 In this conflict between generations 
over silence and speaking about the past, taking the older generation to task for their 
actions or inaction was restricted to a few critical journals and figures. The eminent Swiss 
theologian Karl Barth questioned the widespread assertion that the postwar youth was a 
“lost generation” due to their indoctrination with National Socialist ideology in the Hitler 
Youth and their army experience. In a speech before the student body in Bonn, 
republished in the Göttinger Universitäts-Zeitung—a journal edited by students and 
young Dozenten—Barth argued that the possible political unreliability of the students and 
their mistrust of the occupation was only part of the danger facing them. He was one of 
the few to discuss the issue of the trustworthiness of the older figures, whom the students 
would confront as their teachers and professors. For Barth, there were too many 
professors who, if they had not actively conspired with National Socialism, stood by or 
even welcomed the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. Certainly there were “honorable 
exceptions” among the German professoriate. But there were too many others, Barth 
warned,  
keine Bösewichte, keine Nazis, nur unverbesserliches Nationalisten in der Art 
derer, die das zum ersten Mal frei gewordene Deutschland 1918-1933 dem neuen 
Verderben entgegengeführt, es schließlich ans Schlachtmesser geliefert … Es ist 
 
62 Ibid., 2. 
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fatal, daß so viele deutsche Studenten dem Unterricht, der Erziehung, dem 
Vorbild gerade dieses Professoren-typus ausgeliefert sind. In dieser Schule 
werden sie keine freien Männer werden.”63 
 
However, few commentators were as candid as Barth in their judgment of the older 
generation. 
Certainly, between 1945 and 1949 there was a relatively frank discussion about 
the Nazi past in journals such as Frankfurter Hefte, Die Wandlung, Der Monat or Die 
Gegenwart. However, the political discourse of these journals was largely influenced by 
two elements. First, the editors of and contributers to these journals were of a 
considerable age and, therefore, had vastly different experiences from the youth. Second, 
these journals were subject to the politics of the occupational authority in each respective 
zone. None of this was lost on the German students. Niclaus Sombart, a contributor after 
1947 to Der Ruf, recalled that, despite his respect for publications like Die Wandlung and 
its editors, Dolf Sternberger (1907-1989), Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), and Alfred Weber 
(1868-1958), the journal did not inspire his generation: 
Die Wandlung [war] nicht meine Sache, nicht die Sache meiner Generation. Sie 
beurteilte die ‘geistige Situation’ der Zeit mit den Kriterien der Vergangenheit 
und setzte ein Wissen um diese Vergangenheit voraus. Sie war nicht für junge 
Leser gemacht, die von dieser Vergangenheit nichts wussten, für die Worte wie 
Schuld, Republik, Freiheit, Humanität inhaltlos waren, mit nichts aus ihrem 
eigenen Erfahrungsschatz in Verbindung zu bringen.64 
 
 
63 Karl Barth, “Verlorene Generation?” in Göttinger Universitäts-Zeitung 2, no. 12 (May 1947): 2.  
64 Niclaus Sombart, Rendezvous mit dem Weltgeist: Heidelberger Reminisenzenzen (Frankfurt am Main: S. 
Fischer Verlag, 2000), 122. 
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Indeed, such key words like “humanity,” “Humanism,” “Europe,” “Guilt,” “Spirit,” 
“Character,” and one should add the somewhat untranslatable “Sittlichkeit” as well as 
combinations in catch phrases like “European Spirit,” “Universal Guilt,” or “Spirit of 
humanity” were ubiquitously present in the cultural journals of the older generation. 
However, as Anson Rabinbach and other historians have observed, this rhetoric, though 
sometimes well-meaning, was caught up in the identity politics of older generations and 
especially in their own internal disputes about pre-Nazi intellectual and cultural 
traditions.65 When these aging intellectuals attempted to invoke this language in their 
exhortations of youth and its new “mission,” the words could ring hollow and appear 
quite superficial to German students, particularly when the truly intellectually gifted and 
culturally-aware among them wanted content, learning material, books, as opposed to 
confusing rhetoric. 
“A lost generation?” A “silent generation?”—perhaps it is Richter’s notion of the 
“Olympian silence” of their elders that was the true cause of the youth’s reluctance to 
identify with the political comportment of the older generation. However, Sombart may 
ultimately be closer to explaining the sensibilities of the postwar youth. For the incessant 
recapitulation of past imagery and the recitation of the Modewörter of the day in the 
pages of cultural journals and magazines, limited by the political restrictions, incipient 
 
65 See Anson Rabinbach, “Restoring the German Spirit: Humanism and Guilt in Postwar Germany,” in Jan-
Werner Müller, ed., German Ideologies since 1945: Studies in the Political Thought and Culture of the 
Bonn Republic (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 29-33.   
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Cold-War strategy, and the selective funding of the occupational powers,66 could be just 
as much a cause for the apparent silence of the youth.  Nicolaus Sombart (1923-2008), 
student of Alfred Weber in Heidelberg and the independently wealthy son of the 
sociologist Werner Sombart, had planned his own journal entitled, “Verlorene 
Generation” that was to appeal to the “intellectual sensibilities of the Generation between 
twenty and thirty years old,” the cohort to which he himself belonged.  Although we find 
even in Sombart’s reminiscences of the goals of his failed journal some similar appeals to 
a youth emancipated from the past and directed towards the future, he seemed to grasp 
better the hunger of this disinherited youth for a new relation to the intellectual past and 
the newly opened culture: 
In meiner Zeitschrift wollte ich weniger zu der Jugend sprechen als auf sie hören. 
Horchen auf die Befindlichkeiten, die ‘neu’, die anders, die bewerkenswert waren. 
Dass sie vorhanden waren, sezte ich voraus. Der Blick durfte nicht in die 
Vergangenheit, sondern musste in die Zukunft gerichtet werden. Die Jungen 
hatten ihr Leben vor sich, aber sie waren so tief gefallen, ohne eigenes 
Verschulden, dass etwas geschehen musste, sie aufzurichten. Sie brauchten 
Ermunterung, Perspektiven, Hoffnung. Sie waren gehungert, sie bauchten 
Nahrung.”67 
 
The meditation on the gap between the older generations and the youth was a 
central preoccupation among professors concerned with postwar education. Authors 
 
66 On the role of U.S. cultural agents, such as Shepard Stone, the Office of War Information, the Congress 
of Cultural Freedom, and the OSS, see Volker Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in 
Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 35-36. On U.S. influence over Der Monat in particular, which became affectionately named 
“Die CIA Zeitschrift,” see Ibid., 215-18. The Munich-based Der Ruf, edited by Alfred Andersch and H.W. 
Richter had its license revoked in 1947 after its 17th issue by the U.S. Occupational Authority.   
67 Sombart, Rendezvous mit dem Weltgeist, 123-24. 
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writing in Die Wandlung often self-consciously noted this Ungleichzeitigkeit. Peter 
Heinrich von Blankenhagen, although drawing on a common trope in “Der falsche 
Charakter,” admitted that there was a difficult gap between the experience of the older 
generation of university teachers—those who had reached adulthood before 1933 and in 
1945 were able to view the Nazi past as a parenthesis—and that of their students. 68 He 
hoped this gap could be overcome through clarity on the part of the elders, who he 
thought ran the danger of forgetting not the Nazi past but the situation of the young: 
Die ältere Generation erliegt praktisch der Gefahr zu vergessen, daß wer 
heute zwischen 20 und 30 Jahre alt ist, in einer Zeit aufwuchs, die es nur 
in Ausnahmefälle erlaubte, etwas anderes zu sehen, zu hören und zu lesen 
als was in das “Weltbild” des Nationalsozialismus paßte.69 
 
Nevertheless, von Blankenhagen’s concern remained focused on the effects of the Third 
Reich and the war on the Heimkehrer, not the complicity of the old generation. He 
indicates this fear summarily when he states, “Fast jeder Student von heute hält es für 
absurd und empörend, wo nicht für verbrecherisch zu meinen, gerade der Patriot habe 
den Sieg Deutschlands fürchten, seine Niederlage wünschen müssen.”70 The youth 
lacked the “true character” informed by “humanity” and a “humanistic image of man” 
because such values had been relativized by the National Socialist regime, and could not 
 
68 P[eter] H[einrich] von Blanckenhagen, “Der falsche Charakter: zur politischen Haltung der studierenden 
Jugend,” in Die Wandlung 1, no. 5 (1946): 377-83. 
69 von Blanckenhagen, “Der falsche Charakter,” 377. 
70 Ibid., 379. 
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truly be reintroduced by the occupational forces so long as ‘western’ influences were 
seen simply as another competing ideology imposed by their conquerors.71  
Not everyone judged the youth quite so narrowly. Other authors identified a crisis 
of trust, but better captured the complexity and nuances of inter-generational conflict. 
Writing in the Frankfurter Hefte, Hans-Peter Berglar-Schröer noted that mistrust in the 
postwar era did not necessarily correspond to a trusting comportment to the defunct Nazi 
regime. As he put it in his article, “Die Vertrauenskrise der Jugend,”  
An dieser Stelle muß etwas über das Mißtrauen gesagt werden. Auch das 
Mißtrauen ist kein Denkergebnis, sondern eine Gefühlsregung. Es kann 
sich ebenso täuschen und ebenso getäuscht werden wie das Vertrauen. 
Fehlendes Vertrauen ist noch kein Mißtrauen und umgekehrt, fehlendes 
Mißtrauen noch kein Vertrauen. Beides sind aktive Haltungen. Die breite 
Masse der Jugendlichen, die dem Dritten Reiche nicht vertraut hat, 
mißtraut auch heute nicht dem ‘Vierten.’ Die Mißtrauischen von heute 
setzen sich aus einem Teil der Vertrauenden von gestern und aus denen 
zusammen, die schon gegen das Hitlerreich mißtrausich waren.72 
 
Berglar-Schröer thus warned the older generation not to misinterpret the mistrust of the 
younger generation; for this would only exacerbate a “crisis of trust” which threatened to 
make any influence on the young impossible. The context of generational 
misunderstanding required patience on the part of the elders; yet only the young 
themselves could resolve the problem of mistrust: “Der Junge aber muß erst das Geleise 
finden, in dem er sich fortbewegen kann, er muß die Impulse erst empfangen, die ihn 
dann wie Raketen in seine Bahn hineinschießen und in ihr kreisen lassen sollen. Aus 
 
71 Ibid., 382-83. 
72 Hans-Peter Berglar-Schöer, “Die Vertrauenskrise der Jungend,” in  Frankfurter Hefte 2, no. 7 (1947): 
695. 
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diesem Grunde ist der Verlust jeglichen Vertrauens, aus dem eine Leere oder ein aktives 
Mißtrauen hervorgehen, in ganz besonderer Weise ein Problem der Jugend.”73 Clearly, 
the expectation is placed on the young to find the new “track” (Geleise) that would lead 
towards orientation and trust; however, again, very little is said about the role of the older 
figures, who were still active and influential in the university and wider culture and thus 
bore the clear responsibility to set this youth on the right track. 
Of course, this discrepancy was not lost on some youthful commentators. Writers 
in the journals edited by students, Hochschüler, and Dozenten did not always accept this 
tactic of buck-passing present in most of the older generation’s conceptualizations of the 
postwar generational problem. As one student wrote in the Hamburger Akademische 
Rundschau:  
Über wenig Dinge ist man sich heute so einig wie darüber, daß das Neue 
nur von der Jugend kommen könne. Plausibel wie die Behauptung auf den 
ersten Blick erscheint, ist sie gefährlich in ihrer Verschwommenheit und 
Voreiligkeit. Handelte es sich schon beim Nationalsozialismus weitgehend 
um die Kapitulation einer Generation vor ihren Kindern, so scheint sich 
heute das gleiche Spiel zu wiederholen.74 
 
In some respects, then, this commentator perspicaciously perceived a continuity between 
the cult of youth and spirit of the Hitlerjugend and BDM during the Nazi period and the 
way in which the old after 1945 symbolically ceded responsibility for the future to the 
youth. After 1945, however, it was no longer the National Socialist youth organizations 
 
73 Ibid., 699. 
74 Hans Joachim Lang, “Zum Generationsproblem,” in Hamburger Akademische Rundschau 1, no. 1 (1946-
1947):38. 
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enticing the youth away from parental authority. All too ready to avoid confronting their 
own complicity in the past indoctrination of their children, the compromised elders 
simply passed responsibility onto the youth to find their way out and, indeed, the way for 
all of Germany into the future:  
Eine Generation, gegen die die Geschichte scheinbar entschieden hatte, 
gab sich auf zugunsten einer sieghaft-frechen Jugend, die den Stein der 
Weisen nicht erst gefunden, sondern schon wieder vergessen hatte. Die 
Götter dieser Jugend haben sich als Götzen erwiesen. Ihre Ideale sind 
zerbrochen. In bedauerlicher Verwechslung von Wünschbarkeit und 
Wirklichkeit wird dieses Chaos ziemlich leichtfertig dem Chaos vor der 
Schöpfung gleichgestellt. Etwas Neues würde kommen, es würde von der 
Jugend kommen, und es würde das Gute sein. Es handelt sich nur darum, 
diskret Platz zu machen.75 
 
This contemporary analysis gives some credence to Mitscherlich’s notion of a continuity 
in the “absence of the father” both during the Nazi period and after its collapse. As 
Mitscherlich himself wrote in 1947, this was a “Jugend ohne Bilder,” one that had to 
overcome the experience of “cynicism towards all forms of authority” (Vaterbilder).76 
Although Mitscherlich too echoed the common sentiment that this was a youth for which 
“nothing was . . . more suspicious than ideas,” it remained a youth in need of form 
 
75 Ibid., 38. 
76 Mitscherlich, “Jugend Ohne Bilder,” Du 7, no. 4 (1947), 40. Mitscherlich famously introduced the notion 
of “Vaterlosigkeit” into the discussion of collective, social psychology in his Auf dem Weg zur vaterlosen 
Gesellschaft: Ideen  zur Sozialpsychologie (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1965), though, as in the case of the 
Inability to Mourn, the prescriptive potential and relevance of Mitscherlich’s work for the youth seemed to 
decrease due to a concern to propound a general social-psychological model, which gave little in the way of 
orientation. 
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(Bild).77 For this Mitscherlich demanded a change on the part of their elders: “Man muß 
die Jugend anders ansprechen, anders bilden!”78 
The most astute commentators were more honest about the inability of the youth 
to traverse this path alone, without the guidance and the trust of their teachers. The 
émigré jurist, Fritz Pringsheim, then Oxford professor of Law,79 reported on the “German 
students” in the Neue Züricher Zeitung. Interestingly, the article was reprinted in the 
Hamburger Akademische Rundschau, the student journal of Hamburg University.80 
Pringsheim was perhaps reminding the professors as much as the students when he 
insisted that German university students were “as diligent as ever” and that their desire 
for guidance was unmistakable.81 Though he noted the difficulty of traversing “the desert 
which Nazism achieved,” Pringsheim affirmed that 
 der Boden zeigt sich bereits, auf dem nüchterne, geduldige und harte 
Erziehungsarbeit geleistet werden kann. Die Studenten sind nicht mehr so 
leicht verführbar. Wenn man ihnen keine einzige Entscheidung abnimmt, 
sie überall auf ihr eigenes Denken zurückweist, niemals bloße Autorität 
sprechen läßt, überall Selbständigkeit pflegt, sind sie nach anfänglicher 
Scheu dankbar und bereit.82  
 
 
77 The play here on the German term Bild is lost in English. Mitscherlich uses the notion of the youth’s 
“Bildlosigkeit” in the sense of a “lack of form,” or absence of guiding models, which is clear if we keep in 
mind that the verb bilden means “to form” and “to cultivate.”  
78 Mitscherlich, “Jugend ohne Bilder,” 40. 
79 See Tony Honiré, “Fritz Pringsheim (188-1967),” in Jurists Uprooted: German-Speaking Emigré 
Lawyers in Twentieth-Century Britain  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 205-232. 
80 Fritz Pringsheim, “Über deutsche Studeneten,” reprinted  in Hamburger Akademische Rundschau 2, no. 3 
(1947-1948): 108-112. 
81 Ibid., 108. 
82 Pringsheim, “Über deutsche Studenten,” 109. 
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As we will see, instructors in philosophy and the humanities often lauded the qualities of 
their first postwar students, who overcame material dearth, hunger, and homelessness to 
ardently pursue their education. Pringsheim also observed the unavoidable and 
unfortunate problem that the relationship between professors and students could no 
longer simply be mediated through younger assistants and Dozenten, for, as he points out, 
“this entire generation is lacking.”83 He pointed to the millions of war dead and prisoners 
of war comprising the missing generation that might otherwise have mediated between 
the professors and students. Like the other commentators, Pringsheim noted how the gap 
between the professors and the new generation threatened to become dangerously great. 
Yet instead of burdening the youth with the future, like Blankenhagen, Berglar-Schröer, 
and others we have encountered, Pringsheim placed the onus on the professors, the only 
ones in a position to “build an abiding bridge from the past into the future.”84 Of course, 
it is unclear if émigré commentators like Pringsheim and Karl Barth, or, for that matter, 
the older professors to whom they addressed the call knew what this bridge to the future 
should be or how it might be built. For they were dealing with a youth that to a large 
extent was not only exhausted from the war, but fearful and resentful of the occupation. 
However, Pringsheim was certain that these students by virtue of their experience were 
“no longer so easily seducible [verführbar]”;85 this meant they would be harder to 
 
83 Ibid., 110. 
84 Ibid., 110. 
85 Pringsheim, “Über deutsche Studenten,” 109. 
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convince, but given the proper example, with patience and frank communication, their 
professors could instill in them a more lasting form of trust and democratic sensibility.86 
 
In Search of Lost Time 
The majority of German students entering university after 1945 had taken part in 
the war in some capacity. For these students, the political discussion of collective guilt 
and the Nazi past missed the important point about the immediate circumstances under 
which they had to study. Whether they had been fanatical Nazis or not, most did not want 
to hear about their complicity in the crimes of a murderous regime, or that what they had 
suffered in the war was for naught. More urgently for them, depending on their age 
group, was to cope with the fact of the loss of their years of study. They began their 
university experience in search of lost time. Iring Fetcher (b. 1922), a student of Euard 
Spranger at Tübingen, recalled that the student resistance to party politics or the aims of 
the occupational powers had very clear grounds: “Viele Studierende waren 
kriegsversehrt; fast alle hatten Jahre ihres Lebens als Soldaten verbracht und kamen nun 
– viel zu alt – erst zum Studium. Es fiel ihnen schwer, zugeben zu müssen, daß diese 
Jahre im Dienst an einem verbrecherischen Regime verloren waren.”87 Commentators in 
cultural journals at the time noted the same feeling of lost years of study and the inability 
to cope with this trauma. Indeed, not only had the war years been lost to these students, 
 
86 Ibid., 110-112. 
87 Iring Fetscher, Neugier und Furcht: Versuch, mein Leben zu verstehen (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 
Verlag, 1995), 324. 
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but they now were forced to deal with the realization of their inferior, incomplete, and 
sporadic education under the Nazi regime in the 1930s. As we have learned from the 
studies of Heinz Bude and Rolf Schörken, it was a trauma experienced in different ways 
by a broad range of age groups, those born between roughly 1910 and 1930. This causes 
a problem in how we conceptualize a so-called “45er generation.” The fact that it was not 
so much an experience but a non-experience of lost time makes it difficult to understand 
this generation in terms of Mannheim’s idea of a generation’s Zusammenhang. There was 
no real solidarity characterized by “a participation in common destinies.”88 That they 
were students of vastly different ages meant not only different intensities of actual war 
experience, but also divergent levels of intellectual disorientation, stemming from the 
point at which their studies were interrupted, or their level of awareness at the time that 
they were being deprived of a full education.  
The idea of lost years circulated after the war, but in most cases in reference to 
older generations. In the first volume of the important postwar journal Die Gegenwart 
appeared an article that defined the “generation problem” around the issue of stolen 
years—“Die gestohlenen Jahren.”89 Yet the article did not consider the “stolen years” of 
the young generation but of those born just prior to the First World War, which the author 
dubs the “generation of 1907.” Alongside this trauma of lost years, commentators 
 
88 Mannheim, Wissenssoziologie, 542. 
89 R[obert] H[aerdter], “Die gestohlenen Jahren,” in Die Gegenwart 1, nos. 6-7 (March 1946):14-15. 
Haerdter follows the experiences of a “Generation von 1907” through the experiences of loss from 1918 to 
1945. 
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frequently testified to the more final nature of the defeat in 1945 as a source of 
generational misunderstanding. At the end of the First World War, returning soldiers 
could maintain some idea of Germany as a victim, of a stolen victory, a betrayal, an 
unfair peace, and above all of German heroism; they could commemorate the sacrifices 
of the dead and wounded by erecting monuments to the fallen. Now these same survivors 
from 1918 saw a youth returning home again from a lost war but under very different 
circumstances. Their teachers did not fully comprehend how the search for new 
orientation and intellectual or even spiritual role models was much more difficult in a 
context of physical occupation and the disillusionment that comes after the disappearance 
of an ideologically charged and invasive dictatorship. Public commentators registered the 
youth’s greater sensitivity, defensiveness, and indifference towards the public discussion 
of guilt and the attempts made under the occupation to proliferate the values of their 
former enemies. The elders’ attempts to understand this youth tend to place the blame 
with their indoctrination by Nazi organizations, failed education, and the loss of a sense 
for right and wrong. However, these diagnoses tend to fall short of analyzing, except in 
the vaguest of terms, the specific responsibility born by the old for the youth’s 
intellectual destitution and moral disorientation.90 Edward Spranger succinctly described 
the different challenges facing students and teachers in 1945. Spranger observed,   
[j]etzt aber ereignete sich genau das Umgekehrte wie 1919. Wurde damals 
der älteren Generation an allem, aber auch an allem, Schuld gegeben, so 
 
90 For one of the better discussions of this conflict see, B[enno] R[eifenberg], “Über die Liebe zum 
Vaterland,” in Die Gegenwart 1, nos. 6-7 (March 1946):11-14. 
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brachten die jetzt Studierenden den Lehrern der Hochschulen ein 
Vertrauen entgegen, das von diesen nur in ganz seltenen Fällen als 
verdient empfunden werden konnte. Das verpflichtete, nicht nur zur 
Dankbarkeit. Natürlich wollten und mußten diese um beste Jugendjahre 
gebrachten Heimkehrer an schnelles Vorwärtskommen denken. Sie 
wollten aber auch etwas lernen.91 
 
The most palpable feeling for the “45er generation” was, in the first instance, not directed 
towards the calculus of guilt that seemed to characterize the policies of the occupational 
powers and the reopened universities. More important was their desire to enter the 
university and take up their studies where they had left off, or the need to catch up, often 
signified with the word “Nachholbedürfnis.” In terms of the issue of guilt and political re-
education so often applied to the postwar situation, the students are characterized less by 
an unwillingness to deal with the past so much as by the realization that their only 
connection to a real intellectual life was their teachers—the older generation. The 
language of de-Nazificiation and of identifying guilt would only obstruct and disrupt this 
relationship. This made all the more important the search for teachers and role-models 
who could reconnect them with the living tradition of German thought and shepherd them 
through the university. 
Some older figures misunderstood these specific problems of the post-1945 youth 
because of their embellished and romantic recollections of 1918. In a speech before 
students in Göttingen in July 1946 the physicist Werner Heisenberg drew a comparison 
 
91 Spranger, “Fünf Jugengenerationen,” 54. 
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between his education at the University of Munich directly following the First World 
War and the situation facing the students after the Second. He recalled how  
die Niederlage im Erstenweltkrieg hatte in uns ein tiefes Mißtrauen 
wachgerufen gegen die Ideale, mit denen dieser Krieg geführt und 
verloren worden war und die uns nun irgendwie hohl erschienen: wir 
nahmen uns deshalb das Recht selbst nachzusehen, was in dieser Welt 
wertvoll und wertlos sei, und nicht unserer Eltern und Lehrer 
danachzufragen. Neben vielen anderen Werten entdeckten wir dabei auch 
die Wissenschaft von neuem.92 
 
Heisenberg thus sought to encourage the students to envision an international community 
of scholars. He observed how the natural sciences were successfully appropriated by the 
ideological regime of National Socialism for the practical goals of military might and for 
national purposes, and how the humanities were used to create the building blocks for a 
nationalist world-view. Against this he felt that an international community of scientists, 
particularly in Europe, could counter this tendency towards the instrumentalization of 
science for ideological politics and its employment for narrow nationalist concerns. Yet 
how could the intellectual youth of 1945 develop, or even visualize such values on their 
own, that is, without asking anything of the parents or teachers? 
Heisenberg appears to have overlooked the fact that what was possible after 
1918—to redefine science anew in the face of the world-view of their fathers or 
teachers—was not something that the intellectual youth of 1945, raised as they were in 
the exceptional circumstances of the 1930s and 1940s, could achieve on their own. 
 
92 Werner Heisenberg, “Wissenschaft als Mittel zur Verständgung unter den Völkern,” in Deutsche 
Beiträge 1, no. 2 (1947):165. 
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Heisenberg adopts common tropes of the postwar moment: European cosmopolitanism 
and internationalism, and a revaluing of science in the face of “nihilism.” Yet the 
physicist provided no explanation from whence this dynamic impetus was to come if not 
from the teachers who were themselves compromised and certainly in no position to form 
the “aristocracy” of European scholars (Gelehrten) he envisioned.93 Interestingly, 
Pringsheim wrote of the problem in a different way:  
Worte haben die Tendenz, durch zu häufigen und unbedachten Gebrauch 
leer zu werden. Derselbe Mißbrauch, der früher mit dem Worte “deutsch” 
getrieben wurde, beginnt nun mit dem Worte “europäisch”. Plötzlich 
denken wir nun alle “europäisch”, reden vom dem “erbe des 
Abendlandes”. Das ist aber schön und gut. Aber es klingt doch ein wenig 
nach Spätsommer, nach Flucht in vergangene Herrlichkeit. Die Welt ist 
schon lange nicht mehr von Europa bestimmt, nach Asien und Amerika 
verlagern sich die Gewichte. Selbst ein geeintes Europa wird nicht 
unabhängig, selbständig und frei sein. Das muß man wissen, wenn man 
den großen Gedanken “Europa” verwirklichen will.94 
 
In this lecture before students in Freiburg in July of 1950, Pringsheim perceptively 
observed that such clichéd appeals towards a European spirit and international 
cooperation were empty gestures in the bifurcated Cold War world. The task, for 
Pringsheim, was much more practical and entailed reconstruction of the German 
intellectual tradition.  
Pringsheim expressed this goal in a way reminiscent of Edward Spranger’s 
concept of a Rüstung of ideas. Yet whereas Spranger’s notion of Rüstung was mainly 
cultural and philosophical, Pringsheim’s concern was the political education of the youth. 
 
93 Heisenberg, 167. 
94 Pringsheim, “Student und Politik,” in Die Sammlung 6 (1951):48-49. 
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For this task, again, trust and encouragement was needed on the part of the older 
generation. This could already be accomplished at the level of the university, not only by 
engendering trust between students and their instructors, but also in student self-
government and the use of seminars where professors and students could work together. 
For Pringsheim, this conception aligned very much with the traditional humanistic notion 
of the German university as defined by Wilhelm von Humboldt, which had to be 
recovered from the clutches of the authoritarian-minded Ordinarien. A community of 
thinking and research was the leading idea of the classical university, but as Pringsheim 
insists, “die Studenten sind die Universität, so gut wie die Professoren. Aber dazu gehört 
daß sie von ihrem Recht gebrauch machen im vollen Gefühl ihrer Mit-Verantwortung.”95 
In the end, “politische Erziehung ist wie jeder Erziehung, Anleitung zur 
Selbsterziehung.”96 This meant that the true spirit of the learning process, for Pringsheim, 
was embodied in the free growth of critical thought: “Sie lehrt nicht ein Spiel mit Worten 
und Begriffen. Es ist eine Freude zu beobachten, wie die Abneigung gegen laute Worte 
und heftiges Reden eher wächst, als abnimmt. Skepsis und Wachsamkeit sehe ich 
gern.”97  Pringsheim here reconceptualized the mistrust and skepticism of the youth in a  
much more constructive and concrete way than others like Herman Nohl who, as we have 
seen, proffered a return to einfache Sittlichkeit and German spirit. Pringsheim lauded a 
healthy skepticism as a positive value when redirected in critical dialogue between 
 
95 Ibid., 45. 
96 Ibid., 51. 
97 Ibid. 
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teacher and students. 98 Skepticism as critical thought was not the cause for concern but 
for hope. The development of independent, critical reasoning had been the true goal of a 
classic German humanistic education. Education towards self-education was 
Pringsheim’s way of reformulating the demands for political re-education proffered by 
the occupying powers as the re-establishment of the classical German university, whose 
form was originally determined as much by students as it was by their professors. 
A re-envisioned university curriculum was one way in which the older generation 
of German philosophers and educators hoped to deal with the problem of the younger 
generation and its political heritage. Some invoked a new idea of neo-humanism, which 
hearkened back to ideas of the German classic tradition, and appeared to be a way in 
which a German cosmopolitanism such as existed, in their view, during the Goethezeit, 
could be rediscovered. This appeal was by no means unique or new to the postwar period. 
The German mandarins had made similar appeals during the 1920s. However, whereas 
Goethe could be successfully nationalized after the First World War, he could not simply 
be democratized after the Second. Friedrich Meinecke concluded his famous commentary 
of 1946 on the social and political antecedents of Nazism, Die deutsche Katastrophe with 
a call for the creation of “Goethe Communities” (“Goethe-Gemeinden”) in all parts of 
Germany as means to reconnect with classical German cultural traditions that predated 
 
98 We must therefore differentiate Pringshiem’s praise of the youth’s skepticism from that of Helmut 
Schelsky’s later concept of the “skeptical generation.” For the former signals an openness towards 
education and public, critical discourse, whereas for the latter, as we shall see, skepticism entails above all 
a concern for the concrete and a sober sense of reality, which actually separates this youth from 
constructive public dialogue with its elders. 
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the rise of German militarism.99 However, as Eugon Kogon wrote in the Frankfurter 
Hefte, Meinecke’s short history had more to offer the older, much older generation of the 
Gründerzeit, who could still find much to salvage in German culture and in German 
politics in the age of Bismarck before it had been ‘blown off course’ by Wilhelm II’s 
Weltpolitik and then hijacked by the “masses” into the two-headed hydra of Hitlerism and 
Bolshevism.100 Kogon’s co-editor, Walter Dirks likewise complained of the haste with 
which the Goethehaus in Frankfurt was resurrected “as if nothing had happened.”101 In 
August 1947, as recipient of the Goethe-Preis from the city of Frankfurt, Karl Jaspers 
expressed a similar sentiment towards the contemporary “Goethe addiction” (Goethe-
Anneigung).102 The time of the Goethe-Cult was over, Jaspers declared: Goethe could no 
longer be offered up as a figure for emulation or imitation. Echoing Dirks, Jaspers 
poignantly observed in reference to the Goethehaus, “Es wird nicht mehr das alte Haus 
sein. Die alte Welt is endgültig verloren, wir müssen über einen Abgrund hinüber die 
Erinnerung festzuhalten versuchen.”103 
 
99 Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, trans. Sydney B. Fay (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 120. 
100 E[ugon] K[ogon], “Beginn der Geschichtsrevision,” in Franfurter Hefte 1, no. 8 (1946):776-79. 
101 Walter Dirks, “Mut zum Abschied,” in Frankfurter Hefte 2, no. 8 (1947):819.  Anson Rabinbach also 
points to this anecdote as an example of a “conservative cultural restoration”; however he reminds us that it 
adds to the one-sided view of the immediate postwar era as one of “restoration,” whereas the late 1940s can 
just as well be seen as much more” intellectually vital” period in which more nuanced forms of cultural 
reconstruction were possible (Rabinbach, “Restoring the German Spirit,” 23-24).  
102 Karl Jaspers, Unsere Zukunft und Goethe (Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 1948). This provoked a series of 
heated echanges between Jaspers and the Professor of Romance Languages in Bonn, Ernst Robert Curtius, 
who objected to the way Jaspers used the occasion to raise the question of German collective guilt. See the 
somewhat bemused treatment of the “Curtius-Jaspers-Streit,” in Göttinger Universitäts-Zeitung 4, no.10 
(1949):6-7. 
103 Ibid., 40. Cf. “Das Haus zu den drei Leyern,” in Die Gegenwart 2, 23-24 (Dec. 1947): 17, where Max 
von Brück emphasizes the importance of the Goethehaus as effigy and testament: “Das alte Haus wird 
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Nearing the two-hundredth anniversary of the poet’s birth in 1949, cultural 
journals such as Die Sammlung, Deutsche Beiträge, and Hamburger Akademische 
Rundschau devoted issues to Goethe’s legacy. Like the gestures towards a return to the 
“humanism” of the German classical tradition, to a simpler morality, and to a common 
European culture, it is difficult to imagine that the attempts like that of Hermann Uhde-
Bernays to resuscitate the “undying spirit” of Goethe as a political guide or moral 
touchstone resonated much with the post-1945 youth.104  Some critics pointed to the 
Goethe revival as a way for the older generation to gloss over the crimes of the Nazi past.  
The returned emigré Richard Alewyn argued in the Hamburger Akademische Rundschau 
that Goethe was not an alibi, or, as he put it literally and symbolically, “Zwischen uns 
und Weimar liegt Buchenwald.” Alewyn was highly suspicious of any attempt to reinvent 
Goethe as a German phenomenon, to set up a ‘good’ Germany alongside the bad: “Es 
gibt nur Goethe und Hitler, die Humanität und die Bestialität. Es kann zumindestens für 
die heute lebende Generationen, nicht zwei Deutschlands geben. Es gibt nur eines oder 
keines.”105 
 
Humanism meets Modernity: Studium generale 
 
nicht mehr sein, aber ein Abbild wird sein, hier und an diesem Platze; nicht täuschend und in leerem Trotz, 
sondern al seine Stätte des Gedankens und zu tätigem Anschauen. Und es wird wine Hülle sein für alles, 
was in bedachter Bangnis geborgen werden konnte in der großen Vernichtung.” 
104 Hermann Uhde-Bernays, “Wendung der Jugend zu Goethe,” in Deutsche Beiträge 1, 1 (1946):3-17. See 
Jost Hermand’s discussion of the turn towards Goethe and humanism in Kultur im Wiederaufbau, 69-71. 
105 Richard Alewyn, “Goethe als Alibi?” in Hamburger Akademischer Rundschau 3, no. 8 (1948-
1949):686. 
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Alongside these persistent but ineffectual appeals to a broken German cultural tradition, 
there existed institutional expressions of a reconceived humanist model of learning in the 
German university. The most significant of these was the implementation of the ideal of 
Studium generale. These experiments in general or humanistic education existed at 
several of the most prestigious institutions in the Western zones such as Heidelberg, 
Göttingen, Tübingen and Freiburg. Part of the plan for Studium generale was not just the 
idea of general studies, but a physical re-organization of student life at the university. In 
addition to re-connecting with a humanistic ideal, the implementation of Studium 
generale simultaneously responded to the problems of modernity, more specifically the 
modernization of the university and most specifically the excess of students, paucity of 
teachers and issue of living space. In Heidelberg, for example, 180 students of different 
ages and academic position were brought together in the “Collegium Academicum,” 
established in Winter 1946. Even in a city relatively untouched by allied bombing, the 
students of the Collegium were housed in buildings and barracks formerly belonging to 
the local administration of the Wehrmacht. In spite of cramped living conditions and 
minimal resources, the hope was to foster a spirit of camaraderie among the 
“Collegiaten,” but with the practical goal of teaching them “Selbstverwaltung,” or student 
self-government. Unlike the Korporationen or Burschenschaften of old, which had been 
tainted by their radical conservative record in the 1920s, the new students of the “general 
study colleges” would be placed in an environment where they could learn participatory 
democracy. A report published in October 1947 on conditions at Heidelberg University 
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described these reforms of the Collegium Academicum as potentially more appropriate 
for the changing social constitution of the student body. “Der neue Typ des deutschen 
Studenten, wie er im Collegium erzogen wird, entspricht den veränderten sozialen 
voraussetzungen in besserer und gesünderer Weise als der auch noch gelegentlich 
auftretende Typ der vergangenen bürgerlich gesättigten Jahrzehnte.”106 
Whether in Heidelberg, or the other universities in the Western Zones, reformers 
aimed to create a college within the university, a community where students worked and 
lived together. Pringsheim adopted this idea when he insisted that the students themselves 
were the university. Indeed, Studium generale was related to the practice of the offene 
Türe or dies academicus—the days in which the faculties of the university would offer a 
cycle of lectures (Ringvorlesungen) on all topics in the humanities and sciences. The 
innovation after the war was to adapt and expand these traditional practices to specific 
postwar conditions and, more generally, to the threats presented by the modernization of 
the German university. Advocates of the Studium generale feared the university would 
become a bureaucratic machine that produced only narrow-minded specialists. Heinrich 
Behnke complained in the Frankfurter Hefte that, “Jede Student will heute möglichst 
bald ein gutes Examen machen, er teilt daher seine Zeit sorgfältig ein, wie ein 
Geschäftsmann.”107 This image of “businesslike” postwar students was linked first to the 
 
106 Christel Schmidt-Rohr, “Bericht von der Universität Heidelberg,” Studium Generale 1, no. 1 (Oct. 
1947): 59. 
107 Heinrich Behnke, “Erziehung und Bildung der intellektuellen Jugend: Das studium generale,” in 
Frankfurter Hefte 5, no. 4 (April 1950):.366. 
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economic hardships of the time but also to the commonly expressed view of the young 
generation as much more sober, practical or—in the favorite term—“sachlich.” These 
characteristics promoted the fear that in an age of greater specialization the Hochschulen, 
which traditionally were meant to form a unity, could become a “fragmented 
conglomerate of specialized schools.”108 In a familiar refrain, Behnke lamented the lack 
of connection between professors and students—due in part to the growth of the student 
body as the number of Dozenten in fact decreased. Two dangers appeared imminent: the 
transformation of the university into a soulless business and the students into narrow-
minded paper shufflers:  
So kommt es leicht dazu, daß die Universität, die morgens früh die jungen 
Menschen aufsaugt und sie zum Abend, mit erdrückender Fülle neuen 
Stoffes angefüllt, wieder ausspeit, auf die Studenten wie eine riesige 
Maschine wirkt, zudem die sehr beschränkte freie Zeit nichts mehr von 
dem eigenartigen Reiz des studentischen Lebens früherer Tage hat; nach 
beendetem Kolleg geht man nach Haus, als käme man aus dem Büro oder 
aus einer Werkstatt.109 
 
It was “höchst gefährlich,” Behnke warned, “die Jugend dauernd zu enttäuschen und das 
Verlangen der jungen Menschen, in allen ihren Kräften angesprochen werden, unbeachtet 
zu lassen. Wer weiß denn, wohin der unbefriedigte Idealismus unserer Jugend ein 
nächstesmal ausschlagen wird?”110 Thus the bureaucratization and specialization 
endemic to the ‘mass’ university was often feared as an enabling factor in the 
manipulation of the youth’s will in the service of authoritarian causes. 
 
108 Behnke, “Erziehung und Bildung,” 366. 
109 Ibid., 368. 
110 Ibid. 
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Studium generale was one response to this perceived threat, but it is also 
important to see that it was an expression of the need for orientation of the postwar 
generation. Behnke’s discussion of the German youth focused on the need for an 
academic elite for the future. In order to create this, the universities needed a “different 
atmosphere,” one in which, Behnke insisted, not only the understanding (Verstand) of the 
students must be addressed, but also their emotional life (Gemüt). This holistic approach, 
exemplified both in the program of Studium generale but also the traditional ideal of 
humanistic education, was far superior, Behnke argued, to the Anglo-American model, 
which was, in the minds of most German commentators, equated with bureaucratization 
and ever increasing specialization. Colleges of general studies within the university 
would provide a basis in humanistic education and political awareness for students as 
preparation for entering the Hochschulen. By expanding Studium generale and bringing 
students into closer contact with their peers and their instructors, German reformers 
hoped to engender a community of scholars, at least among the elite students within the 
university, that would counteract the tendency towards specialization and promote the 
development political responsibility, self-awareness, and a resistance to political 
manipulation. 
Studium generale would offer a political education, but one which did not 
compromise the “Einsamkeit und Freiheit” of the traditional humanist university devoted 
to research and teaching—the Universitas scholarum et magisterum. Rather than 
allowing external politics to intrude into the university classrooms, a political sensibility 
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would emerge from within the university community itself. The idea was to create an 
environment where civic responsibility and social consciousness developed alongside the 
reconnection with traditional intellectual and cultural learning. As Arnold Bergstraesser 
argued before the Subcommitte for Hochschulfragen of the Bundestag in 1951, Studium 
generale served two purposes: 
1. dem Studenten wieder eine wirkliche Verbindung mit den geistigen 
Gütern der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart zu schaffen; 
 
2. ihm die Grundlagen des Wissens zu vermitteln, die bei einem 
Akademiker die Voraussetzung dafür bilden, daß er sich später als Bürger 
am öffentlichen Leben beteiligt.111  
 
Echoing this new sensibility, Hermann Heimpel, in his rectorial address to the entering 
class at the University of Göttingen, encouraged students to have “courage towards 
science.”112 He identified Wissenschaft with the idea of Freiheit, which was embodied in 
Studium generale. For Heimpel, this meant less of an emphasis on preparation for exams 
and worry about assessment. However, in a slight departure from the experiments in 
student self-government like the “Collegium Academicum” in Heidelberg, Heimpel’s 
appeal emphasized the traditional form of the German Korporationen as the basis for 
student political self-education. The corporations and student unions would supplement 
classroom learning with political education with the goal of creating a living connection 
 
111 Quoted in Ulrich Schneider, “Hochschulreform, Studium generale und Collegium Academicum 
Heidelberg, 1945-1952,” in Bildung und Erziehung 36, no. 1 (1983):59. 
112 Hermann Heimpel, “Rede zur Immatrikulation an der Göttinger Universität,” in Die Sammlung 8 
(1953):341. 
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between the German Kommilitonen by which they would become citizens of the 
university (Bürger der Universität).113 The rhetoric of community, citizenship, and 
family was a common pedagogical claim that was extended to German secondary 
education as a whole. As another commentator in the pages of Die Sammlung put it: 
“Unsere Schule braucht durchaus nicht im Amerikanischen Sinne zu einem Parlament im 
Kleinen zu werden, sondern mehr im Deutschen Sinne zu einem grossem Familie.”114  
The new approach to education was thought to answer the thirst of the post-1945 
youth for learning while also moderating the understandable desire to make up for lost 
time by proceeding too quickly, and superficially, through their studies. For Eduard 
Spranger, Studium generale was the educational form most adaptable to the earnest desire 
for learning, which he lauded in the student generation of the mid to late 1940s. 
Although, as we have seen, much of Spranger’s outlook on the postwar youth was based 
on an idealized view of the cultural fecundity of the pre-1914 Jugendbewegung, his call 
for a reinvention of the German university along humanistic lines was an honest attempt 
to address the special challenges facing the youth that returned from war in 1945: 
Natürlich wollten und mußten diese um beste Jugendjahre gebrachten Heimkehrer 
an schnelles Vorwärtskommen denken. Sie wollen aber auch etwas lernen. Und 
dieser Lerneifer richtete sich keineswegs nur auf das Fachwissen. . . . Sie 
erwarteten wohl manchmal noch von ihren Lehrern, daß auch dieser Besitz ihnen 
fertig gegeben werden könnte. Denn sie hatten bisher in ganz einseitiger 
 
113 Ibid., 342-43. Kommilitone was the traditional German term for fellow students.  
114 Max Buchheim, “Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der politischen Bildung in der Schule,” in Die Sammlung 
6 (1951):424. 
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Berührung mit der Welt gelebt, und wußten noch nicht alle, was es heißt, um eine 
eigene echte Weltanschauung zu ringen.”115 
 
Providing the youth with a means “to struggle with a proper, authentic World-view” 
“echte Weltanschauung” sounds a great deal like Spranger’s call for a “youth ideology”; 
however, in the context of Studium generale, we see clearly how this was not simply 
romantic pining for the Jugendbewegung, but a response to the postwar, post-Fascist 
youth’s need for defense or “Rüstung” against future attempts at political ideologization. 
In this respect, as Iring Fetcher wrote in 1959 in a Festschrift for his teacher (Spranger), 
this could be seen “as a powerless attempt to hinder the degeneration of the classical 
German university into Fachschule, but it was rather an appropriate expression for the 
need for orientation of the postwar Generation.”116 Fetcher does express on the part of his 
generation and those slightly younger than him a certain enthusiasm for experiment after 
the war, an open-mindedness that was matched by a short-lived readiness for institutional 
experiments on the part of the university. 
We see evidence in such experiments that the quest for Hochschulreform along 
democratic lines did not begin with the 1960s. Certainly, the mid to late 1960s appear in 
hindsight as the most pronounced crisis point for West German universities and the 
political clash of generations. However, the political generation of 1968 must not obscure 
the efforts of young intellectuals in philosophy and humanities of the 1940s and early 
 
115 Spranger, “Fünf Jugendgenerationen,” 54. 
116 Iring Fetscher, “Die Nachkriegsgeneration und der geistige Weg der Deutschen,” in Eduard Spranger: 
Bildnis eines geistigen Menschen unser Zeit. Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 
1957), 578. 
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1950s to work on reestablishing German intellectual and cultural life. This had to happen 
in cooperation with their teachers and in reference to German intellectual and cultural 
traditions; but this relationship to tradition is not grounds for judging this work as merely 
restorative, politically quietist, or conformist.  
Efforts to reestablish and reorient academic and intellectual life both within the 
universities and in the wider cultural field, will be a constant theme throughout our study 
of postwar West German philosophy. One example of the participation of academics in 
philosophy and the humanities in this cultural moment was the important journal founded 
in Heidelberg by Karl Jaspers and others, named Studium Generale. As we will see, this 
journal became a forum in which specialists in all of the sciences could showcase their 
work to non-specialists. The journal, Studium Generale would often feature discussions 
by leading philosophers of the relation of the natural sciences to the humanities, the place 
of philosophy among the sciences, and the ideal of a unity of science versus the real 
social need for specialization. Addressing the role of philosophy in relation to the other 
sciences and the philosopher’s position in the institutional situation of university reform, 
was the chief concern of postwar West German philosophy and, more importantly, a 
defining aspect of cooperation and conflict between the generations of philosophers after 
1945. Many important professors of philosophy also expressed admiration for the 
“seriousness and diligence” of their students after 1945. The young generation as a whole 
was certainly more open to their teachers’ attempts to create a living connection with 
genuine German intellectual traditions and philosophy that went beyond the superficial 
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public fascination with past symbols like Goethe. Yet the intellectual intensity, whether it 
be in contemplation of abstract ideas, or in the pursuit of practical knowledge, also has 
served as the basis for the criticisms of this generation’s political apathy, its silence and 
apparent denial of the past, and, thus, its “superfluity” as a political actor in the history of 
the Bundesrepublik. 
 
A Youth Discontent with Politics 
Undoubtedly, many of the accusations levied against the immediate postwar 
youth arise from the assumption that social groups can be reified as coherent political 
actors. The “45er generation,” however, does not conform to the political mould of the 
generations that came before and after it. We have examined the onerous circumstances 
under which the intellectual youth of this fragmented generation attempted to reorient 
itself after 1945. In response to the incessant commentary of their elders about the 
youth’s character and the critical, often one-sided judgments about their guilt for the past 
and the responsibility towards the future, we can detect a definite, almost cynical 
discontent on the part of this younger generation within its own context, that is, from an 
“inside view.” This youth not only resented the political posturing of their elders—which 
was often perceived as an attempt to placate the foreign occupying powers—but also the 
apparent hypocrisy of the expectation that one could move from unquestioned obedience 
to dictatorship to an uncritical conformity with the newly restored party politics of the 
postwar period. For many young students, Hochschüler, and Dozenten in the university, it 
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seemed unfair that any critique of the new democracy and of party politics was perceived 
as “unpolitisch” and therefore suspicious or criminal. The youth were accused of 
reluctance and apathy just because the immediate postwar politics of the “Great Old 
Men” found no resonance among them. Writing in the Frankfurter Hefte in 1947, Alfred 
Andersch recorded the youth’s discontent, as an “Unbehagen in der Politik” in the space 
of this generational divide. Andersch records the conversation of a young Dozent with his 
students: “Die alten Politiker haben keine Ahnung, wie die heutige junge Generation 
tatsächlich denkt und empfindet. Vor allem wissen sie nicht, daß diese Generation 
jeglicher Dogmatik grundsätzlich abgeneigt ist.”117 Although Andersch’s reportage of the 
young generation “among itself” may be quite limited and embellished, it raises certain 
questions about the divide between the expectations of the older commentators recorded 
in the pages of cultural journals and the immediate concerns and discussions of the 
students and Dozenten. However much programs like Studium generale may have taken 
an inclusive approach towards creating a community of teachers and students, the 
postwar academic youth were ultimately misled by the expectation that the university 
could become not only a place of education but the fashioning of a new intellectual elite: 
one that was at the same time “political but not ideological” and “critical but not 
disenchanted.” The youth were presented with a world in which they would have the 
feeling of apparent freedom and self-determination but only insofar as they chose the 
 
117 Alfred Andersch, “Das Unbehagen in der Politik: Eine Generation unter sich,” in Frankfurter Hefte 2, 
no. 9 (1947): 917. 
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“right” educational path and took on the appropriate comportment in the intellectual field 
and, along with this, the correct political allegiances.  
In the most general sense, the problem was the burden presented by the myth of 
youth itself. This “aimless mission,” which rested on the example of the pre-First World 
War Jugendbewegung and its post-1918 politicization, the idea that the future belonged 
to the youth, or to use the catch-phrase, “Mit uns zieht die Neue Zeit,” was simply ill-
suited to the youth after 1945.118 Emerging from a war of total defeat and foreign 
occupation preceded by a 12-year period of cultural suppression, this youth had no 
intellectual basis for the kind of rebellious pathos found before and after 1918. Moreover, 
this inability to assume responsibility—diagnosed as the “reluctance to identify”—was 
compounded by the fact that even in light of the sudden confrontation with suppressed 
cultural material and new forums of public debate, the space of real possibilities in terms 
of political expression and intellectual choices remained extremely limited for the youth.  
In the wake of their “lost years,” confronted with the inexplicable, exaggerated 
expectations of the older generation, was the intellectual youth after 1945 not set up to 
fail, not merely in the eyes of their elders but also those who would succeed them? 119 
Again, we are reminded of Hans Werner Richter’s now paradigmatic article in Der Ruf 
that the only response of this young generation was to be willfully silent—if not in 
 
118 Here I follow the line of argument developed in Frank Trommler, “Mission ohne Ziel: Über den Kult 
der Jugend im modernen Deutschland,” in Thomas Koebner et al., eds., “Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit”: der 
Mythos Jugend (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985). 
119 Ibid., 46. 
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protest, then in recognition of the impossibility of the task set before them. This was a 
disinherited youth, which could not imitate the older generation’s flight back to their 
existence before 1933 and their re-connection to long-term German cultural and 
intellectual traditions. As Richter put it, “Jede Anknüpfungsmöglichkeit nach hinten, 
jeder Versuch dort wieder zu beginnen, wo 1933 eine ältere Generation ihre 
kontinuierliche Entwicklungslaufbahn verließ, um vor einem irrationalen Abenteuer zu 
kapitulieren, wirkt angesichts dieses Bildes wie eine Paradoxie.”120 
In Der Ruf, Richter and his co-editor, Alfred Andersch attempted to diagnose the 
causes for the silence of the young generation. Still, one cannot help but feel that the 
silence of this youth was a necessary presupposition for the agenda of a journal, which 
was after all a “call” (Ruf) to independence directed towards a purportedly disillusioned 
and speechless generation. Stuck in a paradoxical and burdened conceptual position by 
the selective silence of its elders, the youth appeared in need of slightly older cultural 
figures like Richter (b. 1908) and Andersch (b. 1914) to speak on their behalf.121 Yet it 
seems unclear if the journal, or the work of Gruppe 47 to which Richter and Andersch 
belonged, opened up a space not simply for diagnosis of the youth’s immobilism, but for 
potentially constructive and therapeutic discussion of the past that really took their voice 
into account.  
 
120 Richter, “Warum schweigt die junge Generation?” 2. 
121 Jérôme Vaillant, Der Ruf: Unabhängige Blätter der jungen Generation (1945-1949): eine Zeitschrift 
zwischen Illusion und Anpassung (Munich and New York: K.G. Sauer Verlag, 1978), 104-105. 
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If we look closely at the journals edited by students and Dozenten, like the 
Hamburger Akademische Rundschau or the Göttinger Universitäts-Zeitung, we find that 
the intellectual youth were in fact speaking, and in many cases they expressed a clear 
desire for the public discussion not only of the material problems facing them, but of the 
intellectual antecedents of the recent political catastrophe. A young law student in 
Göttingen articulated a hopeful expectation for the public resonance of the newly founded 
university journal: 
Wir studenten, die wir zum größten Teil aus dem Felde zurückgekehrt die 
Universität bezogen haben und, enttäuscht, vielleicht auch verbittert aus dem 
verlorenen Krieg und den hinter uns liegenden Jahren heraustreten, sind unsicher 
geworden in Vielem, was bislang unserem Leben Maß und Ziel setzte. Wir wollen 
darangehen zu sichten, was der schweren Probe standhielt. In fruchtbarer 
Zusammenarbeit mit unseren Professoren suchen wir nach den geistigen Ursachen 
des Zusammenbruches, eine Arbeit, die in oft erschütternder Ehrlichkeit schon 
begonnen hat. Dabei wird es viele durch eine verantwortungslose 
Zeitungspropaganda entstellte und belastete Begriffe zu säubern gelten. Ihr 
einseitiger guter Klang soll sie neu erfüllen. Vom Unwahren und vom 
Phrasenhaften müssen wir uns trennen. Nach neuen festen und dauernden Werten 
heißt uns die Not unseres Volkes suchen…. Ein Schritt auf diesem Weg kann die 
Universitäts-Zeitung sein. In ihr wird Dozentenschaft und Studentenschaft vor der 
akademischen und darüber hinaus vor der geistigen Öffentlichkeit miteinander ins 
Gespräch treten.122 
 
By 1949, Der Ruf of Richter and Andersch had disappeared. Likewise, the Göttinger 
Universitäts-Zeitung merged with other journals into the Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung. 
Much of the sentiment for a collaborative working through the past with elders and 
professors disappeared in favor of articles on more practical questions about university 
reform. One could interpret this as the result of the youth’s own reluctance to engage and 
 
122 Wolfgang Zippel in Göttinger Universitäts-Zeitung 1, no. 1 (1945-46). 
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its stubborn silence. However, could this not signal a greater failure on the part of the 
older teachers, intellectuals, and cultural critics from whom these young people were 
clearly seeking guidance? In the absence of real models for public communication—that 
is, of figures who listened before presupposing to speak on the youths’ behalf—it is not 
difficult to understand how this ‘schweigende Generation’ by an easy sleight of hand was 
unjustly transformed into the conformist, superfluous, ‘skeptische Generation’ first 
lauded by conservatives in the 1950s and then derided by the next political generation of 
the late 1960s. 
      
From silence to “skepticism.” 
Much of the later discussion of the postwar “generation” is shaped by its 
engagement with or opposition to Helmut Schelsky’s 1957 portrait of a “skeptical 
generation.”123 As we have seen with other authors like Edward Spranger or even Fritz 
Pringsheim, judgments of the post-1945 youth were based on their understanding of the 
young generations that had come before. Schelsky likewise began his study with the 
generation of the Jugendbewegung—defined as a movement aimed at the youths’ 
emancipation from bourgeois propriety prior to the First World War. Although Schelsky 
attempted to distance himself from pedagogical philosophers like Spranger, who as we 
have seen, called for the rise of a new youth ideology, a Jugendideologie, Schelsky’s 
 
123 Helmut Schelsky, Die skeptische Generation: eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend (Düsseldorf and 
Cologne: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1957). 
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conception of the characteristics of the skeptical generation fell very much in line with 
the pedagogical and sociological studies of youth in the early postwar period. Even 
Spranger, in the new afterword to the 1949 edition of his Psychologie des Jugendalters, 
expressed the impression “dass die studierende deutsche Jugend, die heute in meinen 
Gesichtkreis tritt, den Ruhm verdient, die beste und ernsteste unter allen zu sein die 
wenigstens mir begegnet ist.”124 Likewise, Georg Weippert, in an important article in 
Studium Generale in December 1951,125 which Schelsky himself would later cite, argued 
that the political pathos of the Jugendbewegung (and here he included the “Bündische 
Jugend” that Spranger spoke of) had disappeared with the destruction of the Hitler State. 
Still, although one could not detect a strong “common intention” or “pathos” among the 
youth of the Bundesrepublik—Weippert described them as “unpathetisch”126—he did not 
discount the possibility that the youth of the day could “exhibit the traits of an intentional 
association [Verband].”127 Weippert, and later Schelsky, would argue that the call 
towards the responsibility of the youth for society and the political youth towards 
Gemeinschaft or community were inappropriate expectations. The postwar youth, in 
Schelsky’s terms, exhibited not a tendency towards social engagement but “the retreat 
into the personal and private existence” and an “ohne mich Haltung” towards large 
 
124 Eduard Spranger, Psychologie des Jugendalters, new edn., with an afterword from the author  
(Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1949), 323. 
125 Georg Weippert, “Zur Soziologie der Jugend,” in Studium Generale 4, no. 10 (Dec. 1951): 610-620. 
126 Ibid., 613. 
127 Ibid., 615. 
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organizations and the experiments of political parties.128 In Schelsky’s view, this was a 
necessary comportment for a youth resistant to ideology and more in tune with the reality 
of 1950s middle-class society and the demands of expanding professional occupations. 
But it is important to note here that even Schelsky’s insistence on the “overriding 
processes of de-politicization and de-ideologization of the youth consciousness” placed a 
significant burden on the youth.129 This time, the burden took the shape of an expectation 
to resist outdated political ideologies underlying the “experiments” of political parties 
like the SPD and, to a certain degree, to defend themselves against the great planning 
structures (“Großstrukturen”) that govern human reality in the advanced industrial world. 
Implicit in Schelsky’s portrayal of the skeptical generation as one that resisted great 
organizations, programs, dogmas and political parties was his own conservative notion 
that the “ideologies” of the day had lost touch with reality.130 The youth were being set 
up as the bulwark against political radicalism and political experiments. 
 It was not lost on the reviewers of Schelsky’s work at the time that the strengths 
that he accorded this generation, such as “spiritual disillusionment” or “an unusual 
competence in life” were an attempt to portray a society driven towards individual 
security, towards reserve and a “longing for a place of security in a totally material world 
 
128 Schelsky, Skeptische Generation, 91-92. 
129 Ibid., 84. 
130 Helmut Schelsky, “Der Realitätsverlust der modernen Gesellschaft [1954],” reprinted in Auf der Suche 
nach Wirklichkeit: gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie der Bundesrepublik (Munich: Wilhelm Goldmann 
Verlag, 1979), 394-409.  
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[in der totalversachlichen Welt].”131 Although it was clear at the time, as all the 
reviewers point out, that Schelsky restricted his study to the occupational youth 
(beruftätige Jugend) between the ages of 14 and 25,132 which if we take this from 1955 
when Schelsky’s statistical and testimonial material was collected would include only 
those born after 1930, retrospectively the “skeptical generation” has been a catch-phrase 
for the entirety of the German youth after 1945, or what has come to be known as the 
“45er generation.”133 Schelsky’s study was in part a response to many of the pedagogical 
and critical views expressed in the cultural journals in the mid-1940s to early 1950s. The 
difference, of course, was that what was seen as a cause for alarm in the 1940s: i.e., the 
youth’s apoliticism, mistrustfulness, and retreat into private life and the security of the 
family, all become positive traits for Schelsky’s post-ideological age, in which class 
struggle had been superceded by a silent and self-content middle-class majority.134 This 
fell in line with the conservative picture of a self-content West German consumer society 
of the late 1950s presented by sociologists like Schelsky. As Jost Hermand writes, 
Überhaupt herrschte in der offiziellen oder offiziösen Soziologie der späten 
fünfziger Jahre eine penetrante Kritiklosigkeit den bestehenden Verhältnissen 
gegenüber. Da man endlich in einer freien, offenen Gesellschaft lebe, hieß es hier, 
 
131 Anton Reinartz, “Eine kritische Stellungnahme zum Buch von Helmut Schelsky: Die skeptische 
Generation. Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend, ” in Zeitschrift für Heilpädagogik 9 (Nov. 1958):500. 
132 See Schelsky, Skeptische Generation, 94. 
133 Here we are not referring mainly to Dirk Moses’s study, which is not dependent on Schelsky, but simply 
to the common usage of the phrase, which often is used to designate those born roughly between 1920 and 
the mid 1930s. 
134 For a penetrating critique of Schelsky’s depiction West Germany’s “nivellierende 
Mittelstandsgesellschaft” (“leveled-out middle-class society”) see Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy 
in Germany (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1967), 115-120.  
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nütze jeder der Wirtschaft und damit dem Gansen am meisten, wenn er als guter 
Egoist so viel und so genußreich wie nur möglich konsumiere.135 
 
 Schelsky wanted to show, with particular emphasis on the working youth rather than the 
intellectual youth, that they were uninterested in ideology, and moreover, that ideologies 
such as the Marxist notion of class antagonism, or even social democratic 
experimentation were of little interest to this altogether apolitical generation. 
Furthermore, there remained a certain residue of anti-modernism in Schelsky’s 
viewpoint, a concern for the alienating elements of technological society, which a few 
years before, his former teacher, Hans Freyer had designated with the term “secondary 
systems.”136 But whereas Freyer pessimistically viewed these forms of social 
organization as an inescapable dissolution of human agency and loss of meaning before 
institutional constraints, Schelsky discovered in the middle-class youth bound around the 
family and close associations points of general resistance to modern technology and 
social disenchantment.137 At the same time, this youth would be the bulwark against 
radicalism and provide the political backbone for the Federal Republic, which, in quite a 
volte-face, Schelsky, the former Volksgenosse par excellence, had come to support. This 
 
135 Jost Hermand, Kultur im Wiederaufbau, 257, and on Schelsky in particular see p. 256. 
136 The idea of “secondary systems” was developed by Schelsky’s teacher Hans Freyer in his influencial 
Theorie des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1955). Here these secondary 
systems of order are mechanisms of social control and of distraction (e.g., mass leisure activities) that 
divide up the reality of human beings, turning men into functions of the whole. For Freyer and Schelsky, 
secondary systems are the cause of what Hegel or Marx termed alienation (Entfremdung); however, being 
resistant to theoretical reflection and in a definite sense Post-ideological they are simple givens across all 
classes that govern the division of space and time in industrial society by virtue of which, as Freyer writes, 
“Der Mensch wird den Institutionen willig gemacht und ihnen angepaßt” (Ibid., 89). 
137 Schelsky, Skeptische Generation, 86. 
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all resonated well in a “restorative time” led by a government that pledged “no 
experiments” as the CDU slogan of 1957 went, a felicitous concurrence of which neither 
Schelsky nor his publisher, Peter Diederichs were unaware.138  
This was certainly a time in which the youth in general were more concerned with 
private life and close associations rather than identification with political parties and large 
organizations. Evidence from the universities points to an academic youth that was 
likewise turned towards intensive study and close relations with their teachers. However, 
one cannot discount the influence public opinion and critical scrutiny had on this youthful 
turn to “Innerlichkeit” and even its willful silence. Wholesale diagnoses like those of 
Schelsky and other public commentators can have a self-fulfilling character about them, 
particularly when they fall in line with the interests of the dominant political regime. By 
effectively eliding moments of possible cross-generational communication and 
identification with public intellectual life in the name of youth’s “Konkretismus” and 
“Lebestüchtigkeit,” conservative theorists of the “post-ideological age” silenced what 
could have been a basis for genuine intellectual engagement with the past in the public 
domain. We must keep in mind that the skeptical youth are used as a tool by Schelsky 
against public intellectuals or “idea- and ideology producers” as proof of their loss of 
 
138 See Franz-Werner Kersting, “Helmut Schelsky’s ‘Skeptische Generation’ von 1957: zur Publikations- 
und Wirkungsgeschichte eines Standardwerkes,” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 50, no. 3 (July 
2002):485n116. Much of the book’s success can also be attributed to its timely republication in a special 
edition (Düsseldorf and Köln, 1963) from which Schelsky and his editor removed obtrusive statistical 
tables and citations to make the book shorter and more accessible to ordinary readers. Apparently, 
Schelsky, the Mandarin devoted to ‘fortress Wissenschaft,’ was himself not above seeking the status of 
cultural intellectual. 
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touch with reality (Realitätsverlust) and “loss of function.”139 Here the “deradicalized 
conservatism”140 of his teacher, Hans Freyer, returns in a more aggressive form; for now 
the very existence of “secondary systems” becomes a weapon for the conservative 
sociologist against “ideology producing” intellectuals. Precicely, because these “great 
ordering structures” are “secondary”—that is, they function independently of ideological 
direction and across class and social divides—they defy the rational analysis of 
traditional intellectuals, who thereby lose their social function. “Secondary systems” 
make critical questioning of any kind obsolete. Schelsky’s wholesale attack on ideology 
and cultural intellectuals has the collateral effect of leaving no place for a questioning of 
the collusion of older social groups in the ideologies and political misdeeds of the past, 
and, for that matter, of the present. The dismissive tone towards “cynical” cultural 
criticism was even more explicitly expressed by Arnold Gehlen, another student of 
Freyer’s and an early instructor of Schelsky, in his programmatic essay “Ende der 
Persönlichkeit?” which appeared in the pages of Merkur in 1956. Here Gehlen concluded, 
“[d]ieser Kulturkritik ist ein sozialer Reflex, es handelt sich da sehr weitgehend um 
Abwehrhandlungen einer Schicht von Gebildeten, die in der technischen Gesellschaft in 
 
139 Schelsky, “Der Realitätsverlust,” 398-399; 401. 
140 Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God that Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German 
Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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Gefahr gerät, sozial funktionslos zu werden, oder die ihre Rolle im gesellschaftlichen 
Ganzen nicht mehr definieren kann.”141 
The “loss of function” and legitimacy by public intellectuals observed by 
Schelsky and Gehlen effectively served to elide possibilities for genuine criticism of the 
responsibility of the older generations in society to account for the past. What is more, 
even if Schelsky at times lamented the loss of importance accorded to the humanities and 
social sciences in the university, his unwillingness to consider the ideas of public 
intellectuals and writers—Heinrich Böll and others from Gruppe 47 for example—closed 
down possible therapeutic cultural avenues out of the complacency of consumer society 
by which young and old alike could have been provoked into discussion of the past and 
the predicament of silence.142 Although Schelsky provides detailed accounts of the 
youth’s return to the family and to close-knit associations, the sociologist does little to 
explain how the young generation interacts with the old. More importantly he provides no 
explanation of the way in which this youth is to find its intellectual orientation, whether it 
be from teachers or any other possible role models. It is enough that their “ohne uns” 
mentality towards political experiments can be transformed into the “mit uns” of the 
family, close personal associations, and workplaces of a tranquilized, monolithic middle-
 
141 Arnold Gehlen, “Ende der Persönlichkeit?” in Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie (Neuwied am 
Rhein and Berlin: Luchterhand Verlag, 1963), 330. 
142 This can also be seen as defensiveness on Schelsky’s part to protect his own sense of scholarly 
legitimacy and the immunity of his own brand of conservative sociology from left-wing, literary 
intellectuals. See Frank Trommler, “German Intellectuals: Public Roles and the Rise of the Therapeutic,” in 
Michael Geyer ed., The Power of Intellectuals in Contemporary Germany (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 41-43. 
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class society. As Helmuth Plessner noted in his “Nachwort zum Generationsproblem,” 
the characteristics of the youth observed by Schelsky were merely the byproduct of the 
absence of engagement and leadership from their elders. Plessner argued, 
[d]ieses Mißtrauen gegen große Ideen und der Konkretismus in der deutschen 
Nachkriegsjugend, die Schelsky eine skeptische Generation nennt, sind nur 
scheinbar Symptome einer Skepsis. In Wirklichkeit war (und ist) sie vaterlos und 
deshalb in einer diffusen Abwehrhaltung, die auch reaktionäre Züge annehmen 
kann, und zwar in dem Maße, in welchem eine fortschrittliche Ansicht die 
öffentliche Meinung (das heißt der Äteren) für sich hat.143 
 
Despite Schelsky’s attempt to provide a sociological refinement of the generation concept 
as neither an elite nor a non-descript mass, the skeptical generation remains a generation 
in a bubble or a vacuum—a disinherited generation. It is important to recall that 
particularly in their role as educators of or commentators on the youth, the older figures 
draw on their experiences as young people. This is a particularly salient point when we 
recall that the older generations in 1945 are comprised of those who identified with the 
Jugendbewegung (before 1914) or the political youth (Schelsky’s own generation) after 
1918. These remain the standards against which the postwar youth is judged. What 
sociologists like Schelsky failed to admit is that this youth will no doubt encounter drastic 
conflict between the expectations of the older figures and the range of possibilities open 
to them after 1945 and into the 1950s and 1960s. 
The conflict is still one of experiences, or better the position of a generation—
Mannheim’s “Generationlagerung”—towards experiences and events. The traumatic past 
 
143 Helmth Plessner, “Nachwort zum Generationsproblem ,” in Diesseits der Utopie (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), 84. 
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experience, or, as it were, non-experiences of the postwar youth do not disappear in times 
of greater social mobility and economic properity like those of the 1950s in West 
Germany. The methods of coping with these memories and questions of guilt and 
responsibility open to the youth remain limited despite the impressions of Schelsky and 
those older than he, that this was a more earnest, hard-working youth with a “more sober 
sense of reality.” Such tendencies can also be symptoms not simply of an inability to 
mourn—which is a diagnosis that can also be viewed as burden or accusation—but more 
importantly of a dissonance between the old and the young in how they can deal with the 
memory of past events. Unlike those who reached relative maturity before the 1930s, the 
postwar youth had limited access to long-term traditions that extended back beyond 
contemporary events or “ruptures.” And they could have no access to these unless they 
had their older contemporaries as guides. A skeptical generation like that portrayed by 
Schelsky is only conceivable to the sociologist because this was a disinherited and 
“fatherless” youth whose recourse to strategies of restoration and tradition was 
impossible, at least in the short term. Intellectually, this youth possessed no background, 
or “tradition” in the hermeneutical sense, that could serve as a means of understanding 
for such narratives of renewal, rebirth or restoration which the old attempted to proffer by 
either drawing on “good” or untainted German cultural moments, or, à la Schelsky, on a 
belief that a post-ideological age had been reached in which such intellectual gestures 
became unreal and unnecessary. The latter position was particularly dangerous for 
philosophy. In a momentary flush of recognition for the orientation problems of 
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consumer society, Schelsky admitted, “[n]irgendwo wird dieser säkulare Umschwung der 
Aufgaben des Geistes deutlicher als darin, daß die Philosophie ihre Rolle als führende 
Bildungsmacht, die sie seit dem Beginn der Aufklärungsepoche gespielt hat, 
offensichtlich heute zu verlieren beginnt oder schon verloren hat.144 
Another aspect in this picture, at first overlooked and unthematized, was 
identified by Theodor Adorno, writing in 1950 shortly after his return to Frankfurt from 
his Californian exile. He found in the new West Germany a strong engagement in 
intellectual affairs and culture. However, Adorno viewed this in the first instance as a 
space made possible by the momentary suspension of the cultural industry. The Germans, 
in general, had been thrown back upon themselves in the absence of a dominant mass 
culture. Interestingly, Adorno mentioned how students in philosophy and the social 
sciences displayed “the greatest interest in practically unusable problems.”145 Even the 
terrible material hardship in which they live could not deter their intellectual energy: 
Die jungen Menschen machen durchweg den Eindruck, sie seien frei von 
den Gedanken an die tägliche Misere und überließen sich selbstvergessen 
und glücklich der Möglichkeit, sich ohne Zwang und Reglementierung, 
wenn auch ohne viel Hoffnung auf äußeren Erfolg, mit dem zu befassen, 
was ihnen am Herzen liegt. Man kommt sich zuweilen vor, als wäre man 
hundertfünfzig Jahre zurückversetzt, in die Zeit der Frühromantik, als man 
ein so unpopuläres Buch wie die Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes allgemein zu 
den großen Ereignissen des Zeitalters rechnete, und als die 
Einzelwissenschaften sich bis ins Innerste bewegt zeigten von den 
Motiven der großen spekulativen System.146 
 
144 Schelsky, “Der Realitärsverlust,” 408. 
145 Theodor Adorno, “Auferstehung der Kultur in Deutschland,” in Frankfurter Hefte 5, no 5 (May 1950): 
469. 
146 Ibid., 470. 
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Adorno’s answer to the question about the existence of a “resurrection of culture in 
Germany,” as his article was titled was ultimately negative, since any resurrection would 
be possible only under the historical conditions of a temporary remission of the culture 
industry. This also accounted for a certain “romanticism” of the German youth in the new 
humanistic atmosphere.147 However, in more general terms, Adorno had touched upon a 
great obstacle to the intellectual youth in 1950. It was too late to resurrect the German 
character of the Dichter und Denker and make of it a cultural program. The fear of the 
return of the mass culture industry threatened to undermine the elite notion of German 
cultural uniformity inherited from tradition. Only a new intellectual orientation could 
confront the political realities of the postwar world. If not from a public sphere in which 
there would again rise an inescapable culture industry, then the impetus towards such 
cultural reorientation would have to come from the university, and, above all, from 
philosophy. Though here Adorno, at least in 1951, did not fully appreciate the extent to 
which the university and the classical ideal of Bildung would have to change to 
accommodate the great influx of students following the Second World War. These would 
be students of different social background, who would come to university not in search of 
elite cultural knowledge, which was second nature for Weimar cultural intellectuals like 
Adorno, but usable knowledge and expertise required for diverse professional 
opportunities of industrial society and an expanding welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s. 
This meant, as we shall see, that however high-minded the ideas of political reeducation 
 
147 Ibid. 
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and classic humanism that directed the reform of West German higher education were, 
they revealed the insularity and even revaunchist attitudes of professoriat towards a more 
inclusive definition of German culture, one that could encompass new social realities and, 
most importantly, the exponentially growing student population that filled their 
classrooms. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Philosopher after 1945: Political Continuities and the Burden of Legends from the 
Past 
 
The political events of 1945 presented no “Stunde Null” for German philosophy. 
Although the idea of unbroken continuity across the 1930s and the Second World War 
would be equally simplistic as the idea of the Third Reich period as an absolute rupture, 
after 1945 there was not only an interaction of generations but also of the ideas of the 
previous decades, including those of the 1930s. The era of the Third Reich should not be 
dismissed as a kind of intellectual dead zone from which nothing persisted into the 
postwar era. Volker Böhnigk has referred to this view as the “separation theory” of 
intellectual history, whereby historians tend to view the period between 1933 and 1945 as 
a destitute time for German science that had corrupted the ideas of the culturally affluent 
1920s and left no impact after 1945.148 For Böhnigk this view is contradicted by figures 
like Erich Rothacker, who not only retained a prominent position in the philosophical 
 
148 Volker Bönigk, Kulturanthropologie als Rassenlehre: Nationalsozialistische Kulturphilosophie aus der 
Sicht des Philosophen Erich Rothacker (Würzburg, Verlag Königshausen & Neumann, 2002). Böhnigk 
describes the view of the “Separat-Theoretiker” thus: “Die deutsche wissenschaft ist nach 1945 nicht 
sprunghaft zu neuer Blüte erstanden – womöglich in paralleler Entwicklung zum Demokratisierungprozß in 
Deutschland, gar unter Anbindung an die wissenschaftlichen Tradition vor 1933 – so, als wäre die Zeit 
zwischen 1933 und 1945 ein wissenschaftsloses Trümmerfeld gewesen” (ibid., 92). 
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profession and was a leading figure promoting the humanities after 1945,149 but also 
continued to espouse the core ideas from his work of the 1930s and early 1940s.150 Much 
of the legend of the 1920s as the time of German cultural flourishing and the 1930s as 
cultural and scientific stagnation is based on the view of the émigrés who returned to 
Germany in the late 1940s and early 1950s. From the perspective of hindsight, the great 
caesura after 1933 was due to the loss of many of Germany’s greatest philosophers and 
philosophical schools. As Herbert Schnädelbach argued in 1990, “Nicht Hitler, der Krieg 
und Auschwitz haben die Deutsche Philosophie nach 1933 inhaltlich bestimmt, sondern 
die Folgen der Emigration. Durch sie wurden Traditionen unterbrochen, die dann umso 
mächtiger im Ausland weiterwirken sollten, und so wurde die Deutsche Philosophie 
ziemlich provinziell.”151 To be sure, the departure of the great figures of the Wiener 
Kreis, the Institüt für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt as well as prominent Neokantians, 
phenomenologists, and Existenzphilosophen represented a great loss and meant a lack of 
alternatives to men like Heidegger, Rothacker, or Arnold Gehlen. However, if we simply 
discount the activities of such thinkers, dubious though they may be, which comprised 
 
149 Rothacker’s professorship in Bonn was not suspended by the British Occupational Authority after 1945, 
though he was required to submit to the Fragebogen (Questionaire concerning political activity during the 
Third Reich). He was a founding member of the Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, 
“geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse,” which was established in 1949. Among the members supported by 
Rothacker were Heinz Heimsoeth, Joachim Ritter, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hans Blumenberg. Finally, 
as we will see below, Rothacker played a leading role at the first congresses for philosophy in Garmisch-
Parteikirchen (1947) and in Mainz (1948). 
150 Bönigk offers a close comparison of editions of Erich Rothacker’s works before and after 1945. 
Although Rothacker altered, or excised some explicit references to Nazi policies, what is more interesting 
are the elements that he chose to leave in; the core vocabulary of the “Sieger- und Herrenschicht” of the 
German or “Aryan” race remained unaltered and was even expanded upon. See ibid., Chapter 5.   
151 Herbert Schnädelbach, “Deutsche Philosophie seit 1945,” in Wolfgang Prinz and Peter Weingart,eds., 
Die sog. Geisteswissenschaften: Innenansichten (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990), 404. 
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the political-scientific paradigm shift during the National Socialist period, we risk 
overlooking the subtle and sometimes not so subtle effects of their ideas and practices on 
the postwar intellectual and cultural field.  
In this chapter and the next, we will weigh the impact of continuities in German 
intellectual history before and after 1945 against the undeniable attempts to renew and 
reorient the discipline through professionalization and institutional innovations. This new 
spirit of collaboration took many forms: the founding of philosophical societies, scientific 
academies, and academic journals in the late 1940s and 1950s; and later the 
interdisciplinary research projects of the 1960s and 1970s. These efforts implied a 
departure from the mode of philosophizing of the great, though isolated thinkers, like 
Martin Heidegger and a turn towards collaborative philosophical research projects 
organized around particular questions or problems rather than segregated into “schools of 
thought.”152 If we follow Schnädelbach, while Existenzphilosophie and Heidegger’s 
“original German philosophizing” dominated the image of West German philosophy in 
the public sphere, one cannot overlook the fact that alongside and against this “Heidegger 
Wirkung,” a young philosophical generation came into its own and sought reconnection 
with German intellectual traditions, even those that had been suppressed during the 
1930s. They did this not only in collaboration with returned émigrés, but even in close 
collaboration those who had been able to remain in Germany during the Third Reich, 
many of whom were Heidegger’s former students. 
 
152 Cf. ibid., 414. 
93 
 
                                                
The war years undoubtedly had been a major disruption. Universities had closed, 
or at the very least limited teaching activities and curricula from lack of students and 
teachers, or because of the constant threat of bombings. Most scholarly journals in 
philosophy and the other sciences became scarce or ceased to be by the early 1940s. The 
dearth of materials at the height of the war made the publication and distribution of 
scholarly texts nearly impossible. After food and perhaps cigarettes, the German 
philosopher’s greatest concern in the first years following 1945 was for paper and books. 
The fall of the Nazi regime did present the possibility for a greater public openness about 
cultural and intellectual subjects. The most striking examples for the youth were in the 
rediscovery and recovery of forms of modernist art like expressionism that were 
classified ‘degenerate’ by Nazi cultural propagandists. The pages of student and 
Dozenten run journals like the Hamburger Akademische Rundschau printed numerous 
articles and reviews, peppered with images of sculpture, sketches, and paintings from the 
art exhibits in which the intellectual youth “celebrated the rebirth of their spiritual 
freedom.”153  
Yet a renewed orientation in philosophy as a discipline developed more slowly 
and only after the material dearth could be ameliorated after the years of occupation. 
What is more, established philosophers faced no great intellectual rupture or tabula rasa 
of learning immediately after 1945. Rather, the ideas of the 1920s and 1930s endured. 
 
153 See the Hamburg art historian, Carl Georg Heise’s review of the “Wegbereiter” [Path Breaker] exhibit 
of Expressionist art in Hamburg, which was presented in co-operation with a committee of students from 
the University, in Hamburger Akademische Rundschau 1, no. 1 (1946-47): 36-37.  
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Most of the personalities that had accommodated or at least silently coexisted under the 
twelve-year Reich remained active after the war. Though ‘denazification’ began as an 
Allied effort to purge the academy of Nazism and general anti-democratic sentiment, for 
most established German academics of any scholarly ability this amounted to at most a 
suspension or “moratorium,” to use Bernd Weisbrod’s useful term, during a period of 
intellectual “redefinition” and “rehabilitation,” before they could be reinstated and 
properly “placed.”154 Our concern here is not to undertake a full analysis of the practice 
and mixed outcomes of “denazification” in West German universities or society, which 
has been exhaustively dealt with elsewhere. However, it is safe to say that most of the 
professoriate that had at least accommodated the Nazi Regime continued their 
professional and public activity after the war; even the select few compromised figures, 
who initially were removed by the Occupational Authorities, in most cases, regained their 
positions, or at least their civil servant status and pensions by the early 1950s.155 
 
154 Bernd Weisbrod, “The Moratorium of the Mandarins and the Self-Denazification of German Academe: 
a View from Göttingen,” in Contemporary European History 12, no. 1 (2003): 49. Although much of 
Weisbrod’s empirical basis rests on cases at the University of Göttingen, his analysis supports in large part 
the work done by Steven Remy on the University of Heidelberg in The Heidelberg Myth, see esp. Chaps. 5-
6. 
155 See Steven Remy, The Heidelberg Myth; on prominent philosophers and pedagogues see in Göttingen 
and elswhere see Bernd Weisbrod, ed., Akademische Vergangenheitspolitik: Beiträge zur 
Wissenschaftskultur der Nachkriegszeit (Göttingen: Wallenstein Verlag, 2002); and the key general studies, 
Norbert Frei, Vergagenheitspolitk: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit (Munich: 
C.H. Beck Verlag, 1996); Clemens Vollnhals, ed., Entnazifizierung: politische Säuberung und 
Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen (Munich: DTV, 1991); James Trent, Mission on the Rhine: 
Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1982); Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter 
amerikanischer Besatzung (Frankfurt a/M: S. Fischer Verlag, 1972). 
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 These observations are not intended to support unequivocally the notion that 
German philosophers and, particularly the young philosophy students, failed to deal with 
the Nazi past. As we have already seen in the first chapter, such diagnoses of repression 
and denial often derive more from the retrospective expectations of future generations of 
commentators and critics than from a realistic appreciation of the modes of coping 
available at the time, particularly to the postwar youth. The expectation has always been 
that the intellectuals and, perhaps the philosophers in particular, should have reacted 
more openly to the moral repercussions of National Socialist crimes. The young, 
however, had neither the means nor the information to take the lead in this kind of public 
moral reckoning. Among the ‘great old men’ there were exemplary cases like Karl 
Jaspers, Theodor Litt, Julius Ebbinghaus, and Eduard Spranger. However, the ‘spirit’ of 
renewal evoked in their public speeches did not always translate into the institutional 
practices that would have dealt with the practical consequences of the twelve-year period 
of active collaboration. The laudable efforts of these figures to examine National 
Socialism publicly was not the same as dealing with the unavoidable continuities in 
personnel and institutional practices that carried on into the postwar reconstruction of the 
discipline. Later commentators like Helmut Fahrenbach observed with disbelief how the 
philosophical-political discourse present in the public speeches of these select few 
philosophers found little resonance in the organs and institutions of philosophy, such as 
the new philosophical journals and in particular the early congresses of philosophy.156 
 
156 See Helmut Fahrenbach, “Der Neuanfang ‘westdeutscher Philosophie’ 1945-1950,” in Wissenschaft im 
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Yet a serious discussion of the relationship between philosophy and National Socialism at 
these congresses, even under the direction of men like Julius Ebbinghaus, Theodor Litt, 
and Helmuth Plessner, would have run counter to the interest of those wishing to re-
establish the integrity of academic philosophy. The academic space of the congress was 
not considered the place for such political interventions and open discussion. A concern 
for professional discretion ensured such a dialogue could not take place. Reference to the 
recent past, whether at conferences or in the scholarly journals, was always mediated 
through the very general language of intellectual or spiritual renewal and above all a 
departure from the explicit intrusion of politics into the scientific realm. However, so 
long as they remained wedded to the narrative of a pure, ideal Wissenschaft that had been 
supplanted or perverted by the völkisch ideology of Nazi biological determinism, the 
public philosophers left no room for the revelation that, as Martina Plümacher puts it, 
“scholars as scholars and philosophers as philosophers could be brought into the service 
of National Socialism.”157 
Indeed, most intellectuals understood the Nazi period as a moment in which 
politics entered all too intrusively into the academic sphere. Most philosophers had to 
some degree made concessions with the Nazi Regime, even if only by joining the 
Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund (National Socialist Teacher’s Association), whose 
membership was not restricted to the normal cast of “echte Nazis,” but included men like 
 
geteilten Deutschland, 109-112. 
157 Martina Plümacher, Philosophie nach 1945 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Hamburg: Rowohlt 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996), 33. 
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Julius Ebbinghaus and Johannes Hessen, who were very outspoken about Nazi crimes 
after the war.158 Surely, the silence of many among the incriminated (belastete) scholars 
was less a case of the repression of guilt than of disappointment with the downfall of 
Germany and the failure of their attempt to become the spiritual aristocracy of the Nazi 
movement. German philosophers had happily engaged in opportunistic political intrigues 
and defamations in the early 1930s. The distinction between intellectual life and politics 
is not nearly so neat and clear cut. As Hans Sluga has convincingly shown, the political 
conflicts of philosophers were often continuations of complex intellectual disputes of the 
1920s.159 In most cases the evidence is overwhelming, that Promovierung (i.e., the 
awarding of the Ph.D.), habilitations, and new university appointments were, as they had 
been during Weimar, determined in large part by the favor of competing Ordinarien 
professors with the federal or national representatives of “culture.”160 The Nazis simply 
encouraged and expanded the possibilities for such opportunism by creating more 
associations and projects controlled at the national level by Alfred Rosenberg’s Office or 
by Goebbels himself. Finally, on the level of discourse, the ideas of Nazism remained 
vague and pliable enough in the first years that almost any academic philosopher could 
 
158 A thorough record of philosophers’ membership in the NSLB, the Nazi Party, the SA, and many other 
organizations and research groups can be found in George Leaman, Heidegger im Context: 
Gesamtüberblick zum NS-Engagement der Universitätsphilosophen (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 1993). 
159 Hans Sluga, Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
160 See the mammoth, two-volume study of university politics and record of university promotions, 
habilitations, and appointments from Weimar to the Third Reich, Christian Tilitzki, Die deutsche 
Universitätsphilosophie in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich, 2 vols. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
2002). 
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see elements of Nazi ideology to which their own work could appeal. With this in mind, 
Sluga argues that one cannot take the ideological claims of National Socialism at face 
value by drawing substantial connections with particular schools of thought. This practice 
fails to see that National Socialism succeeded with many intellectuals precisely because it 
is open to multiple philosophical views. Sluga observes, 
This line of reasoning is involved when Nietzsche and Heidegger are singled out 
as the philosophers of National Socialism. It fails to see that Nazi ideology had 
many sides to it and could connect itself with many different philosophical 
schools. National Socialism was not a philosophical system; it was not based on a 
coherent set of philosophical assumptions but drew opportunistically on whatever 
served its purposes.161 
 
Many were able to achieve as much or more with distortions of Kant, Hegel, and even 
Goethe than Heidegger was able to by selectively interpreting Nietzsche.162 In this sense, 
one cannot restrict the understanding of intellectual collaboration to a ‘few bad apples,’ 
or as the simple political distortion of the ideals of science. As Max Weinreich already 
revealed in his work of 1946, Hitler’s accomplices “were to a large extent people of long 
and high standing, university professors and academy members, some of them world 
famous, authors with familiar names and guest lecturers abroad. . . .The younger 
academic people might have stayed a little longer on the waiting list as ‘Privatdozenten’ 
except for the fact that several thousand positions were vacated through the dismissal of 
Jewish or liberal professors; but, technically, the young Nazi instructors more often than 
 
161 Sluga, Heidegger’s Crisis, 229-30. 
162 On the role of Kantian philosophy during the Third Reich see Volker Böhnigk, Kant und der 
Nationalsozialismus: eine programmatische Bemerkungen über Nationalsozialistische Philosophie (Bonn: 
Bouvier Verlag, 2000). 
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not were qualified for the positions they were offered.”163 In other words, academic 
rituals of consecration concerning the appointment of professors, promotion and 
habilitation of younger scholars, and the proliferation of their research continued as 
before; the only difference was perhaps a more open repudiation of values considered 
non-Aryan by the regime and a more flagrant disregard for scholarly integrity. The 
complexity of the levels of collaboration and the variety and number of those who made 
concessions to the regime indicates that scholars qua scholars, philosophers qua 
philosophers always operate in a field of power, which can be bent towards the goals of a 
political will; Nazism is simply one of the most extreme examples. 
By the late 1930s, most philosophers had become disenchanted with the Hitler 
Regime, once they realized that the leaders of the Nazi movement had no intention of 
setting their plans according to the ideas of leading intellectuals. Certainly, many 
philosophers of any reputation and ability were eventually replaced with lesser men—
hacks who would toe the Party line. However, the German Mandarin philosophers 
continued to go through the motions of outward support for the Regime, while at the 
same time restricting their intellectual reservations and practical differences to the realm 
of ‘inner emigration.’  
 The expectation that these same ‘inner émigrés’ would suddenly become public 
intellectuals after the war seems naïve in hindsight. They simply gave more license to the 
 
163 Max Weinreich, Hitler’s Professors: the Part of Scholarship in Germany’s Crimes Against the Jewish 
People, second edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1999),7. Originally published as Hitlers 
Professoren (New York: YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, 1946). 
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fatalistic ideas to which they succumbed after the spiritual promise of the Third Reich 
disappeared. High-profile collaborators like Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, Arnold 
Gehlen, and Hans Freyer fell into deeper, though somewhat ‘deradicalized’ cultural 
pessimism by the late 1930s and especially after the War’s end.164 For those disenchanted 
like Heidegger, this ‘late Nazism’ of the collaborators was simply the redefined form of 
reactionary modernism that now included the Nazi movement, once its “inner truth and 
greatness” proved unable to master the global confrontation with technology, as 
Heidegger had hoped in 1935.165 For Heidegger, the heroic form of radical anti-
modernism and the “positive” or “active nihilism” represented by the Nazi war machine 
had faded with its changing fortunes on the Eastern Front by1943.166 Even after the war, 
the great catastrophe for Heidegger was not the demise of the movement that had let him 
down, nor the sufferings of its victims; rather, the great disappointment, for the self-
proclaimed ‘thinker,’ was the delay of “the advent of a new order of Being” that his 
idealized version of National Socialism was meant to bring about.167 The postwar 
accounts of the process of modernity, whether it be the increasing dominance of natural 
science and positivism, positive law and parliamentary democracy, the end of 
metaphysics and the forgetting of Being, or the image of a German cum European culture 
 
164 Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God that Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German 
Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
165 Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik [1935] (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), 152. 
166 Domenico Losurdo, “Heidegger and Hitler’s War,” in Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis, eds., The 
Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992), 141-164. 
167 Anson Rabinbach, “Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ as Text and Event,” in In the Shadow of 
Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 115. 
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caught between American and Soviet style bureaucratization and technologization—all 
employed the tropes of decline and crisis which were borrowed from the conservatism of 
the Weimar period and adapted to postwar conditions. Although this “melancholy 
modernism”168 did not match the genuine emotional Kulturkritik of the 1920s and early 
1930s, the summary conclusion that German intellectuals in the first two decades after 
1945 “adjusted to the mass and machine age”169 does little to explain what this process of 
adaptation meant for different generations. 
That someone like Freyer moderated and “deradicalized” his ideas does nothing 
to suggest a process of rehabilitation. Jerry Muller has argued that because Hans Freyer 
remained silent about his Nazi past (and actively covered it up), his detractors after the 
war did not fully appreciate how much his views had changed in his postwar writings. 
Apparently, we are meant to give the man credit for the extent to which he had come to 
embrace bourgeois individualism in his diagnoses of the threat of “secondary systems” 
and the functionalization of man.170 It seems misguided to use the silence of men like 
Freyer, Schmitt, or Heidegger as an explanation for why their disillusioned postwar 
conservatism was not fully appreciated as a break with their Nazi past. Certainly, Muller 
may simply intend to provide a plausible historical explanation of the irony that Freyer’s 
 
168 This phrase is used by Jan-Werner Müller to describe the muted antimodernism of Joachim Ritter and 
his closest ‘Schüler’ in A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in postwar European Thought (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2003), 116-132. 
169 Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins. New edition (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1990), 444. 
170 Muller cites Freyer’s Weltgeschichte Europas (Wiesbaden: Dieterich Verlag, 1948) and Theorie des 
gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (1955) as examples of Freyer’s new liberal-conservative tone. 
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attempts to conceal the past actually led to greater suspicion; however, this seemingly 
innocuous explication is undercut by the comparison Muller makes to postwar 
confessions of former Communists.171  
 Muller directs our attention to the continued threat of Stalinism as the more 
pressing problem of the postwar era and the impetus for “repentant Marxists” like Arthur 
Koestler. This seems to be a veiled deflection of responsibility for the greater crimes 
committed with the help of ardent Nazis like Freyer. Of course, the former Nazis 
produced no statement to match that of Arthur Koestler et al. in Richard Crossman’s 
volume;172 for their responsibility ran much deeper than these former Communists. 
Freyer, Schmitt, Heidegger, Rothacker, Gehlen—these men supported an openly anti-
Semitic regime, adjusted their ideas to fit its racism, and continued to support the 
Regime’s brutal policies so long as its armies were winning in the field. The changes to 
their ideas late in the War and after the Nazi Collapse were purely intellectual attempts to 
come to terms with these ‘unfortunate’ events and, finally, the fact that they had been 
wrong about Nazism as the answer to modern nihilism and estrangement, or as the means 
to the mastery of technology. A better way to understand the philosophy of these figures 
after 1945 is as a kind of late, disillusioned Nazism—a lament for the ‘pure’ or ‘heroic’ 
 
171 This is the dizzying logic used by Jerry Muller, The Other God that Failed, 367. “In fact,” argues 
Muller, “the absence of any explicit confession of personal error comparable to The God that Failed [by A. 
Koestler et al.] had quite the opposite effect. The absence of such an admission fed the suspicion that 
Freyer had emerged from the collapse of the Third Reich defeated but not transformed” (ibid., 368). 
172 Richard H. S. Crossman, ed., The God that Failed, texts by Arthur Koestler et al. (New York: Harper 
Publishers, 1950). 
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Nazism that they had envisaged in the early to mid 1930s, or so long as Hitler was 
winning the war. The fallback position of ardent Nazis like Hans Freyer, disillusioned by 
the failure of Nazism to fulfill their idealized model of a new European order, was to a 
half-hearted acceptance of a bourgeois western European alternative to American 
bureaucracy and Soviet technocratic civilization. This was the simple escapism to which 
the old were long inured. In the consciousness of the intellectual youth, however, it 
created a new, more implicit barrier to active questioning. Their elders’ escapism saddled 
them with the burden of confronting events without the benefit and knowledge of certain 
experiences or traditions for orientation.  
Of course, the very idea of confession, rehabilitation, and even guilt were matters 
only fully understood in Germany by those old enough to have observed their colleagues’ 
actions. The silence and active dissemblance of the former Nazi philosophers had more 
important consequence for the younger students of philosophy, who, in any event, would 
only come across those works from the 1930s in (sometimes altered) republications, 
which, in the absence of historical context would very rarely provoke a political 
questioning on the youth’s part.173 Still, we have to remain open to the possibility that the 
changes in the philosophical field—particularly in the subject matter, interdisciplinary 
exchanges, and practice of teaching—could have developed out of and even alongside the 
 
173 Of course, the most important counterexample to this is Jürgen Habermas’ review of the 1953 
republication of Heidegger’s 1935 lectures, Introduction to Metaphysics, which we will discuss in detail 
below. However, even in this case, the negative responses to Habermas’ critical review design their 
apologia for Heidegger’s misstep by evoking the young upstart’s lack of understanding for the political 
context of Heidegger’s statement. 
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intellectual and institutional continuities of the older generations. Despite the persistent 
cultural pessimism of the aging “reactionary modernists,” the youth above all remained 
open to a renewed connection to the cultural traditions that predated the pathos of 
intellectual revolt that accompanied the destruction of First World War and fueled the 
National Socialist rise to power.174 
 
Philosophy, Politics, and the Young Generation 
Although “overburdened” with political expectations and under-informed about 
the misdeeds of their teachers, the question remained for the young, aspiring philosophers 
in West Germany: was there any role for philosophy, even in the broad sense of 
intellectual guidance, to play in political and social reality? In publications like Der Ruf, 
commentators lauded the idea that in a time of “spiritual privation” (geistige Not), 
philosophy must take on the role of the “Weltanschauung von morgen,” as the prominent 
Catholic philosopher, Aloys Wenzl demanded in a speech before students in Munich.175 
“Weltanschauung,” or “world view” was a very controversial term in the cultural and 
political discourse of immediate postwar era. It conjured up images of the conflict of 
 
174 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in the Weimar and the Third 
Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). I regret that I cannot provide more than a gesture to 
Herf’s excellent and very apt characterization of how the radical conservatism of the Weimar Period 
combined a concern for the decline of Kultur, the rise of materialism, and leveling powers of mass society 
with a fascination with modern alienation, the figure of the ‘worker,’ the warrior, the ‘heroic’ nihilist, as in 
the examples of men like Heidegger, Schmitt, Jünger, or Werner Sombart. However, it is fair to say that 
these same figure after 1945 maintained an ambivalent view of technologization, ‘massification,’ and 
specialization; the only difference was that Nazism was now include as another manifestation of these 
problems rather than a solution. 
175 A. von Bernstorff, “Philosophie, Weltanschauung von morgen,” in Der Ruf 1, no. 10 (Jan. 1947):8. 
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multiple Weltanschauungen among competing philosophical schools and academic 
disciplines from the Fin de siècle to the early 1930s. The word was also often used 
interchangeably with political ideology, as when one spoke of the Nazi or Communist 
Weltanschauung. Yet Wenzl’s catch phrase was not a call for philosophy to become 
another political ideology; rather, like many older philosophers he hoped for quite the 
opposite: that philosophy could guide human beings away from the image of a world 
divided by competing political world views by a return to ‘true’ German culture. He was 
not alone in this desire. 
In a lecture given in 1946, the eminent Bonn philosopher and pedagogue, Theodor 
Litt associated the teaching of world views or “Weltanschauungslehre” with the pseudo-
philosophies proffered by figures like Ludwig Klages and Oswald Spengler after the First 
World War. In the enmity of competing world views, Litt observed, the true “Sendung 
der Philosophie” had been lost. Lebensphilosophie fascinated the popular imagination of 
the 1920s, while the sciences in the university, tending towards greater specialization, 
produced only disenchanted ‘experts’ (Fachmänner). For German Mandarin thinkers, 
philosophy’s rightful place was as the coordinating and unifying force of science and 
learning among the disciplines.176 For aged thinkers like Litt, this narrative was as true in 
1945 after the twelve-years of collaboration of German science with the Nazi dictatorship 
as it was in 1918. The task now, was not only for philosophy to reassert its place in 
science and pedagogy, but to guide the practical reasoning of human beings. Litt argued, 
 
176 Ringer, German Mandarins, 106. 
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“Der Mensch ist eben das Wesen, das nicht nur in weltanschauulicher Bindung steht, 
sondern auch um diese Bindung wissen kann.”177 Against the uncertainty of 
“unconditioned” (bedingungslos) life, Litt held up the ability of human beings to stand 
both “in and above their horizon,” which included the grim political realities of the hour. 
Philosophy alone, as the protector of truth, possessed this ability to determine and to 
restrain competing Weltanschauungen.178 In the wake of a political catastrophe that Litt 
elsewhere plainly explained as the subjugation and misdirection of a people by years of 
ideological suggestion,179 he risked the final observation “that today the politicians must 
go along with the philosophers” not in the sense of Plato’s ‘philosopher kings,’ but 
because the essence of philosophy was unity. Because, Litt concluded,  
Noch nie hat der Wille zur Einheit so viele, so starke Widerstände gegen sich 
gehabt wie in unseren Tagen. Dem Willen zur Einheit den ideellen Beistand 
zuzuführen, den ihm nur der lautere Wille zur Wahrheit zu leisten – das ist, so 
glaube ich, die Sendung, die die Philosophie in dieser Welt der Zerrissenheit zu 
erfüllen hat.180 
 
Johannes Hessen, a strongly Catholic philosopher in Köln, gave philosophy the “partly 
critical, and partly positive” task (Aufgabe) of helping to “overcome the old and build the 
new.”181 In the National Socialist Weltanschauung fashioned by Party hacks like Alfred 
Rosenberg, the German ‘Spirit’ (Geist), once envied by its neighbors as one determined 
 
177 Theodor Litt, Von der Sendung der Philosophie: ein Vortrag (Wiesbaden: Dieterich’sche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1946),39. 
178 Ibid., 40. 
179 Theodor Litt, Geschichte und Verantwortung (Wiesbaden: Dieterich Verlag, 1947). 
180 Litt, Sendung, 50-51. 
181 “Die Philosophie soll das Alte überwinden und das Neue aufbauen helfen.” Johannes Hessen, “Von der 
Aufgabe der Philosophie in unserer Zeit,” in Von der Aufgabe der Philosophie und dem Wesen des 
Philosophen: zwei Vorlesungen. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1947), 7.  
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by “poets and thinkers,” became a “Funktion der Rasse” and of power. Biological 
vitalism came to deny the metaphysical and moral basis of humanity. Kultur and 
Wahrheit were likewise connected to the ideology of race and thus relativized and 
pragmatically instrumentalized for political goals. Wissenschaft served the purposes of 
the racial community alone. “Thus,” Hessen argued, “biological relativism joins itself 
with biological pragmatism [So verbindet sich der biologistische Relativismus mit einem 
biologistischen Pragmatismus].”182 Within the framework of this union of relativism and 
pragmatism, for an entire culture, the ‘true’ became only that which was ‘useful’ relative 
to the goals of the racial community or “Volksgemeinschaft.” For Hessen, philosophers 
now had the difficult task of critically engaging this misguided world view, but in a 
constructive way such that particularly the young had something upon which to build. 
Reconceived with a positive intent,  
Die Philosophie soll nicht nur den Irrtum zerstören, sie soll zugleich die Wahrheit 
aufbauen. Wichtiger noch als die kritische ist die positive Funktion der 
Philosophie. Wie stark das Interesse gerade der jungen Generation von heute für 
diese Funktion der Philosophie ist, wie viel sie von ihr erwartet, haben mir in 
vergangenen Winter meine philosophischen Seminarübungen gezeigt, deren 
Teilnehmerzahl eine außergewöhnlich große war. Mehr als ein Studierender hat 
mir erklärt: Wir sind entwurzelte Menschen und studieren Philosophie, um wieder 
geistigen Boden unter die Füße zu bekommen, um eine Lösung jener tiefsten und 
letzten Fragen zu gewinnen, die uns allen auf die Seele brennen.183 
 
Many established philosophy instructors also testify to the desire on the part of their 
students for intellectual guidance and stability. However, the fulfillment of such a need 
 
182 Ibid., 10. 
183 Ibid., 18. 
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was not nearly as clear cut as the lofty phrases of older professors seemed to suggest. On 
the one hand, students in the humanities and philosophy would inevitably confront the 
strictures of an intellectual field in the process of greater professionalization and 
differentiation. The universities and particularly the newly established, semi-public 
professional journals and associations did not offer forums for the realization of what 
Litt, Hessen, or even Spranger put forth as the positive functions of philosophy.  
On the other hand, there were many thinkers, slightly younger than Litt or Hessen, 
who were critical of the notion that philosophy could serve as the protector of ‘unified 
science’ and ‘objective truth.’ If anything, the experience of the recent past showed that a 
plurality of competing Weltanschauungen arose from a shared belief that each somehow 
possessed the final answers to the problems of concrete existence. In a speech before the 
teaching faculty of University of Leipzig in September 1945, the newly appointed Rector, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer reminded his audience now under Soviet occupation that 
Eine voraussetzungslose Lehre von den Weltanschauungen kann es nicht geben; 
das ist eine der großen Leistungen der deutschen Philosophie der letzten 25 
Jahren, die Fragwürdigkeit des Begriffs der Tatsache aufgewiesen und damit auch 
das Ideal einer voraussetzungslosen wissenschaftlichen Weltanschauungslehre 
zerstört zu haben. Sie hat die asketische Selbstbeschränkung der Wissenschaft auf 
‘wertfreie Objecktivität’ und ihre Unabhängigkeit von der Philosophie als eine 
Selbsttäuschung erwiesen.184 
 
184 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Die Bedeutung der Philosophie für die neue Erziehung,” in Über die 
Ursprünglichkeit der Philosophie: zwei Vorträge (Berlin: Chronos-Verlag, 1948), 6. The speech was given 
not only at the end of 1945 in Leipzing but in Berlin in the Summer of 1946. It is important to note, that the 
slim book containing the two lectures could only be published under license of the French Military 
Authority in Berlin. By 1948, Gadamer had already left Eastern Germany for a position in Frankfurt due to 
political differences with the SED and the Soviet authority. See the somewhat biased account given in 
Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, 232-263. One can laud Gadamer for continuing to uphold the freedom of 
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Gadamer recalled how the almost universal “misuse of the prestige of science and 
genuine research [Wahrheitsforschung]” served not only to support the biologism of 
National Socialist doctrine, but allowed ‘reputable’ scholars to exercise reason 
instrumentally to serve their own political purposes and professional intrigues. In this 
way, Gadamer came as close as any philosopher of the time to explaining the way in 
which the ideal of modern science was itself implicated in its political mobilization. 
Although Gadamer invoked the critique of truth and reason made by Nietzsche 
and the German historicist tradition, he insisted that “die Diskreditierung der Vernunft im 
Zuge unserer jüngsten Erfahrungen ist eine der gewaltigsten Gefahren, die unserem 
menschlichen Leben noch immer droht.”185 Yet far from viewing the perspectivism or 
historicity of truth and knowledge as the main threat to reason, Gadamer argued that it 
was dogmatism dressed in “romantic phrases” and the general lack of respect for the 
positions of others that led to reason’s (and philosophy’s) degradation. Echoing the 
opinions of some of the early commentators in the western Zones, Gadamer spoke of the 
need for educating students with the goal of teaching “self-education” and also what 
Gadamer called “Belehrung.” Belehrung meant, for Gadamer, not indoctrination, but an 
erudition mindful of one’s own subjective presuppositions as well as respectful of the 
opinions of others. It meant a departure from the half-hearted democratic politics of the 
1920s, which had led to the “struggle of world views” each maintaining the pretense of 
 
scholarship in the face of new political intrusions; however, it is hard to reconcile this with his support as 
Rector for the reinstatement of men like Hans Freyer to full teaching duties. 
185 Gadamer, “Die Bedeutung der Philosophie,” 10-11. 
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truth. Philosophical learning could also inform a new political existence. “Denn was wir 
philosophierend vom Wesen der Warheit erkennen, lehrt uns das gleiche, was wir, Bürger 
unseres Staates, als das Wesen der echten Demokratie immer müssen realisieren lernen: 
Belehrt zu werden,” declared Gadamer, “auch gegen unsere eigene, subjektiv gewisse 
Überzeugung ist der Weg der Ermittelung der eigentlichen geschichtlichen Wahrheit.”186 
Gadamer too had an image of “the primordiality of science,” to which he devoted 
a Rectoral address before students of Leipzig in 1947.187 Self-doubt, humility, and an 
objectivity through “absent-mindedness,” by which Gadamer meant complete devotion to 
scholarly subject matter and an aloofness towards or ignorance of politics, were the 
classical forms of science for the Greeks and for the classical humanists in the era of 
Humboldt and Goethe. This detached, non-dogmatic intellectual habitus was a far cry 
from his teacher’s definition of the essence of science. In the latter’s infamous Freiburg 
Rectoral address fourteen years earlier the task of scholar and student alike was work 
within the bonds of “service to the Volksgemeinschaft.”188 The Heidegger of 1933 would 
have perhaps criticized his pupil’s later characterization of science as the mistaken 
“theoretical attitude” often attributed to the Greeks’ commitment to pure 
 
186 Ibid., 14. 
187 Gadamer, “Über die Ursprunglichkeit der Wissenschaft,” in Leipziger Universitätsreden 14 (Leipzig: 
Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1947); appears in English translation as “On the Primordiality of Science”: 
Rectoral Address, in Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson, eds., Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, 
Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics, trans. Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Reuss (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1992),15-21. 
188 Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” in Richard Wolin, ed., The 
Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1993),35. 
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contemplation.189 However, though he did not speak of science as risk [Wagnis] or 
decision, Gadamer hardly believed science to be mere diversion for pleasure. Rather, he 
maintained that the university and, with it, the unifying force of philosophy had been 
transformed and endangered by the contemporary equation of science with technological 
advancement and the production of specialized knowledge (Fachwissen). This may sound 
similar to Heidegger’s “questioning standing firm in the midst of the totality of being 
[Seineden]” as the defense against the splintering of the fields of knowledge into 
specialized disciplines.190 Yet Gadamer saw the ideal of true Wissenschaft as having been 
most clearly perverted during the Third Reich:   
The increasing dependency of research on an expensive apparatus and the 
repercussions of its results on industrial production have created forms of 
unconscious dependency for science which are opposed to its original essence—
up to the extreme of its orientation toward military-scientific and military 
economic applications, as were outrageously forced upon German science and so 
humanity for Hitler’s insane war.191 
 
Gadamer admonished the scientists, who had meekly accommodated the Regime, for 
their lack of humility and eagerness to use politics as a means to promote their own 
opinions. Philosophers had not asserted their independence from politics and from the 
spurious notion of the blood-bond to the German Volk. This was a failure of science and 
philosophy itself that would be repeated if the more humble form of science he prescribed 
 
189 Cf. Heidegger, in ibid., 31. Gadamer recalls in a late interview receiving a copy of Heidegger’s Rectoral 
address in 1933. After reading his teacher’s newly adopted salutation: “Mit deutschem Gruß,” Gadamer 
confesses to having thought his teacher had “gone crazy.” See the 1986 interview, “The German University 
and German Politics. The Case of Heidegger,” translated in Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, 
and History, 10. 
190 Ibid., 32-33. 
191 Gadamer, “On the Primordiality of Science,” 17-18. 
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could not be reinstated and proliferated above all in the relationship between teachers and 
students. 
 
Existentialism as Political Liability in postwar Germany192 
Much of the early debate in Germany after 1945 focused on a separation of 
philosophy and politics. If philosophy had any active, public role or function it was as a 
counterweight to the instrumentalization of science and the university for political goals. 
Again, this was based on an older mandarin conception of the university as universitas—
a unity of scholars and researchers that was vouchsafed by the philosophers. This view 
set the German thinkers often labeled as “existentialists,” such as Jaspers and even 
Gadamer, apart from the popular philosophy coming from France. Certainly, Sartre’s call 
for engagement, or “Einsatz,” as it was rendered into German, resonated among many left 
wing commentators outside of professional philosophy. Der Ruf used the readiness of the 
young generation in France to engage in political, existential debates as a model for the 
German youth, who again seemed reluctant and unready to judge political realities for 
themselves. The French youth took part in the lively discussions, above all in the 
literature of the day, while young people in Germany, as the programmatic statements of 
Der Ruf always suggested, needed first to overcome the ideology of crisis and existential 
love of danger that prevailed in the philosophies of the 1920s and 1930s and, to an extent, 
 
192 It would be anachronistic at this point to speak of a “West Germany,” as the Bundesrepublik came into 
being only with the proclamation of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) on May 23, 1949. However, the 
influence of existentialism was certainly a phenomenon of Western Europe. 
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prepared them for the sacrifices of the war. “Anders als in Deutschland,” wrote Carl 
August Weber, “wo die junge Generation erst in wenigen Exponenten scharf umrissene 
eigene Meinungen zur Gegenwart ausdrückt, ist darum in Frankreich einen lebhafte 
Diskussion im Gange, in der sich die verschiedenen Standpunkte klar voneinander 
abheben.”193 
German commentators tended to place Heidegger’s thought alongside the 
“fashionable philosophy” (Modephilosophie) coming from Sartre and Camus in Paris. 
For some critics of popular existentialism coming from France, this language of 
engagement and will sounded too much like a return to Heidegger’s undirected 
“Resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit), which, in Heidegger’s case, appeared to have been 
given concrete expression in the political texts of the1930s.194 Furthermore, the 
appearance of Heideggerian terminology in the feuilleton pages of major newspapers and 
popular cultural journals somewhat undermined the legitimacy of his thought for 
academic philosophers. At the same time, some intellectual commentators outside the 
academic field criticized the way in which the doyens of German university philosophy 
dismissed existentialism as a popular fashion. In a piece for Die Neue Zeitung in August 
1947, shortly after the US occupational authority pulled the license for his journal Der 
 
193 Carl August Weber, “Die literarischen Strömmungen in Frankreich und die junge Generation,” in Der 
Ruf 1, no. 5 (Oct. 1946):13. 
194 Of course, Heidegger explicitly differentiates his philosophy from the humanistic existentialism of 
Sartre and his followers. However, as we will see below, Heidegger’s departure from any notion of the 
subject into the question of Being was often lost on many older German philosophers who still identified 
Part II of Sein und Zeit as the quintessential statement of Heidegger’s philosophy. In this sense, Anson 
Rabinbach’s strict differentiation between the postwar German and French reception of the Letter on 
Humanism (“Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’,” 118) must be slightly modified in the next chapter. 
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Ruf, Alfred Andersch challenged the tendency of German academic philosophers to 
dismiss the politicized version of existentialism coming from France. He pointed out that 
what figures like Julius Ebbinghaus objected to as existentialism’s nihilism and denial of 
objective values overlooked the historical context in which French existential humanism 
arose, namely out of the resistance to Fascism.195 In a very provocative rhetorical turn, 
Andersch juxtaposes the French existentialists’ idea of political engagement and the 
questioning of values with the German subservience in the recent past to supposedly 
‘higher’ values proffered by the Nazi State. Andersch writes,  
Wie gut wäre es gewesen, wenn die Deutschen in den letzten zwölf Jahren 
der Suggestion einer Philosophie entronnen wären, die gerade in ihre 
Entartung ihr Wesen enthüllte. Es gibt keinen objectiven Wert – also auch 
nicht den des Nazionalsozialismus. Die Philosophie des Idealismus, 
welche die Freiheit als Bindung an die Verantwortung begreifen wollte, 
trug sich mit ihre Perversion selbst zu Grabe. Das monomanische Kreisen 
des deutschen Freiheitsdenkens um den Begriff der Verantwortung (wem 
gegenüber?) – wird es vom Existentialismus nicht endlich entscheiden 
unterbrochen.196 
 
Here Andersch challenged the Hegelian turned Kantian, Ebbinghaus to justify the partial 
responsibility of the system of German Idealism for the perversion of German morality 
during the Third Reich. Finally, Andersch pointed to the way in which the question of 
Existenz was one for the younger generation for whom the loss of objective values was 
their reality, a reality which they faced without the benefit of their elders’ ability to find 
 
195 Julius Ebbinghaus, “Streifzug durch die Exitenzphilosophie,” Hamburger Akademische Rundschau 3, 
no.1, (1948/49): 27-34. 
196 Alfred Andersch, “Die Existenz und die Objektiven Werte: Eine Entgegnung,” Die Neue Zeitung, 15 
August 1947. 
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refuge in the high-minded ideals of the past. Existentialism confronted the youth with the 
burden of a freedom in the wake of being asked to kill in the name of higher values. The 
returned prisoner of war Andersch asked bluntly: “wollen wir morgen wieder Menschen 
töten weil wir angeblich in Besitz der hohen Werte und ethnischen Ziele sind?” For the 
young who had taken part in the war, Andersch remined his readers, “[d]as ist eine 
exisentielle Frage, für die uns, Angehörigen einer Generation, die unmittelbar aus dem 
unbedingtesten Gehorsam in den unbedingtesten Zweifel und – wir leugnen es nicht – in 
den hemmungslosesten Zynismus gesprungen ist, die Philosophie Jaspers, Heideggers 
und Sartres eine Lösung anzubieten scheint.”197 Yet, the enigmatic character of the first 
postwar writings hardly seemed to provide a solution to the problems of the intellectual 
youth; rather, Heidegger’s language seemed to confirm for many that the great 
philosopher had little to offer in the way of guidance in destitute times. Nonetheless, in 
1948, the prominent German theologian Helmut Thielicke, then professor of philosophy 
at Tübingen, wrote a report entitled “Religion in Germany” for the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. Along with describing National Socialism as a false 
substitute for religion, Thielike also reported on the “present tendencies of nihilists.” He 
stressed to his American audience the problem intellectual nihilism posed for a youth in 
search of meaning. Thielike observed how 
the leading German existentialist, Martin Heidegger, though strongly 
tainted by his political past and deprived of his academic post, is still the 
representative prophet of “Nothingness” for large intellectual circles .... 
 
197 Ibid. 
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Youth, in particular, seems to recognize its own feeing of existence in this 
philosophy. This youth – more innocent than guilty – that stands on the 
ruins, that seems to be burdened by a terrifying past, with the rubble of the 
large cities constantly before its eyes, feeling duped by the adult 
generation, yet remains astoundingly aloof from politics and seemingly 
still the captive of terror. In all its hopelessness, this youth at least feels in 
this philosophy the impulse to an adventurous and daring life and the 
message of a freedom that wants to shed all bonds – those that bind it to 
the past as well as those that bind it to God – and “other out-of-date 
authorities”.198 
 
 
“The Sphinx is not Dead”: Heidegger’s Riddle for the German Intellectual Youth 
Max von Brück expressed a wider cultural concern with Heidegger’s influence 
among the youth in an article for Die Gegenwart from December 1948, entitled “Die 
Sphinx ist nicht tot.”199 Von Brück opened with the image of Oedipus solving the riddle 
of the Sphinx at the beginning of his tragic path. This is juxtaposed with the position of 
the German youth in the present, who found themselves likewise thrown back on human 
finitude and insecurity because of the privation of their past intellectual development. 
Von Brück depicts a “crisis of intellectual foundations [Grundlagen]” on a personal level. 
He related a conversation with a student, “‘Wir haben keinen Grund’, sagte mir neulich 
ein Student. ‘Sieben Jahre Mittelschule, kaum das Elementare gelernt, dann der Krieg, 
dann die Gefangenschaft, 1946 würde ich entlassen.’ – Was soll man darauf antworten? 
Die gestohlenen Jahre gibt denen keine zurück. Nur nichts vertüschen und 
 
198 Helmut Thielike, “Religion in Germany,” in  Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 260 (Nov. 1948): 146. 
199 Max von Brück, “Die Sphinx ist Nicht Tot,” Die Gegenwart, 3, no. 24 (15 December 1948): 17-19. 
117 
 
                                                
beschönigen!”200 Certainly, von Brück conceded that some of their knowledge will 
someday prove useful in their occupations and in the routine of their daily life. However, 
this should not obscure the reality that “Die Menschheit, voran die Jugend, steht vor 
einem Nichts, wenn erst die Kulissen, die aufgepappten erkerchen des Glücks, 
durchschaut und vortgeblasen sind.” For von Brück, Martin Heidegger was the most 
radical thinker of the time, who with his “Letter on Humanism” broke a long silence to 
offer not answers but new questions or riddles to his contemporaries. Heidegger is here 
differentiated from the picture which Sartre and his French followers developed from the 
earlier idea of “Geworfenheit,” or the “thrown character” of human, finite existence. But 
the answer was not as easy as Sartre’s inference that the human being is a project that is 
condemned to be free and thus responsible for what he makes of himself. Heidegger’s 
picture was one of Heimatslosigkeit, homelessness and exteriority. Von Brück observed 
“das Auszeichnende im Denken Hiedeggers scheint mir darin zu liegen, daß es unserer 
Weltsituation die im Alltag dumpft und tausendstimmig an uns anbranden, in einer neuen 
Fragestellung dem Bewußtsein sichtbar werden läßt. Sichtbar freilich nur am äußersten 
Rande, den auch im Satz des Parmenides [“Es ist nämlich Sein”] steckt die Sphinx.”201 
Von Brück pointed to the ambiguity in Heidegger’s oracular language and the latter’s 
return to the simplicity of early Greek thought. It may well seem to Heidegger that human 
being possessed the same path towards the “Lichtung des Seins” (“clearing of Being”) 
 
200 Ibid., 17. 
201 Ibid., 18. 
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and in this sense remained “der Hirt des Seins” in the manner of the Ancients. However, 
von Brück confessed, “für uns bleibt der Satz von der ‘Lichtung’ der dunkelste, da es in 
ihm nicht um eine gelehrte Erkenntnis geht, viel mehr um eine Lebenswahrheit, die 
wieder aufgefunden werden muß.”202 Whether his turn from philosophy to “thinking” 
would result in this return to the truth of Being, remained a mere possibility and, by 
virtue of the departure from the metaphysics of subjectivity, never a certainty.203 The 
passive imagery of the philosopher, or the human being in relation to the truth of Being—
as “shepherd” or “neighbor” in the midst of Being204—could easily leave the students of 
philosophy with a feeling of powerlessness before the realities of their threatened 
existence and traumatic past. Von Brück ends with the hope that the image of the 
clearing, die Lichtung, could be realized in something more tangible: “Wenn es möglich 
wäre, daß der Mensch dieser Weltstunde dorthin zurück- und vorfände, doch nicht als zu 
einer theoretischen, viel mehr einer erlebten Gewissheit, dann schlösse sich der Abgrund, 
der zwischen den einsamsten Gedanken einer Elite und dem Tun und Leiden der Massen 
klaft.”205 
However, despite the possibility for a new beginning, out of the state of 
indeterminacy and exteriority of modern existence, there remained the obstruction of 
Heidegger’s language. Heidegger purposely adopted a very pictorial (bildhafte) language 
 
202 Ibid.,19. 
203 Cf. Heidegger, “Brief über den Humanismus,” 72, where Heidegger states his focus on “dieses andere, 
die Subjektivität verlassende Denken.”   
204 Ibid., 75, 90. 
205 von Brück, “Die Sphinx,” 19 
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to prevent or discourage translation into the conceptual (begriffliche) terminology of the 
metaphysical tradition. Otto Friedrich Bollnow pointed to the continued infatuation with 
Hölderlin as a primary source for Heidegger’s apparent destruction of the boundary 
between poetry and philosophy. Heidegger had begun to see the task of the “thinker” as 
one with that of the poet; that is, the task for both was the dwelling in language. But this 
was a task that presented an obstacle for the interpreter and, more importantly, a danger 
for the student of philosophy. “Wenn es bei Schüler dann zur erlernbaren Manier wird,” 
Bollnow warned, “entsteht die Gefahr jenes ‘vornehmen Tons in der Philosophie’, gegen 
den sich schon Kant gewehrt hatte und die sich heute wiederum bei den verschiedensten 
Strömmungen abzeichnet.”206 
In an essay from 1958, Walter Kaufmann suggested that West German philosophy 
in the 1950s continued to be dominated by Heidegger, though only because German 
thinkers still believed that something profound lay behind the new, idiosyncratic turn 
towards poetic language and the settling upon the question of Being. Kaufmann used the 
image of “Heidegger’s castle”—a stronghold made impregnable by the ramparts of 
Heidegger’s impenetrable vocabulary. Heidegger’s later works raised questions but no 
answers.207 His “thinking” undermined the potential for philosophy to engage in the 
scientific search for truth. Heidegger’s thought was a distraction; for it erroneously 
 
206 Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “Heideggers neue Kehre,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 2, 
no. 2 (1949-1950): 127. 
207 Walter Kaufmann, “Heidegger’s Castle [1958],” in From Shakespeare to Existentialism (Princeton: 
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maintained the illusion that there was a deeper, older truth that could not be arrived at 
through logical procedure. But the departure from the standards of scientific thought was 
simply a sophistic tactic that made Heidegger’s position impervious to rational criticism. 
At the same time, Kaufmann pointed to the mystique and the public “fascination” with 
Heidegger’s printed lectures which was “due in no small measure to the way in which he 
manages to keep alive the hope that in just a few more pages, or surely before the course 
is over, we may see something that even now reduced any other enterprise to 
insignificance.”208 Kaufmann cited Karl Löwith, who in 1953 published a very 
convincing critique of his teacher entitled “Heidegger: Denker in dürftige Zeit” in which 
the Master’s oldest student argued that in the later works Heidegger often substituted 
etymologies for arguments, playing with words in order to create connections.209 As 
Löwith wrote, “Heidegger’s language is, as he himself says along with Hölderlin, ‘the 
most innocent of all affairs,’ a glass bead game with words, and at the same time ‘the 
most dangerous of all goods.’ Its danger is that it is insidious and that it encumbers more 
than it liberates.”210 Löwith related this back to earlier claims which he had made about 
the nature of Heidegger’s appeal to students in the 1920s and early 1930s, those of 
Löwith’s own generation: that the notion of resoluteness developed in Being and Time 
 
208 Ibid., 345. 
209 Karl Löwith, Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1953). The 
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was without content and could be a resoluteness towards anything, whether the 
resoluteness of Dasein, or transposed on the resoluteness of a political agent choosing 
Nazism. In his 1953 work on Heidegger, Löwith reiterated, “that to which one resolves 
oneself remains intentionally undefined in Being and Time since this is first determined 
in the very resolution, which is a projecting upon factical possibilities.”211 Löwith had put 
it more explicitly in his important article from 1942 written in exile in which he 
compared Heidegger and Franz Rosenzweig. Löwith declared,  
the anticipatory resoluteness lacks a definite aim! Upon what existence actually 
resolves, remains an open question and undecided; for only when a decision is in 
the making, is the necessary vagueness of its ‘for what’ replaced by a definite 
aim. To make up one’s mind depends on the actual possibilities of the historical 
situations. Hence, Heidegger refuses to be positive or even authoritative as to 
existential liabilities.…The resolve, thus does not come to any conclusion; it is a 
constant attitude, formal like the categorical imperative and through its formality 
open to any material determination, provided that it is radical.212 
 
Aimless and non-specific, Heidegger’s resoluteness took on the character of an 
“occasional decisionism” that Löwith juxtaposed with that of Carl Schmitt.213 In the 1953 
work, though, Löwith added another important observation of the potential danger of 
Heidegger’s ideas in the seductiveness of his style of argumentation, that of the 
 
211 Ibid., 42. Löwith had made this claim already in the early 1940s. See Löwith “M. Heidegger and F. 
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“displaced preacher.”214 Whereas the earlier Heidegger had animated the generation of 
the political youth of the 1920s through talk of resoluteness, authentic and inauthentic, 
existential and common, now the later Heidegger’s turn to poetic language could 
fascinate as much as his earlier philosophy, but ostensibly without the same radical 
existential or political decisionism. 
Nonetheless, Löwith reaffirmed his conviction that Heidegger’s political decision 
in 1933 was a logical outcome of the latter’s philosophical radicalism.215 Löwith’s 
insinuation of a continuity in the shirking of responsibilities in Heidegger’s thought, first 
by removing the normative yardstick from any existential or political resolutions, then 
through the escape into seemingly innocuous language games, was not that far from the 
strongly political criticisms raised by Georg Lukács in his 1947 review of Heidegger’s 
Brief über den Humanismus.216 Lukács interpreted the language of the “Letter” as 
escapist and an attempt to obscure the real consequences of Heidegger’s political actions 
 
214 Löwith had already isolated the seductiveness of Heidegger’s lecturing in the then unpublished report 
submitted to an essay contest offered by Harvard University in 1940. Here Löwith wrote, “The fascination 
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and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 44; on Heidegger as “displaced preacher” see ibid., 30.  
215 “Heidegger’s decisionism in favor of Hitler goes far beyond agreement with the party’s ideology and 
program. He was and remained a ‘National Socialist,’ on the margins and in a state of individuation, . . . He 
was influential solely in virtue of the radicalism with which he placed the freedom of Dasein that is 
German and always one’s own upon the manifestness of the Nothing” (Löwith, “Occasional Decisionism,” 
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of the 1930s. For Lukács, Heidegger’s turn towards the irrational, either in Nietzsche or 
in, for Lukács, a false interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetry was a way now of augmenting 
Heidegger’s “pre-fascist philosophy” with a relativization of the crimes of the Nazi 
regime by a retreat from all values and metaphysics by claiming to have discerned the 
“misguided development” of philosophy.217 It was Heidegger’s way of escaping 
judgment for the deeds of the past by focusing on the deeds of thinking which was “more 
primary” (anfänglicher) than all values and all types of beings (Seienden). Lukács ends 
his review with a powerful statement of the continuity of Heidegger’s enigmatic, quietist 
postwar work with the thinker’s earlier political misdeeds. The Hungarian Communist 
concluded, “Heidegger hat mit seiner präfaschistischen Vergangenheit nicht gebrochen, 
ja nicht einmal  sein persönliches Eintreten für den Faschismus philosophisch 
desavouiert. Ja, das hier entworfene Inkognito des Seins dem Seinde gegenüber kann 
leicht ein Deckmantel für eine spätere Enthüllung von was immer sein.”218 
Knowledge of Heidegger’s political collaboration with National Socialism not 
only disseminated from émigrés in the West and figures like Lukács in the East. In Die 
Neue Zeitung, published in Munich by the US Occupational Authority and edited by 
Erich Kästner, there appeared a short piece in 1947 from a lecture given by Kurt Hiller in 
Hamburg entitled “Über die Denkwebel.” Hiller could not have laid out the case against 
Heidegger more explicitly, 
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Der narrisch überschätzte Heidegger zeichnet sich dadurch aus, daß er statt des 
Gehirns einen metaphysischen Blumenkohl im Schädel herumträgt. Das äußert 
sich in eine Sprache, daß nur dem Ausländer Deutsch klingt während sie für den 
Deutschen von Urteil einen nie versiegenden Born des Spasses bedeutet. Wir 
hatten den Spaß schon anno Weimar. Die Sache äußert sich aber nicht nur im Stil. 
Sie äußert sich auch in Ismus: im zwar schnörkligen, dennoch stumpfsinnigen 
Inhalt jenes “Existentialismus” … Zwar frivolisiert Herr Heidegger das 
Bestehende, aber erst recht frivolisiert er die es brennende Vernunft, in dem er, 
besessen vom Tode, nichts ernst zu nehmen vorgibt, es sei den das Nichts, aus 
welchem er seine bizarren intellektuellen Ornamente spinnt.219 
 
Hiller cites the way in which theologians, intellectuals, and cultural critics like Max Brod 
tried to seriously engage Heidegger in discussion.220 However, for Hiller this was a 
pointless endeavor with someone who had confused intellectualism and barbarism. The 
returned émigré literary critic with record of Heidegger’s fresh in the mind:  
Ich halte daß schon deshalb für unnötig, weil mir der Aufruf bekannt ist, den er 
am 3. November 1933 als Rektor von Freiburg an seine Studenten richtete. Auf 
eine Kaskade von Phrasen tanzt da der Kork der These: 
 
“Nicht Lehrsätze und ‘Ideen’ seien die Regeln eueres Seins. Der Führer 
selbst und allein ist die heutige und künftige deutsche Wirklichkeit und ihr 
Gesetz.”221  
 
Aus diesem Sätzen spricht Existentialismus: das Wort “Ideen” ist in 
hämische Gänsefüßchen gesetzt. Ideen in Gänsefüßchen: der Geschmack der 
Epoche!222 
 
219 Kurt Hiller, “Über die Denkwebel,” Die Neue Zeitung, Friday, August 15, 1947. 
220 Hiller was most likely referring to Max Brod, “Kierkegaard – Heidegger – Kafka,” in Prisma 1 (1947): 
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221 See the English translation of Heidegger’s speech of November 3, 1933 to German students prior to the 
Nazi plebiscite of November 12, 1933 in Richard Wolin ed., The Heidegger Controversy, 47. 
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After 1945, the majority of university philosophers, as we have seen, understood the Nazi 
period as the perversion of philosophy’s genuine function as the organizing discipline of 
the sciences. This view went as far as to assign philosophy the role of defender of 
German intellectual life and the university against political intrusion. Hans Sluga has 
analyzed the large-scale miscalculation on the part of German philosophers—the attempt 
to read politics through philosophy, exemplified by Heidegger—as evidence that 
philosophers would do best to resist political engagement. Although Sluga presents a 
very original interpretation of the intellectual field in the Nazi Period, one cannot wholly 
aver the general conclusions about its legacy for post-1945 German intellectual life. 
Sluga describes both German philosophers and German society as a whole after 1945 as 
devoted to the collective task of forgetting the recent past. It seems paradoxical that Sluga 
decries the collective silence of German intellectuals and at the same time advocates the 
separation of philosophy and politics, of truth and power.223 For even if German 
intellectuals after 1945 were willing to impose the self-limitation from political action in 
the way Sluga suggests, the avoidance of political engagement in the Federal Republic of 
Germany could appear as no less than escapism or denial. As we have seen in the first 
chapter, for many living in the wake of the ‘German catastrophe’ the active engagement 
of intellectuals and of a new intellectual youth in the process of ‘democratization’ and 
‘Westernization’ of German cultural life and academic institutions appeared a moral and 
political necessity.  
 
223 Sluga, Heidegger’s Crisis, 243ff. 
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Constructive political engagement within the university need not take the form of 
overbearing “spiritual mission” of students and teachers bound to the German Volk that 
Heidegger had outlined in 1933. Though Heidegger never recanted his early enthusiasm 
for the spirit of National Socialism, responses of intellectuals in West Germany after 
1945 were quite diverse. It is simplistic to view the decades immediately following 1945 
as a period of avoidance, denial, and restoration. To be sure, silence did pervade German 
culture and intellectual life in the 1940s and 1950s, but for the young in particular this 
was a conscious silence that could itself serve as particular kind of intellectual protest and 
disagreement with the lofty speech of the older generation. For some, silence 
corresponded to a greater cultural belief that the immediate past was impossible to 
represent and unthinkable to interpret by any existing literary or philosophical means. 
Theodor Adorno’s well-known observation about the status of ‘traditional’ cultural 
criticism was a nagging reminder that the return of old cultural attitudes did not dispel the 
nightmares of the recent past: was philosophy as well as poetry impossible after 
Auschwitz?224   
Yet Adorno now famous words still echoed the sentiment of an older generation 
and, more specifically, for those who had experienced forced emigration and who were 
personally touched by the Holocaust. This was not a model for the younger German 
intellectuals. The incessant implication of guilt was not easily accepted, particularly when 
 
224 “To write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric, and that also gets at the insight that explains why it has 
become impossible to write poetry today” (Theodor Adorno, “Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft,” in Prismen 
[Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955], 31). 
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their German elders were all too eager to bypass the question of guilt by focusing on the 
need for political reeducation. Thus, it is not useful to view the history of postwar 
philosophy, any more than that of the wider postwar generation in the light of an 
expected direct engagement with Nazism. It is equally reductive to view silence one-
sidedly as evasion when this expectation is not met.  
Again, the silence of the young was not that of the older, compromised figures, 
nor was it always captured by the émigrés like Adorno, or the returned prisoners of war 
like Richter and Andersch, who had their own understandable manner of coping through 
a “nachgeholter Widerstand.” As we have seen, the reductive view of silence coincides 
with the expectations for a political generation that had determined the traditional sense 
of the concept used by Karl Mannheim and those writing in the 1920s, who then as older 
teachers and commentators imposed sometimes burdensome expectations on the postwar 
youth after 1945. There was no political generation of 1945 that could compare with the 
strong sense of shared identity, or match the very self-consciously stylized avant-garde 
political and cultural movements of the Jugendbewegung before and after the First World 
war, or the so-called “generation of 1968” that would follow. The youth of the 1940s and 
1950s had shared experiences in the Second World War, though these could be very 
different depending on the capacity in which they served in the war effort because of age, 
or location. If they displayed any “shared destiny” or Generationszusammenhang, then it 
could only be based on the non-experiences of “lost years” of study and on a lack of 
character formation. Their lack of form, or “Bildlösigkeit” (Mitscherlich) was driven 
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home again and again in the pages of cultural journals and in the speeches of their elders, 
who judged this youth for its reluctance to identify with the projects of political 
reeducation and for its unwillingness to assume responsibility for the past, and more 
importantly, for the future of the nascent West German state and its cultural life. 
  In a 1996 lecture delivered in memory of the recently deceased philosopher, Hans 
Blumenberg, Dieter Henrich recalled how members of his generation, now “on the way 
out” [“Im Abgang”], were not always in a position to comprehend, or be convinced by 
the call to Einsatz either in the speeches of prominent public philosophers in Germany 
such as Karl Jaspers and Theodor Litt, or by the existentialists in France. His age group 
lacked the means to start again with only slightly reconceptualized ideas that predated 
1933, which were presented in the public sphere with little background contextualization. 
Henrich confesses, 
Die Erfahrung einer Jugend unter den Schatten von Indoktrination, 
Kriegsgeschehen und Überlebenmüssen ergaben wohl eine Gestimmtheit, die, 
wenn sie denn in eine philosophische Denkart und deren öffentlichen Vortrag 
eingebracht werden sollten, nach einer Verständigungsweise aus neuem Einsatz 
verlangte. Zu ihm fehlten aber die Ressourcen und Kraft verständlicherweise 
zunächst einmal gänzlich.225 
 
Henrich’s recollections also respond to the notion that existentialism was a possible 
avenue towards self-understanding for the whole of a ‘young generation’ in the late 
1940s.  Alfred Andersch, born in 1914, may not have been accurately expressing the 
sentiments of younger intellectuals born in the mid to late 1920s, when he claimed that 
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the youth could find workable answers in the philosophy of existentialism and its 
passionate critique of ‘objective values.’ Henrich points out, “Zwar wirkte aus Frankreich 
der Existentialismus herüber, der aber erkennbar modisch getönt war. Wer sich also auf 
ihn nicht verlassen mochte und auch Altbewährtes nicht nur fortsetzen wollte, mußte 
einen indirekteren Zugang zum selbständigen Denken suchen.”226 As we will see in the 
following chapters, there were many such “indirect avenues to independent thought” for 
the philosophical youth. However, the most successful among them found their way by 
means of a questioning of the German tradition and, later, a reconnection with intellectual 
movements that had been suppressed or forced from Germany and Europe by the Nazi 
Regime. Critical engagement, not with contemporary politics in the first instance, but 
with the problems of the German and Western philosophical tradition was the first, 
difficult path that they had to traverse to gain entry to the profession. This might have 
appeared to many in the public realm as yet another example of the postwar intellectual 
youth’s political apathy; or it could have been an abdication of responsibility on the part 
of their instructors to engender a discussion of contemporary political events. Yet 
recourse to tradition also can take the form of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of 
one’s own cultural inheritance. In this way, the most gifted young thinkers coped with the 
trauma of the recent political and moral collapse by focusing their critical questioning 
first on the long-term intellectual antecedents of their current predicament. Philosophical 
instruction and research into the history of philosophy became the safe enclave for 
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critical questioning in the midst of political and professional uncertainty. Teacher and 
student alike had to overcome the residua of the older ways of philosophizing, whether 
embodied in the former schools of philosophy, or the singular ‘great thinkers’ and living 
legends from the recent past. 
This youth’s earnestness and desire for learning and cultural orientation did not go 
unnoticed by the most perceptive among their instructors. The need to catch up 
(Nachholbedürfnis) on their interrupted study meant that the priority for the philosophical 
youth was to locate teachers who were willing to spend the time and effort to impart the 
fundamental ideas of the Western philosophic tradition as well as the practice of critical 
thinking. This generation of young, eager students could be classified as a part of the 
“45er Generation”—again, those born roughly between the end of the First World War 
and before the Nazi Machtergreifung of 1933.227 However, this first generation of 
students after the war ran up against the tropes of political ‘rupture’ and intellectual 
parenthesis of Nazism that framed the narratives of older cultural commentators and 
professors and was a basis for the expectations the latter placed on the youth. The 
“generation” of 1945 lacked the living connection to the German intellectual past and 
was concerned in the first instance with a desire to make up for lost time. As Willy 
Hochkeppel (b. 1927) writes, 
Ein ganz natürliches, heftiges Nachholberdürfnis und der Wunsch, ein neues 
Lebensgefühl zu artikulieren sowie sich angesichts einer nahezu globalen 
 
227 A. Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. See especially Chapter 3 “The Forty-Fivers: a 
Generation between Fascism and Democracy”, 55ff.  
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Auflösung weltanschaulich zu orientieren, dazu die Verklärung einer so jüngen, 
aber auch so ferngerückten Vergangenheit – die ‘goldenen’ oder ‘roaring 
twenties’ – machten die auffällige Hinwendung zum philosophischen Denken, vor 
allem in Europa plausible.228 
 
Hochkeppel was expressing in this hindsight appraisal a feeling of “euphoria” among 
many Western philosophers in the 1940s and 1950s for a return to pure thought and an 
escape into a meta-historical philosophia perennis. Of course, any return to tradition was 
mediated by the older generation and thus refracted through and weighed against the 
legendary cultural and intellectual productivity of the 1920s. The German philosophical 
youth were not immune to these “Fluchtlinien,”—“lines of flight”—or escape into a 
romanticized past from the present realities of political accountability and economic 
privation. Hochkeppel repeated the common refrain of the critics in the first years after 
the war that the intellectual youth, along with many of their elders, availed themselves of 
any opportunity to avoid political questions of the day as well as their own responsibility 
for the criminal deeds of the recent past. Even the talk of ‘responsibility’ and 
‘engagement’ found in the popular philosophies coming from the French existentialists 
and parroted by some West German cultural critics were mere phrases, short outbursts of 
emotion that punctuated an otherwise silent period of retreat into pure thought and 
speculation in the hopes of remaining untouched by the political judgments of the day. 
Hochkeppel cynically observed: 
Politisch wollte die Mehrzahl abstinent bleiben, niemand wollte sich wieder die 
‘Finger verbrennen’: In der Welt der Ideen und des reinen Gedankens bestand 
 
228 Willy Hochkeppel, Mythos Philosophie (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1976), 24.  
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keine Gefahr, mit der Realität zu kollidieren, auch wenn die Mode-Philosophie 
jener Tage viel von Verantwortung und Entscheidung redete; es war alles nich so 
ernst gemeint, man spielte Freiheit und grämte sich nicht sonderlich, daß man zu 
ihr verurteilt sein sollte.229 
 
Of course, Hochkeppel was writing as an outsider to the philosophical profession in the 
1970s. Although it would seem that he paints a picture very close to that of conservatives 
like Schelsky and Gehlen in the mid to late 1950s, Hochkeppel had different reasons for 
reflecting on the way in which philosophers and intellectuals had steadily lost touch with 
reality and, as a result, had forsaken their claim to scientific status and their greater social 
function. As we shall see below, external commentators like Hochkeppel would come to 
negatively judge academic philosophers for the professionalization and 
institutionalization of the discipline that took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 
this way, the greater ‘irreality’ of philosophical questioning and the practice of 
philosophy within the West German universities existed in homology with the putative 
political skepticism of consumer, middle-class society extolled by Schelsky. However, 
this picture of the philosophical profession and, the young academics that came to take up 
the leading roles within it, was as much an oversimplification as it was to label the 
attitude of the German youth in general as “skeptical” or “de-politicized.” As in the latter 
case, it is important to see that political interests, most importantly, a determination to 
come to terms with the experiences of the twelve-year dictatorship developed only after 
the more primary needs of intellectual formation and professional orientation had been 
 
229 Hochkeppel, Mythos Philosophie, 24. 
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met. Political engagement was never overt in the first decades after the war. The more 
pressing concern was, first, the critical reinterpretation of the German and greater 
Western philosophical tradition and, second, what could be achieved institutionally to 
realize a new model of professional collaboration for the discipline of philosophy. The 
apparent “euphoria” of the intellectual youth for a newly opened cultural and 
philosophical tradition must not be equated with the equally dubious portrayal of 
opportunism or conformity in the sense of a soporific functional, “sachlich,” or business-
like comportment of the restorative 1950s.  
 
The Legend of the 1920s. 
 As we have seen above, myths of past cultural originality and political activism 
often functioned to overshadow the less spectacular but no less important process of 
learning and discovery which characterized the postwar intellectual youth’s path to self-
sufficient thought. Many intellectuals whose academic careers predated the 1930s 
retained a strong belief in the ‘legend’ of the cultural and intellectual inspiration of the 
1920s that then provided the standard against which post-1945 philosophy and culture 
could be judged unoriginal or exhausted.230 It was even apparent to foreign visitors like 
Walter Kaufmann that the situation of philosophy and culture in Germany after the defeat 
 
230 Here I refer to an address by Helmut Plessner in 1962 republished as “Die Legende von den zwanziger 
Jahren,” in H. Plessner, Diesseits der Utopie (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1974), 87-119. I would argue that 
until recently much of the historiography on German postwar culture and intellectual life retained 
something of this ‘legend.’ 
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in 1945 was the exact reverse of the cultural flourishing that followed the defeat of 1918. 
“Now it is the economic and political recovery of West Germany that nobody would have 
considered possible when the war ended; but there are no cultural achievements of 
comparable significance. . . .West Germany is doing brisk business on all fronts,” 
Kaufmann observes, “but culturally she is living on her capital.”231  
During the 1950s, thinkers of older generations—those born in the 1880s, 1890s, 
and around 1900—of the most disparate schools, temperaments, and former political 
affiliations were joined in the diagnosis and resistance both to the putative threat of 
positivism and the decline in number of positions for Ordinarien and Dozenten relative to 
the exponential rise in student enrollments at the major universities in West Germany. 
One finds a decidedly Mandarin conservatism, in Fritz Ringer’s use of the term, latent in 
the concerns about the prospects for the continued relevance of philosophy inside and 
outside the university. Even leading philosophical figures among the German 
“existentialists,” a label that could really designate a very disparate grouping of thinkers, 
many of them effectively on the margins of academia, all lamented the loss of a unified 
philosophical ideal of learning that guided the university and coordinated the now 
dispersed Einzelwissenschaften. By the late 1950s, these already strange bedfellows were 
joined in the defense against “positivism,” albeit from the platform of a debate inside 
 
231 Walter Kaufmann, “German Thought after World War II,” reprinted in From Shakespeare to 
Existentialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 371. This article first appeared in The 
Kenyon Review, Winter 1957. Cf. James V. McGlynn, “A Note on Philosophy in German Universities 
Today,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19, no.2 (Dec. 1958): 248-252. 
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sociology, by the old Frankfurt School leader, Theodor Adorno. Herbert Schnädelbach 
(b. 1936) was a student in Frankfurt beginning in the mid 1950s. He recalled a shared 
concern in the philosophy profession and the Geisteswissenschaften as a whole for the 
loss of philosophy’s “Totalitätsanspruch” and degradation as just another 
Einzelwissenschaft. Schnädelbach pointed out,  
Man muß sich klarmachen, daß in den zwanziger Jahren, in denen auch die 
“Kritische Theorie” enstanden ist, Philosophie noch so etwas wie eine 
personengebundene Deutungsdiziplin war, die jeweils individuell vertreten wurde 
durch einen Lehrstuhlinhaber. Bei solcher Positionen war ja nichts Geringes 
beansprucht als eine Gesamtdeutung der Totalität der menschlichen Kultur oder 
des menschlichen Denkens. Inzwischen ist auch die Philosophie 
verwissenschaftlicht worden – vereinzelwissenschaftlicht –, wozu sie selbst 
beigetragen hat.232 
 
Although Adorno and the Kulturkritiker often referred to the cultural and philosophical 
radicalism as well as the scholarly productivity of the 1920s as positive models for 
postwar German intellectual life, the continuing confrontation with the ubiquitous threat 
of “positivism,” or, what many some younger philosophers later described as the 
“scientification” or “Verwissenschftlichung” of philosophy, was the common cause for 
concern among philosophy at the leading universities in West Germany, including the 
Frankfurt School of the 1950s.233 
 
232 Herbert Schnädelbach, “Philosophieren lernen: Interview mit Josef Früchtl,” in Josef Früchtl and Maria 
Calloni, eds., Geist gegen den Zeitgeist: Erinnern an Adorno (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1991), 65. 
233 In addition to Schnädelbach’s quote above, one must acknowle the work of the Gadamer student and 
accomplished Tübingen philosopher, Walter Schulz, Philosophie in der veränderten Welt (Pfullingen: 
Neske, 1972), esp. 11-245. 
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By the 1960s, many cultural critics turned their attention to the failure of the 
younger generation of students—those whose intellectual development began only after 
the culture of the 1920s had been silenced by a new political order—to introduce a new 
thinking that could replace or at least challenge the old philosophical radicalism of the 
1920s and even the classical tradition of German idealism. The negative comparisons of 
the young philosophers of the day to the radical philosophers of the 1920s were relatively 
widespread, not surprisingly in the more popular cultural magazines and journals. 
A short article appeared in the March 1966 issue of Der Monat in which a well-
known intellectual commentator gave the following diagnosis of the state of German 
philosophy in the decades following 1945: “There was and is no young philosophical 
generation. . . The old has not been displaced by youthful thinking; [they] still spoke and 
speak with the old words, with the vocabulary that the sixty, seventy, eighty-year-olds of 
today had inherited.”234 The author was the free-lance writer, literary critic, and “aged 
student of philosophy,”235 Ludwig Marcuse, who had only just returned to his birth city 
of Berlin at the beginning of the 1960s after having been forced to emigrate in 1933. His 
“descriptive appraisal” of German philosophy in the 1960s as a tentative or “Provisional 
Philosophy” derived from the author’s memory of the cultural productivity and 
philosophical radicalism of the years between 1918 and 1933—the years of his own 
 
234 “Es gab und gibt in Deutschland keine junge philosophische Generation. . . . Die Alten wurden nicht von 
jungen Denken abgelöst; sprachen und sprechen noch mit den alten Wörten: mit dem Vokabular, das schon 
die heute Sechzigjährigen, Siebzigjährigen, Achtzigjährigen ererbt hatten.”  Ludwig Marcuse, 
“Provisorische Philosophie,” Der Monat 18, no. 210 (March 1966), 31. 
235 See Ludwig Marcuse, Aus den Papieren eines bejahrten Philosophie-Studenten (Munich: List, 1964). 
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intellectual maturation—and also from his time abroad, where, like so many exiled 
Jewish intellectuals he was exposed to Anglo-American philosophical ideas that were in 
part the product of an exported Viennese analytic tradition to which in his youth Marcuse 
was very close.236  
I dwell on Marcuse’s biography only to foreground the experiences and memory 
that influenced his point of view and that of the more literary critics of philosophy, 
particularly the émigrés. His nostalgia for the cultural novelty of the 1920s was 
accompanied by the belief that the radical renewal for philosophy that occurred after 
1918 was impossible after 1945. Marcuse observed, “Philosophy did not begin ad ovo 
after 1945; there was no philosophy of the rubble [Trümmer-Philosophie] (which was 
there after 1918, when there was no rubble).”237  Although Marcuse’s provocative 
observation about the persistence of German philosophical traditions and the at best 
makeshift character of an intellectual community of younger philosophers certainly 
resonated with the wider cultural public—the readership of “an international journal for 
politics and intellectual life” (the secondary title of Der Monat)—these were only the 
opinions of an outsider to the field of academic philosophy, even if they were very much 
 
236 It is also worth mentioning that his pre-1933 works included most notably intellectual biographies of 
Heinrich Heine (1931) and Ludwig Börne (1929), which gained a tragic poignancy after the German-
Jewish author’s own forced emigration. Heine’s 1834 work, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie 
in Deutschland, written in French exile, seems to have been an archetype for Marcuse’s own reflections on 
the decline and provincialism of German philosophy since the 1920s. Thus it is important to see a kind of 
love-hate relationship with the cultural production of the 1920s in Marcuse’s criticism. His ideal would 
have been for the younger thinkers of the 1950s and 1960s to give up the philosophia perennis and to build 
upon the analytic tradition as it had been incorporated into the Anglo-American tradition while in exile. 
237 Marcuse, “Provisorische Philosophie,” 31. 
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in line with the views of a more academically-based, but no less publicly visible 
philosopher like Theodor Adorno. Adorno argued in the pages of Merkur that any 
contemporary artistic or philosophical production, especially when it gestured to the 
rebellion against tradition of the 1920s, gave the feeling of “second hand” radicalism and 
could only serve as “ideological distraction” from “the powerlessness of political 
subjects.”238 Thus, not only was the composition of poetry after Auschwitz “obscene,” it 
also no longer served as the “negative knowledge of the actual world,” by dynamically 
exposing the contradictions in the apparent “harmony,” whether it be of the subjectivity 
of the spectator, or the passive consumer of the culture market.239 
Shortly after Adorno’s piece appeared, Hans Paeschke, editor of Merkur, ran a 
short article from Helmuth Plessner in which the latter expressed an uncommon 
opposition to the mythologization of the 1920s by the political generation of the First 
World War. In the 1950s Plessner had renewed his critique of the German political 
tradition, or, the “belated” development of the nation state, which led the stable bourgeois 
view of the relationship between society and the state astray.240 This peculiar national 
 
238 Theodor Adorno, “Those Twenties,” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. 
Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 47. This essay first appeared as “Jene zwanziger 
Jahre,” in Merkur 16 (1962): 46-51. 
239 Theodor Adorno, “Reconciliation under Duress [on Georgi Lukács ca. 1961],” trans. Rodney Livingston 
in Aesthetics and Politics: Key Texts from Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, et al. trans. ed. Ronald 
Taylor, afterward by Fredric Jameson (London and New York: Verso Publishers, 1980), 160-61.  
240 Helmuth Plessner, Die Verspätete Nation: über die politische Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1959). We will have more to say in  chapter five about the profound 
influence Plessner’s timely republication had on younger West German philosophers, historians, and social 
scientists. “The Belated Nation” was based on Plessner’s 1935 pamphlet published in exile, Das Schicksal  
deutschen Geistes im Ausgang seiner bürgerlichen Epoche (Zurich and Leipzig: M. Niehans, 1935). 
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development also manifested itself in the postwar view of German philosophy and 
culture:  
Das Fascinosum der zwanziger Jahre, verdichtet in der Legende von ihrer 
einzigartigen Produktivität, ihre unvergleichlichen Fülle an Talent und Wagemut, 
erklärt sich zu einem Teil aus der perspektivischen Verklärung, in der eine 
versunkene, jäh abgebrochene Zeit den Alten und den Jungen gerade heute 
erscheinen muß.241 
 
Plessner argued that from the perspective of those in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
1920s were bracketed off first by the political catastrophe and its consequences, but also, 
and perhaps more importantly for one’s judgment of its originality, from the “long 
process of consolidation” that took place in German culture before 1914. Moreover, 
Plessner warned that the young philosophers of the postwar suffer from a very distorted 
and misleading sense of the greatness of these epigonal times. Those older philosophers 
educated between the defeat of 1918 and the political revolution of 1933 could recall a 
time of tension, but of a productive tension that had to seem all the more meaningful 
because it was precisely directed at the youth and against the stuffiness of tradition. 
Plessner writes, “Separated from the questionable epoch by the dead zone of the Third 
Reich, for those over sixty, they [the 1920s] stand for the splendor of their own youth, 
and for the young under forty, as a period of brilliance, which they know only by way of 
stories.”242  
 
241 Helmuth Plessner, “Die Legende von den zwanziger Jahren,” in Diesseits der Utopie: ausgewählte 
Beiträge zur Kultursoziologie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), 101. This essay also appeared 
in Merkur 16 (1962) shortly after Adorno’s “Jene zwanziger Jahre.” 
242 Ibid., 87. 
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Just as the generation of the Jugendbewegung, idealized by commentators like 
Eduard Spranger and many others, served as the standard by which the postwar 
intellectual youth could be judged less original and conformist, the stories of the “epic 
time” of 1920s philosophy, found in the reminiscences of figures as different as Hans-
Georg Gadamer and Theodor Adorno, would burden younger philosophers well into their 
own mature careers. The self-consciousness of their own unoriginality continued to 
inform their self-criticisms. As late as 1976, Willy Hochkeppel, judged his own 
generation’s adherence to tradition quite severely. Echoing Ludwig Marcuse and Walter 
Kaufmann, Hochkeppel charges, “We speak the language and think the thoughts of our 
grandfathers and fathers, those men, whose cultural, ethical, social, and political ‘world 
picture’ [Weltbild] supposedly lies so far from us, and which we have put behind us.”243 
In the 1960s despite the public talk of its collapse, philosophy in Germany saw an 
explosion of publications, congresses, exhibitions, and workshops. However, in the view 
of those outsiders, like Hochkeppel, this was at the expense of its receding from the 
public world. The provincialism and abstraction that had characterized German 
philosophy since the First World War was institutionalized in postwar 
Universitätsphilosophie. Hochkeppel invoked Karl Popper and his followers such as 
Hans Albert as counterexamples. The displaced Vienna School thinkers and their German 
students had always argued that philosophy must have its roots outside itself. With the 
 
243 “Wir sprechen die Sprache und denken die Gedanken unserer Großväter und Väter, jene Männer, deren 
kulturelles, ethisches, soziales und politisches ‘Weltbild’ uns doch angeblich so fern liegt, das wir hinter 
uns gebracht haben.” Hochkeppel, Mythos Philosophie, 23. 
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professionalization of the 1960s these roots apparently had receded into the closed 
domain of the specialized disciplines. Philosophy was reduced to being one subject 
among others with its own closed system of practices and its own specialized jargon. 
Though this meant a brisk business for the academic philosophers, it caused a loss of 
interest on the part of a “cultivated bourgeoisie” for the ideas and opinions of 
philosophers: “Die Philosophie hat sich, so darf man durchaus sagen, der Öffentlichkeit 
entfremdet.”244 More importantly, for Hochkeppel, writing after 1968, as professional 
philosophers abdicated their social function, they allowed “vulgarized philosophies” to 
move unmediated into the public mind in the form of catchwords and phrases, 
particularly attractive to the new, impatiently activist youth of the 1960s. Hochkeppel 
writes, “Es ist nicht verwunderlich, daß die jüngste Generation ihrem Verdruß über den 
Zunftgeist, die Esoterik, das bloße Theoretisieren und die gänzliche Uneffektivität der 
total zersrittenen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft ‘bürgerlicher’ Philosophen lautstark und 
manchmal handfest Luft machen. Diese Jüngsten wollten philosophische Gedanken 
unvermittelt in Taten umsetzen.”245 
Thus, in a final bitter irony, the complacency and professional achievements of 
the first postwar generation of philosophy—the youth of 1945—are blamed for the 
misguided radicalism of the ‘68er movement. As a result of the ‘45er’s supposed 
indifference to the wider social function of philosophy and their ‘businesslike’ 
 
244 Ibid., 32. 
245 Ibid., 33 
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(betriebsam) habitus of professionalism and collaborative research, the subsequent 
politicized youth movement of the 1960s was left vulnerable to the pseudo-philosophies 
of vulgar Marxism and the left-wing ideologies of the day.  
Still, the hindsight pronouncements of cultural critics before a wider public in the 
quality, literary journals like Merkur and Der Monat in the 1960s do not explain the 
models for the practice of philosophy that were offered to the philosophers, who came to 
professional maturity and entered academic positions in the mid to late 1950s. Again, 
politics for this ‘generation’ was overshadowed by a search for orientation and the 
mitigation of their lost or wasted years under Nazism and during the War through 
collaboration with their teachers and active participation in the reconstruction and 
redefinition of the discipline.  
 The practice and production of philosophy within the specialized field of 
academic philosophy can only ever partially heed the pronouncements of outsiders before 
a wider public (and also pronouncements and revelations of its own members through 
non-scholarly mediums). However, that does not mean that the actual “business as usual” 
of the profession remained unaffected by broader social changes. With the overflow of 
students seeking professional degrees, academic chairs and directorships had to be taken 
up—and indeed, despite the crisis of the Ordinarienuniversität, the official policy of 
Hochschulreform by the late 1950s was to expand the number of instructors, above all the 
Assistanten, in the humanities to accommodate the exponentially growing number of 
young people seeking higher education. Academic societies like the Heidelberger 
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Akademie der Wissenschaften or the Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in 
Mainz continued to grow and to take in new members, congresses are sponsored, research 
groups meet and exchange ideas. These paled in public attraction to the radical activities 
of the 1920s, but they were the means of pursuing philosophy in the 1950s and 
particularly, in the 1960s. The majority of philosophers interested in teaching and in 
making a career in the profession had neither the time nor the public notoriety to make 
grandiose pronouncements about the “crisis” or the ‘end of philosophy.’ 
For most, Adorno’s question of 1962, “Wozu noch Philosophie?”246 was 
provocative and marginally interesting; but this public “spectator” position could appear 
superficial and diversionary for many younger philosophers, who were engaged in the 
practice of academic philosophy and its various institutional articulations. Those who 
questioned the raison d’etre of the profession, or its social relevance as “negative 
thinking,” like Adorno or Herbert Marcuse were viewed as outsiders to the academic 
field. Habermas recalls how “during the course of the late 1950s, Adorno became well-
known to the public above all through his journalistic publications. Inside the discipline 
[of philosophy] the Frankfurt philosophy has remained an enclave for a long time.”247 As 
 
246 First delivered as a radio lecture “Wozu Philosophie heute?” on Hessischer Rundfunk, January 2, 1962; 
then published as “Wozu noch Philosophie?” in Merkur 16 (1962:1001-1011). 
247 Jürgen Habermas, “Eine Generation von Adorno getrennt: Interview mit Josef Früchtl,” in Früchtl and 
Calloni, Geist gegen den Zeitgeist, 47; on Adorno’s public interventions, see Stefan Müller-Doohm, 
Adorno: A Biography, trans. Rodney Livingston (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 366-74. 
Marcuse’s case is more ambiguous and difficult to track. His wartime work on Hegel, Reason and 
Revolution was well respected and often cited by the circles around Joachim Ritter and Gadamer. Odo 
Marquard recalled presenting Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955) before Ritter’s 
“Collegium Philosophicum” at Münster in 1956; Marquard and others invoked this anecdote as evidence of 
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a recent biographer of Adorno observes, in the early 1950s, the returned émigrés did not 
experience the “triumphant reception” that was assumed in later accounts, after figures 
like Adorno became well-respected scholars as well as public intellectuals.248 Equally 
problematic was the relation of the Frankfurt School émigrés with their young, German 
assistants.  
Habermas confesses that he never fit in at the Institute after being appointed 
Adorno’s assistant in the Autumn of 1956. This tension was caused not only by political 
differences of opinion—which related more to Max Horkheimer’s anti-Marxism and 
support for the restorative politicies of the Adenauer government—but also by 
generational differences. The older members at the Franfurt School were bound by the 
experiences of intellectual exchange during the 1920s, when the Institute für 
Sozialforschung’s idea of critical theory was first actualized; just as significantly, they 
were connected by the shared experience of emigration, exil and cautious return. A young 
assistant, like Habermas, could only admire the intellectual intimacy of the émigrés from 
afar.249 
 
Ritter’s openness to unconventional, quasi-Marxist thinkers. See, Marquard, “Farwell to Matters of 
Principle,” in Farwell to Matters of Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 8 and Jürgen 
Siefert, “Joachim Ritters ‘Collegium Philosophicum’: ein Forum offenen Denkens,” in Richard Faber and 
Christine Holste, eds., Kreise – Gruppen – Bünde: zur Soziologie moderner Inetellektuellenassociationen 
(Würzberg: Könighausen & Neumann, 200), 192. If Marcuse’s work of the 1950s were more esteemed by 
the academic profession in Germany, there would not be this suggestion of something on the margins 
becoming  momentarily salonwürdig within the coterie around a professionally respected professor such as 
Ritter.  
248 Detlev Claussen, Theodor W. Adorno: One Last Genius, trans. Rodney Livingston (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), 176. 
249 Habermas, “Eine Generation von Adorno getrennt,” 50. 
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The more pressing question for those who entered the profession in the 1950s and 
who were just achieving institutional recognition and their livelihood by the early 1960s 
was perhaps “Wozu noch Philosophen?” and, more than this, who or what is the model 
for the philosophical intellectual? These questions bear in upon the same problematic 
legacy of the past and the displacement of alternative forms of philosophy through forced 
emigration or suppression.250 The only role models for the younger philosophers were the 
same philosophers, whose intellectual coming of age occurred in the 1920s, who were 
now the senior Ordinarien in control of the philosophical faculties, the learned societies, 
and scholarly journals. These older figures, most of whom had accommodated, or 
supported the Nazi Regime, would guide their most promising young apprentices into the 
profession after 1945 and would, to a certain extent, offer them critical methods for 
dealing with the more unsettling legacies of the German intellectual past. In this way, it 
was precisely the “fathers” and even some “grandfathers,” who offered the philosophical 
youth of the 1940s and 1950s the tools to overcome the inherited language of the 1920s 
and 1930s by means of a new professional means of scholarly collaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
250 Here one has to add to the exiled Frankfurt School, the Wiener Kreis and other philosophers of science 
like Karl Popper and Hans Reichenbach as well as those in analytic philosophy, or Neo Kantians such as 
Ernst Cassirer. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The “Freedom of Emptiness” for Teachers and Students amidst the Strictures of a New 
Professionalism 
 
While the German ‘Existenzphilosophen’ like Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger 
remained the most prominent and apparently prolific thinkers in the public sphere, many 
professional philosophers in the universities would diverge from the work of these ‘living 
legends’ both in their ideas and language as well as in their professional practice. Most 
importantly for our narrative, the actual teachers of philosophy in the West German 
universities and Hochschulen would direct their students beyond the ‘popular’ 
philosophies, or “Modephilosophien” of the existentialist authors by means of a critical 
return to the texts of the German intellectual tradition. The first priority, for teachers and 
students alike, was the need for orientation in a postwar intellectual atmosphere that 
could at once overwhelm the student with rediscovered learning from the past and appear 
groundless and uncertain because of the specter of ‘nihilism,’ which resounded as the fate 
of (western) Europe in the pages of the cultural journals.251 Driven by their own thirst for 
learning, the philosophical youth responded to the guidance of their teachers and, more 
 
251 See an interesting exchange from the feuilleton pages of Die Neue Zeitung in Munich over the “legend 
of nihilism” Hans Kudzus, “Die Legende vom Nihilismus,” Die Neue Zeitung, no. 61 (March 13, 1950) and 
Kurt Seeberger, “Ist der Nihilismus doch keine Legende?” Die Neue Zeitung, no. 90 (April 15, 1950): 9. 
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generally, to the habitus of a discipline seeking to reassert its relevance in a world of 
greater academic specialization, professionalization, and ‘scientification.’  
A bitter conflict arose over the role and language of professional philosophy. The 
popular existentialists in France and the reluctant ‘Existenzphilosophen’ like Heidegger 
or Jaspers quickly became liabilities for academic philosophers, who, in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, were struggling to adapt their once dominant, unifying faculty to the 
institutional realities of an expanding university system and an academic field where the 
specialized, ‘positive’ sciences asserted their independence and material power more than 
ever. Aspiring young philosophers could only achieve intellectual and professional self-
sufficiency by mediating the space of this conflict between German philosophy’s public, 
popular image and its professional-institutional articulation. Although in the space of the 
collapse of dictatorship and of its cultural restrictions, the postwar philosophical youth 
now seemed, to use Sartre’s popular injunction, “condemned to be free”; their path into 
philosophical study was sometimes constrained by the models presented to them by the 
older generation of philosophers. At the same time, the best among their teachers could 
offer direction both by returning their brightest students to the history of Western thought 
and ushering them into the philosopher’s new, professional comportment, often by using 
the questions raised by the contemporary German tradition and their enigmatic, 
nonconformist representatives as cautionary foils. 
In contrast to the wider public sphere and its mutual suspicion and conflict over 
the political past, when we turn our focus to the relationship between students and 
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teachers of philosophy, the feeling we find is one of cooperation and mutual curiosity in 
an uncertain context. As Dieter Henrich recalled in 1970, “in place of the coercion to 
think and feel only the compulsory [Vorgeschriebenes], at first only the freedom of 
emptiness [Freiheit der Leere] could step forth after the suspension of all continuity. In 
this space only the most intimate bonds could exist.”252 This “Freiheit der Leere” in 
intellectual terms made necessary the cooperative attempts to overcome material 
restrictions such as the lack of classrooms, the absence of textbooks, and all the amenities 
of a fully functioning university. Official reforms along the lines of Studium generale 
were only the most conspicuous part of this process of cooperation. Teachers could 
ameliorate the conditions of material dearth and overcrowding by holding special 
seminars and lectures, or by producing new introductory texts in the history of 
philosophy, often at the expense of their own specialized research. This was true of 
philosophers like Ludwig Landgrebe in Kiel, Joachim Ritter in Münster, and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer in Frankfurt and then Heidelberg, who, instead of following the ingrained 
practice of the Mandarin Ordinarien, devoted increasing time to introductory seminars 
and small reading groups.253 On the part of the students, there was an unmatched 
curiosity and thirst for ideas, which only provoked more willingness on the part of their 
 
252 Dieter Henrich, “Die deutsche Philosophie nach zwei Weltkriegen,” in Konzepte  (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 45. 
253 Gadamer’s lectures and seminars in Frankfurt and Heidelberg, particularly in the period from 1948 to 
1951, reflect this need to reconnect students to “the beginnings of Western Philosophy.” For Gadamer, this 
meant literally beginning at the beginning with the pre-Socratics, courses devoted to foundational texts 
from Plato and also to major turning points in Western philosophy, like Descartes Meditations or Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit. For a useful list of Gadamer’s announced course offerings in these years see 
Appendix 2 in Jean Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, esp. 372-73. 
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teachers to provide them with the necessary material means and intellectual content to 
prepare them for philosophical study. Questions of the recent political past and of the 
guilt born by themselves or their teachers were of lesser importance in the academic field. 
 Despite the public pronouncements of aging figures like Julius Ebbinghaus, 
Johannes Hessen, Theodor Litt, and most prominently, Karl Jaspers, academic 
philosophy in the university, the actual teaching and research of philosophy professors 
paid little heed to the demands for moral reckoning with the past.254 Jaspers’ apparent 
dissatisfaction with the inability of the Germans to confront the question of guilt led him 
to leave Heidelberg for Basel in 1948. But even Jaspers admitted to Hannah Arendt that, 
despite political apathy, “The one positive factor is that there are young people, minority 
though they are, who are eager to learn, indomitable, grateful, hungry for the life of the 
mind.” He advised Arendt to relay to her colleagues in the United States that “Anyone 
who has a passion for teaching can have some wonderful experiences” at a German 
university.255 Ludwig Landgrebe also painted a highly positive picture of teaching after 
the war in the devastated cities of Hamburg and Kiel:  
Für den Universitätslehrer war diese Zeit [direkt nach dem Krieg] besonders 
erfreulich. Die erste Generation der Studenten nach dem Kriege waren 
größtenteils Kriegsteilnehmer, die, aus der Gefangenschaft zurückgekehrt, das 
Bewußtsein um die Notwendigkeit eines ganz neuen Anfangs hatten. Mangelhafte 
 
254 On these “exemplary attempts at political self-reflection” see Helmut Fahrenbach, “Nationalsoziolismus 
und der Neuanfang ‘wesdeutscher Philosophie’ 1945-1950,” in Walter H. Pehle and Peter Sillem, eds., 
Wissenschaft im geteileten Deutschland: Restauration oder Neubeginn? (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1992), 99-109. 
255 Letter from Karl Jaspers to Hannah Arendt, Heidelberg, April 19, 1947, in Hannah Arendt and Karl 
Jaspers Correspondence, 1926-1969, ed. by Lotte Koler and Hans Saner, trans. by Robert and Rita Kimber 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,1992), 82. 
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Kleidung und Ernährung und die ungeheizten Hörsäle konnten sie nicht davon 
abhalten, mit unermüdlicher Aufmerksamkeit den ganzen Tag in der Universität 
durchzuhalten.”256 
 
For the committed teachers like Landgrebe, most of their time in the decade and a half 
after the war was devoted to lectures, seminars, and the production of texts designed to 
reintroduce philosophical ideas of the recent and more distant Western philosophical 
tradition. To this end, Landgrebe published his lectures on Husserl’s phenomenology as 
well as on the great turning points of Western metaphysics257 and even an essay on Hegel 
and Marx for the Hamburger Akademische Rundschau in the late 1940s.258 His most 
influential work of the 1950s was Philosophie der Gegenwart,259 a synoptic work 
organized around the major philosophical problems in contemporary philosophy, which, 
for Landgrebe, derived from the interaction of Husserl’s phenomenology and 
Heidegger’s philosophy with the German tradition.260 Landgrebe was determined to show 
that contemporary philosophy could no longer be taught as a survey of “movements” or 
“schools.” This outmoded view of German philosophy often gave the deceptive 
impression that “philosophy is essentially a struggle of different views of life 
(Weltanschauungen) and systems of thought, among whom everyone may freely choose.” 
This “willful arbitrariness (Unverbindlichkeit)” made philosophy appear as a “useless 
 
256 Ludwig Landgrebe, “Selbstdarstellung,” in Ludwig Jakob Pongratz ed., Philosophie in 
Selbstdarstellungen, 3 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1975), 2:149. 
257 L. Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik (Hamburg: M.von Schröder, 1949). 
258 Landgrebe, “Hegel und Marx,” in Hamburger Akademische Rundschau (1948). 
259 Ludwig Landgrebe, Philosophy der Gegenwart (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1952). In English: Major 
Problems in Contemporary European Philosophy: from Dilthey to Heidegger, trans. Kurt F. Reinhardt 
(New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 1966). 
260 Langrebe, “Selbstdarstellung,” 153. 
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intellectual game”; and had the “result that philosophy, instead of dealing with specific 
problems, has become preoccupied with reflections on its own nature, with attempts at 
justifying itself and its tasks and function in society.”261 For Landgrebe, the task of the 
teacher of philosophy was to get beyond the orientation around schools or movements in 
order to raise “vital problems” towards which the student must be encouraged to take a 
stand (Stellungnahme).262 The most important task of the teacher was not to proffer 
worldviews or to focus their young apprentices on abstruse questions of philosophy’s 
claim to social or political relevance. Rather, the necessity was first to instruct aspiring 
philosophers, as well as those who took up philosophy as a means to a professional 
degree, in the task of critical thinking by focusing on the interpretation of classic texts 
and the questions of philosophy, which persisted in contemporary thought. 
 Hans-Georg Gadamer was similarly committed to reconnecting students to the 
living traditions and questions of Western philosophy. To this end he produced 
introductory texts for students and his Hochschüler during the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
In the time between the war’s end and his return west from Leipzig in 1947 to the 
publication of Truth and Method in 1960, Gadamer dedicated his time to publishing 
“didactic” pieces as introductions to new students of philosophy. His close collaboration 
with Klostermann Verlag, which began before 1945,263 allowed him to undertake a series 
 
261 Landgrebe, Major Problems in Contemporary Philosophy, 2. 
262 Ibid., 3. 
263 After the publication of the now controversial text, Volk und Geschichte im Denken Herders (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1942) Gadamer proposed editing a series of texts, which would 
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of volumes designed as introductory texts, and written by many of his closest academic 
contacts—the friends from his Marburg days like Walter Bröcker and Gerhard Krüger.264 
This was reinforced by his founding of the journal Philosophische Rundschau in 1953.265  
 
Philosophizing in Common?: Early Attempts to Mediate Professionalization in German 
Philosophy 
Through the Philosophische Rundschau, Gadamer and Helmut Kuhn sought to 
renew philosophy through critical discussion and, in the process, brought younger voices 
to the fore. Similar but more conventional initiatives were undertaken after 1945 by the 
newly established Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (ZphF) and the organization 
that grew out of it by 1950, the Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland 
(AGPD). The AGPD was meant to reconstitute the philosophical discipline and an 
academic community of researchers, initially within the entirety of occupied Germany, 
but then only within the western zones. Beginning in 1947, the founders of the AGPD 
attempted with varying success to choose themes and organizational forms for the 
congresses that would establish philosophy’s relevance beyond the limits of the academic 
 
serve as introductions to key texts of the Western philosophical tradition and also basic questions of 
philosophy, which was admittedly directed towards question of the end of metaphysics raised by 
Heidegger.  
264 Gerhard Krüger, Die Geschichte im Denken der Gegenwart (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann Verlag, 
1947); indem, Grundfragen der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wahrheit – Wissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1958). Both of these were based on lectures given by Krüger in the late 1940 and early 
1950s. 
265 See Jean Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2003), 267. 
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philosophical discipline. There were many debates between 1947 and 1950 about the 
form which the philosophy congresses should take. The early congresses in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen (1947) and in Mainz (1948) were relatively conventional, limited 
discussions among specialists, and certainly constrained by the difficulty of traveling 
between the four zones of occupied Germany. Dissatisfaction among the leading 
organizers for the traditional series of disconnected lectures led to the most structurally 
novel experiment in the first congress officially held by the AGPD. The congress and the 
published proceedings were called “Symphilosophein,” which was meant to evoke the 
sense of “philosophizing in common” that recalled the classic period of German 
idealism.266 In his opening address, Helmuth Plessner, the President of the Congress and 
of the AGPD, signaled the realities of this departure from the ostentatious forms of the 
past. He recalled how “in the Wilhelmine period, when we were still rich, people were 
apparently less concerned that each one had their say according to the principle of 
unrestricted liberality.”267 Gone were the “parades” of the (Imperial) past when the 
financial support and public esteem for academic ceremony had not yet been shattered by 
the devastation of dictatorship and war. Plessner lamented that the present poverty of the 
philosophy profession in West Germany meant that one had to sharply weigh the costs 
 
266 Symphilosophein. Bericht über den Dritten Deutschen Kongreß für Philosophie Bremen 1950, ed. by 
Helmuth Plessner (Muncih: Verlag Leo Lehnen GmbH., 1952). The Congress was held in the rooms of the 
Bremen Courthouse from October 1-5, 1950. The term originated with the Jena Romantics at the end of the 
eighteenth century above all in the circle around Novalis the brothers Schlegel. 
267 Helmuth Plessner, “Eröffnungsansprache des Präsidenten,” Symphilosophien, 9. 
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against the primary needs of the academic conference and the demands of its changing 
constituency: 
Man verlangt, jedenfalls die Jüngeren verlangen es, daß die Kongresse ihrer 
ursprünglichen Bestimmung sachlicher Auseinandersetzung wieder dienen, was ja 
nur möglich ist, wenn sie eine neue Form bekommen. Ein solche neue Form, die 
des Gesprächs am runden Tisch, des Symposions . . . [ist] seit Jahren schon mit 
Erfolg ausprobiert worden und beginnt auch in unserem vortragsfreudigen 
Vaterlande – wie sagte schon Heine? Die deutschen sind ein Volk, in dem der 
eine Teil dem anderen Teil Vorträge halt –, wenn ich recht sehe, gebräuchlich zu 
werden.268 
 
Thus, Plessner, not without some irony, put forth the symposium as a form suited to the 
primarily cultural land of “Dichter und Denker” and for German philosophers, who were 
belatedly coming to realize that their profession could no longer unproblematically 
assume its novelty vis-à-vis the other disciplines and before the public realm. However, 
the concern for Plessner and the organizers was not so much the relevance of the themes 
of the symposia to wider social or political concerns. More significant was the problem of 
how the philosophers understood their discipline. Was philosophy merely a “subject 
among others” (Fach unter Fächer), whose representatives come forward to present the 
positive results of their research? Or was philosophy’s scientific scope wider than that of 
the research form of the positive sciences in that it raised problems that challenged the 
understanding and meaning of scientific practice as such? This was a much more 
practical formulation of Adorno’s question “Wozu noch Philosophie?” The choice of 
Symposien, for Plessner and the other planners, was based on the conviction that 
 
268 Ibid. 
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philosophy possessed this general function, but that its distinctiveness from the other 
sciences in terms of scope and function need not mean its isolation from the so-called 
Einzelwissenschaften, or a rejection of the forms of scholarly organization and 
collaboration that had developed in the latter. Therefore, in Plessner’s view, 
Die Frage bleibt offen, und vielleicht bildet die Offenheit eben dieser Frage des 
Philosophierens nach sich selbst keinen ungelösten Rest, auch kein 
Scheinproblem, sondern ihr spezifisches, ihr schöpferisches Element, das freilich 
die Gefahr der Asozialität, des Eigenbrötlertums und der Originalitätssucht für 
den Philosophen beschwört.269 
 
Hans Leisegang put it differently in his closing address to the Bremen congress. The new 
form of the congress signaled a turn away from the idea that philosophers should offer a 
personal or group-oriented Weltanschauung, a worldview. As he put it rather succinctly, 
“auf unseren Philosophenkongressen wird keine Weltanschauung, sondern Philosophie 
getrieben.”270 The clear inclination towards philosophical practice and 
professionalization was guided by the determination that these congresses of the AGPD 
would be not only a collection of “philosophers” of one school or another, but a gathering 
of researchers and teachers, who each carried a responsibility to the philosophical 
community. The antique form of the symposium imparted an image of an intimate 
conversation between philosophers, but conducted in view of the public, which could 
gather around and potentially speak instead of passively receiving the conference reports. 
It was also a way for an older generation of German philosophers to come to terms with 
 
269 Plessner, “Eröffnungsansprache,” Symphilosophien, 13. 
270 Leisegang, “Schlussansprache,” Symphilosophein, 355. 
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the modernization of philosophy as a discipline. The Mandarin ideals, but not necessarily 
Mandarin “attitudes” of older philosophers were curbed to fit the discipline within the 
new university system and to adapt its practices more closely to those of the natural and 
newly independent social sciences. This meant above all adopting models of professional 
communication and public exchange.  
The young philosopher of religion, Jacob Taubes, then still in the United States, 
lauded these efforts to shift the tendency of German philosophy towards the dialogic 
form. In a review of the proceedings, Taubes observed, “The form of the symposium or 
of a round table conference is not a genuine German method of philosophizing, and it 
took some courage to experiment with a dialogical philosophy instead of continuing with 
the usual way of oracular monologues.”271 Albeit from a distance, Taubes believed the 
Bremen experiment successful in dealing a blow to the dictatorship of the German 
philosophical Mandarinate. Yet within the West German press, the reviews of the 
Bremen Congress were mixed. Most applauded the effort to adopt the style of the 
symposium in order to prevent scholars from simply lecturing, or speaking past each 
other. However, many younger commentators complained that the conference failed to 
engender a heightened, more dynamic discussion and exchange. There was a certain 
“Unfähigkeit zum wirklichen Gespräch,” as the 23-year-old Hans Heinz Holz observed in 
 
271 Jacob Taubes, Review of Symphilosophien, ed. Helmuth Plessner, in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 14, no. 2 (Dec. 1953): 284. Taubes was not in attendance at the actual congress in 1950. 
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the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.272 Other critics cited the failure of philosophers at 
the congress to take up the important problems of the time, such as the responsibility of 
philosophers and academia for the recent past. Nor was it lost on the attendees that 
among the participants and even the chairs of some of the panels were former, ardent 
National Socialists, such as Hans Freyer, Erich Rothacker, Carl August Emge, and 
Arnold Gehlen. This was not surprising since the same politically burdened individuals 
had figured prominently at the congresses in 1947 and 1948 as well as in the pages of the 
new ZphF. It may only be astounding in retrospect that the Symphilosophein Congress 
had not altered the continuity in the cast of characters, despite being presided over by the 
returned émigré, Helmuth Plessner. 
More significant to many participants in the first postwar conferences was the 
lack of discussion about the most prominent philosophical movement at the time: 
existentialism. In an review published shortly after the Mainz Concress in 1948, Otto 
Friedrich Bollnow complained that the newest philosophical tendencies that may have 
found resonance above all with the youth and wider public were as a rule marginalized in 
the topics of the conference panels. Bollnow argued that the discussion was still 
determined by the “consolidated world picture of the older generation,” those who were 
over sixty and who viewed existentialism as a mere expression of the crisis of the times. 
The dominance of this view was due in part to the lack of young philosophers, who might 
have offered a “counter-balance” to the older figures. Bollnow lamented, “Von der 
 
272 FAZ, 17.3.1953. 
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älteren Generation haben verhältnismäßig viele die Wirren der Zeit überdauert, es fehlt 
schon die mittlere, und die Verluste der jungen Philosophengeneration durch Emigation, 
Krieg und andere Einflüsse werden für lange Zeit nicht wieder zu ersetzen sein.”273 This 
apparent lack of interest for the concerns of the young generation undermined the picture 
of a profession attempting to attune itself to broader intellectual problems both inside and 
outside the university. Despite official pronouncements to the contrary, that an academic 
congress of philosophers was likely to spark enough interest to have some sort of 
exchange between specialists and “the public” appears at best unlikely and at worst naïve. 
The more practical problem facing leading acadmic philosophers was the structure not 
only of the congresses, but of the inclusivity of organizations that would determine the 
practice of the profession itself.  
After the Congress of 1947 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen the leading academic 
philosophers formed a “Kuratorium,” whose tasks included planning of future 
conferences and also the formulation of the organizational principles of the AGPD. 
Organizers of the Mainz Congress (1948) led by Fritz Joachim von Rintelen (Mainz), 
Aloys Wenzl (Munich), Theodor Litt (Bonn), and Helmuth Plessner (Groningen, later 
Göttingen) formed  “Das engere Kuratorium,” which would be responsible for planning 
the next conference to meet in two years time. A small coterie comprised of the same 
notables of the Mainz Congress also met in Deidesheim on 8 and 9 August 1948 
 
273 Otto Friedrich Bollnow. “Der Mensch – die Welt – Gott: Rückblick aud den Mainzer 
Philosophenkongreß”  in Die Neue Zeitung 1 (14.18.1948) 
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following the Congress proper. The so-called “Deidesheimer Geschpräche” were meant 
to address the question of “Das Verhältnis der Philosophie zu den Ereignissen unserer 
Zeit.” Theodor Litt opened the discussion with the intention of addressing the status and 
task of philosophy under the present circumstances in Germany as well as with 
condsideration of the recent past and an uncertain future. Above all, Litt emphasized the 
need for a renewed, albeit provisional “Bildungideal” as a guide for the work of 
philosophers and teachers of philosophy inside and outside of the university.274 Von 
Rintelen then pointed to the impossibility of forming a definite picture of human life in 
Germany at present, particularly with respect to the German youth: 
Wir leben dem Zeitbewußtsein nach in einer Art Dämmerzustand. Ich deute ihn 
so: Das seelische Spannungsvermögen ist überspannt worden. Jugentliche, die aus 
dem Krieg zurückkamen, scheinen wie stehengeblieben. Sie sind nicht innerlich 
wesentlich vorangekommen, sondern es ist, wie wenn ihre Entwicklung den Atem 
angehalten hätte. Und so ist es in ganz Deutschland.275 
 
At the same time, in his opening address as president of the Mainz congress, Von 
Rintelen strongly spoke out against Existenzphilosophie and the call back to “actual 
human existence,” and a resoluteness that demanded both engagement and unconditional 
freedom as an answer to the present misery. For figures like Litt and von Rintelen there 
was no going back to the vitalist intellectual movements and Lebesphilosophie of the first 
two decades of the twentieth century. As von Rintelen declared, “[h]inter uns liegt auch 
 
274 Theodor Litt, recorded in “Die Deidesheimer Gespräche,” summarized by Hermann Wein, in Georgi 
Schischkoff, ed., Philosophische Vorträge und Diskussion. Bericht über den Philosophen-Kongreß, Mainz 
1948. Sonderheft 1 der Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (Wurzbach, 1949), 197-98. 
275 Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen recorded in ibid., 198. 
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eine Zeit der Lebensphilosophie in all ihren Höhen und ihren minderen Abarten. Sie hat 
in weitem Maße Schiffbruch erlitten.”276 Against the resurrection of this “vitalistic 
dynamic,” von Rintelen places at the center of the congress a renewed “freedom of spirit” 
which would grow out of a community of scholars. This renewal of Geist and Intellekt 
against Leben and Existenz did not entail a purely formal intellectual project. Like Litt’s 
tentative Bildungideal, von Rintelen saw renewing the philosophical spirit as primarily 
question of education and of counteracting the image of specialized training that 
continued to dominate the schools and universities in West Germany. Pure intellectualism 
and pure vitalism were to be avoided in favor of the education towards true humanism, 
“wahren Humanitas,” which von Rintelen in the common gesture of the time identified 
with the age and values of the Goethezeit.277 The overall tenor of the Mainz congress was 
a move away from what Litt labelled the “philosophical defeatism” and “depressive 
mood” of existentialism and the reinvestment of meaning in philosophical activity.278 
Despite the talk of humanistic ideals of inclusivity and universalist ideals of Bildung, 
practically the turn away from Existenz to the freedom of intellect secured philosophy as 
the domain of the few, of professional philosophers. 
By 1950 the organization of the AGPD and the planning of the conferences was 
controlled by the “Engerer Kreis,” which was made up of academic teachers of 
philosophy and philosophical authors with membership in the AGPD. This was opposed 
 
276 Von Rintelen, “Zur gegenwartigen Stunde der Philospohie,” in ibid., 13. 
277 Ibid., 14-15 
278 Theodor Litt, “Die Weltbedeutung des Menschen,” in ibid., 23. 
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initially by some like Erich Rothacker, who viewed the initiative as an institutionalization 
and even bureaucratization of philosophy.279 Hans-Georg Gadamer, on the other hand, 
objected to the idea that the membership of the AGPD, which included those outside the 
discipline, would be able to decide on the formal rules for the philosophical field.280 
Gadamer was eager to see the regulation of the profession remain in the hands of 
professional philosophers. At a meeting of the AGPD in Marburg in October 1951, a 
significant change was made to the composition and conceptualization of the Engerer 
Kreis by limiting its membership only to those “Lehrer der Philosophie an deutschen 
Hochschulen mit Promotionsrecht,” that is to philosophy professors—the Ordinarien, 
who had the right to confer the Ph.D. Thus, the broad composition of the AGPD, which 
by design was intended to include all those interested in philosophy (philosophische 
Interessierte), would not be allowed membership, or even representation in the Engerer 
Kreis. This “Fachverband” would instead be composed of a select elite of university 
professors of philosophy. As Alex Demirovic has observed, 
Mit der Gründung des engeren Kreis hatte sich die Universitätsphilosophie nicht 
nur eine zentrale berufs- und wissenschaftspolitische Institution geschaffen, 
sondern rückwirkend auch die Philosophie als universitäre Wissensdisziplin 
festgeschrieben. Philosophie hatte nun die fest umrissene Form eines 
akademischen Wissens, das durch Lizenzen in seiner Autorität geschützt und 
 
279 Letter from Erich Rothacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Bonn, May 8, 1951. Rothacker-Nachlass, Teil I, 
Universität- und Landesbibliothek, Bonn. 
280 Letter from Hans-Georg Gadamer to Erich Rothacker, Heidelberg, May 3, 1951. Rothacker-Nachlass, 
Teil I, Universität- und Landesbibliothek, Bonn. Cited with permission of Andrea Gadamer. 
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gegen Irrlehren nichtprofessionelle Philosophien und Zeitströmmungen verteidigt 
werden konnte.281 
 
Hence philosophy and the philosopher’s activities became identified in large part with 
institutional duties and the network of professional associations that established the 
formal requirements for the initiation of younger members into the discipline. This 
formalized the political field of the discipline. It restricted access to the means of 
scholarly reproduction in the university and in the secondary schools—such as rules for 
promotion to doctor or Habilitation as well as the Staatsexamen for teaching 
certificates—to an elite of Ordinarien, civil servants, appointed by the Federal States 
(Bundesländer).    
An important element of this professionalization of philosophy after the war was 
the establishment of a journal of professional philosophy. The statement introducing the 
journal, the ZphF, distinguished itself from the kind of partisan journals based around a 
restricted philosophical school that had dominated the profession in the past. The ZphF 
was to be “ein Organ … das alle Auffassungsweisen, Arten, Problemgebieten und 
Strömungen des Philsophschen Denkens bzw. der philosophischen Forschung 
unparteiisch zur Verfügung steht und also einfach ein Veröffentlichungsblatt für 
Forschebeiträge der streng philosophisch Denkenden schlechthin darstellt.”282 The editor 
emphasizes that the journal “geht nicht von einem philosophischen Kreis aus, sondern 
 
281 Alex Demirovic, “Sympilosophien – oder die organizierte Philosophie: die Algemeine Gesellschaft für 
Philosophie in Deutschland und ihre Veranstaltungen 1947-1951,” in Widerspruch 18 (1990): 36-37. 
282 Georgi Schischkoff, “Zum Beginn,” in Zeitschrift für Philosophishe Forschung 1, no.1 (1946):1. 
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lediglich von einem Herausgeber und einem Verleger, die das philosophische Leben 
dadurch erreichen wollen, daß sie die Möglichkeit bieten die neuesten Ergebniße der 
Forschearbeit in Zeitschriften aussetzen anzuzeigen oder eingehend zu behandeln.”283 
Yet, the ZphF, or at least its editor Georgi Schischkoff, was largely responsible for the 
first two meetings of what was then simply called the Philosophenkongress, in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen in 1947 and then in Mainz in 1948 and selected papers and reports on the 
congresses were published in the ZphF. Only with the Bremen congress in 1950 was a 
report and essay collection from the congress published separately.284 Although the 
journal’s name pointed towards a new form of collective philosophical research, its 
content remained rather traditional. But it did serve as the main organ for the 
philosophical profession. In contrast to Gadamer’s Philosophische Rundschau, founded 
seven years later, the ZphF lacked in the early years a critical engagement with 
contemporary literature and pressing questions of contemporary philosophy. It focused 
more on recasting the German philosophical community as a scientific profession and, as 
one of the sections of the journal was called, a “philosophical life” in Germany. 
However, it was clear that the “philosophical life” was now narrowly focused on the 
rhythms of academic philosophy; this section of the journal consisted of nothing more 
than listing the dates of birth and the deaths of leading philosophers, appointments to 
university chairs in philosophy, and the announcements of philosophical congresses. The 
 
283 Ibid. 
284 Helmuth Plessner, ed., Symphilosophien. 
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“philosophical life” tied in very closely with the ideal of a shared philosophical 
community and the professional ethos of the AGPD. Reflecting on the journal ten years 
on in 1956, Schischkoff identified the ideal of Forschung with an increase in tolerance 
among professional philosophers for opposing viewpoints. In this context Schischkoff 
lauded the abatement of Existenzphilosophie with its desire for conflict and its insistence 
on concrete individuality and an “incomparable, scarcely communicable, inwardness.”285 
Following a common refrain of the profession in the mid-to-late 1950s, 
Existenzphilosophie was viewed as a product of the disorientation of the wider cultural 
field in the first years after the war. The lack of basis in rational and even positivistic 
sharpness meant that Existenzphilosophie never had the chance to become a leading 
philosophy (Hauptphilosophie). Schischkoff observed, 
Es hat viel mehr den Anschein, als wäre man etwa abwartende und geduldige 
geworden; in diese zunehmenden Toleranz in der philosophischen Forschung der 
Gegenwart scheint die Existenzphilosophie vielfach als eine Art, als eine “Vor-
Philosophie” angesehen zu werden, von deren Sprachnot in der subjektiven 
Innerlichkeit die langsame Formung neue Konzeptionen, die etwa “nachträglich” 
zu allgemeingültigen Urteilen führen könnten, zu erwarten wären.286 
 
Here Schischkoff typifies the exemplary paradox of the proclamations of philosophical 
openness and cooperation presumed in his identification of Forschung with tolerance. For 
the equation of philosophy with research and, thus, with the institutions which regulated 
and promoted it acted as a powerful means of exclusion of those ill-defined philosophical 
 
285 Georgi Schischkoff, “Zehn Jahre Philosophische Forschung und Toleranz,” Zeitschrift für 
Philosophische Forschung 10, no. 4 (1956): 574.  
286 Ibid., 575. 
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movements like existentialism that did not fit the image many had of professional 
philosophy.   
The Philosophische Rundschau appeared in 1953, seven years after ZphF and was 
by design less wedded to the traditional view of philosophical research. The Rundschau 
presented a contrasting view of the professionalization of the discipline, which aimed in 
Helmut Kuhn’s words to “revitalize the standards [Wiederaufrichtung der Maßstäbe] 
through the application of a philosophical style of review.” Gadamer and his co-editor 
Helmut Kuhn succeeded in turning the journal into a forum for the critical discussion of 
the most pressing questions of contemporary philosophy. The preferred form of the 
contributions was the extended review article. In a letter to Gadamer from November 
1952 Kuhn singled out the review articles as the “most important part” of each issue: here 
the Rundschau would “concentrate on the philos[ophical] ἔλεγχος [Elenkhos]”, the 
Socratic method of refutation and cross-examination, in order to foster the critical 
exchange of ideas.287  Many of these critical discussions of contemporary literature were 
penned not only by men of Gadamer’s generation, but by the most promising young 
philosophers in West Germany. In the Philosophische Rundschau, aspiring philosophical 
talents like Hans Blumenberg, Wolfgang Stegmüller, Dieter Henrich, Wolfgang Wieland, 
Iring Fetscher, Hans-Robert Jauß, Hermann Lübbe, Otto Pöggeler, Karl-Otto Apel, and 
 
287 Helmut Kuhn to H-G Gadamer, November 21, 1952 in Gadmaer Nachlass, DLA Marbach. “hier wird 
sich die Wiederaufrichtung der Maßstäbe durch Anwendung eines philos. Rezensionsstils zu redigieren 
haben.”  
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Jürgen Habermas would take on questions of the philosophical tradition in reviews of the 
newest works of leading scholars of philosophy. 
Walther Bröcker, who served on the board of editors for the ZphF, wrote to Hans-
Georg Gadamer in October of 1952 that Gadamer’s plan for a “critical organ of 
philosophy” (i.e., the Philosophische Rundschau) was exactly what had been lacking in 
the field for so long.288 Two years later, in another letter to Gadamer, Bröcker criticized 
the editor Georgi Schischkoff for the decline in the quality of contributions to the ZphF:  
Ich meine wir brachen neben der [Philosophische] Rundschau eine 
brauchbare Zeitschrift, die nun nur aufsetze, aber keine Rezensionen 
bringt, und die nichts so viel Mist veröffentlicht. Schischkoff muss 
abgesetzt werden. Ich meine Landgrebe könnte den Herausgeber machen, 
und er würde das auch tun, wenn man ihm darum bäte. In Kiel gibt es 
auch brauchbare Leute unter den Jüngeren, die ihm helfen könnten. … Ich 
meine man sollte eine einzige gute Zeitschrift anstreben, die die Lücke 
ausfüllt, welche die Rundschau lässt.289 
 
It is difficult to determine if Gadamer shared his old friend’s antipathy towards the ZphF 
and its editor, though he and his students never published there. Gadamer undeniably 
distanced himself from the AGPD in the late 1940s and early 1950s. He expressed his 
concern, as we have seen, only in regard to the issue of the Engerer Kreis. Nonetheless, 
Gadamer was the single most important institutional influence in postwar German 
philosophy after 1950; and although he remained distant from the AGPD at first, he 
would come to exert great influence over this organization by 1960, when his colleague 
Kuhn became president of the AGPD, followed by Gadamer himself in 1966. As we have 
 
288 Brocker on Gadamer, 18.10.1952 in Gadamer Nachlass, DLA Marbach. 
289 Walther Bröcker an Gadamer, Kiel 21.2.1954, Gadamer Nachlass, DLA Marbach. 
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seen, in the years immediately following the end of the war the AGPD and the ZphF, 
despite some attempts at institutional and intellectual renovation, only superficially 
contributed to the re-founding of German philosophy in a new democratic key.   
 Bröcker had identified Kiel as a possible site for the founding of a new 
philosophical journal. It was not only the presence of Ludwig Landgrebe and himself, but 
of “younger talents”; most likely Bröcker had in mind Hans Blumenberg, the most 
promising of Landgrebe’s students. However, Kiel was arguably on the periphery, and as 
a key port and industrial city, the university had suffered heavy damage from bombing 
during the war. The universities that produced the best and brightest philosophers after 
the war had nothing special about them, except perhaps in certain cases like Heidelberg 
and Göttingen, which, relatively untouched by the bombings, possessed facilities superior 
to most other philosophical centers. Graduate students (Hochschüler) after the war 
cleaved to individual professors because of their personalities and teaching abilities, not 
because they were identified with a particular school or approach. In the case of 
Heidelberg, the presence of key figures like Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Löwith, or the 
historian Werner Conze made a very desireable place for study before any lingering 
association with a particular philosophical tradition, or school. Other important 
philosophers and teachers were Joachim Ritter in Münster, Erich Rothacker and Oskar 
Becker in Bonn, Otto Friedrich Bollnow and Gerhard Krüger in Tübingen, Max Müller 
and Eugen Fink in Freiburg, Helmut Kuhn, Ernesto Grassi, and Romano Guardini in 
Munich and, one might add, Theodor Adorno in Frankfurt. What could distinguish these 
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universities were region and in some cases, religion. For instance, Freiburg and Munich 
remained the center for many Catholic philosophers and also the most important Catholic 
journal of philosophy, Philosophisches Jahrbuch of the Görres Gesellschaft, edited by 
Aloys Wenzl, Fritz Leist, and Hermann Krings.  
The university defined by a “Schulphilosophie” became a thing of the past—
exemplified for many of the teachers we have just listed by the various Neo-Kantian 
schools, which dominated places like Marburg, Heidelberg, and Freiburg, when they 
were students in the 1920s. Yet while not traditional Mandarins in this sense, the new 
teachers were academic philosophers of great pedigree. With few exceptions, all of the 
names above had taken their doctorates and/or Habilitated under Martin Heidegger and 
Edmund Husserl. By the early 1950s the philosophical field was dominated by those 
brought up in the traditions of “Existenzphilosophie,” Heidegger’s Ontological 
Hermeneutics, Husserl’s phenomenology, and/or the historical school revitalized through 
Wilhelm Dilthey and his students.  In this way, the teachers of the teachers, particularly 
Heidegger, could also greatly influence the philosophical discussion of the late 1940s and 
early 1950s despite their absence from the professional scene. 
 
The Shadow of the Living Legends 
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The ideas of aging Existenzphilosophen, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, and 
Nicolai Hartmann290 continued to dominate philosophical discussion well into the middle 
of the 1950s. Although figures like Heidegger receded into the background in academic, 
university philosophy, most of the younger philosophical generation would come into 
contact with and need to traverse Heidegger’s path of thinking. Heidegger remained the 
most well-known and sought after philosopher in postwar West Germany. The fact that 
he was no longer an institutional and professional presence in academic philosophy only 
increased his mystique. The ‘outsider’ status continued to bestow the myth of greatness 
and profundity on this thinker. Heidegger’s ideas and institutional presence had 
dominated the 1930s in part from lack of competition: most of his famous detractors were 
forced to emigrate. The most important result of this dominance was that he had 
“promoted” (conferred the doctoral degree) and habilitated the most students, who later 
would hold a majority of the most prestigious university chairs in West Germany.291 The 
Heidegger epigone, Max Müller (professor at Freiburg) spoke on the occasion of Martin 
Heidegger’s ascension to the status of Ehrenbürger of his home town of Meßkirch in 
1959. Müller evoked Heidegger as the “Meister,” not of a school but of an intellectual 
movement. He spoke directly to the Master of his legacy:  
 
290 N. Hartmann died in 1950, but his influence continued through his son, Max Hartmann, who was an 
important contributor to the journal Philosophia Naturalis.  The elder Hartmann had also produced 
students, who came to have a very wide influence beyond existentialism, especially in the philosophy of 
science. 
291 As many have noted. See in particular Schnädelbach, “Deutsche Philosophie Seit 1945,” 406. 
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es gibt keine Schuldoktrin und kein Schulsystem, welche von Ihnen 
[Heidegger] ihren Ausgang genommen hätten. Als “Meister” waren Sie 
ein “Weiser”: ein so Weisender ist mehr als ein Gelehrter. Der Weise hat 
Grunderfahrungen gemacht und sich für sie jederzeit offengehalten, 
während die anderen vor ihnen zurückschrecken oder sie sich wieder 
verschütten lassen. Er lebt in der Offtenheit zu den Grunderfahrungen und 
hält sie aus. Das ist unlehrbares Leben. Dieses ist nicht lernbar, aber sein 
Vollzug wirkt und erweckt. Und so ist ohne Schule im akademischen Sinn 
trotzdem auch Ihre Wirksamkeit im Raume der Universität fast 
unübersehbar.292 
 
Müller proceeded in his laudatio to list Heidegger’s students from north to south in 
Germany, from Bröcker in Kiel on the Baltic to Gadamer in Heidelberg and also 
Gadamer’s students—Heidegger’s “Enkelschüler,” as Müller refers to them—Karl-Heinz 
Volkmann-Schluck in Köln and Walter Schulz in Tübingen, and finally Heidegger’s 
assistants remaining in Freiburg, Eugen Fink and himself. Interestingly, Müller failed to 
mention Heidegger’s oldest student, Karl Löwith, who taught in Heidelberg after 
returning from exile in 1952. Nor when turning to the Master’s international influence 
does Müller remember any of Heidegger’s émigré students such as Hannah Arendt, Hans 
Jonas, or Herbert Marcuse. Here we do not identify the dominance of Heidegger’s 
students in the university in order to construct a narrative of guilt by association. They 
were hardly “Heidegger’s children” caught in a tragic drama in which they ineluctably 
reproduced the ‘sins of the father.’293 Each of them recognized the legitimacy of 
 
292 “Ansprache Max Müllers in Meßkirch anläßlich der Verleihung der Ehrenbürgerurkunde an Martin 
Heidegger am 27. September 1959,” in Martin Heidegger, Briefe an Max Müller und andere Dokumente, 
ed. by Holger Zaborowski and Anton Bösl (Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 2003),94-95. 
293 This is the simplistic narrative constructed by Richard Wolin about Heidegger’s prominent Jewish 
students in Heidegger’s Children (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). It seems impossible for 
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Heidegger’s thought—at least his early thought.  Each of them would pass the thoughts 
of the master on to their own students, but not without alteration. For the former 
Heideggerians, those trained in the Existenz tradition and the phenomenological 
approach, the purpose had always been to work through the dead end that Heidegger 
seemed to reach after the so-called ‘Kehre’ into fundamental ontology. 
Most did accept the end of the old metaphysics that Heidegger had affirmed in his 
works of the mid and late 1930s all of which were republished in the timely collection, 
Holzwege in 1950.294 Vittorio Klostermann followed up with the republication of Kant 
und der Problem der Metaphysik in 1951 and then the introductory lectures from 1935 
entitled Einführung in die Metaphysik appeared in 1953 from Max Niemeyer.295 In this 
sense, by the 1950s it was clear that Heidegger’s star had not fallen or even dimmed in 
the philosophical profession. However, few working philosophers merely followed him 
down what he now depicted as occluded ‘wood paths,’ few were content with the image 
of the slow, solitary thinker, whose toils in language were more inconspicuous than those 
of the farmer making “furrows in the field.”296 Many of the most important academic 
philosophers of the fifties and early sixties, including Heidegger’s former students, 
 
Wolin to formulate Heidegger’s influence in terms other than the trope of tragic continuity, which elides 
the possibility that these gifted students (or anyone else) could draw on Heidegger’s work with a new level 
of awareness generated out of the experiences of forced emigration, war, and postwar political 
developments in the polarized Cold War world.  
294 Martin Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt a/M: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1950). 
295 Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Frankfurt a/M: Klostermann Verlag, 1951); indem, 
Einführung in die Metaphsik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Veralg, 1953). 
296 “Das Denken legt mit seinem Sagen unscheinbare Furchen in die Sprache, die der Landmann langsam 
Schrittes durch das Feld zieht.” Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den 
Humanismus (Bern: Verlag A. Franke,1947), 119. 
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attempted to overcome or at least mediate Heidegger’s “Destruktion” of the philosophical 
tradition through a critical re-examination of that tradition. 
The postwar publications of Heidegger’s lectures of the 1930s and early 1940s 
created the sense of a continued presence of Heidegger in German philosophy. However, 
the republication of unaltered editions of old lectures alongside the newer, more oblique 
writings also introduced the complexity of anachronism into their reception, which had a 
particular effect on younger readers. As Ignaz Knips has observed, “Durch diese 
editorische Geste wird das zweideutige Verhältnis der späteren Arbeiten zu ‘Sein und 
Zeit’ zwischen Bruch und Kontinuität unterstrichen, vor allem aber wird es seiner 
eindeutigen Chronologie von Werkabschnitten entzogen.”297 Academic philosophers 
received these texts in light of the new postwar works such as the “Letter on Humanism” 
to Jean Beaufret in 1946 that appeared in Platons Lehre der Wahrheit a year later. The 
archaic idiom of the later works with their focus on Sein, Ek-sistenz, Lichtung des Seins 
found its way into academic publications on existentialism in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.298 However, for most professional philosophers the easy adaptation of 
‘existentialist’ jargon by the feuilletonists only supplied Heidegger’s detractors with 
further proof of the superficiality of his later thinking. For younger philosophers and 
aspiring students this context indicated that Heidegger’s was not a philosophy on which 
 
297 Ignaz Knips, “Die ‘Kehre’ und die Kontinuität: Heideggers Arbeiten nach 1945 und ihre Rezeption,” in 
Widerspruch 18, Restauration der Philosophie nach 1945 (1990): 81-88. 
298 See above all Max Müller, Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart (Heidelberg: F. H. 
Kerle, 1949). 
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one could build. Not only did it close itself off by way of its esoteric language, but 
Heidegger was compromised and contaminated by his wider cultural notoriety. 
Heidegger had become fashionable.299 Only celebrities like Heidegger could talk and 
write this way. As we will see in the next chapter, there was an almost universal fear 
among professional philosophers both within and outside West Germany that 
Heidegger’s eccentric manner of philosophizing would corrupt the very language of their 
students and lead them astray (verführen) from serious critical thinking. The easiest way 
for the younger academic philosopher to lose respect and possibly end his career would 
have been to try to imitate the language of ‘the thinker’ in his hutted sanctuary. One need 
not completely repudiate Heidegger’s postwar writings to realize that they were no model 
for the aspiring generation pursuing their PhDs and Habilitations. 
A distinct but parallel influence was exerted by the other great Existenzphilosoph, 
Karl Jaspers. Of equal or greater public notoriety after the war than his former friend, 
Heidegger, Jaspers represents another case of a powerful background force in postwar 
German academic philosophy. Unlike Heidegger, Jaspers’ professional and moral 
reputation remained unblemished by collaboration. Jaspers could no longer teach after 
1935 and was forced to emigrate in 1937, only to return to Heidelberg with some 
hesitation in 1946. In contrast to Heidegger, who could teach and, more importantly, 
produce students well into the 1940s, Jaspers’ time of exile meant a disruption of his 
professional influence during the war, and this limited what he could achieve in academic 
 
299 Hochkeppel, Mythos Philosophie, 24-25. 
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philosophy after his return in 1946. His most memorable interventions in these years 
were outside the profession. In his 1946 lecture, “The Question of German Guilt” (Die 
deutsche Schuldfrage), Jaspers sought to locate German guilt within precise intellectual 
and political traditions in Germany in order to provide a moral and philosophical basis for 
Germany’s cultural reconstruction.300 This meant initially, in Jaspers view, the 
suppression of the thought of Martin Heidegger, which the former characterized as “in its 
essence unfree, dictatorial, and incapable of communication.”301 Jaspers articulated the 
now familiar conviction that Heidegger’s philosophy led directly to his political decision 
to support the Hitler Regime in 1933; however, we can also interpret Jaspers’ actions as 
an explicit intervention into a political process of institutional reorganization of German 
universities and German intellectual life in general. Jaspers’ interventions were based on 
the ideal that the political transformation of Germany required an intellectual and moral 
basis in free public discussion as well as in the free communication between researchers 
and scholars in the universities.302 Prior to his departure from Heidelberg for Basel in 
1948, Jaspers exerted a profound institutional influence during the reopening of the 
universities in Western Germany. This meant intervening in Heidegger’s case to block 
the latter from teaching, although according to Steven Remy, Jaspers actively obstructed 
 
300 Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage: ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage, 2nd edn. (Zürich: Artemis Verlag, 
1946).  
301 Karl Jaspers, “Letter to the Freiburg University Denazification Commission, December 22, 1945” in R. 
Wolin ed., Heidegger Controversy, 149. 
302 Anson Rabinbach, “The German as Pariah: Karl Jaspers’ The Question of German Guilt,” in In the 
Shadow of Catastrophe, 140. 
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efforts to remove other compromised figures in Heidelberg and thereby helped engender 
“the thickening of an atmosphere hostile to any reckoning with the professoriate’s 
support for National Socialism.”303 Remy’s indictment seems a little harsh in light of the 
thinker’s public pronouncements on the question of German guilt. What is more, this fails 
to see the difference between public questions of collective guilt and the guilt of 
individuals, a distinction that Jaspers clearly maintained in Die Schuldfrage. Indeed, 
Jaspers intervened personally—though only upon request—in Heidegger’s case; for at 
that point in 1945, Jaspers did not face the institutional realities and constraints that he 
later met with in Heidelberg—not the least being his belief in the need for the 
reconstruction of a scholarly community. 
The rebuilding of the university community required communication between 
scholars. Too thoroughgoing a denazification process would result in a university 
community paralyzed due to political infighting. Jaspers had experienced the worst kind 
of political opportunism and the denunciation of colleagues in the 1930s. The last thing 
he wanted was a similar atmosphere created by acts of retribution in the context of 
denazification. Central to Jaspers’ philosophy and his idea of the university was 
communication and cooperative research; his was the ideal universitas scholarum et 
magisterium which could only preserve its “solitude and freedom” by restricting the 
influence of the political sphere. It did not exclude the cultivation of the critical skills to 
negotiate the practical, political realm along the lines of studium generale. This required 
 
303 Remy, Heidelberg Myth, 169-170. 
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mutual exchange between scholars but also between teachers and students. Unfortunately, 
under the pressures of reforming the intellectual community in West Germany, one often 
had to settle for the semblance of ‘rehabilitation’ and general amnity, if only to maintain 
the students’ trust. Thus, even in the case of Heidegger, after the initial letter to the 
Freiburg Denazification Committee, Jaspers refrained from public condemnations in the 
name of scholarly decorum. 
Although Jaspers’ commitment to a political ethic of communication provided a 
prominent counter-example to Heidegger’s solitude and silence, the former never denied 
the importance of the latter’s philosophy.304 By the end of the 1950s, Jaspers even 
supported Heidegger’s distance from professional philosophy as the better example of 
genuine philosophizing. By comparison, what was being carried on by professors within 
the West Germany universities Jaspers deemed uninspiring on the whole because of its 
narrowness, unmediated specialization, and alienation from the public interest. 
Although Jaspers held the most prestigious chair in philosophy at Heidelberg and 
exerted public political influence through new journals like Die Wandlung, which he 
helped found along with Dolf Sternberger, Werner Krauss, and Alfred Weber, his work 
and his personal reputation were not always taken seriously by academic philosophers in 
Germany. The specialized works containing Jaspers’ own version of Eixistenzphilosophie 
were always accompanied by the appearance of voluminous works on the history of 
philosophy like Die grossen Philosophen as well as many print and radio introductions to 
 
304 Rabinbach, “The German as Pariah,” 164. 
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philosophy.305 This along with his refusal to take part in philosophical conferences with 
his peers in Western Germany ensured that Jaspers would be considered by some as more 
of a Populärphilosoph than a serious academic philosopher. When he left Heidelberg for 
Basel in 1948-49, his institutional and professional power was nearly nil. Unlike 
Heidegger, Jaspers had produced very few students. This was due in part to his forced 
exile from Germany after 1937, but also to the style of his thinking. As Otto Friedrich 
Bollnow observed,  
Daß von Jaspers verhältnismäßig wenig direkte Schüler ausgegangen sind, liegt in 
der ganzen Art seines Denkens begründet, daß der Ausbildung einer Schulmäßig 
ausmünzbaren Terminologie bewußt entgegen tritt. Sein Einfluß liegt, literarisch 
und fassbar, bei denen, die, von den Einzelwissenschaften herkommend, in seinen 
Vorlesungen den Appell eines ursprünglichen philosophierens erfuhren.306 
  
Jaspers left no school of thought behind, whereas Heidegger’s influence continued to 
shape German philosophy through the network of his students. Even the few students of 
Jaspers who remained in Heidelberg could not be promoted or habilitated in his absence. 
The former Heidegger protégé, the then unknown, Hans-Georg Gadamer replaced him, 
and set to forming a circle of colleagues and gifted students around him along the 
humanist model that was more in-line with the goals of professionalization.  
 
305 The earliest one of these was a very popular series of twelve radio lectures delivered in 1950, first 
published as Karl Jaspers, Einführung in die Philosophie: zwölf Radiovorträge (Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 
1950); published in English translation as Way to Wisdom: an Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Ralph 
Mannheim (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951). I will cite from the Second English Edition of 
2003. 
306 Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Deutsche Existenzphilosophie, Bern, A. Francke AG Verlag, 1953, 11-12. 
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 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, ‘living legends’ like Heidegger and Karl 
Jaspers had lost their institutional, academic influence, but not their notoriety and broader 
culture capital. Even so, they were not exactly models for the younger thinkers, who had 
not yet made a name for themselves. (And one could not make a name for oneself in the 
same manner that Heidegger did in 1927 with Sein und Zeit, or as Jaspers did in 1919 
with his Philosophie der Weltanschauungen and 1932 with the 3-volume opus magnum, 
Philosophie). More importantly, Jaspers and, to a lesser extent, Heidegger publicly 
expressed their disillusionment with contemporary university philosophy and shunned the 
attempts of West German philosophers to create a more professionalized discipline along 
the lines of the the seemingly more ‘rugged’ sciences like sociology and political science. 
Jaspers continued to maintain the humanistic ideal of the university and also a view of 
philosophy’s role as a unifying discipline, which ensured the possibility of 
communication between researchers, teachers, and students in the human and the natural 
sciences.307 By contrast, Heidegger completely superseded the idea of philosophy’s 
relation to the sciences in favor of his notion of “thinking.”  
The most public pronouncement of Heidegger’s view of “thinking” came in a 
1952 radio address for Bayerisches Rundfunk—the lecture “Was heißt denken?” which 
was then published in Merkur in 1953.308 It was also the title of a lecture course which 
the newly reinstated or rehabilitated Heidegger delivered in Freiburg between 1951 and 
 
307 See Karl Jaspers, Die Idee der Universität, Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1946. 
308 Martin Heidegger, “Was heißt Denken?” in Merkur 6, no. 7 (July 1952): 601-611. 
179 
 
                                                
1952.309 In the early address, “Was heißt Denken?” Heidegger distinguishes the 
“interest,” or “Inter-esse”—the indifferent “being among and between things” that 
characterizes the haphazardness of modern life—from what he means by “thinking.” 
Heidegger fears the interest shown for philosophy at the universities to have the same 
ephemeral quality. By philosophical “interest” Heidegger meant in the first instance the 
preoccupation with the history of philosophy, or the common practice of introducing 
texts by the great thinkers with the hope of teaching the student the practice of critical 
thinking. But, Heidegger contended,  
these are useful and worthy tasks, and only the best talents are good enough for 
them, especially when they present to us models of great thinking. But even if we 
have devoted many years to the intensive study of the treatises and writings of 
great thinkers, that fact is still no guarantee that we ourselves are thinking, or even 
are ready to learn thinking. On the contrary – preoccupation with philosophy 
more than anything else may give us the stubborn illusion that we are thinking 
just because we are incessantly ‘philosophizing.’310 
 
In part this can be interpreted as a gesture of Heidegger’s departure from the history of 
metaphysics. After all, in the wake of “the end of philosophy,” he predicted the rise of 
superficial attempts to dabble in its history in such a way as to mimic the practice of the 
technical disciplines. At the same time, he was attempting to articulate what was lost in 
 
309 M. Heidegger, Was heißt Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954); in English as What is 
Called Thinking? trans. by J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968). 
310 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 5. In the address published in Merkur we read, “Daß man ein 
Interesse für die Philosophie zeigt, bezeugt keineswegs schon einen Bereitschaft zum Denken. Selbst die 
Tatsache, daß wir uns Jahre hindurch mit den Abhandlungen und Schriften der großen Denker eindringlich 
abgeben, leistet noch nicht die Gewähr, daß wir denken oder auch nur bereit sind, das Denken zu lernen. 
Die Beschäftigung mit der Philosophie kann uns sogar am hartnäckigsten den Anschein vorgaukeln, daß 
wir denken, weil wir ‘philosophieren.’” (“Was heißt Denken?” in Merkur 6, no.7 [July 1952]: 602-603).  
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the separation of the sciences from philosophy as they moved more towards research and 
their technological character from the 19th into the 20th century.  
However, Heidegger remained ambiguous about the so-called “End of philosophy 
and the Task of Thinking” as he titled an important text from 1964.311 Here we learn of 
the “dissolution of philosophy in the technologized sciences,” which privileged an 
“operational and model-based character of representational-calculative thinking.”312 In 
“The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger had already diagnosed the dangerous 
form of “Ge-stell” or “Enframing” of modern technology as an “ordering” that “drives 
out every other form of revealing.”313 In the same way that this sort of “revealing” of 
objects as “standing reserve” could block man’s access to a more originary revealing, the 
mode of technologized thinking in the empirical sciences, in their instrumentalized focus 
on beings (Seiende), could deny the question of Being and the new task of thinking. 
However, the sciences could never dispense with their origin in philosophical 
questioning. In this way, Heidegger does not see “thinking” in opposition either to 
philosophy or to the sciences. Scientific discussion as practiced in the contemporary 
research university could obscure the task of thinking, but if one viewed the role of 
 
311 Heidegger, “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens (1964),” in Zur Sache des Denkens 
(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969). I cite from the revised English translation inDavid Farrell Krell, 
ed., Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, second, expanded edition  (New York: HarperCollins, Publishers, 
1993),  431-449. 
312 “The End of Philosophy,” in Basic Writings, 435. 
313 “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
trans. by William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), 27. “Die Frage nach der Technik” 
was part of series of lecture delivered in 1949 and first published in M. Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze 
(Pfulingen: Günther Neske, 1954). 
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thinking as that of an opponent to science, it would only further the misunderstanding. In 
his lecture course from the early 1950s, Heidegger told his students,  
when we speak of the sciences as we pursue our way, we shall be speaking not 
against but for them, for clarity concerning their essential being. This alone 
implies our conviction that the sciences are in themselves positively essential. 
However, their essence is frankly of a different sort than what our universities 
today still fondly imagine it to be. In any case, we still seem afraid of facing the 
exciting fact that today’s sciences belong in the realm of the essence of modern 
technology, and nowhere else.314 
 
Here Heidegger strikes at the essence of the traditional university devoted to research and 
to teaching. He was giving expression, perhaps, to what academics in philosophy and the 
humanities lamented as the rise of positivism and specialization within their disciplines. 
Yet Heidegger in usual fashion attempts to remain above the professional fray by 
focusing attention not on the threat of specialization or modern science, but on its 
misinterpretation; on the notion that “true thinking” still held out the possibility for an 
understanding of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences and therefore the 
supersession of the modern scientific world picture.  
We see, as in Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” a return to simple, ‘provincial,’ 
and possibly comforting images. He directs us to the cabinet-maker (Schreiner) and his 
apprentice, and even the poet: the first must have a “relatedness to wood” and, the 
second, to language, to writing and saying. In both these cases, the “learning” was not the 
mere technical mastery of tools and methods as could be related simply by the teacher’s 
example. Likewise with thinking, the teacher was in an uncertain position insofar as 
 
314 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 14. 
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merely understanding the necessary information or, in the case of the teaching of 
philosophy, providing access to the texts of the great thinkers did not ensure that the 
students were learning. For Heidegger, “the proper teacher lets nothing else be learned 
than—learning. His conduct, therefore, often produces the impression that we really learn 
nothing from him, if by ‘learning’ we now automatically understand the procurement of 
useful information.”315 With this “letting learn” Heidegger may have been, in his mind, 
expressing a fundamental paradox of pedagogy. However, to most teachers and students 
of philosophy it could appear either trite or as a shirking of the thinker’s responsibility. 
Heidegger had already taken leave of responsibility in relation to the historical political 
events of his past. Now, in his criticism of university philosophy, he again bore no 
responsibility for what his students might learn, or fail to learn from his oracular 
monologues. 
This was not so much different from the ‘radical’ and anti-academic self-
stylization that Heidegger had employed in the 1920s and into the 1930s. Heidegger 
again played the role of the intellectual ‘rebel,’ whose thinking could move outside the 
academy into an idealized bucolic existence of the simple farmer (Landmann). Of course, 
Heidegger could only make this retreat to more originary existence and adopt an arcane 
form of expression precisely because of the “cultural capital” that he had accumulated as 
a respected teacher and scholar in the decades before the Second World War.316 Yet the 
 
315 Ibid., 15. 
316 Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, 46-47. 
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images of the Schreiner or Landmann were no models for the aspiring philosophical 
youth of the early 1950s. Gone was the revolutionary pathos that had served as the 
background ‘mystique’ for the Master’s defiant provincialism during the Nazi 
takeover;317 gone was the nebulous, undirected ‘resoluteness’ that had found content in 
the belief in the spiritual mission of the German Volk. In a time when so much of the 
focus of pedagogy in West Germany was concerned with teaching so as to cultivate 
students’ resistance to ideology and being led astray, to develop their capacities for 
independent critical thought, Heidegger calls thinking precisely the absence of such 
guidance. 
With regard to the appropriate attitude and professional calling of the philosopher, 
Jaspers was the more direct and outspoken. Even with his distance from the academy, 
Jaspers perceived the reality that fewer students in West Germany followed the normal 
path into the philosophy profession (e.g., from Ph.D. to Dozent to Habilitation to 
Professor). However, Jaspers contended that the decrease in interest for professional 
philosophy was only relevant from within what he termed the “Universitätsphilosophie,” 
or the “philosophischer Betrieb.” In radio and television addresses and public lectures he 
made it clear that philosophy was not the possession of the scholars of the academy; 
 
317 Heidegger, “Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?” originally a radio lecture, printed in Der Alemanne, 2 
March 1934.  
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rather, it belonged to everyman.318 As Jaspers provocatively put it in an interview from 
1963: “Philosophie und Philosophieprofessor sind nicht ja identisch.”319  
For Jaspers, the academic philosopher by the 1960s was not the independent 
philosopher of whom he had publicly spoken in 1950, when his institutional presence in 
West Germany was still somewhat powerful. Just as he had described the university as “a 
community of scholars and students engaged in the task of seeking truth,” he called upon 
philosophers to achieve the independence—from dogma, politics, and narrow 
specialization—that was necessary for this “battle for truth and humanity.”320 In a sense, 
the philosophical life was the means of transcending the “self-forgetfulness” that had 
been exacerbated by the “machine age.” Although here we can see a relationship to the 
anti-modernism contained in Jaspers’ earlier works, most specifically Die Geistige 
Situation der Zeit (1932), and perhaps an affinity to Heidegger’s notion of the 
“forgetfulness of Being,” Jaspers maintains that the philosopher achieves transcendence 
through unconditional communication among scholars, students, and even the interested 
public; it could never be achieved through solipsistic concern for Being.321 Here Jaspers 
might very well have had Heidegger in mind, when he wrote of how “those who cultivate 
 
318 This is shown very unequivocally in his short introduction, Karl Jaspers, Philosophy is for Everyman: a 
Short Course in Philosophical Thinking, trans. by R. F. C. Hull and Grete Wels (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1967). 
319 Jaspers, “Philosophie und Welt: ein Gespräch mit François Bondy über den Einfluß der Philosophie,” 
aired on schweizerischen Fernsehen, February 1963, in Jaspers, Provokationen – Gespräche und 
Interviews, ed. by Hans Saner (Munich: R. Piper Verlag, 1969), 33. 
320 Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, 118. 
321 Though here one must concede, that Being, for Heidegger, would not preclude communication in the 
sciences; for it is the very possibility for scientific research into the world of beings (Seinde).  
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this independence of irresponsibility shun self-awareness. The pleasure of vision 
becomes assimilated to passion for being. Being seems to reveal itself in this mythical 
thinking, which is a kind of speculative poetry.”322 
Jaspers already suggested how the claim to exclusive truth had been the practice 
of totalitarianism and was opposed to all philosophical independence. He now attributed 
the same sort of practice to the “solitary vision” that disregarded communication. This he 
called a “dictatorial language of wisdom and prophecy” which could also manifest itself 
in intellectual opportunism. Again with his former friend in mind, Jaspers warns of this 
illusory independence of the solitary thinker, who “actually says nothing but seems to be 
promising something extraordinary. He exerts an attraction by vague hints and 
whisperings which give men a sense of the mysterious.” Most importantly, Jaspers 
concluded, “no authentic discussion with him is possible, but only a talking back and 
forth about a wide variety of “interesting things. Conversation with him can be no more 
than an aimless pouring forth of false emotion.”323 The philosophical life and pursuit of 
truth had to avoid the seduction of this kind of inauthentic self-assertion. He commanded 
the philosopher to engage in “constant communication, risk it without reserve, renounce 
the defiant self-assertion which forces itself upon you in ever new disguises, live in the 
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323 Ibid., 114. 
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hope that in your very renunciation you will in some incalculable way be given back to 
yourself.”324 
In practice, as we have noted, Jaspers saw the realization of philosophical 
independence in the collaboration of researchers and scholars within the university. 
Philosophers had to retain a living connection with the sciences in order to prevent the 
dissolution of the traditional disciplines, abandoning the many areas of the specialized 
knowledge to the domination experts (Fachmänner). Not unlike Heidegger, Jaspers also 
attacked those academic philosophers, who confined themselves to the history of 
philosophy as if this self-referentiality would secure philosophical study as one subject 
amongst others. For Jaspers, the role of philosophy was fundamentally larger in scope 
than that of the Einzelwissenschaften in that it served these sciences as a guide. Though 
this meant transcendence of the boundaries and the subject matter of the disciplines, 
Jaspers insisted that the philosopher “must participate in the actual work of the 
scientists.”325 Jaspers was expressing an old concern in a new context. Already in 1929, 
Fritz Heinemann had argued that the current crisis in science derived from the reluctance 
of the philosophers of different schools to orient themselves towards the practices and 
problems of the individual sciences. Any “new foundation” for philosophy, Heinemann 
claimed, had to repair this broken relationship with science that had resulted not only in 
philosophy’s loss of function. The fragmentation of a humanistic “cosmos of sciences” 
 
324 Ibid., 124. 
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into the chaos of the modern Einzelwissenschaften meant that the scientists too had lost a 
sense for the real significance of their work and with it, a lack of consensus on what were 
the central questions of their disciplines. Heinemann succinctly summed up the pressing 
dilemma that would continue to burden German philosophers into the 1950s, “Philosophy 
without science is empty, science without philosophy is blind.”326 
Jaspers helped found another journal in Heidelberg entitled Studium Generale in 
1947, which had as its goal “das teilnehmende Interesse an der Gesamtheit des Wissens 
wachzuhalten und als Organ solchen Interesses diese Teilnahme zu ermöglichen.”327 The 
point of the journal was not to erase the borders between the sciences, but rather to clarify 
them by virtue of collective discussion. The content of the journal embodied Jaspers’ 
ideal of fostering communication between researchers in different disciplines, not in 
opposition to specialization—which he saw as inevitable—but in order to encourage 
general philosophical consideration of how specialized research and training could be 
made most effective and fulfilling.  
Jaspers had no illusions that the fragmentation of specialization was irreversible 
and that neither philosophy nor theology could make them whole again as they once had. 
In 1950, Jaspers believed that teachers were the best philosophers; for the practice of 
good teachers was to relate the totality of specific science to the whole of what was 
known for their students. They could teach respect for great thinkers, but not their 
 
326 Fritz Heinemann, Neue Wege der Philosophie: Geist – Leben – Existenz. Eine Einführung in die 
Philosophie der Gegenwart (Leipzip: Qulle und Meyer, 1929),  11. 
327 “Zum Geleit” Studium Generale 1, no.1 (October 1947), 1. 
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idolization. Thinking, in Jaspers’ sense, was achieved by exchanges between researchers, 
teachers, and students, where the last were pushed more by the experience of not 
knowing, finding limits and then working to overcome them. Much like his successor in 
Heidelberg, Gadamer, Jaspers believed that the former philosophical systems and the 
dogmatic Weltanschauungen of Schulphilosophien were self-deceptions in that they gave 
the illusion that what only served for a time as a “signpost” guiding scientific thinking 
was absolute.328 Instead, philosophy constantly developed and was “always alive in the 
sciences and so inseparable from them”; however, philosophy’s role was beyond that of 
the sciences, for “the concrete work of the scientist is guided by his conscious or 
unconscious philosophy, and this philosophy cannot be the object of scientific 
method.”329 Thus, Jaspers retained the notion that the sciences must be guided by 
philosophy, which was always more than a simple Hilfsdiziplin; however, such a view 
would prove untenable with the changing demands placed on professional philosophers 
in the universities. With the exponential increase in the student enrollments through the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, what was left of the ideal of the classical German 
university—the unity of research and teaching—had to be abandoned to the instrumental 
needs of the mass of students pursuing professions. 
By the 1960s Jaspers observed how the pursuit of philosophy no longer displayed 
demonstrable benefits to the public in the way that the social and natural sciences could. 
 
328 Jaspers, “Philosophy and Science,” in Way to Wisdom, 161. 
329 Ibid., 158. 
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In a world inhabited by disciplines that each could point to a specific region of 
knowledge, or set of skills as their own, philosophy possessed no strong claim to a 
specific area of competence. Traditionally, philosophers had claimed to transcend the 
goals of the specialized sciences; they now had the choice of either being content to find 
their ‘expertise’ solely in critical reflection on the method of the human and natural 
sciences, or risk having no role at all. The view of the academic philosophers that appears 
widespread to Jaspers in the mid 1960s, which he holds to be fundamentally false is “the 
idea, first, that philosophy is the territory of the sciences in which experts work and 
advance specialized knowledge that can be used like the knowledge of the sciences. And, 
second, [the view] that philosophy is the science that is the business of philosophy 
professors for which they are the experts.”330 
The job of the philosophy professor was not the reproduction of a kind of 
specialized study of historical problematics that only addressed the internal debates and 
concerns of other academic philosophers. For Jaspers, it was no great wonder that the 
philosophers of the academy had alienated the public so completely. Evidence could also 
be found in the lack of interest in philosophical congresses and in the fact that most of the 
publications of philosophical research required subsidies to even see print. If everyman 
 
330 “die Vorstellung: Erstens, Philosophie sei ein Gebiet der Wissenschaften, an dem Sachkundige arbeiten 
und Erkenntnisse fördern, die man brauchen kann, wie Erkenntnisse von Wissenschaften. Und zweitens, 
die Philosophie sei die Wissenschaft, die von den Philosophieprofessoren betrieben werde, die dafür die 
Sachkundigen sind.” Jaspers, “Wie kommen Sie zu Ihrem Urteil, Herr Professor?” Interview with Armin 
Eichholz about the book “Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?” in Münchener Merkur, 16-17 June 1966, 17-
19, republished in Provokationen, 186.   
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needed to philosophize, then the proper work of the philosophy professor was to “convey 
the ideas of the great thinkers” of the past. On the other hand, if the professional 
philosophers attempted “supposedly to conduct their own philosophy, or in groups a 
philosophical school [Schulphilosophie], then in most cases today it is a hobby.” But then 
he added, surprisingly, “One can count some exceptions like Heidegger.”331 
Jaspers called attention to the deficits of academic philosophy, and above all its 
inability to capture the imagination of a wider reading public.332 Jaspers may have also 
subscribed to the ‘legend’ of the 1920s, or the period of the cultural Jugendbewegung 
before the First World War; many of his generation presumed that a period so fecund in 
cultural and philosophical production was as interesting to a “reading public” as it was to 
intellectuals and scholars. At the same time, that one would attempt to develop one’s own 
philosophy or “school” he found to be nothing more than a hobby. Still, it is mystifying 
that Jaspers now esteemed Heidegger’s thinking as more significant and original form of 
philosophizing when compared to the practices of specialists in the academic 
‘philosophischer Betrieb.’ From Jaspers’ perspective, academics who mainly took part in 
philosophical congresses and published in specialized journals and academic publications 
were engaged in mere monologues or a kind intellectual diversion for academics. 
 
331 Ibid. 
332 This was not the case for Jaspers, or his contemporary Martin Heidegger. A short article appeared in Der 
Spiegel, where it was reported that Jaspers’ 1966 work, Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik? had sold over 
35,000 copies and was due to surpass the 40,000 mark reached only by Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. The 
article also reported that while there existed no “Jaspers-Schule” that his former Freiburg colleague, 
Heidegger “Whose followers [Anhänger] or students occupied around ten percent of the circa 100 
Ordinarius positions in philosophy in the Hochschulen of the Federal Republic.” See “Philosophie Jaspers: 
Wißbar wohin,” in Der Spiegel 20, no. 29 (July, 11 1966), 76.  
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However, one can imagine that, from the perspective of the academic professors Jaspers’ 
is deriding, he and especially his “exceptional case,” Heidegger were the ones who were 
engaged in monologues. 
This was precisely the point made by Karl Löwith in an interesting employment 
of the idealized 1920s, not against the youth but against his teacher. Löwith described the 
period after the First World War in which both Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and Franz 
Rosenzweig’s existential consideration of eternity (Ewigkeit) in Stern der Erlösung 
appeared, as “for the time being, the last epoch of German philosophy in which it was 
productive and had a definite vision [Gesicht] that was not merely the opinions of the 
solitary thinkers engaged in monologues” [“der vorerst letzten Epoche der deutschen 
Philosophie, in welcher sie produktiv war und ein bestimmtes Gesicht hatte, das nicht nur 
der Kopf von monologisierenden Einzelgängen war”].333 Like Jaspers, Löwith was 
perhaps idealizing the years of his academic apprenticeship in the 1920s and early 1930s; 
however, Löwith would not concede the postwar Heidegger as an example of genuine 
philosophizing. Clearly, the “Einzelgänger” in this addition to the revised version of his 
1942 essay was Heidegger, who Löwith introduced in his 1959 contribution on the 
thinker’s seventieth birthday as “The native of Messkirch . . . who prefers ‘wood paths’ 
[Holzwege] and ‘country paths’ [Feldwege] to heavily traveled thoroughfares.”334 But the 
 
333 Karl Löwith, “M. Heidegger und F. Rosenzweig: ein Nachtrag zu Sein und Zeit,” in Gesammelte 
Abhandlungen: zur Kritik geschichtlichen Existenz (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960), 68. 
334 Karl Löwith, “On the Critical Appraisal of Heidegger’s Influence,” in Richard Wolin ed. Martin 
Heidegger and European Nihilism, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 128. 
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times at Marburg in the 1920s with this Privatdozent under Husserl, comparable it 
seemed for Löwith to the 1830s and 1840s—the great moment and radical break that he 
had identified in From Hegel to Nietzsche—seemed less momentous when one observed 
in the 1950s how 
Heidegger’s willful monologue conducts itself in a space without discussion, a 
space on whose edge there stand those who are fascinated, those who parrot 
Heidegger, and those who are reluctant, though on the other hand there are those 
who negotiate Heidegger’s achievements like hard currency. . . . How can we 
expect others to follow a thinker as his traveling companions, when it is part of 
that thinker’s essential character to reject all community and cooperation and to 
proceed in isolation along paths that end precipitously in what cannot be 
traversed?335 
 
Although Löwith’s view of Heidegger was not shared by many of the thinker’s former 
students, most notably Gadamer, Löwith’s friend and colleague in Heidelberg after 1952, 
he did express the common view within the academy, which privileged the collaboration 
and exchange of philosophical ideas within the universities, academic societies, and 
professional journals. In certain ways, Lowith unlike, his teachers, Jaspers and 
Heidegger, supported the model of professionalization in academic philosophy that had 
emerged in the 1950s. This was epitomized in the figure of Gadamer, who was, as we 
shall see, the most important academic philosopher in West Germany during the 1950s 
and 1960s, particularly when one views his influence over the greatest minds of the 
younger generation. Gadamer occupied the chair in philosophy at Heidelberg, which at 
 
This short piece was added to the second, expanded edition of Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit [orig. 
1953] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960). 
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that time was also the most prestigious. He was a leading member of the Heidelberger 
Akademie der Wissenschaften and the Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie.  
In the learned societies and new publications, Gadamer and others of his 
generation put forward perhaps the most common and influential image of the 
philosopher and of the postwar academic intellectual. As Gadamer would later write, in 
the learned academies one found “the only kind of meeting worthwhile for an intellectual 
in contemporary intellectual life: There is a little administrative work, but only after a 
scholarly presentation with intensive discussion.”336 The philosophy of the universities, 
of the learned societies, of academic journals, and formal research groups continued to 
grow in influence and membership. They were the only pathways into the philosophical 
profession for the young generation, even if their new professionalism seemed to have 
“alienated the wider public sphere,” as Hochkeppel or even Jaspers concluded. Indeed, it 
was less Jaspers, or for that matter Heidegger, but their students, or their students’ 
students who began the task of renewing philosophy by discovering ways out of the 
solipsistic practice of the great thinkers, above all through professional collaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
336 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships, trans. Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge, Mass: The 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Task of Philosophy Inside the University and in Scientific Culture 
 
In 1951 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
organized an inquiry into the teaching of philosophy. Georges Canguilhem, Inspector 
General of Secondary Education in France arranged the investigation. UNESCO 
produced a published volume in which Canguilhem both introduced the materials and 
responded to the questions with regard to teaching philosophy in France.337 An 
international group of both Western and non-Western philosophers was asked to respond 
to a series of questions concerning the nature of philosophical instruction in their 
respective countries. The questions focused on all aspects of philosophy and its relation 
to society from the procedures of examination and degree requirements to the relationship 
of philosophy to politics, religion and culture and especially its influence on students’ 
political and intellectual formation. The Freiburg philosopher, Eugen Fink, was the 
respondent for West Germany. Fink was invited to participate  not only for his interest in 
the philosophy of pedagogy but possibly because Freiburg lay in the former French 
occupation zone. His answers reflect his own philosophical background in Husserl’s 
 
337 Unesco, ed., The Teaching of Philosophy,  intro by Georges Canguilhem (Paris: UNESCO, 1953). 
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phenomenology and his closeness to Heidegger’s philosophy.338 However, beyond these 
intellectual preferences, Fink’s responses also reflect a concern to uphold the German 
values of humanist education, the freedom of teaching and research from central 
planning, and the belief in the unity of philosophy and its independence from other 
disciplines. His responses do reveal a general attitude of professional philosophers in 
West Germany of the 1950s and the concerns of the early Cold War era.  
Fink characterized German philosophy as interested in speculative, metaphysical 
questions at the expense of social or political concerns. In the land of “Dichter und 
Denker,” he claimed, there had been no viable philosophy of society and politics since 
Hegel.339 Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Marxist tradition did not enter into Fink’s 
equation. Since Hegel, German philosophy had had no impact on the political field. 
“Unless,” Fink wrote, “one wishes to designate by the name ‘philosophy’ the nineteenth-
century beliefs which long ago became mere trite articles of faith for the masses, 
philosophical ideas exert no marked influence on political doctrines and 
 
338 Eugen Fink (1905-1975) earned his doctorate under Edmund Husserl in Freiburg and remained 
Husserl’s private assistant even after 1933, when the latter was banned from publishing and working in 
Germany because of his Jewish ancestry. After Husserl’s death in 1938, Fink along with Ludwig 
Landgrebe helped secure Husserl’s unpublished papers in Leuven, Belgium under the custodianship of the 
Franciscan H. L. Van Breda (See Landgrebe’s account in Pongratz, ed., Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen, 
2:147-49). Fink seems to have reconciled with Martin Heidegger after the war, even though it was 
publically well known that Heidegger would have nothing to do with his former teacher after the “Law for 
the Reconstruction of the German Professional Civil Service” banned Husserl, already in retirement, from 
teaching in Freiburg. Heidegger also removed the famous dedication to his teacher from the fifth edition of 
Sein und Zeit published in 1941. On the record of Heidegger’s fallout with Husserl see Hugo Ott, Martin 
Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. Allan Blunden (London and New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 172-86.  
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controversies.”340 Likewise, Fink confessed that the attitudes of the student body as well 
as the design of curricula in the philosophical faculties exhibited a general apathy with 
regard to social and political questions. Fink thus confirmed the common claim of the 
1950s that the German youth were on the whole skeptical, or suspicious of political and 
ideological agendas and even reluctant to claim religious affiliation. Fink writes: 
In my opinion, it is quite impossible to give any indication of the students’ 
ideological interests, especially as regards philosophy rather than the politics of 
the hour, for such interests do not so much refer to their content as reflect an 
attitude. There is a tendency to be careful, suspicious, critical, to refuse to be 
taken in, there is little interest in current social beliefs, but rather a tendency to 
wait and see whether new ideas and social programmes turn up; it is ‘the thing’ to 
be neither a Christian nor an atheist, neither a Marxist nor a liberal. The 
ideological beliefs which had their origin in the philosophical thought of the 
nineteenth century are considered antiquated and out-dated. There is a tendency to 
‘wait and see’, which may prove to be either a sign of weakness or of strength. In 
any case, young German students fail to show any clear-cut ideological 
interests.341 
 
The ‘wait and see’ attitude attributed to the youth by Fink is remarkably similar to 
Helmut Schelsky’s depiction of the depoliticizing and de-ideologizing elements in the 
social realities of the “skeptical generation” in the 1950s. In Schelsky’s account, this 
‘wait and see’ response to political projects was accompanied by the “without us 
mindset” (die Ohne-uns-Haltung)—the refusal of organizational and community life for 
fear of the programs and dogmas that go along with associational commitments.342 To be 
sure, Fink lamented the fact that “the relationship of contemporary German philosophy to 
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political and social ideas and to urgent questions of social reorganization is both weak 
and under developed.”343 Yet Fink, like so many of his generation, was unwilling to 
endorse the need for any fundamental structural reform of the Humboldtian, humanistic 
university. 
“[F]ree teaching as the outcome of free research” was the shared mantra of the 
philosophy profession. Practically, this outlook represented German professors’ 
determination to retain their high degree of autonomy and independence in choosing what 
they will teach and in designing their syllabuses. Unlike France, Fink argued, German 
academia and universities did not present a clear hierarchy; nor did West Germany have 
an intellectual center that matched Paris. By comparison, German universities were 
decentralized and their composition and policies were shaped by the federal structure, 
i.e., the different Länder of which they were a part.344 Nascent university reform along 
the lines of Studium generale—with instruction in the humanities 
(Geisteswissenschaften) at its core—appeared promising given the “growing demand for 
a general education with a philosophical basis, and . . . a recognition of the danger of one-
sided specialization.”345  For Fink, the vocation of the German professor was to bring his 
students into contact with “living thought” from the classic texts of philosophy rather 
 
343 Fink, “Philosophy in West Germany,” 84. 
344 Though Fink also made the unlikely claim that “Despite this administrative decentralization, however, 
research is equally free everywhere, and is unhampered by an spirit of regionalism” (ibid). 
345 Ibid., 73. 
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than providing “routine instruction” for instrumental purposes.346 Defending the freedom 
of the professor to lecture on what he wished, often times on his own research, was the 
fundamental means of maintaining the autonomy and exclusivity of the universitas 
scholarum. This went hand in hand with maintaining what Fink described as “the concept 
that philosophy in the real meaning of the word cannot be divided into disciplines, but is 
a uniform system of questioning and thinking which covers every aspect of ‘being’, and 
whose quest extends beyond a regionally subdivided ‘being’ to existence itself, to the 
whole world.”347 
In addition to maintaining the old Mandarin notion of “indivisibility” and “unity” 
that set philosophy and the philosopher apart from the specialized ‘experts,’ Fink was at 
pains to respond to the questions put by the UNESCO commission about the political and 
social dimension of philosophical inquiry and instruction. Fink admitted that “Germany 
still has far to go before its thought penetrates the crucial problems of the modern world 
(human rights, democracy, community of nations and world peace). . . . it would be both 
more important and to the point if the energy spent on lofty speculation were for once to 
be more logically devoted to the educational problems of life in a world community.”348 
There was a lack of interest on the part of professors, students, and the greater public for 
 
346 The former was also made more difficult and more critical by the material scarcity after the war. Fink 
describes the dearth of textbooks and the general lack of reprints of classic philosophical texts in new 
critical editions. This limited what professors could teach and assign and what level of competence they 
could expect from state examination candidates (ibid., 80). 
347 Ibid., 78. 
348 Ibid., 79. 
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the problems of society, the State, the international community, or democracy. In the 
philosophical-cultural field, Fink observed, an analogous absence of “an adequate and 
broadly based cultural contact with contemporary foreign philosophies.”349  
Despite this persistence of German ‘provincialism,’ Fink argued that in fact the 
lack of uniform educational guidelines set by the Federal government, combined with the 
autonomy of the professors, secured the freedom of West German philosophy from a 
dominant intellectual tradition, or the reigning ideological doctrines of the state. For the 
German philosopher, Fink claimed, “[t]here is only the whole tradition of the history of 
Western thought which forms the background to original philosophizing.”350 What is 
more, Fink declared, “there is no real popular philosophy bearing a purely German stamp, 
but genuine philosophy is widely popularized, as shown, for instance, by the fashion for 
existentialism.”351 German professors were not influenced by popular philosophemes, nor 
were they bound to the use of “official syllabuses”; they existed in splendid ‘isolation’ 
(Einsamkeit) from both political intervention and public intrusion. As a result, university 
philosophy in West Germany was resistant to bias towards any dominant tradition and 
dogma as well as impervious to contemporary ‘Mode-Philosophien’ like existentialism 
and, naturally, the pseudo-philosophies of Marxism. Clearly, the German professor’s 
‘unpolitical’ nature was not above contriving a philosophical tradition that squared nicely 
with the prevailing anti-Marxist ideology of the West.    
 
349 Ibid., 85. 
350 Ibid., 83. 
351 Ibid., 86. 
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 No doubt sensitive to the expectations of his international audience, Fink painted 
a reassuring philosophical and cultural scene that was fundamentally open to and 
prepared for the introduction of Western democratic impulses, and to the possibility of 
improved relations with the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Even 
the apparent lack of concern for political and social reorganization, Fink concluded, could 
be overcome without a general reform of the university system. He concluded that  
.the fundamental structural form in which philosophy is at present taught in 
Germany (free teaching as the outcome of free research) does not require to be 
reformed, but its subject matter does seem to need modifying. Its profoundly 
speculative nature should be retained, but there must be a definite swing over to 
the crucial problems of modern life (technology, the machinery of State, the 
masses, the comity of nations, the setting up of a world-wide social order, etc.). 
The most imperative need here is to strike a balance between Anglo-Saxon social 
philosophy, with its growing interest in political matters, French ideas and 
German metaphysics.352 
 
As unlikely and tendentious as Fink’s UNESCO report may seem in hindsight, the 
Freiburg philosopher and pedagogue expressed the hopes and concerns of his profession 
about its present and future status in the university. Many of his assumptions register the 
widespread belief in the apoliticism of the postwar youth and, more generally, the 
neutralization of the effects of ideology on German culture. Although Fink contended 
that the teaching of philosophy at the university did not require substantial reform, he 
nonetheless had to admit the great extent to which West German philosophy failed to 
respond to social and political problems. It was clear to Fink that after Hegel, German 
 
352 Ibid., 87. 
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philosophy had lost its claim to competence in dealing with the concrete social and 
political problems of modernity. 
Throughout this chapter, we will assess the meaning and consequences of these 
core beliefs and concerns for the development of professional philosophy in West 
Germany in the 1950s and early 1960s. Of particular importance, was this desire to 
maintain the autonomy of philosophy and the closely-related Geisteswissenschaften 
under the pressure of the dominant model of science and research offered by the natural 
sciences, and also by the social sciences, particularly sociology and political science, 
which were ‘emancipated’ institutionally from philosophy by the mid 1950s.353 The 
professors and teachers of philosophy responded to the threat of diminished status for 
themselves and their discipline by reasserting the classic ideas of philosophy and the 
university in the continuous debates about university restructuring and 
“Hochschulreform.” The leading professors explained this decline intellectually by 
focusing their debate on the twin threats posed by “positivism” and  popular existentialist 
philosophies. The latter were seen as the expression of postwar anxieties and the 
alienation of life in industrial, consumerist society, though in the initial years after the 
war both French existentialism and Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit were often represented as 
 
353 Most universities in West Germany approved the degree (Diplom) in sociology by the mid 1950s—for 
example, 1955 in Frankfurt and 1956 at the Freie Universität Berlin. The great institutes for political 
science were opened to Hochschulkandidaten in the early 1950s—notable examples included the Otto Suhr 
Institut at the FU and the Institut für wissenschaftliche Politik under Wolfgang Abendroth in Marburg, 
established in 1949 and 1950 respectively. 
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part of a critical response to positivism.354 At the same, professional philosophers viewed 
existentialism as a potentially damaging and misleading cultural fashion unsuited to the 
tasks of professional renewal and detrimental to the prestige of the discipline. 
 
Defining the Boundaries of the Field: Separating ‘Genuine Philosophizing’ from Cultural 
‘Fashion’ 
The process of professionalization within academic philosophy took place 
alongside the dissemination, or “popularization” of philosophical ideas and language 
beyond the walls of the university. Existentialism, broadly defined, pervaded cultural 
discussions of philosophy, politics, literature, and virtually every artistic medium treated 
in the quality press and even in some professional journals. In a widely cited article for 
the Frankfurter Hefte in 1948, the philosopher and former student of Heidegger, Wilhelm 
Weischedel (1905-1975) noted how the omnipresence of the term ‘existentialism’ in 
cultural journals and the feuilleton pages of newspapers frustrated attempts to pinpoint 
the meaning and essence of Existenzphilosophie. Weischedel complained, 
[w]enn man heute eine Zeitung oder eine Zeitschrift aufschlägt, kann man beinahe 
sicher sein, auf das Wort “Existentialismus” zu stoßen. “Existentialistische” 
Romane, “existentialistische” Dramen, “existentialistische” Filme werden 
angezeigt; Maler und Bildhauer werden “Existentialisten” genannt; 
“existentialistische” Lebenshaltung, ja sogar “existentialistische” Politik wird 
besprochen. Eine Fülle von Aufsätzen versucht, den “Existentialismus” zu deuten: 
als tiefe Weisheit oder als oberflächliches Gerede, als trübsinnige 
Weltanschauung oder als Haltung des stolzen Trotzes, als Rettung aus der Krisis 
 
354 See for example, Hermann Riefstahl, “Review of Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Être et le Néant: Essai d’Ontologie 
phénomenologique (Paris, 1943),” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 2, no. 4 (1948): 610-19. 
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oder als abgründigen Nihilismus. Was aber dieser “Existentialismus” vor aller 
Deutung von sich selber her ist, davon ist nur wenig die Rede.355 
 
Because of its ubiquity German philosophers considered existentialism to be a sign of the 
times, or, more often, the result of the impatience of the younger generation. Above all, 
existentialism could be viewed as the disillusionment of a growing ‘mass’ of university 
students with the uncertainty of professional philosophy and the uncoordinated 
knowledge offered by the “special sciences.”356 Concerns about the confusion caused by 
existentialist thought managed to penetrate academic philosophy, at the early philosophy 
congresses at Garmisch-Partenkirchen (1947), Mainz (1948), and Bremen (1950), even if 
the most conspicuous “Existenz-philosophers” were absent and remained largely aloof 
from these internal debates. Many academic philosophers attempted to discredit the 
prominent German ‘existentialists’ like Jaspers and Heidegger by associating them with 
what they viewed as the superficial pseudo-philosophies produced by the fashionable 
literati of Paris. Nevertheless, some of the most prolific commentators in the German 
language sought to isolate different forms of western existentialist thought along national 
lines, while still emphasizing their common historical emergence “as after-effects of 
national catastrophes.”357 In the West German case, however, there seemed to be more 
 
355 Wilhelm Weischedel, “Wesen und Grenzen der Existenzphilosophie,” Frankfurter Hefte 3 (1948): 726. 
356 F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, 6. 
357 Fritz Heinemann, “Was ist lebendig und was ist tot in der Existenzphilosophie,” Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 5, no. 1 (1950): 5; Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “Deutsche Existenzphilosophie und 
französischer Existentialismus,” in Die Sammlung 2, no. 2-3 (1948): 231-43. Bollnow in particular 
highlights the intensified political meaning of existentialism in France because of the association with 
representatives of the resistance movement; however, he too views each of the national variants of western 
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cause for mistrust among philosophers because of the need to reestablish their 
beleaguered discipline under the pressures of occupation and the politics of 
denazification, and, most importantly, the perceived threat of the disintegration and 
degradation of their profession into individualized disciplines, the Einzelwissenschaften, 
which philosophy was traditionally meant to guide. 
At least initially, academics in philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften also 
tended to portray the putative nihilistic implications and irrationalism attributed to the 
publicized work of leading ‘Existenzphilosophen’ as impediments to democratic 
reeducation and damaging to a shared sense of intellectual responsibility. At the same 
time, however, the West German reception of the work of French existentialists almost 
without exception downplayed, or neglected completely, the notion of “engagement” and 
the background of political activism in the case of figures like Sartre, Camus, or Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.358 One could argue that existentialism most often served as a useful foil 
in the face of which philosophers and Geisteswissenschaftler could articulate the reasons 
for the decline of culture and the diminution of their own status within it. Professional 
philosophers often represented the persistence of existentialism, broadly construed, as a 
poignant example of how European culture continued on the wrong path that had been 
 
existentialism as common attempts to come to terms with the “crisis situation” of postwar Europe rather 
than mere fashion (ibid., 243).    
358 An exception to this is the work of Otto Friedrich Bollnow, who emphasized how French existentialism 
was shaped by the background of political resistance to fascism, and that these historical circumstances 
made its comparison with German Existenzphilosophie very misleading. See Bollnow, “Deutsche 
Existenzphilosophie und französischer Existentialismus,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 2, nos. 
2-3  (1948): 233 and Bollnow, “Existentialismus und Ethik,” Die Sammlung 4 (1949): 321-35. 
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paved by the irrationalism and personal irresponsibility of philosophers and intellectuals 
during the interwar period. However, there were a handful of university philosophers, 
who believed that postwar existentialism was the crisis point of these previous three 
decades of irrationalism and, potentially, a first step towards recovering a new 
philosophical ethics that could counter intellectual passivity and unassumingly regain its 
guiding influence on the special sciences.359 
 
Existentialism between France and Germany  
For West German philosophers, the confrontation with Existenzphilosophie became the 
impetus for critical reflection on the German philosophical tradition. Public literary 
intellectuals were the principal representatives of the existentialist movement in France. 
The French debates about existentialism, even when they included university professors, 
took place in cultural and political journals, in widely-circulated literary works and in 
theatre. The result was the apogee of the French literary intellectuals’ influence in the 
field of power.360 However, in Germany, the debates about Existenz oftentimes became 
entangled with the pressing questions about the historicity of the philosopher along with 
the philosopher’s status in the university hierarchy, and, in effect, the scientific basis for 
the entire German philosophical tradition since Hegel. The political content of 
 
359 Cf. Bollnow, “Existentialism und Ethik,” 335. 
360 Regis Débray, Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: the Intellectuals of Modern France (London: New Left 
Books, 1984), 67-68; Sartre combined the charisma of the writer with the institutional power of the 
publisher at the height of “The Publishing Cycle (1920-1960)” see ibid., 67-79. 
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existentialism embodied in the French intellectuals’ call for intellectual responsibility to a 
universal community was lost in the German professors’ concern for their own future. 
The relevance of French existentialism for the German academic was at best limited to 
the private, inner commitments of the philosopher as an individual, an embodiment of the 
“Innerlichkeit” that seemed to characterize all of postwar German culture. Existentialism, 
viewed as a “school of inwardness” was counterproductive and potentially ruinous if one 
tried to put it forth as a model for research in philosophy or the sciences in general.361 
Yet the leading Existenzphilosophen in Germany continued to exert a great deal of 
influence on the debates within the profession, which was only compounded by these 
figures’ extra-academic cultural notoriety. In this way, existentialism proved to be both a 
provocation to and a liability for the postwar German philosophical profession. For better 
or worse, German academic philosophers had to begin with the dominant figure, whose 
work and influence was closest to them: Martin Heidegger. Dieter Henrich, Gadamer’s 
assistant in Heidelberg noted that up until the “middle of the 1950s Heidegger dominated 
philosophical discussion in Germany.”362 However, the master gave them little to work 
with. All observed that Heidegger had produced no great statement of his philosophical 
position since Sein und Zeit of 1927, the first part to a planned greater work that never 
came to be. Since the early 1930s, Heidegger had only published short essays and 
lectures on Kant and Hölderlin; and his postwar publications seemed to raise more 
 
361 Edwin Latzel, “Bemerkungen zum Umgang mit Existenzphilosophie: Existenzphilosophie als Katharsis 
und Katharsis der Existenzphilosophie,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 6, no. 3 (1952): 409-410. 
362 Henrich, “Die deutsche Philosophie nach zwei Weltkriegen,” 49. 
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questions about the path of Heidegger’s thinking. Initially, and perhaps necessarily, 
German commentators after the Second World War focused not on Heidegger’s own 
development, but on that of his French appropriation. The second-hand existentialism of 
the French was determined by the complex intellectual appropriations of German thought 
during the 1930s. 
Heidegger’s French influence derived from interpretations of the unfinished 
masterpiece Sein und Zeit. The French interpretations were normally limited to Division 
II and, even then, to the first and second chapters that focused on those existential 
“modalities of being” that disclosed Dasein’s “owness” and singularity. Thus, the French 
already started from a point in Heidegger’s existential analytic where it was most easily 
adaptable to anthropological and subjectivist readings of Dasein’s being as “care” (Sorge) 
and “resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit), and “my-owness” (Jemeinigkeit). The French 
debate was further radicalized by the strong presence of the Marxist Hegelianism of 
Alexander Kojève in the Parisian intellectual scene. Heideggerian concepts of “anxiety,” 
“throwness,” and “being towards death” were often taken as a kind of secularized version 
of Kierkegaard’s individualist existentialism and as a modification of Hegel’s example of 
the struggle for recognition between master and slave. These two components comprised 
what Ethan Kleinberg has distinguished as the first reading of Heidegger, which came to 
dominate French existentialism and French phenomenology in the inter-war period.363 
 
363 Ethan Kleinberg, Generation Existential: Heidegger’s Philosophy in France, 1927-1961 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 13-17. 
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The influence of Kojève was clear. As Kleinberg writes, “Kojève’s anthropocentric 
reading used Heidegger’s philosophy to read Hegel in the light of subjectivist tendencies. 
… This led to a fundamentally anthropocentric understanding of Heidegger’s work in the 
years to come.”364 Likewise the popularity of Jean-Paul Sartre’s literary works after their 
postwar republication, particularly La Nausée, and the plays, Les Mouches and Huis clos 
ensured that the French debate, at least outside of the academy, remained the domain of 
literary intellectuals, whose main concern was appropriating those elements most suited 
to intellectual activism. Heidegger’s idea of Geworfenheit, or the “thrown character” of 
Dasein, was represented as the human existential predicament in which a subject can 
choose to act, or remain in the tranquilized complacency of das Man, the conformist, or 
“undifferentiated” “they-self.” The Marxist politics of figures like Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and Sartre also led to a very voluntaristic interpretation of resoluteness and of 
authenticity as “engagement” towards the goals of the socialist movement.365 Beginning 
from “Existenz,” which many like Sartre took as a kind of materialist credo, French 
existentialists introduced a purely formal ethics of commitment based on an 
 
364 Ibid., 68. 
365 It is important to note that Merleau-Ponty’s reception of Heidegger and Husserl’s phenomenology 
departed significantly from that of Camus or Sartre’s humanistic readings. Merleau-Ponty’s abiding interest 
is in the way the subject can no longer be thought of in purely logocentric terms as a thinking being, nor as 
a physical object. The critique of the Cartesian subject and new behavioral approaches to psychology are 
the main interest in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, and this also what distinguishes 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential Marxism from Sartre’s abstract notion of the freedom based on the idea of a 
completely undetermined subjective will in Being and Nothingness.  On Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the 
Sartrean subject and the former’s non-dogmativ reaffirmation of the role of history and collective social 
projects as the meaning-giving background for subjective decisions see Mark Poster, Existential Marxism 
in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 151-153. 
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unconditionally free will, which, some German commentators were quick to point out, in 
Sartre’s case, invoked the binding claim to universality of Kant’s categorical imperative 
despite the existentialist’s denial of any metaphysical guarantees that one acted morally, 
authentically, or “in good faith.”366 
Although there was nothing like a “Generation Existential” in Germany 
comparable to that of the French case, German commentators ultimately had to contend 
with the ideas of popular existentialism because they believed it to be an expression of 
the real anxieties of western European societies in the wake of the Second World War. Of 
course, none of the German representatives of Existenzphilosophie like Heidegger, 
Jaspers, or Nicolai Hartmann embraced the term ‘existentialism’ and even actively 
militated against it. Heidegger’s successful publication in 1946 while still confined in 
French-occupied territory of the booklet containing his Plato essay and the 
‘Humanismusbrief’ to Jean Beaufret generated a vehement public debate over 
“Heidegger’s new turn” to Ek-sistenz.367 German thinkers of the same age as their French 
counterparts—those Kleinberg calls the “generation of 1933” born around 1900—had for 
the most part followed the development of Heidegger’s thought through the 1930s. For 
them, the “Letter on Humanism” was not the abrupt volte face as it was for the French. 
Indeed, for Max Müller, who had been Heidegger’s student and assistant during the 
 
366 O. F. Bollnow, “Existentialism und Ethik,” 325-27. The clearest expression of Sartre’s notion of free 
will that comes close to replicating the structure of Kant’s deontological ethics appeared in Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s lecture “Existentialism is a Humanism,” a lecture first published in 1946.  
367 Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “Heideggers neue Kehre,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 2, 
no. 2 (1949-1950): 113-128. 
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1930s, the terms Existenz-philosophie or existentialism never suited his teacher’s 
philosophy. Müller made drew this distinction clearly in an important synopsis of 1949, 
where he wrote, “für Heidegger gibt es nur ein Thema des Philosophierens: Nicht den 
Menschen und die Existenz, sondern einzig und allein das Sein. Aber die Existenz und in 
ihr der Mensch ist Mittel und Ort und Grund der Möglichkeit und Ansatz für die Seins 
Erhellung. Alle Aussagen über die Existenz und den Menschen in ‘Sein und Zeit’ waren 
daher von Anfang an niemals im Sinne eine philosophischen Anthropologie gemeint.”368 
It was no surprise then, for Müller, or any other of Heidegger’s students when the Master 
took leave of both the traditional concept of essentia as well as the Sartrean notion of 
‘existence.’ The focus on the history of Being and the turn to language as the “house of 
Being” in the Humanismusbrief was a refinement and extension of Heidegger’s earlier 
claims in Sein und Zeit about the “concealment” of Being in Dasein’s everyday 
understanding of beings.369 Now, with “Being, and only Being” as the very possibility for 
truth, as “unconcealment,” there could be no question that Heidegger’s thinking 
completely denied the recourse to a willing, knowing, or thinking subject. This made the 
later Heidegger’s thought completely incompatible with any merely anthropological or 
humanistic perspective such as that which guided the French reception in these years.   
 
368 Max Müller, Existenzphilosphie, 13. 
369 Heidegger’s ontological analysis eschewed both  transcendental and materialist understandings of 
existence. As Heidegger wrote, “Dasein’s kind of Being thus demands that any ontological Interpretation 
which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality, should capture the Being of 
this entity, in spite of this entity’s own tendency to cover things up.  Existential analysis, therefore, 
constantly has the character of doing violence [Gewaltsamkeit], whether to the claims of the everyday 
interpretation, or to its complacency and its tranquilized obviousness” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1962), 359.   
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It was clear to the early German reviewers of Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” 
that this new turn signaled nothing less than “die radikale Absage an jede Art von 
‘Existentialismus’, den Abbruch aller Brücken zu einer über zweitausendjährigen 
Tradition und den kühnen Versuch einer Rückkehr zur urwüchsigen Kraft eines 
archaischen Denkens im reinen Elemente des Seins.”370 Certainly, the picture of the later 
Heidegger as a radical break with tradition and retreat into a seemingly humble and 
archaic language can be interpreted as a kind flight from responsibility and an attempt to 
obscure the historical events of his dubious political past.371 However, by reducing 
Heidegger’s later writings to an expression of the escapism of a politically compromised 
individual, one risks passing over the meaning of the later texts for Heidegger’s West 
German readers.372 
Heidegger’s postwar philosophy by virtue of its turn to the question of Being 
certainly precluded the ethics of engagement championed by Sartre’s early adherents in 
France. But for most of his German interpreters, Heidegger’s later writings also revealed 
the extent to which the “thinker” remained gripped by the problem of historicity. 
Heidegger’s new linguistic turn was perceived by critical readers such as Bollnow and 
Heidegger’s student, Gerhard Krüger as a significant departure from the crisis thinking of 
 
370 Heinz-L. Mazat, “Review of Martin Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über 
den ‘Humanismus’ (Bern, 1947),” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 2, no. 4 (1948): 648. 
371 Georg Lukács, “Heidegger Redivivus,” Sinn und Form 1, no. 3 (1949): 37-62 ; Anson Rabinbach adopts 
a similar position, albeit with much more subtlety and historical contextualization than Lukás in 
“Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ as Text and Event,” in In the Shadow of Catastrophe, 114-17. 
372 The content of the “Letter on Humanism” and its timing as “event” certainly support such a reading. But 
to view the text as opportunistic apologetics and conscious deception does not exhaust its significance for 
the postwar West German audience.    
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the 1920s and early 1930s.373 Anson Rabinbach has reminded us of how the 
Humanismusbrief, within the context of the 1940s, was a personal attempt on 
Heidegger’s part to explain the German catastrophe, the failure of National Socialism and 
to relativize and obscure his involvement in historical events. Disappointed by defeat and 
contemptuous of the occupation, Heidegger’s language was “a gesture of defiance in the 
cloak of humility.374 However, Heidegger’s recourse to poetic and simpler language in 
the late 1940s resonated within a wider cultural tendency towards inwardness and the 
search for a new language in philosophy. For many readers of the later Heidegger, the 
step away from “die Seiende,” “beings,” into a thinking epitomized by the poet or the 
Dichter, the move into language of heilen and Heiligen, healing and the holy, and finally 
a return to a simpler relationship to the world along the path of language, which was “das 
Haus des Seins” could serve as a kind of consolation in a culture coping with political 
upheaval and physical destruction. As Jost Hermand has observed, in West German 
during the 1950s, many differentiated Jaspers and Heidegger from the nihilism and 
exteriority present in the work of the French existentialists and the German thinkers of 
the 1920s and early 1930s: 
Statt sich von Vokabeln wie Kälte, Geworfenheit, Nichtigkeit oder 
Todesverfallenheit blenden zu lassen, entschloß sich diese Gruppe zu einer 
“Kehre” vom Heroisch-Solipsistischen zum Konservativ-Geborgenen und 
rückte eher das Sinnstiftende in den Vordergrund. Bei den meisten lief das 
auf den Versuch hinaus, die durch die zunehmende Technisierung und 
 
373 Gerhard Krüger, “Martin Heidegger und der Humanismus,” Theologische Rundschau 18 (1950): 148-
178. 
374 Rabinbach, “Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ as Text and Event,” 115. 
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Vermassung in irgendein Nichts gestellte menschliche Existenz auf dem 
bereits von Heidegger und Jaspers vorgezeichneten Weg über die Kunst, 
den Mythos, die Natur oder die Religion wieder in den Trostraum des 
Umgreifenden, Bergenden, Heilenden zurückzuholen.375 
 
To be sure, many contemporaries found nothing compensatory in this turn inward. 
On the contrary, many interpreted post-1945 existentialism as a return to dangers of the 
irrationalism of the 1920s. The influential Munich philosopher, Alois Dempf (1891-1982) 
warned that the Existenzphilosophie of the interwar years was part of a turn towards 
“private ethics” and “private intelligence [Intelligenz]” that arose from the renewed 
influence of Kierkegaard and the popularity of Lebensphilosophie in the 1920s. The 
intelligentsia’s focus on personal resoluteness and the search for unconditioned ‘living 
experience’ led to a refusal to engage or believe in the public use of reason.376 For the 
Catholic thinker, this was the end result of the modern loss of faith in God and the 
“immortal spirit” and, more practically, the betrayal of the humanistic model of 
intellectual life. The Renaissance appreciation of the independent “vita contemplativa” 
gave way to the instrumentalization of ‘secularized’ university philosophy by the state.377 
Dempf provided a clear articulation of what the nebulously overused concepts of 
“Säkularisierung” and “Verweltlichung” actually signified: “der Sündenfall der 
neuzeitliche Philosophie in die existenzielle Staatsphilosophie.”378 Philosophers 
 
375 Jost Hermand, Kultur im Wiederaufbau, 75 
376 Alois Dempf, “Die fehlende Intelligenz,” Frankfurter Hefte 5, no. 3 (Mar. 1950): 251.  
377 Ibid., 247-48. 
378 Ibid., 246. 
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embraced a disconnected existential pathos centered on individual, undirected 
commitment, which left the “mechanistic method” and instrumental aims of “scientism” 
or “positivism” to triumph unopposed. “Inner emigration” and the outright complicity of 
intellectuals with Nazism legitimized the ostensible “successes” of the “organizational 
rationalization” of the state, the economy, and the university, and finally the diminution, 
or complete appropriation of cultural and intellectual life by the “total state.” For Dempf 
and many others, after fifty years of intellectual betrayal and subservience to the state, 
there could be no illusions of an easy return to the humanistic ideals of the classical, 
Humboldtian “universitas magistorum et studentium [sic]”: 
Die Wissenden sind als Produzenten von Macht verstaatlicht worden, und da es 
ein eigenes Standesbewußtsein der Intelligenz nicht gibt . . . denkt sie viel zu 
wenig an ihre auch wirtschaftliche freie Existenz. . . . Die Dichter leben von der 
Vernügungs- und Unterhaltungsindustrie, die Wissenschaft lebt vom Interesse des 
Staates an der Ausbildung der Beamten und der Techniker . . . noch immer aber 
muß sie um ihre Forschungsmittel betteln, und sie erhält sie nur im Blick auf die 
Vermehrung des Machtpotentials.379 
 
The selective reception of French existentialism likewise confirmed for Marxist 
thinkers that postwar West German philosophy was merely an ideological expression of 
the material circumstances of the 1940s and 1950s. Hans Heinz Holz (b. 1927) recalled 
how the German reception of the French existentialists was limited to the “petit bourgeois 
reactionary elements: the individualism, immoralism and voluntarism of Sartre from the 
period of Being and Nothingness.” Holz also depicts German Existenzphilosophie as 
something of a ‘Staatsphilosophie,’ whose anthropological, privatized tenor “connected 
 
379 Ibid., 252. 
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the bourgeois atmosphere of collapse in the early postwar period with the robust 
unsolidarity and egoism of the black market phase and the first reconstruction period of 
capitalism.”380 Although Holz would point to Bollnow as one of the main protagonists in 
this regression of West German philosophy back into its function as “bourgeois 
Weltanschauung,” for Bollnow, existentialism represented a cultural expression of 
concrete human uncertainties, albeit not in the dialectical Marxist sense, that ultimately 
would need to be overcome. Bollnow argued,  
Es kommt darauf an, die Existenzphilosophie, zum mindesten in ihren 
bisherigen Formen, zu überwinden, auch in diesem Sinn, sie zu 
transzendieren. … Sie [Existenzphilosophie] ist die letzte große Krisis, 
durch die die Philosophie hindurchmuß und ohne die ihr eine letzte 
Unbedingtheit nicht möglich ist. Sie ist das Tor, durch das der Weg zu 
einer letzten unbedingten und vor den wirklichen Aufgaben des Lebens 
verwantwortlichen Philosophie hindurchgeht.381 
 
Bollnow took the ideas and especially the nuances of the different versions of European 
existentialism very seriously. For him, the ideas of French existentialism and German 
Existenzphilosophie were not simply fashionable sophistry; rather, they contained the 
promise of a new beginning. 
 
“New Security” and Existentialism in the Culture of the 1950s 
Although the various forms of existentialism and ‘Existenzphilosophie’ remained 
dominant across a wide cultural context in the late 1940s and 1950s, by the mid 1950s 
 
380 Hans Heinz Holz, “Philosophie als bürgerliche Weltanschauung: Umerziehung und Restauration – 
westdeutsche Philosophie im ersten Jahrzehnt,” in Dialektik 11 (1986): 48. 
381 Bollnow, “Deutsche Existenzphilosophie und französische Existentialismus,” 241. 
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academic philosophers began to call for a shift of focus. Otto Friedrich Bollnow 
described the necessary move away from existential Angst towards a “New Security.” 
For Bollnow, existential philosophy had resulted in a pressing dilemma. One could 
neither ignore existentialism because “it gives expression to the crisis of our present”; 
nor could one remain trapped within existential philosophy; for it provided only the 
expression of the present crisis, not its “sublation” (Aufhebung). The problem or task 
facing philosophy was the “overcoming of existentialism” (Überwindung des 
Existentialismus).382 Fritz Heinemann also argued that Karl Jaspers failed in the attempt 
to connect subjective “existence” to a universal or transcendent logic. In his review of the 
German philosophical scene in 1949, Heinemann suggested that “Jaspers’ central 
problem remains the problem of our time, namely, whether within the welfare-state and 
in the age of mass-production the independent person working out his own destiny is able 
to survive.” Heinemann concludes succinctly, “although ‘philosophies of existence’ may 
be a mistake, ‘existence’ may point to a pressing problem.”383 In an important article that 
appeared in the ZphF in 1950, Heinemann took stock of “What was Living and What was 
Dead in Existenzphilosophie.”384 Heinemann felt that existentialism in both its French 
and German varieties represented “one of the essential forms of western European 
 
382 Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Die Neue Geborgenheit: das Problem einer Überwindung des Existentialismus 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1955), 12-13. 
383 Fritz Heinemann, “Philosophy in Germany,” Philosophy 24, no. 90 (July 1949): 261. 
384 Fritz Heinemann, “Was ist lebendig und was ist tot in der Existenzphilosophie,” Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 5, no. 1 (1950): 3-24. The article’s title may have been a conscious allusion to 
Bendetto Croce’s Ciò che è vivoe ciò che è morto della filosofia di Hegel (Bari, 1907). As we will see 
below, many drew rough parallels between the (failed) attempts of existentialists like Heidegger to place 
Sein “before all Seinenden” as “Nichts” and Hegel’s notion of “absolute spirit” as the negation of the real. 
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philosophy in the age of the European collapse.”385 French existentialism had changed 
from an expression of intellectual resistance to an international fashion. Heinemann, who 
was driven from Germany in 1933 to France, the Netherlands, and finally to Oxford, 
placed the highest ethical demand on the existentialists, while still distancing himself 
from Sartre’s view of freedom as total engagement and singular responsibility; For 
Heinemann Sartre’s ethics of commitment during the war and liberation was “an honest 
and relevant description of this situation, but nevertheless only the reflex of the 
totalitarian attitude of the German conqueror in the mind of a man of the French 
resistence.”386 Sartre’s German counterparts—the philosophies of Karl Jaspers and 
Martin Heidegger—had proven themselves able to express only the emptiness and 
nihilism of the contemporary state; they ultimately presented no new ethics or logic on 
which to base a philosophical orientation. “In our situation,” Heinemann observed, “a 
touchstone for the success or failure of a philosophy is the overcoming or failure to 
overcome nihilism.”387 Yet this could no longer be done through a systematic 
philosophy, like that of Hegel. Existenz defied philosophical systems, logic, and 
ontology. However, existentialism remained a “living” concern for philosophy insofar as 
“it grew out of the traumatic convulsion of the existence of millions of European human 
beings.”388 For Heinemann the problems raised by the existentialists called upon 
 
385 Ibid., 5. 
386 Ibid., 22. 
387 Ibid., 15. 
388 Ibid., 20. 
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philosophers and thinkers to pose different questions that were ultimately humanistic and 
required “not Existenzphilosophies but rather existentiell philosophers.”389  
Bollnow’s overcoming of existentialism began with a clear disentanglement of the 
various strands of Existenzphilosophie that had developed in Germany and a further 
differentiation of the German focus on Existenz from the French notion of existence that 
Sartre and Camus developed along humanistic lines. Heidegger’s later philosophy, his 
“neue Kehre,” as Bollnow called it, presented a different problem for German 
philosophers than it had for Sartre and the existentialists in France, or, for that matter, 
those who still focused on Heidegger’s pre-War writings. Humanism in West Germany 
was for the most part an apolitical humanism based on a return to tradition and, as we 
have seen in the first chapter, a renewed contact with German idealism and the 
cosmopolitanism of the Goethezeit. It did not contain the Sartrean notion of engagement, 
certainly not in academic philosophy, but neither in the more widely diffused ideas of 
existentialism in the cultural pages of the literary journals and newspapers. 
Most admitted that existentialism and the tendencies towards nihilism or anti-
humanism evoked real concerns, fears and the predicament of postwar Europe. But for 
most of the serious academic philosophers of the 1950s, this was a problem to confront 
and to overcome. Most importantly, for Bollnow, there could not be any recourse to the 
old ethos of the Jugendbewegung. In his programmatic essay “Einfache Sittlichkeit” 
 
389 Ibid., 24. 
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published in the first volume of Die Sammlung,390 Bollnow, after already pointing to the 
need to recover practical morals (Sitten) such as duty (Pflicht) and sympathy (Mitleid), 
turned in the conclusion to Anständigkeit, which can be translated as trustworthiness, 
decency or honesty, but Bollnow notes that he is trying also to capture the English idea of 
“fairness” and moderation. In this sense the Anständigkeit was the overarching 
characteristic of true Sittlichkeit and also the key to a new security or shelteredness 
(Geborgenheit). As opposed to fanatics and doctrinaire ideologues, who found their duty 
in the chauvinism of the struggle for power, Anständigkeit expressed the value of a 
solidarity between “everything human.” Bollnow wrote, “[i]n der Anständigkeit des 
Verhaltens liegt eine gewisse Duldsamkeit: sie ist zurückhaltend gegenüber den 
unbedingten Vorderungen eines bestimmten ethischen Systems. Mit einem Wort: der 
Begriff der Anständigkeit verkündet in gewissen einfachen Verhältnissen den Vorrang 
der einfachen Sittlichkeit gegenüber den Vorderungen des höhen Ethos.”391 Bollnow was 
very clear to distinguish Anständigkeit from the idea of ‘authenticity’ and the search for 
the spiritual depth and the immediacy of experience as things of the past. The latter were 
the high ideals of the Sturm und Drang and the Jugendbewegung or, artistically, the 
expressionism before and after the First World War.392 Bollnow identified with 
Anständigkeit what we have already encountered as the characteristics of the postwar 
 
390 Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “Einfache Sittlichkeit,” in Die Sammlung 1, nos. 3, 4, 6 (1946): 153-161; 217-
229; 334-338. 
391 Bollnow, “Einfache Sittlichkeit,” Part 3: 334-35. 
392 Ibid., 336. 
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German youth: a concreteness, a sober attitude, a lack of pathos, precisely the strengths 
needed to hold up against a situation of crises and loss of belief. Much in the same way 
he would later talk about an overcoming of existentialism, in this early essay Bollnow 
points to the overcoming of the crisis situation of values in desperate times. He 
concluded, “In solchen Zeiten, wo alle Wertungen schwankend geworden sind und der 
Mensch nicht mehr wießt, was recht und unrecht ist, bleibt die sauberer und schlichter 
Anständigkeit ein letzte, verläßliche Maßstab für sein Verhalten, und er weiß in der 
bestimmten Situation, was ihre Vorderung von ihm verlangt, auch wenn er es nicht in 
allgemeinen Formulierungen angeben kann.”393 Bollnow’s position was an inluential 
critique and alternative vision to what was perceived as the danger of the extreme 
situation to which the different forms of existentialism and Existenzphilosophie 
consigned modern man. Whereas the existentialists emphasized Angst and the 
confrontation with nothingness or, in Heidegger’s case, the abandonment of man in favor 
of the primordial question of Being, Bollnow’s non-dogmatic turn to simple values such 
as patience, reserve, thankfulness, the home, and being at home in the world resonated 
with a general concern in the mid-1950s for comfort and security. “Shelter” and 
“housing” (Behausung) could be a powerful image in a time of the rebuilding and 
restoration of West German society.394 
 
393 Ibid., 338. 
394 Playing on Bollnow’s spacial concept of ‘housing,’ a contemporary reviewer in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine satirically jibed that it was “zweifelhaft, daß ein Haus die von Bollnow supponierten 
Funktionen erfüllen kann, wenn in ihm ein Fernsehgerät steht, wenn ein permanentes Rundfunkprogramm 
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However the quest for security seemed to confirm the clichéd picture of the 1950s 
as a restorative time, an era of crass materialism, opportunism, and cultural conformity. 
As Holz later argued Bollnow’s “new security” and the virtues of “einfache Sittlichkeit” 
expressed and promoted the quietism and “resigned passivity” of a society that shunned 
rational social planning, repressed the past, and embraced a widespread pseudo-religious 
current of trust in the status quo: 
In ihr wurde wurde der weltanschauliche Anschluß an die Konsolidierung der 
retaurativen Staatlichkeit der BRD gewonnen, das Krisenbewußtsein der ersten 
Nachkriegsjahre überdeckt. Die Konvergenz mit den politischen Parolen der 
Adenauer-Zeit (‘Keine Experimente’, ‘Sicherheit’, ‘nationale Wiedergeburt und 
Größe’) in der Erneuerung eines bourgeoisen Lebensgefühles der 
“machtgeschützten Innerlichkeit” ist mühelos festzustellen.395 
 
  Still, for Bollnow and for many of the leading philosophers of his generation, a 
signal that a general turn towards moderation and simplicity could bind philosophy and 
the humanities to greater cultural and social needs and thus give these disciplines a 
renewed relevance. The general need for a new shelteredness was a turn away from the 
dogmatism and fanaticism of the scientific and philosophical Weltanschauungen of the 
past. Bollnow wrote,  
Es geht heute durch die Menschen ein ungeduldiges Drängen nach eine 
definitiven Festlegung in allen Fragen der letzten Überzeugungen. …Man 
will auch hier Entscheidung um jeden Preis. Demgegenüber ist es aber der 
Geist echter Wissenschaftlichkeit, die Probleme in ihre ganzen 
 
das Gespräch der Bewohner verstummen läßt” F. Schonauer, Rezension in FAZ (Aug. 27, 1955), cited in 
Harmut Längin, “Das Problem einer Überwindung des Existentialismus: Otto Friedrich Bollnows ‘Neue 
Geborgenheit’,” in Widerspruch 18, Restauration der Philosophie nach 1945 (1990): 93n6. 
395 Holz, “Philosophie als bürgerliche Weltanschauung,” 66-67; cf. Längin, 92-93. 
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Kompliziertheit zu erkennen und sich des Urteils solange zu enthalten, bis 
sie die nötigen Grundlagen für eine begründete Entscheidung gewonnen 
hat. … Diese zurückhaltende Art der Wissenschaft ist in den Vergangenen 
Jahren oft als Zeichen der Schwäche angriffen worden. Und trotzdem liegt 
grade [sic] in diesem langen Atem und in dieser großen Geduld diejenige 
Überlegenheit die wissenschaftlichen Haltung, die wir heute erst langsam 
wiedergewinnen müssen.396 
 
Bollnow here has fused the two concerns with which the philosophical profession was 
burdened in the immediate postwar period. Bollnow invoked this new modesty as the 
only practicable position for the philosopher towards the demands for decisive 
engagement with wider social concerns. More than an expression of the general 
“retaurative” character of this period, Bollnow’s somewhat bland philosophy of 
“Geborgenheit” also registered the professional concerns of philosophers to distinguish 
their humanistic mode of understanding and research from the methodological rigidity of 
the natural sciences. The “new security” applied to science and the university was a 
means to counteract the notion that Heidegger’s challenge to all previous metaphysics 
and Jaspers’ departure from academia could only be surpassed through equally radical 
“overcoming” of tradition. The seclusion and reserve of the professional philosopher or 
Geisteswissenschaftler would offer the example of a kind of understanding that, while 
relevant to human practical concerns, did not succumb to the popular demand of 
providing new Weltanschauungen.397 Through a confrontation with but also an 
understanding of philosophical and intellectual traditions, along with a new 
 
396 Bollnow, Neue Geborgenheit, 46. 
397 Cf. Gadamer, “On the Primordiality of Science,” 20-21. 
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professionalism that emphasized moderation, humility, and collaboration, philosophy 
would offer a path which could bring young philosophical minds to self-confidence. 
 
Renouncing the Radical Twenties and the Promise of a“Philosophy of Reconstruction”   
In his closing remarks to the Congress of the AGPD at Stuttgart in 1954, Eduard 
Spranger registered a turn towards a renewed methodological and scientific basis for 
contemporary philosophy in response to a growing “Substanzverlust,” or “loss of 
substance.” Spranger admitted that “if one wanted to find a general trend in contemporary 
philosophy—or only a strongly presiding main trajectory of interest—the they would find 
themselves disappointed.”398 Nevertheless, in the absence of a dominating school, or 
system of philosophy, the printed essays from the Stuttgart Congress in large part 
represented a departure from questions of the crisis of humanism, or the challenge to the 
practical orientation of human subjectivity given expression in the various 
“Existenzialismen.” These were the residuum of the “Kulturkrise” of the interwar period 
and a continued challenge to the traditional beliefs and certainties of German idealist 
philosophy, among them the unity of the subject, of  philosophy, and the ability of either 
to produce “allgemeingiltige Urteile.”399 Spranger differentiated these “Philosophies of 
 
398 Eduard Spranger, “Schlußwort zum Philosophen-Kongreß [Stuttgart 1954],” in Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 9 (1955): 410. 
399 Spranger admits a “Sehnsucht” for Kant’s famous question “Wie sind allgemeingiltige Urteile möglich,” 
though with the caveat that he leaves out the “a priori” (ibid., 410). He thus announces his two-fold 
contention that philosophy can still find a basis in universally accepted method and provide meaning and 
orientation for practical human affairs in general. 
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Catastrophe” of the first half of the twentieth century with the forms of “Restoration 
Philosophy” that were available to the contemporary, postwar profession. Rather than a 
pure “Restaurationsphilosophie,” which he identifies with the introduction of theodicy 
into philosophy after 1815,  Spranger advocated what he termed a “philosophy of 
reconstruction”—“eine Wiederaufbauphilosophie”: 
Bei ihr handelt es sich nicht um bloße Wiederherstellung des Alten, sondern um 
einen Neubau über den Trümmern. . . . Eine solche philosophie würde sich 
vielleicht nicht mehr, wie bei Hegel, zu einem geschlossenen System verdichten 
können. Aber alle wesentlichen Faktoren müßten doch wenigstens vorkommen, 
als schwere Spannungen diagnostisch festgestellet werden.400 
 
Spranger also expressed his concern for the philosophical youth. Addressing himself to 
the younger academics at the conference, Spranger insisted that philosophers need not 
only be determined by the modern existential predicament but that philosophy also 
possessed a potentially “formative reciprocal effect on cultural life.”401 Here Spranger’s 
earlier emphasis on the Jugendbewegung as a role-model for the cultural and intellectual 
“armament” (Rüstung) of a vulnerable, but assiduous postwar intellectual youth had 
shifted to the profession.402 Now, the needs of intellectual ‘reconstruction’ mandated a 
belief, especially on the part of the philosophical youth, in the wider cultural relevance of 
professional philosophy. Freed from the pretense of combining philosophy and science 
 
400 Ibid., 415. 
401 In closing, Spranger, honorary president of the Congress, expressed the promise embodied in the work 
of the younger philosophers for his aging generation: “Es war für uns Alte deshalb tröstlich, bei dieser 
Zusammenkunft so viele junge Philosophen sehen zu dürfen, auf deren Werk wir hoffen und für deren Weg 
wir alles Förderliche wünschen” (ibid., 416). 
402 Spranger, “Gibt es heute in Westdeutschland eine Jugendideologie?” in Kulturfragen der Gegenwart, 
85. 
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into a closed philosophical system like that of Hegel, young philosophers could negotiate 
present cultural concerns about professional relevance by recourse to a living tradition 
without at the same time being burdened with the task of fulfilling the ‘systematic’ goals 
of that tradition, or, it seems, without trying to emulate the cultural avant-gardism of the 
Jugendbewegung. As Iring Fetscher noted, while a figure like Spranger certainly 
represented the classical German ideals of Bildung and Geist for the younger generation, 
he embodied a tradition “not in antiquarian conservation, but rather in a living realization 
[in lebendiger Vergegenwärtigung],” which made reconciliation with the German 
intellectual past possible.403 Yet Fetscher’s glowing praise for his teacher 
notwithstanding, it is unlikely that Spranger’s written work would convey this living, 
dynamic relation to the past, even the recent political past, that was present in his 
seminars at Tübingen. 
 However well-meaning Spranger’s efforts were to actualize traditional intellectual 
ideals in contemporary philosophical practice, it is important to recognize that a 
‘Wiederaufbauphilosophie,’ could easily be interpreted as part of the reconstruction of 
the ‘unpolitical’ bourgeois cultural models that predated the “crisis years” of the first half 
of the twentieth century. We have tried to show that the sensibilities of the intellectual 
youth—of the so-called “skeptical generation”—did not in fact signal only the silent 
acceptance of or indifference to the politics of the occupational powers and later of the 
newly formed Bundesrepublik. This is the ‘restoration hypothesis’ used as short-hand to 
 
403 Fetscher, “Die Nachkriegsgeneration und der geistige Weg der Deutschen,” 583. 
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represent the culture and politics of the Adenauer era. However, the notion of a politically 
indifferent youth befitting the “leveled-out” (nivellierende) middle-class consumer 
culture of the 1950s is based more on the expectations of future political generations as 
well as on the ideological goals of certain conservative thinkers at the time.404 While 
prominent, aged professors of the late 1940s spoke of instilling democratic values in the 
young through student self-government and studium generale, the antiquated humanistic-
corporatist vision of the university and its values of seclusion (Einsamkeit) and freedom 
from political intrusion can only be viewed as an abdication of responsibility for the 
prevailing ideologies of the past and present. It was the self-denying politics of the 
‘unpolitical’ university elite, who, as professional civil servants, were mainly concerned 
with preserving their own privileges. What is more, by recalling the political intrigues 
and compromises of the Hitler only in the most general of terms, academics provided a 
kind of abstract, moral justification for their political indifference. The lesson embedded 
in the scholastic habitus was the pusillanimous imperative that philosophers refrain from 
asking social and political questions. That their very indifference to politics could have 
been the decisive political choice of professional security over independent public 
resistence may have been the real betrayal of their vocation during the 1930s and 1940s 
 
404 Here Helmut Schelsky, Arnold Gehlen, and Hans Freyer come to mind, though naturally each of these 
thinkers would never admit to having an ideological agenda, living as they often claimed in the age of the 
“end of ideology.” 
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never entered into the discussion. Falling in line with the ideology of restoration405—the 
supposed “exhaustion of ideologies”—was, in any event, the obvious choice for a group 
that had a vested interest in maintaining the existing social hierarchy.  
 
Philosophy: Good for Nothing? 
Theodor Adorno expressed similar concerns and questioned the philosopher’s 
function under the twin pressures of intellectual currency in mass culture and 
instrumental relevance for the expanding bureaucratic state of the 1950s. Adorno’s views 
brought him very close to those expressed by Alois Dempf and the Christian socialists of 
the Frankfurter Hefte, with whom Adorno had closely debated in the 1950s.406  
Wozu noch Philosophie?—the question framed by Theodor Adorno in a lecture 
and radio address from 1962 came at a time when many claimed that academic 
philosophy had lost its practical significance. Rather than a simple rhetorical strategy to 
restore and reassert philosophy’s relevance and the philosopher’s livelihood, “Why 
Philosophy Still?” was unique as a critique and affirmation of philosophy’s limited 
function. It was a response precisely to the longing for a philosophy that could provide 
 
405 Here we use “ideology” in Marx’s sense of a false appraisal of social conditions that derives its 
seductive power precisely from a convenient intellectual dissonance with reality. 
406 Interestingly, in a debate held at the University of Münster with the editors of the Frankfurter Hefte, 
Eugen Kogon and Walter Dirks, Adorno located primary guilt for the instrumentalization of reason not 
with revealed religion, but with philosophy, suggesting, “daß die Philosophie heute womöglich eine moch 
größere Schuld daran trägt als positive Religion. Und ich bin allerdings der Ansicht, daß der Name von 
Herrn Heidegger an dieser Stelle sehr nachdrücklich genannt werden sollte als seines der 
Hauptschuldigen.” Theodor Adorno and Eugen Kogon, “Offenbarung oder Autonome Vernunft,” 
Frankfurter Hefte 13, no. 7 (July 1958): 497. 
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ideological orientation, or practical, instrumental relevance. Adorno characteristically 
reached back to the period that had ended with Hegel in which, he believed, thinking still 
had enjoyed the independence of not having to produce positive ‘results.’ This spirit of 
the dialectic lived on as the immanent critique of philosophy and was, for Adorno, the 
only feasible alternative to the disastrous twin paths that philosophical ontology had 
taken since Hegel: positivism and Heideggerian ‘archaism.’ 
In this argument, however, Adorno seems to have already grasped the irony in the 
“ideology” of the two prevailing philosophies that challenged metaphysics. The 
“positivist” ontology posed its challenge by holding the logic of a contingent social 
configuration as a universal standard for any truth claims; whereas those taken in by 
Heidegger’s “mythology of Being” simply claimed that there was a “thinking” more 
fundamental than the tradition of modern philosophy, which they equated with the history 
of metaphysics. Unlike the positivists, whose critical reduction of philosophy to a 
specialized science of epistemology offered the promise of greater clarity, the new 
history of the “forgetting of Being” offered by the Heideggerians was a retreat into 
obscurity—a lament for the end of philosophia perennis perhaps, but one which also 
conferred upon the one who espoused it profundity by creating the expectation that this 
“thinking” would disclose what is more original. For Adorno and others much closer to 
the Existenz movement in German philosophy, this signaled a move from the great 
questions of metaphysics and from the critical engagement with the history of philosophy 
into obscurity. Positivism, or ‘scientism’ and Heidegger’s brand of existentialism had 
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brought the question of philosophy’s continued relevance to the fore. Here we might 
recall the observations of Schelsky and of Gehlen that philosophy had lost touch with 
reality both broadly in professional society as well as in the universities of the 1950s, 
where instrumental knowledge and the bureaucratic certifications necessary for 
professional life were at a premium for a generation of sober, practically directed youth. 
In this context Adorno’s modest claims for philosophy could seem slightly obtuse. He 
declared, 
Only a thinking that has no mental sanctuary, no illusion of an inner realm, and 
that acknowledges its lack of function and power can perhaps catch a glimpse of 
an order of the possible and the nonexistent, where human beings and things each 
would be in their rightful place. Because philosophy is good for nothing, it is not 
yet obsolete; philosophy should not even invoke this point, lest it blindly repeat its 
wrong: self-justification by self-positing.407 
 
Adorno elided the possibility that philosophy (or philosophers) could account for its own 
function and purpose. However, he attempted this without endorsing a detached academic 
philosophy, or the “Innerlichkeit” and retreat into pure contemplation for which so many 
later commentators criticized the philosophers of the immediate postwar years.408 As 
early as the first book of Minima Moralia written in 1944, Adorno lamented the lack of a 
 
407 Theodor Adorno, “Why Philosophy Still?” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. 
Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 15. “Nur Denken, das ohne 
Mentalreservat, ohne Illusion des inneren Königtums seine Funktionslosigkeit und Ohnmacht sich 
eingesteht, erhascht vielleicht einen Blick in eine Ordnung des Möglichen, Nichtseienden, wo die 
Menschen und Dinge an ihrem rechten Ort wären. Weil Philosophie zu nichts gut ist, ist sie noch nicht 
verjährt; selbst darauf dürfte sie nicht sich berufen, wenn sie nicht ihre Schuld, die Selbstsetzung, 
verblendet wiederholden will.” Adorno, “Wozu noch Philosophie?” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 10-2. 
Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft II. Eingriffe – Stichworte – Anhang (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 
471. 
408 Cf. Theodor Adorno, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit: zur deutschen Ideologie (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1964). 
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third way between the thought “inside and out”—between the “piety, indolence and 
calculation” (Pietät, Schlamperei und Berechnung) that determines the academic field of 
“salaried profundity” (beamteten Tiefsinn) and extra-academic thinking that was given 
over to the economic pressure of the market. Whereas the latter obliged the independent 
writer “at each moment to have something choice, ultra-select to offer, and to counter the 
monopoly of office with that of rarity,” the path of academic thinking led to ever 
increasing organization and a narrowing of thought. 409 In Heidegger’s case, it was clear 
to Adorno that the drive towards radicalizing the thinking of established schools of 
philosophy from within the academy—albeit as a self-styled eccentric outsider—only led 
to the opportunistic embrace of a specious political ideology. On the other hand, 
ostensibly independent thought suffered from the demand for cultural currency; lacking 
the “critical element” of true thinking, the outsider to the academic field was compelled 
to produce the au courant. Adorno expressed the paradox, 
In an intellectual hierarchy which constantly makes everyone answerable, 
unanswerability alone can call the hierarchy directly by name. The circulation 
sphere, whose stigmata are borne by intellectual outsiders, opens a last refuge to 
the mind that it barters away, at the very moment when refuge no longer exists. 
He who offers for sale something unique that no-one wants to buy, represents, 
even against his will, freedom from exchange.410 
 
 
409 Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. by E. F. N. Jephcott (London and New 
York: Verso, 2005), 66; §41. 
410 Ibid., 68. “In einer geistigen Hierarchie, die unablässig alle zur Verantwortung zieht, ist 
Unverantwortlichkeit allein fähig, die Hierarchie unmittelbar selber beim Namen zu rufen. Die 
Zirkulationssphäre, deren Male die intellektuellen Außenseiter tragen, eröffnet dem Geist, den sie 
verschachert, die letzten Refugien in dem Augenblick, in dem es sie eigentlich schon gar nicht mehr gibt. 
Wer ein Unikum anbeitet, das niemand mehr kaufen will, vertritt, selbst gegen seinen Willen, die Freiheit 
vom Tausch” (Gesamelte Schriften, vol. 4:74). 
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Although Adorno’s notion of “Unverantwortlichkeit,” or “unanswerability” and the 
freedom from the demand to produce results certainly resonated among many of the more 
mainstream academic philosophers in the mid to late 1950s, they understood this not in 
Adorno’s sense of a freedom to critique political or cultural hierarchies from a critical 
distance; rather, their interest lay in preserving their elite status in the university and, to 
some extent, in broader cultural life. This was the implicit motive behind the common 
refrain during the late 1940s and early 1950s for a renewed cultural humanism and for the 
return to the Bildungsideale of the early nineteenth century under which philosophy still 
enjoyed preeminence among the sciences. For many professional philosophers, these 
gestures towards “untarnished” traditions became more subtle by the mid 1950s. The 
initial flush of nostalgia that accompanied the intellectual discourse of restoration in the 
late 1940s and 1950s, as exemplified by the “Goethe-Anneigung” that had accompanied 
the Jubilee celebrations around 1947, gave way to calls for a critical reevaluation of the 
German intellectual tradition and the present demands of a discipline in need of new 
professional credentials.411 
 
The Call for ‘Intellectual Leadership’ and a ‘Scientific Attitude’ 
Fritz Heinemann raised the issue of the philosopher’s loss of function in a lecture, 
provocatively titled “Philosophie und Geistige Führerschaft,” which was given at the 
second congress held under the auspices of the AGPD to which he was invited as an 
 
411 Jaspers, Unsere Zukunft und Goethe. 
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international guest in 1954.412 The Oxford professor complained that contemporary 
philosophers had given up the constructive task of the collaborative search for value and 
meaning. Instead, both the Existenzphilosophers and the positivists denied the possibility 
of this task in their common critique of metaphysics:  
Es ist ein Charakteristikum unserer Zeit, daß viele Philosphen gegen die 
Philosophie sprechen, sei es gegen die Metaphysik, gegen die Philosophie 
als ein eigenständiges Wissengebiet, gegen die Möglichkeit von 
philosophischen Sätzen, die sich nicht auf wissenschaftliche Aussagen 
reduzieren ließen, oder gegen die Logik, gegen die Werte und gegen die 
Ethik. Dabei betrachten sie dieses Gerede als ein höchst originelles und 
verdienstvolles Unterfragen, das an die Stelle des Philosophierens treten 
solle. Teils werden sie in diesen Angriffen zu poetisierenden Romantikern, 
teils zu bloßen Technikern der Sprache oder der Logik, denen das 
Philosophieren zu einem Spiel mit bestimmten Spielregeln wird. Sie 
glauben an nichts mehr und halten diesen ihren Unglauben für einen 
entscheidenden Fortschritt. Ohne Glauben aber kann man kein geistiger 
Führer sein. Geistig führen heißt Glauben und Vertrauen einflößen.413 
 
In opposition to this, Heinemann argued, “Die Philosophen sollten keine Sinnzerstörer, 
sondern Sinngeber sein; dann die spezifische Aufgabe des Philosophen ist die 
Sinndeutung des Ganzen unserer Erfahrung im Gegensatz zu den Einzelwissenschafter, 
die sich wohlweislich auf die Analyse und Durchforschung von Einzelbereichen 
beschränken.”414 The idea of an intellectual leader, “geistige Führer,” for Heinemann, 
was certainly not a call for the scientist or philosopher to become the political prophet, 
 
412 Fritz Heinemann, “Philosophie und geistige Führerschaft,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 9, 
no. 2 (1955): 390-401. 
413 Ibid., 391. 
414 Ibid., 397. 
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against which Max Weber had warned in 1918.415 Rather, the task of the philosopher as 
intellectual leader was thinking in order to encourage self-thinking: “Der Philosoph soll 
zum denken, d.h. zum selbst denken erziehen.”416 The current problem with the teaching 
of philosophy in Germany was not, as Heidegger claimed, that it did not yet think; rather, 
that the philosophers were “no longer thinking” in a constructive sense—i.e., with a belief 
in philosophy’s ability to guide knowledge and belief through wisdom.417  
Against Heidegger’s nebulous, passive formulations of thinking, and the purely 
materialist thinking of the positivists, philosophers had to regain a belief in the inner 
worth of man. In response to the narrow view of positivism, Heinemann directed the 
philosopher to the “primacy of the values of persons before those of material ends [den 
Primat der Personenwerte vor den Sachwerten].”418 He harkened back to the Kantian 
notion of the “kingdom of ends,” or “Das Reich der Zwecke.” The universal imperative 
that every human being be treated as ends in themselves also prescribed the duty of 
philosophy teacher to the student. “Der Philosoph,” argued Heinemann, “soll kein Hirte 
des Seins sein; das Sein ist fähig, sich selbst zu hüten. Er soll kein Seher sein, aber er soll 
sehen lehren. Er soll das geistige Auge und das innere Ohr seiner Schüler öffnen.”419 
This belief led Heinemann to identify “spiritual leadership” in philosophy with the 
 
415 Max Weber, “Wissenschaft als Beruf,” originally published in Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur 
Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922), 524-55.  
416 Heinemann, “Philosophie und geistige Führerschaft,” 395. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid., 400. 
419 Ibid., 393. 
234 
 
                                                
traditional precepts of humanistic education. Thus teachers of philosophy were to guide 
their students according to a moral imperative in which the end of education (Bildung) 
could not be reduced to any partial, or merely instrumental transmission of knowledge. 
Particularly in “times of crisis,” the teacher had the “task to give the work and life of his 
students direction.”420 The potential of teachers and students to think in common was lost 
in both Heidegger’s passively construed notion of teaching as “letting learn” and in the 
purely instrumental instruction of experts in the positive sciences. In a powerful charge 
directed both at existentialists like Heidegger as well as the positivists, Heinemann stated, 
“Wer nicht mehr an Philosophie glaubt, sollte aufhören, Philosophie zu lehren.”421  
In the course of the Stuttgart congress, other thinkers came forward in defense of 
the practical, scientific relevance of philosophy against the charge of irrationalism 
provoked by the Existenzphilosphie of the day. The Jena philosopher, Paul Linke, 
presented an important programmatic paper on the “Unentbehrlichkeit der 
wissenschaftlichen Haltung in der Philosophie,” [the indispensability of the scientific 
attitude in philosophy] in which he pointed to Heidegger’s much-imitated imprecise and 
poetic use of language as a cause of philosophy’s loss of credibility as a science.422 
“Schreibe kontrollierbar!” was the dictum with which Linke introduced his concluding 
remarks. It was imperative not only for the general scientific demeanor of philosophy but 
 
420 Ibid., 392. 
421 Ibid., 401. 
422 Paul F. Linke, “Die Unentbehrlichkeit der wissenschaftlichen Haltung in der Philosophie,” Zeitschrift 
für philosophische Forschung 9, no. 2 (1955): 209-218. 
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also a necessity for communication between philosophers and non-philosophers in other 
fields. He continued,  
Schreibe so, daß du von jedem sachkündigem Leser nicht bloß kontrolliert werden 
kannst, sondern auch kontrolliert werden willst und daß man dir dies anmerkt. 
Schreibe so, daß man dir anmerkt, daß du deinem Gegner nicht als Feind ansiehst 
sondern als Mitarbeiter, dessen du bedarfst, um kontrolliert zu werden. Nur so ist 
Wissenschaft, nur so auch wissenschaftliche Philosophie möglich.423 
 
The obscurity of their language and the unscientific character of their ideas, exemplified 
by the case of Heidegger, were the main liabilities existentialist thinking presented for 
professional philosophers. Linke echoed Spranger and Heinemann’s comments about 
Heidegger and the existentialists’ influence on the youth at a time when reconstruction 
and reorientation needed sound leadership and scholarly clarity. The fear underlying the 
Stuttgart Congress was that the “fascinating effect” of Heidegger’s language would tempt 
the youth away from the ‘correct’ scholarly path, or, as Linke put it, that “[d]er Anfänger 
steht hilflos vor den Ausführungen des Irrationalisten.”424 This was, one could argue, a 
powerful moralizing element in philosopher’s struggle to secure recognition of the 
continued relevance of their profession as a necessary component in the curriculum of 
modern higher education. The belief that at stake was the competency and reliability of 
the philosophical youth as the future representatives of their discipline intensified the 
established philosophers’ engagement in the debates about Hochschulreform of the mid 
to late 1950s. However, as we shall see, many of the old Mandarin breed were reluctant 
 
423 Ibid., 217. 
424 Ibid. 
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to sully themselves in the politics and administrative affairs of the new ‘mass’ 
universities. 
 
The Philosophers’ Struggle to Retain Autonomy within the University 
The ideals of the mid to late 1940s about the centrality of philosophical and 
humanistic education to democratic reconstruction persisted through the 1950s. At the 
same time, these concerns for reform ran up against a profession in search of scientific 
status and thereby, the preservation of its autonomy over against the 
Einzelwissenschaften. A reverse polarity existed between the “salaried profundity” of the 
academy and the standards of “currency” or relevance in the cultural and political field. 
Within the university, gestures toward the broader cultural importance of philosophy for 
democratic re-education and practical orientation beyond the university were 
overshadowed by the concerns of the professors of philosophy within the academy for 
their own elite status. The most significant register of this tension was the growing 
concern of philosophers for the stake of their discipline in the continuous debates about 
Hochschulreform during the 1950s; however, even in this public debate, the professors 
tended to downplay the political and social implications of the university reforms and no 
longer wished to see universities become the sites of political reeducation. As Georg 
Picht observed, 
Die Universitäten, einst Mittlepunkt der politischen Erneuerung, zogen sich mehr 
und mehr in den Raum der ‘reinen’ Forschung und Lehre zurück, der ihnen von 
der Kulturverwaltung zugewiesen wurde; die Wahrheit, der sie dienten, verlor die 
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Kraft, sie zur Verantwortung für das geistige Schicksal von Volk und Staat 
aufzurufen. Der Gebildete wird zum “Unpolitischen”, und entsprechend entartete 
die Politik in einem Bildungszerfall, der noch heute andauert und keine Grenzen 
zu kennen scheint.425 
 
Certainly, after the political compromises of the 1930s, many university philosophers 
were reluctant to look towards the political realm for advancement. More than this, 
however, the persistent problems of Hochschulreform were a political minefield in the 
university which the Ordinarien nonetheless had to traverse if they wished to preserve 
their autonomy and dominance. The Mandarin professors were faced with the questions 
of student self-government and the increased role of graduate students, younger 
Dozenten, and assistants in determining curriculum and teaching because of the 
exponential growth in the number of matriculating students by the mid 1950s. The ideas 
of student involvement in university politics had moved beyond the localized 
experiments with studium generale to the level of state (Land) and national policy. 
Professors now had to either swallow their pride and take on a more active role in the 
bureaucratic tasks of university administration, or risk isolation and a loss of control over 
curriculum, examination policy, and the division of labor. But breaking out of the realm 
of ‘pure’ research as Picht advocated ran counter to the Mandarin habitus.  
 To be sure, leading philosophers attempted to reassert their professional standing 
by emphasizing the scientific character of their discipline and, paradoxically, by 
modeling new forms of collective research—journals, conferences, and professional 
 
425 Georg Picht, “Universität und Schule,” in Frankfurter Hefte 7, no. 1 (Jan. 1952): 18. 
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associations—after the example of what they sometimes considered the ‘lesser 
sciences.’426 Learned societies like the AGPD attempted to regulate teaching and 
examination policies by means of the “engere Kreis.” However, these efforts to retain 
control over the standards of the discipline often fell short of effecting actual policy, 
often because the pace of changes in the university and rising student enrollments outran 
the philosophers’ ability and willingness to accommodate them. 
A poignant example of the difficulties facing both philosophers and those in the 
Geisteswissenschaften more generally in the course of Hochschulreform was the debate 
about the threat posed by the increase in the number of assistants at the West German 
Hochschulen. As part of a study headed by Helmuth Plessner at the University of 
Göttingen in the mid 1950s, Dietrich Goldschmidt reported that “[d]as Aufkommen der 
Assistenten ist nur der personelle Ausdruck für die wachsende Differenzierung und 
Aufwendigkeit moderner Forschung und Lehre, die – ganz im Gegensatz zur Universität 
nach den Ideen Humboldts und seines Kreises – einer situierten Helferschicht nicht 
entraten können.”427 There was also a palpable sense of fear for the radicalizing potential 
of this new surplus of educated men and women with little hope of advancement within 
an overextended university structure. 
 
426 German philosophers will often evoke the narrowness and diminutive stature of specialized sciences by 
labeling them with terms such as “Einzelwissenschaften” and “Fachwissenschaften.” There are no suitable 
English equivalents. The first is meant to signify their isolated or “singular” applicability and, the second, 
their focus on specialized knowledge needed to train ‘experts’ (Fachmänner/Gutachter).  
427 Dietrich Goldschmidt, “Die gegenwärtige Problematik (1956),” in Helmuth Plessner, ed., 
Nachwuchsfragen im Spiegel einer Erhebung, 1953-1956, Unterzuchungen zur Lage der deutschen 
Hochschullehrer, vol. I (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), 41. 
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The rise in assistants that could not move forward to habilitation and 
professorships also symbolized the decline of the ideals of the humanistic 
Ordinarienuniversität, which united teacher and researcher in one person, the Ordinarius, 
the full professor. By the mid-1950s, the Hochschulen were forced to produce more 
assistants in response to the rise in student enrollments. At the same, the number of 
Ordinarien positions remained relatively steady such that there was left a ‘mass’ of 
unhabilitated assistants with little chance of moving into professorships. While assistants 
oftentimes were taking on the tasks of instructors, the professors’ time was increasingly 
taken up by administrative duties, which left less time for research and teaching. As 
Dietrich Goldschmidt argued, “[d]er Ordinarius mag selbst noch Lehrer und Forscher 
sein, mehr und mehr muß er nunmehr auch verwaltender und planender Direktor oder 
‘Manager’ seines ‘Betriebes’ sein.”428 
Also, the ‘Privatdozent,’ who traditionally devoted their ‘Wanderjahre’ to free 
research supported by occasional teaching activities—viz., by the Hörgeld given out for 
public lectures, was a thing of the past; the designation still existed but in name alone. In 
greater number were the wissenschaftliche Assistanten who were the byproduct of the 
new division of labor and delegation of teaching duties in the modern, mass university. 
The Assistanten came to represent the increasing degree of specialization and the 
purpose-oriented (zweckmäßig) outlook of the contemporary students. The institutional 
attitude embodied in the assistants appeared even more threatening as their numbers 
 
428 Goldschmidt, 42. 
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increased in gross disproportion to the number of Ordinarien, who were supposed to be 
their mentors. Embittered as their chances for a secure academic career thinned, the 
assistants were employed in the universities’ administrative substructure. Along with 
these frustrations came generational conflict. Although there had always been some 
degree of tension between the professors and their impatient, aging assistants, 
Goldschmidt observed, “[d]aß heute in dieser Mischung die Kritik überwiegt, ist nicht 
nur ein Ausdruck einer allgemein geringer geworden Autoritätsgläubigkeit, sondern das 
Ergebnis der Prägung durch einschneidende geschichtliche Erfahrung, welche die 
Generationen ungleich schärfer voneinander trennen, als das bis 1914 der Fall war.” The 
losses of the war and the resulting delay in their studies as well as the material dearth of 
the postwar years had taken their toll on those 30-40-year old assistants of the mid 1950s, 
a youth that one encountered “not in rebellion, but in conformity [Anpassung] and at 
most – and indeed considerably among those over forty years old – in resignation.”429 
Philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften were affected most acutely by this 
dynamic. Doctoral candidates and Ph.D. assistants were not being ‘trained’ for a 
profession external to the discipline; for philosophy did not offer the serviceable expertise 
of the Einzelwissenschaften. While the rest of the “skeptical generation” could move 
through from Staatsexamen, or Diplom to “free professions” (Freiberufe) or the secure 
prestige of civil service, the scholarly assistants and “Dr. Dozenten” in philosophy found 
themselves without the competency, in terms of specialized training, for a job outside a 
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shrinking discipline. Odo Marquard (b.1928) provides a vivid recollection of how as a 
young philosophy student at Freiburg and Münster during the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
he took on the ‘skepticism’ of the younger generation, but certainly was not given the 
chance to prove an “unusual competency for life” and “surety of success” that Schelsky 
later lauded.430 “For as a rule,” Marquard admits dramatically, “the choice of philosophy 
as a field of study meant, then as it does now, not the beginning of a successful career, 
but the beginning of a personal tragedy.”431 In his report on the status of the 
Geisteswissenschaften in Plessner’s volume, Christian Graf von Krockow summarized 
the modern dilemma facing philosophers, observing how 
Alle anderen Diziplinen können jedenfalls festumrisse Bereiche nachweisen, 
denen sie forschungsmäßig zugewandt sind; für Philosophie jedoch läßt sich ein 
solcher Bezirk nicht verbindlich angeben, ja es läßt sich heute nicht einmal 
allgemeinverbindlich sagen, in welchem Sinn Philosophie überhaupt 
‘Wissenschaft’ ist oder sein soll bzw. in welchen Verhältnis sie zu den 
Einzelwissenschaften steht.432 
 
The reluctance with which philosophers adjusted the practices of their discipline to the 
needs of the other, specialized sciences had practical consequences, which were not 
always taken into account because of the persistence of the ideal of the unity of teaching 
 
430 Schelsky, Die Skeptische Generation, 488. 
431 Odo Marquard, “Farwell to Matters of Principal,” in Farewell to Matters of Principal: Philosophical 
Essays, trans. Robert M. Wallace (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),  5. Of course, 
Marquard’s trajectory ended in a successful career by the mid 1960s, and this was not uncommon for 
philosophers of his age. Marquard promoted in Freiburg under Max Müller in 1954 and served as Joachim 
Ritter’s wissenschaftlicher Assistant until his habilitation in 1963, after which he took up a professorship in 
Gießen in 1965. However, almost ten years as an assistant was clearly an indication of the great difficulty 
for philosophy Ph.D.s in the 1950s to achieve habilitation and appointment as professor. 
432 Christian Graf von Krockow, “Geisteswissenschaften (Erforschungsbericht),” in Plessner, ed., 
Nachwuchsfragen, 173. 
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and research, embodied in the model of the Ordinarius. The first consequence was the 
languishing of the assistants and Dozenten. Moreover, the inability to place one’s 
students into university chairs, or, in some cases, even to have them habilitate was an 
indication of the institutional isolation suffered by many professors of philosophy as well 
as a constant reminder of the loss of prestige and esteem for their discipline among 
university administrators. Ironically, it was the philosophers’ jealous separation of their 
research from the practices of the Einzelwissenschaften as well as their understandable 
dislike for administrative tasks that contributed to the decline of their institutional 
influence. 
Jürgen Habermas, then assistant to Adorno in Frankfurt, observed how the 
antiquated belief of philosophers and Geisteswissenschaftler in a “universitas litterarum” 
in which the sciences were united under philosophy was belied by the necessities of 
modern industrial society for “functional competence.” There was an “archaic moment” 
in continued influence of the ideal of the independence of research and teaching on the 
structure of the university. “Freiheit ist etwas Altmodisches,” Habermas declared, “und 
wenn sich akademische Freiheit im liberalen Wortlauf auf ihre verbürgten Rechte beruft 
und sich sperrt gegen die Verwaltung dessen,was im Kern nicht verwaltet werden kann, 
dann bieten sich als wirksame institutionelle Instrumente kaum andere als die 
unzeitgemäßen Reste korporative Privilegien”433 From this point of view, the tension 
caused by the increase in assistants to meet the strain on the body of university teachers 
 
433 Jürgen Habermas, “Das chronische Leiden der Hochschulreform,” Merkur 109, no.3 (March 1957): 270. 
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was a result of a traditional structure that could not be adjusted to the exponential rise in 
student enrollment. Nor were the initial reforms based on “studium generale” enough to 
prevent the needs of modern industrial society for functionally necessary 
(funktionsnotwendig) disciplines—the natural and new social sciences—from rendering 
humanistic education centered on the Geisteswissenschaften and philosophy obsolete. 
Habermas observed how “[j]ener Kern der philosophische Fakultät, der zu Humboldts 
Zeit noch der Kern der ganzen Universität war, ist heute an die Peripherie gerückt.”434 A 
forstalling of university reform based on studium generale was, for Habermas, the result 
of a reluctance on the part of the specialized sciences to reflect on their own principles. 
More significant, however, was the failure and unwillingness of philosophers and 
Geisteswissenschaftler to critically address the question of their relationship to a society 
in which social mobility and diversification necessarily meant the training of a ‘mass’ of 
new specialists.435 
The Geisteswissenschaften and philosophy in particular no longer seemed to 
possess the competence to serve the specialized disciplines as critical self-reflection. 
According to Habermas, this was an outcome of the stubborn refusal of many in 
philosophy and the human sciences to support university reforms that would have 
genuinely addressed the need for self-criticism among all the sciences rather than an 
uncritical reassertion of the traditional universitas litterarum and a misguided division of 
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general education from specialized training. Lost too were the ideals that initially had 
guided the “reformist elan” in the late 1940s, which had placed equal importance on the 
development of socially conscious education and participatory, semi-democratic student 
self-government. Instead, the philosophers and humanists retreated into the domain of 
inwardness and solitude, and they upheld the antiquated view of Bildung as cultivation of 
an ideal bourgeois “Persönlichkeit.”436 At the same time, the specialized sciences rigidly 
adhered to method and instrumental goals as false guarantors of ‘value-free’ research and 
training. Thus, Habermas argued, “Die Versachlichung des vermittelten Wissens und die 
Verfachlichung der darauf sich stützenden Ausbildung hat zur Folge, daß die Einheit von 
Forschung und lehre nur noch fiktiv aufrechterhalten werden kann.”437 Yet the ‘freedom’ 
to determine the direction of their disciplines independent from philosophy that the 
Einzelwissenschaften had enjoyed since the mid nineteenth century—viz. after the 
positivist model of the Naturwissenschaften became dominant following the 
fragmentation of Hegel’s system—did not release them from the necessity of 
communicating across disciplines. Furthermore, the relation of the multitude of 
independent disciplines could and should no longer be modeled on the dominance of one 
domain of reflection, a philosophy that had depended on the exclusivity and ‘seclusion’ 
of the humanist university, populated by an elite of the bourgeois class. Rather, Habermas 
concluded: 
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Das Privileg der ‘Grundlagenforschung’ hat nun eine jede Wissenschaft für sich 
selbst, und, über sich selbst hinaus, für den Bereich der benachbarten 
Wissenschaften auszuüben. Und wo es die Philosophie behält, wie im Falle der 
philologisch-historischen und der sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen, da 
handhabt sie es nicht mehr wie früher in einsamer Autonomie, sondern im 
dialogischen Kontakt mit diesen Wissenschaften selbst.438 
 
The new scientific comportment of philosophers did not fully preclude the 
antiquated view that the philosopher belonged to a “spiritual aristocracy” that stood 
above not only the specialists of the empirical sciences but also the day-to-day 
administrative duties of the modern, mass university. A continued “idealization of pure 
and impractical learning” combined with the conservative implications of the classical 
ideal of Bildung remained as a hangover from the period of Mandarin preeminence 
expertly examined by Fritz Ringer.439 The legacy of political collaboration with the Hitler 
dictatorship had indeed undermined the apolitical or “idealistic” approach to political and 
social questions that was a hallmark of mandarin academics at the apogee of their 
influence. However, the often unthematized “attitudes” of a spiritual “aristocracy of 
cultivation” persisted behind the new “scientific” veneer of professional philosophy after 
1945.440 
 
438 Ibid., 284. 
439 Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, 123. 
440 Ibid., 120-121. Ringer finds the unifying element in mandarin ideology on the “pretheoretic level,” in 
the defensive language of idealistic politics that came to oppose “pragmatic compromises” with the realities 
of mass democracy. For our postwar narrative, it is extremely important to highlight the way group 
competition and the maintenance of exclusivity became the often unthematized concern of a professional 
elite in the context of the exponential growth of the university student body and the increasing prominence 
of the specialized disciplines.  
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Though philosophers often complained of the bureaucratization and the 
multiplication of administrative duties within the postwar universities, they continued to 
take practical, institutional steps to ensure the exclusivity of their discipline and the 
independence of its function vis-à-vis the other sciences. The “scientification” 
(Verwissenschaftlichung) of philosophy on the model of the empirical, natural and social 
sciences was a necessary concession, but it stopped well short of a willing subordination 
to and dependence on the methodological and epistemological needs of these 
Einzelwissenschaften. German philosophers and Geisteswissenschaftler more generally, 
would maintain the conviction that philosophical and humanistic scholarship was 
independent and above the specialized “training” of experts in instrumentally applicable 
knowledge. These two contradictory tendencies, towards professional seclusion in 
institutions on the one hand, and the continued resistance to diminution of status as a 
“Fach unter Fächer” in the service of the mass of professional students on the other, 
reduced to a minimum the relevance of the philosopher to a wider non-academic world. 
Yet this reality only served to confirm the widely held belief among philosophers that the 
“vita contemplativa,” even in an age dominated by the world view of the natural sciences, 
required exclusivity and a degree of alienation from the public realm. Gerhard Krüger 
expressed this necessity aptly:  
Die Popularisierung der Wissenschaft wird zwar zu einem ständig empfundenen 
Bedürfnis, dem man immer wieder abzuhelfen sucht; aber sie ist ja gerade deshalb 
ein ständiges Bedürfnis, weil die modern Wissenschaft an sich selbst wesentlich 
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unpopulär ist. Wer die wissenschaftliche Wahrheit kennen lernen will, muß mit 
dem populären Denken des Alltags prinzipiell brechen.441 
 
Two Cultures? The Contest between Positive Science and the Humanities according to 
the Philosophers and Cultural Theorists 
 “Outsiders tend to see uniformity in other groups and fine distinctions in their 
own.” Stephan Collini made this seemingly obvious observation in his astute commentary 
on C. P. Snow’s Rede Lecture of 1959, “The Two Cultures.”442 Collini drew attention to 
the tendency, touched on by Snow, of scientists and ‘literary intellectuals’ to make 
summary judgements about the myopia inherent in each other’s views on the 
modernization of society, technology, the nature of scientific inquiry, and their 
implications for human beings in general. However, even Snow, himself on the side of 
the natural scientists, avered the unbridgeable division between ‘the sciences’ and the 
‘literary intellectuals’ in the humanities at a time when English scientists and 
intellectuals, and, more generally, intellectuals in all advanced industrial societies were 
coping with the vicissitudes of cultural and institutional change, particularly with regard 
to specialization and organization in the universities. Snow’s mostly anecdotal analysis 
seemed to fall on the side of the empirical scientists’ work. He naturally abhorred the 
narrow specialization and lack of cultural knowledge and intellectual skills—reading, 
writing, communication—embodied in the crassest form of experts and technocracts. 
 
441 Gerhard Krüger, Grundfragen der Philosophie, 183. 
442 Stephan Collini, “Introduction,” in C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), lv. 
248 
 
                                                
However, he seemed more concerned with the “Luddism” of the literati and the general 
disregard within the humanities for the ethical commitments of scientists, and how the 
industrious efforts of the latter were the only path to ameliorating the tension between 
rich and poor, First and Third World through industrial progress. Put in his terms, it was 
more important that the literary intellectuals gave up their antipathy towards the industrial 
revolution and learn what scientists do than for the scientists to read more Shakespeare, 
or Dickens.443 
 Snow’s ideas resonated with certain thinkers in West Germany, who had come to 
accept as fate the technologization and instumentalization of modern science. In an 
important essay that appeared in Merkur in 1961, Hans Freyer invoked Snow’s notion of 
the necessity of the “scientific revolution” in the advanced stage of contemporary 
industrialization, which placed Wissenschaft and its institutions like the university at the  
disposal of the “great planning systems,” again, the “secondary systems” over whose 
anonymous strategies the individual human being had no control.444 Freyer used Snow’s 
viewpoint as a foil in his fatalistic diagnosis of the instrumentalization of the sciences and 
the decline and anachronism of the humanistic ideals of Bildung and the university; his 
statements, much like those of his pupils, Gehlen and Schelsky, had the effect of 
neutralizing the efficacy of any form of progressive social critique as naïve and utopian. 
 
443 See, C. P. Snow, “The Two Cultures,” particularly, 22ff.; on the German reaction to Snow’s bias see, 
Hochkeppel, Mythos Philosophie, 59-60. 
444 Hans Freyer, “Die Wissenschaften des 20. Jahrhunderts und die Idee  des Humanismus,” Merkur15, no. 
2 (Feb. 1961): 102-105. 
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The antiquated view of humanists, the philosophers above all, about the “unity of the 
sciences” and philosophy as “die Krönung der Wissenschaft” was belied by the realities 
of specialization and the irreversible extent to which science (Wissenschaft) had become 
the exclusive domain of the specialists, the researchers, and technocrats.445 We see the 
affinity here between Gehlen’s notion of the “crystallization of the Persönlichkeit” and 
Schelsky’s claim about the “Realitätsverlust” of the cultural intellectuals. Freyer 
contended, “[w]ir können uns schließlich die Wissenschaft, die wir aus humanistischen 
Gründen gern haben möchten, nicht malen. Die geistige Welt des klassischen 
Humanismus, die ich als Gegenbild zeichnete, ist ein Wunschbild, aber derzeit eines 
Modus des Irrealis.”446 
 One detects a clear lament in the fatal diagnoses of these figures for the fall of the 
Gelehrten-Kultur and even the Bildungsideale of the humanistic university. However, 
none of these conservative ‘cultural sociologists’—it is difficult to designate Freyer, 
Gehlen, and Schelsky under a general discipline—can offer any constructive, positive 
moment in the dialectic between ‘objective’ social processes and the rational power of a 
community of intellectuals. Freyer and company denied the dialectical power of the 
negative that was being offered at the same time by Adorno, and especially Herbert 
Marcuse as a normative, critical moment in the philosopher, or intellectual’s 
confrontation with seeming objective cultural and social processes and hierarchy. For 
 
445 Ibid., 113-14. 
446 Ibid., 114. 
250 
 
                                                
Marcuse in particular, the situation of modern man was still contingently based on a form 
of domination, whose logic imposed the reign of experts and caused the narrowing of 
personal desires to a point of “one-dimensionality.” Those needs that required liberation 
were ignored to such an extent that all which remained was “the consciousness of 
servitude.”447 But for Freyer, such an insight would amount to nothing more than “mere 
secondary overviews [Überblicke]” that neglected the extent to which individuals could 
no longer see past their own position in the crowd. Ideed, Schelsky, Gehlen, and Freyer 
all appropriate David Riesman’s notion of the “other-directed man” from The Lonely 
Crowd, published in German translation as Die einsame Masse, with an introduction by 
Schelsky in 1958.448 Schelsky had used the image of “other-directedness” as a model for 
understanding the conformist, goal-oriented view of the ‘skeptical generation,’ those 
competent but closed-off young people, who lacked more than a purely functional 
interest in the learning process of the university. Instead, the generality of “other-
directed” persons acquired much of their knowledge of life, values, sexuality, science etc. 
“second hand” from external peer groups, or from the media. For Freyer, “general 
consumer culture” produced an “interestedness in science” that was received passively 
 
447 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man [1964] (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 2nd edn. 1991), 6-7; 
For Marcuse’s reaction to Snow’s “Two Cultures” see, H. Marcuse, “Bemerkungen zu einer 
Neubestimmung der Kultur,” in Kultur und Gesellschaft, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1967), 2:168. 
448 David Riesman, Reuel Denney, and Nathan Glazer, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing 
American Character (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); in German translation as Riesman et al., 
Die einsame Masse: eine Untersuchung der Wandlungen des amerikanischen Charakters, with an 
introduction by Helmut Schelsky (Berlin and Neuweid: Luchterhand, 1956), and the more widely-
circulated paperback edition in the series, Rowohlts Deutsche Enzyklopädie vol. 72-73 (Hamburg: 
Rohwolt, 1958). 
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like all consumer values and forms of “secondary” fulfillment, which had the effect of 
preventing any genuine critical hold for the individual vis-à-vis the instrumentalized 
application of science by the bureaucratic, welfare state.449 We find an even stronger 
formulation of the “Lonely Crowd hypothesis” developed in Gehlen’s notion of “cultural 
crystallization”: “Heute aber ist es, wie Riesman in seinem Buch ‘Die einsame Masse’ 
sehr richtig sagt, unmöglich geworden, ein Programm aufzustellen, das die Beziehungen 
zwischen dem wirtschaftlichem und dem politischen Leben entscheidend verändern 
könnte. Ein solches Programm fände in der gewaltigen, einespielten Maschine, in der 
auch die Betriebsverluste eingeplant sind, gar keine Fugen zum Eingreifen.”450 
 The views of cultural sociologists like Freyer of Schelsky and the “critical 
theorists” like Adorno and Marcuse exerted a broad influence and certainly provoked 
discussions of the loss of function for the humanities and philosophy in its old supposedly 
‘unified’ form. However, philosophers tended to view the “two culture” question from 
above. Positivism embodied in the specialized sciences and the various kinds of 
irrational, existentialist cultural fashions were often criticized as two sides of the same 
coin. The belief in an unproblematic, presuppositionless realation of the scientist to the 
object world and the focus of existentialists on unconditioned existence both produced a 
kind of false compensation for the uncertainty in the self-understanding of modern man, 
 
449 Freyer, “Wissenschaften des 20. Jahrhunderts,” 115; cf. Heidegger’s differentiation between mere 
“interest in philosophy” and “readiness for thinking,” in  “Was heißt Denken?” in Merkur 6, no.7 (July 
1952): 602-603. 
450 Gehlen, “Über kulturelle Kristallisation [1961],” in Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie, 324.  
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both had anthropological bases in this fundamental insecurity.451 As Wolfgang de Boer 
argued, “Es ist ein und dasselbe ungeheure Ereignis der Selbstverfinsterung, welsches 
sich sowohl in der positivistischen Flucht zum gegenständlich Vorzeigbaren wie in der 
existenzphilosophischen ‘Angst’ bekundet. In beiden enthüllt sich die eine Wahrheit der 
Verborgenheit des Seins für den Menschen, der sich von dieser Verborgenheit seiner 
Zeitlichkeit her versteht.”452 
 Within philosophy itself, however, the tension in the two cultures of thinking 
endured. For the false opposition between existentialism and positivism presented by 
their apparent antipathy was a product of the German tradition; both represented the 
compensatory paths that philosophy and the sciences pursued after the downfall of 
systematic philosophy with the demise of Hegel. Not only this distant process, but also 
the recent past caused the dislocation of the very elements of international philosophy—
analytic philosophy developed from Wittgenstein, the logical positivism of the Vienna 
Circle, and Karl Popper’s critical rationalism as main examples—that by the 1960s made 
their way back into West German philosophical study. There were explosive moments 
like the Positivismusstreit of the late 1950s and early 1960s; however, it is important to 
remember that this was very much a debate within German sociology.453 It began after all 
at the congress of the Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie that was held in Tübingen in 
 
451 Wolfgang de Boer, “Positivismus und Existenzphilosphie,” Merkur 6, no.1 (1952): 12-35. 
452 Ibid., 21. 
453 See Theodor Adorno et al., The Positivist dispute in German sociology, trans. by Glyn Adey and David 
Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976). 
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October 1961, where the theme was the “Logic of Social Sciences.” Also, the foermost 
representative of ‘German’ dialectical theory was Theodor Adorno, whose thought and 
practices as we have seen hardly represented those of academic philosophers in West 
Germany. Popper and Adorno continued the debate with missives published in René 
König’s Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie. In this exchange, one could say, Collini’s 
observation about the tendency of entrenched groups to treat the nuances of outsider’s 
opinions reductively was given a most obvious confirmation. Ultimately, the ‘dispute’ 
saw the main participants speaking past each other. In the end it became clear that Popper 
hardly supported a sort of simplistic view of the presuppositionless gaze of the natural 
scientist and an absolute claim to objective knowledge. Likewise, Adorno’s critical 
theory did not deny the possibility of rational consensus, despite his caveats about the 
limitations of positivism in social research.  
 Still, despite the caricature of scientific method as based on the belief in “value 
free” research, both positions in the Postivism Debate seemed to demanded a change in 
“attitude” towards research that brought both the critical rationalists around Popper and 
the social research model associated with Frankfurt into conflict with the views of 
traditional humanist scholarship, whose representatives in mainstream philosophy had 
come to emphasize the basis for truth in the Geisteswissenschaften in conceptual clarity 
and creative reflection on tradition in language and the historicity of the knower as 
opposed to developing a method for the human sciences, as, for example, Dilthey had 
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attempted.454 The new attitude of the newly institutionalized social sciences quickly 
emerged as the more progressive and living form of critical thought, whereas the 
Geisteswissenschaften and philosophy saw their ideals of Bildung and universitas give 
way to that of scientific procedure of the great social research institutes of the 
sociologists and political scientists. The response of philosophers followed at once the 
path of partial emulation of scientific organization and the return to a tradition of German 
reflective philosophy that supposedly died with Hegel. Some commentators perceived 
this new ‘scientificity’ and push for interdisciplinary exchanges as superficial gestures. 
Willy Hochkeppel argued about the impossibility of resolving the split between the two 
cultures of thinking within the sciences on philosophical grounds. For Hochkeppel, “[d]as 
Auseinanderbrechen ‘der’ Philosophie in mindestens zwei fundementale, gänzlich 
beziehungslos einander gegenüberstehende Philosopheme oder Denkkulturen spottet 
auch all der augenblicklich so betulichen Versuche, durch sogenannte interdiziplinäre 
Gespräche oder Arbeitsgruppen der Philosophie wieder Zusammenhalt oder gar erneute 
Reputation zu verschaffen.”455 We will consider this tension in philosophy, which might 
be seen by some as halfhearted at best and at worst, the continuation of a particular 
German provincialism. But as we will see, these two paths were radically transformed by 
the younger figures of German philosophy just at the moment when it seemed that the 
 
454 This we will find above all in our discussion of Gadamer’s herneneutics below. 
455 Hochkeppel, Mythos Philosophie, 69. 
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crystallization of the “two cultures” had left philosophy without a purpose and means to 
mediate between apparently irreconcilable approaches to human understanding. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Redefining Tradition beyond ‘Provincialism’ and the Limits of Institutional Change 
 
Diagnosing German Provincialism   
In postwar West Germany, the debate about existentialism and Heidegger in 
particular, was also complicated by the question of the political implications of 
Existenzphilosophie and its nihilistic pathos. Heidegger’s Nazism figured prominently in 
the appraisals of his detractors for an English-speaking audience from the end of the war 
into the late 1950s. At the same time, it is worth recalling that much of the debate 
surrounding Heidegger’s political involvement had to be “rediscovered” by a younger 
generation in the mid 1980s through the publications of foreign commentators such as 
Victor Farias.456 The wider implications of Heidegger’s case for the living memory of 
German commentators, and often German-Jewish émigrés was absent from the 
Heidegger Controversey of the 1980s. The late debate failed to appreciate the 
complexities of the cultural and professional context in which philosophers of the “45er 
generation” first discovered the details of the political misdeeds of prominent intellectual 
figures in the face of a general atmosphere of discretion that prevailed in postwar 
academic philosophy. 
 
 
456 Victor Farias, Heidegger et le Nazisme (Paris: Éditions Verdier, 1986). 
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In his “field trip to German universities” undertaken in 1953, the philosopher 
Walter Cerf, a German Jew who had emigrated from Germany in 1933, finished his 
studies at Princeton before the war, and finally taught at Brooklyn College pointed to the 
problem of German professors neglecting the needs of their students by clinging to an 
antiquated educational tradition. Cerf was a critic of what he felt was an inadequate 
liberal, individualistic notion of free speech and cultural power. He advocated for a more 
complex understanding of the unequal power relationship between teacher and student in 
American higher education particularly during wartime and more equal distribution of 
what he termed “cultural power” in the student-instructor relationship.457 On this basis, 
Cerf criticized the attempts to reform the German universities under the program of 
studium generale. For him, despite the invocation of such a “respectable name,” Cerf 
argued, “on the whole, however, the German university is still a professor’s 
university.”458 He cited the passivity that continued to prevail on both sides of the lectern. 
On the one hand, students could not ask questions nor express any criticism of the 
professors. On the other hand, German philosophy professors simply read aloud from a 
prepared text that was nothing more than a manuscript containing their recent research. 
Even in seminars Cerf criticized the way in which students’ Referaten did not truly 
engage critically with the texts and thinkers considered; rather, the Referent was content 
 
457 Walter Cerf, “Freedom of Instruction in War Time,” in The Public Opinion Quarterly 6, no. 4 (Winter, 
1942): 576-87. 
458 Walter Cerf, “A Field Trip to German Universities,” in Journal of Higher Education 26, no. 3 (Mar. 
1955): 135. 
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to simply give bland accounts of their historical antecedents.459 Finally the subject matter 
of lectures and seminars in the German universities showed a “stubborn narrow-
mindedness” and an “arrogant kind of provincialism,” which for Cerf was exemplified by 
the exclusive focus on contemporary French and German existentialism and complete 
neglect of recent Anglo-American philosophy.460 Seminars as well as lectures were 
devoted to thinkers rather than to a field or set of problems, which could span national 
traditions.461 For Cerf, German philosophers displayed “intolerance towards views 
different from their own”: departments had become strongly conformist and wedded to 
the different ‘schools’ of existentialism.462 
Cerf’s appraisal contrasted starkly with the intentions of editors like Georgi 
Schischkoff, who around the same time as Cerf’s field trip was extolling a decade of 
intellectual“tolerance” embodied in the ZphF which he felt had served as an open forum 
for work that crossed schools of thought and promoted exchange between divergent 
points of view. The idea was to replace the intolerance of competing world views with 
the openness of a new scholarly ethos based on the ideal of ‘Forschung.’463 Even if the 
content of the ZphF was certainly inclined towards Continental philosophy, it could 
hardly be considered existentialist in its outlook. In fact, Fritz Heinemann in his survey of 
 
459 Walter Kaufmann complained of the same passivity of the German style of “referieren” in his report on 
postwar West German philosophical instruction; see, Kaufmann, “German Thought Today,” The Kenyon 
Review 17, no. 1 (Winter 1957): 17-21. 
460 Cerf, “Field Trip,” 139. 
461 Ibid., 137. 
462 Ibid., 140. 
463 Georgi Schischkoff, “Zehn Jahre Philosophische Forschung und Toleranz”, 574ff. 
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German philosophy for the journal Philosophy lauded the ZphF’s commitment to a “high 
standard of objectivity” as early as 1949.464 Habermas, however, in his important 
statement of 1971, “Wozu noch Philosophie?” which directly referred back to Adorno’s 
1962 radio address, stated that the ideal of “Forschung” embodied in West Germany’s 
leading philosophy journal had only recently—that is, over the course of the 1960s, and 
not before—signified the “transformation of spirit” that brought German philosophy to 
the stage at which Anglo-Saxon as well as Russian philosophy had been for years.465 
Habermas observed an “astonishing continuity” of the questions and schools of thought 
that still dominated the practice of philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s with those that had 
began in the 1920s. Here we find an echo of the sentiments of figures like Hochkeppel, 
Kaufmann, and even those who contested the “legend of the 1920s” like Helmuth 
Plessner. Habermas took aim at the leading cultural critics of the late 1950s and 1960s, 
those whom he had “profiled” in very public forums since the early 1950s. The successor 
to Adorno and Horkheimer at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, now argued, 
in the wake of the events of 1968, that German philosophers and intellectuals in the two 
decades after the war had failed to address the relationship between the leading ideas and 
“great thinkers” of the German tradition and the crimes of National Socialism. Habermas 
argued that “in postwar Germany the leading philosophical teachings have contained 
 
464 F. H. Heinemann, “Philosophy in Germany,” Philosophy 24, no. 90 (July 1949): 264. 
465 Haberms, “Does Philosophy Still have a Purpose?” in Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick 
G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1983), 2. Below I will also reference the expanded 
German edition of 1984 because the English edition is an incomplete version of the original collection of 
essays published as Philosophisch-politische Profile (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971). 
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(often at the price of analytical purity) an explosive potential for a critique of the present 
age, ranging from authoritarian institutionalism, through the cultural criticism stylized in 
terms of the history of Being and the cultural pessimism on the Left, to a radical utopian 
critique of society.”466 In this way, German philosophy—here Habermas includes figures 
from East Germany like Ernst Bloch—had remained trapped in its provincial 
noncontemporanaiety with the pace of social and political changes. Here he did not just 
name the usual suspects; rather, Habermas argued, “[t]hat holds true for the irrationalist 
impulses of Heidegger and Gehlen as for the dialectical critiques of Bloch and 
Adorno.”467 
The trajectory of Habermas’ discussion of the successes and shortcomings of 
German attempts at cooperative philosophical research seems to pass over, or, at least, to 
assume knowledge of the day-to-day workings of professional philosophy in the 1950s 
and 1960s, which we find strongly criticized in the reports of external commentators. 
Two weeks after his report for the Journal of Higher Education, Cerf followed up with an 
article in the Journal of Philosophy in which he claimed that German philosophy, 
especially the teaching of philosophy, in the university was pervaded by what he called 
“existentialist mannerism.”468 Cerf conceded the importance of the early Heidegger, “I 
believe Heidegger to have been the most original philosopher of the continent in the 
 
466 Habermas, “Does Philosophy Still Have a Purpose?” 5-6. 
467 Ibid., 6. 
468 Walter Cerf, “Existential Mannerism and Education,” The Journal of Philosophy 52, no. 6 (Mar. 17, 
1955): 141-152. 
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period that extends roughly from the end of the First World War to the beginning of the 
second. His weakness is his lack of analytic clarity.” However, on his visits to several 
universities in West Germany, Cerf encountered several of what he considered to be blind 
acolytes of the Master who practiced existential mannerism in their lectures: “The 
existential mannerists, without having any of his redeeming features, and simply 
repeating in a watered-down and often misleading way his personal insights, have 
completely succumbed to emotivism.”469 For Cerf, the presence of existential mannerism 
in the major universities he visited—Freiburg, Heidelberg, Tübingen, Marburg, Münster, 
Kiel, Freie Universität Berlin, Göttingen—frustrated genuine philosophical and moral 
education and as a consequence even lowered students’ moral resistance to potential 
resurgent political ideologies: “Existentialism is precisely the kind of philosophy which 
will lead to a lack of intellectual and moral resistance to political Romanticism.”470 In 
Cerf’s observations, we find an early version of the thesis of Germany’s intellectual 
Sonderweg: for over a century, German universities had given up the idea of moral 
education in favor of the transmission of knowledge and research results. German 
existentialists in particular were the end product of an intellectual Kultur that had never 
fully embraced the Enlightenment age of optimism, progress, and intellectual freedom.471 
In contrast to the Enlightenment project of moral education, “Existentialism has no 
 
469 Ibid., 144. 
470 Ibid., 141. 
471 See Cerf, “Existential Mannerism,” 147. Interestingly, Cerf notes that the only German professor that he 
heard say anything positive about the Enlightenment was Otto Friedrich Bollnow in Tübingen. 
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educational philosophy except the appeal to this empty and whimsical authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit).”472 In language very similar to that of Heinemann’s notion of “geistige 
Führerschaft,” Cerf pointed to the general failure of philosophical pedagogy in Germany: 
In brief, the last thing an existentialist professor considers to be his duty 
toward his students is to awaken in them a logical conscience. Just the 
opposite. He accustoms them to big words and profound sentences whose 
meaning is mainly emotive and whose appeal is to Erlebnis and Vernunft, 
and not to reason. . . . . Questionable etymologies replace arguments and 
evocation replaces evidence. What can one reasonably expect of the great 
mass of students whose only exposure to philosophy has been to this 
emotive mannerism? 
 
Cerf explicitly linked the German students’ exposure to emotive, mystical 
language to their vulnerability to the rhetoric of political extremism. What is 
more, in the reference to a new ‘mass of students,’ Cerf again asserted his own 
educational philosophy based on the idea that freedom of education required not 
simply the protection of individual liberty, but public and institutional measures to 
ensure that students are taught the values of democratic society, not leaving it to 
the unmentored student to decide on their individual values for themselves, as if 
as young people they were really in a position to exercise this cultural 
judgment.473 Cerf was arguing that the German students were similarly offered 
only emotive mannerism in monologic lectures without any development of their 
own critical capacities. He observed, 
 
472 Cerf, “Existential Mannerism,” 148. 
473 Cf. Cerf, “Freedom of Instruction in War Time,” 584-86. 
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They [German students] will be victims of similar parlance in the field of 
politics. They will have no intellectual resistance of any strength and 
sincerity to political romanticism arid charlatanry. In the very courses 
which should have awakened their logical conscience, they have learned 
to mistrust reason and facts. They will again trust political and social 
nonsense if it is dressed pretentiously and emotively.474  
 
Cerf offered many examples of lectures that he attended to prove how existential 
mannerism had infected German philosophers and particularly the students of Heidegger, 
though aside from Wilhelm Weischedel in Berlin (after 1953), who Cerf quoted as an 
example of “arrogant German provincialism,” Cerf cited no other German philosophers 
by name.475 However, Weischedel was according to his own later account concerned 
with the burdens facing his students in the immediate aftermath of the war. Indeed, whar 
brought him to the Freie Universität from Tübingen in 1953 was “the fact that this 
university [FU] was considered the hotbed for new academic forms.”476 Berlin 
represented the “realization” of the democratic aspect of reforms based on studium 
generale towards which Weischedel and his colleagues had attempted, but with less luck 
at the older, traditional universities like Tübingen, Freiburg, and Heidelberg. Weischedel 
further claimed that he had great sympathy for the initial phase of the student movement 
in the mid 1960s. Weischedel wrote, 
 
474 Ibid., 145. 
475 Cerf, “Field Trip to German Universities,” 139. 
476 Wilhelm Weischedel, Beitrag in Pongratz, ed., Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen, 2:330. Weischedel 
had broken with Heidegger in 1933 after the latter gave his support to the National Socialists and idly 
watched as his Jewish students were turned out from the universities and Germany. Weischedel (1905-
1975), a non-Jew remained in Germany, but was banned from publishing due to his political views. He 
served in the library at Tübingen while working on his Habilitationsschrift, which could not be accepted 
unless he joined the NSDAP. Weischedel also made contact with the French Resistence with whom he 
served shortly before the war’s end. The symbol of arrogant German provincialism he was not. 
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In der ersten Phase ging es darum, den Studenten maßgebenden Einfluß auf die 
bisher fast ausschließlich von den Ordinarien bestimmte Universität zu 
verschaffen. Hier habe ich mit ganzer Kraft, in mancherlei Reden, Diskussionen 
und Artikeln für die Sache der Studenten und Assistenten eingesetzt; auch mir 
erschien die bisherige Gestalt der Hochschule dem demokratischen Geiste nicht 
zu entsprechen.477 
 
Cerf attended lectures in Heidelberg, where he likewise seemed to find only Heidegger 
acolytes. However, it is hard to believe that Gadamer or Löwith could be characterized as 
“Existentialists [who] believe they philosophize when they translate everyday language 
into Heidegger’s terms.”478 Kaufmann directed a similar attack at Karl Löwith. 
Kaufmann suggested that even Löwith’s book pulished after the latter’s return from 
forced exile, Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit in 1953, in which the former pupil 
revealed the political implication of his teacher’s philosophy, still “contributed to the 
[Heidegger] mystique.” The Princeton professor, whose own book on Nietzsche had met 
with a slightly lackluster review in the Philosophische Rundschau from Löwith a few 
years before,479 was shocked in 1956 to hear the Heidelberg professor give a lecture to a 
room of 200 students entitled, “Introduction to Modern Philosophy: From Nietzsche to 
Heidegger.”480 
 
477 Ibid., 2:332; see also, Wilhelm Weischedel, “Wie frei muss eine Universität sein? Die Lehren aus den 
Vorgängen an der Freien Universität Berlin,” in Die Zeit Nr. 20 (May 13, 1966): 17f. 
478 Cerf, “Existential Mannerism,” 143-44. Cerf only alludes to a “famous existentialist” in Heidelberg. 
However, that the lecture in question dealt with Ancient Greek philosophy, Cerf may very well have been 
describing Gadamer.   
479 Löwith, “Review of W. A. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton, 
1950),” in Philosophische Rundschau 2 (1954-55): 235-36. Among other things, Löwith objected to the 
way in which Kaufmann insisted on reducing the meaning of Nietzsche’s life and work to the 
psychological level. 
480 Kaufmann, “German Thought Today,” 28. 
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Cerf’s damning presentation provoked a response from Ludwig Landgrebe, then a 
prominent professor in Köln. Landgrebe was bemused by the suggestion that 
existentialism, particularly the philosophy of Heidegger dominated the German 
philosophical scene. Cerf had criticized the tendency to discuss classical philosophical 
texts in seminars and lectures as well as the apparent need of all discussions of “new 
ideas” to be couched in historical terms. But Landgrebe insisted that the focus on primary 
texts was a necessity that arose from the need of German students for a reconnection with 
their own cultural past. Landgrebe contended that “instead of an overall uniformity 
dominated by existentialism” there was “a multitude of efforts towards opening a new 
path in a seemingly impenetrable chaos, mainly by going back to past traditions.”481 In 
the West German universities, students were required to demonstrate a capacity for 
critical thinking and this was done through the interpretation of a classic of Western 
philosophy. It was not, as Cerf supposed, an attempt on the part of the professors to stifle 
the independent thought of the students. The more pressing problem, for Landgrebe, was 
not the presence of emotion or romanticism on the part of the German youth, but rather 
the drive towards specialization on the part of the students who were coming to view 
their studies as merely a means towards the end of a possible profession, generally their 
teaching certificate, or Staatsexamen. What is more, evoking perhaps a dominant view of 
the German youth, Landgrebe wrote “German students today have been so disillusioned 
 
481 Ludwig Landgrebe, “The Study of Philosophy in Germany: A Reply to Walter Cerf,” Journal of 
Philosophy 54, no. 5 (Feb. 28, 1957): 128. 
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by abusive emotion and high-sounding words that they are deeply skeptical of 
philosophy.”482 This practical state of mind on the part of the German youth was ample 
reason to believe that students were not expecting guidance to come from philosophy. 
Nor were they searching for an ideology that could be described as ‘intoxicating.’ 
Landgrebe reasserts the distinct character of the German university, which had always 
had as its foundation the unity of research and teaching. The idea of lectures devolving 
into “a conversation between teacher and students” would jeopardize this unity, “for this 
unity depends on the teacher being able to present in his lecture a wide range of material 
over a continuous period of time.”483 While Landgrebe admits that the lectures may only 
reach a minority who will find them meaningful, the present circumstances of the 
German university, the overflow of students attending lectures simply as a means to an 
end—that is, a profession—meant that one had to be satisfied with teaching abstract 
thinking through the interpretation of texts. Finally, against Cerf’s charge that the topics 
of seminars were mainly historical in character, Landgrebe reminded his Anglo-
American audience, “that the German people has lost its historical memory, so to speak, 
and needs to be reminded of the standards of thought established by the classic works 
and, indeed, to be reminded of its own tradition, so largely forgotten.”484 Landgrebe ends 
by pointing out that the Germans’ task of thinking through their intellectual past could 
not be transplanted by an “alien tradition”—that of Anglo-Saxon philosophy. “The way 
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to recover absolute principles,” Landgrebe concluded, “can only be found by overcoming 
and conquering one’s own traditions.”485 However, the recovery of “absolute principles” 
seems an improper goal to set for philosophical instruction if philosophy was no longer 
meant to proffer Weltanschauungen and organize itself into combatant schools of 
thought.486 
 In a report given in Berlin in October of 1955 before the meeting of the Engere 
Kreis of the AGPD, later published in the Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 
Landgrebe offered a presentation of the possibilities for philosophical instruction in 
secondary school (“an der höheren Schule”). Landgrebe distinguished philosophy from 
the Einzelwissenschaften made up of corporate bodies (Stände) of experts. He also 
distinguished contemporary philosophy from the systematic philosophy of the past by 
making the common claim that there was no longer any dominant school of philosophy. 
Landgrebe contended, “es gibt daher auch keine herrschende Schulphilosophie der Art, 
wie sie etwa im Mittelalter oder in der neueren Zeit bis zum Ausgang des 18. 
Jahrhunderts eine allgemein anerkannte Grundlage des Lernens war.”487 As a 
consequence, Landgrebe made several important observations about the teaching of 
philosophy in the present situation. First, in the absence of a dominant philosophical 
school and the uneven expertise of the teachers of philosophy, it was impossible to put 
 
485 Ibid., 131. 
486 Cf. Landgrebe, Major Problems, 2-3. 
487 Landgrebe, “Zur Gestaltung des Philosophieunterrichts an der höheren Schule,” Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 10, no. 4 (1956): 568. 
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forth a set, uniform teaching plan. Rather, it would be more possible for an institution like 
the AGPD to circulate suggestions and model teaching plans as examples. Second, as a 
consequence of this, Landgrebe argued, philosophical instruction “may not be 
dogmatically built upon a definite philosophical system.”488 Secondly, Landgrebe also 
warned that teaching could not take on the character of a Weltanschauungslehre. 
Although he also opposed the idea of creating a kind of “instruction based on lived 
experience” (Erlebnisunterricht) which could lead to “idle talk” and “dilettatism,” 
Landgrebe did argue that the initial questions raised in a model philosophy class should 
be ethical ones.489 But ethical questions in the classroom did not mean “Normen 
aufstellen oder Restbestände von ‘einfache Sittlichkeit’ registrieren als das, was noch 
gilt.”490 Landgrebe seemed to support the idea that philosophical instruction could be 
organized around a consideration of general ethical questions, which directly related to 
the existential position of the human being whether as cultivated, responsible intellectual, 
or mere expert and functionary. In this way, Landgrebe argued, instructors focused 
directly on countering not simply dogmatism in traditional philosophy, but also the threat 
posed by the greater organization and technologization of human life. Therefore, he 
directs attention away from what he thinks of as simple, abstract intellectual 
consideration of problems. Rather, Langrebe wrote, such a discussion “muß verbunden 
werden mit einer Besinnung auf die Mächte, die im heutigen Gesellschaftsleben die 
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Freiheit des Menschen, seine Selbstverantwortung, seine Möglichkeiten, sein Leben 
zuführen, bedrohen, auf die Gefahren, die dieser Möglichkeit vom Apparat, von der 
Organisation, von den Mächten der öffentlichen Meinung drohen.”491 Landgrebe 
suggested that one could best engender such discussion in the classroom by choosing 
philosophical texts that would give the students examples of how to deal with these 
questions philosophically. Again, Landgrebe warned that the students must be insulated 
against the influence of public opinion and the interference of popular catch-phrases 
(“Schlagworten”). The successful instructor had to demonstrate that current existential 
problems “selbst ihre Geschichte haben, in der sich die Begriffe und Methoden zu ihre 
Beantwortung gebildet haben, die heute vielfach als in ‘gesunkenes Kulturgut’ unser 
Denken leiten und ihm seine Perspektiven vorschreiben.”492 
Here, Landgrebe made an important hermeneutical observation, which was 
common to other thinkers of his generation like Otto Friedrich Bollnow and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. Namely, that when one dealt with perennial questions and texts, one did so 
always with the background of a “philosophical tradition” (“philosophische 
Überlieferung”), and that this hermeneutical mode of understanding was particularly 
well-suited to the Geisteswissenschaften and, therefore, a model for instruction in 
philosophy. The problems of dogmatically positivistic science and the intrusion of 
romantic, ideological Weltanschauungen were the result of individuals losing this 
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“historical horizon of tradition.” The point was to clarify the horizon of tradition for the 
student, in order to give them the critical means to defend against these intrusive 
elements.493  
Interestingly, at the end of his report, Landgrebe advised against drawing from 
texts of contemporary philosophy for the purposes of instruction. Contemporary 
questions had a long history and tradition. A narrow focus on present-day texts could 
prevent  
die Wiederherstellung der Kontinuität in unserem Bewußtsein, die Weckung der 
Einsicht, daß die Weise unseres Gemeinschaftslebens und die Denkschemata, die 
zu seiner Bewältigung ausgebildet wurden, ihre zweitausendjährige Geschichte 
haben, die nicht etwas hinter uns Liegendes und Abgetanes ist, sondern eine in 
unserem Selbstverständnis verborgen weiterwirkende Kraft, ist eine der 
wesentlichen Aufgaben, die der heutigen Bildung gestellt ist. Zu ihrer Lösung 
beizutragen wird an Hand eines Textes aus der Gegenwart weitaus schwieriger 
sein als im Rückgang auf die sogenannten Klassiker der Philosophie.494 
 
Landgrebe’s views on the practice of teaching philosophy were based upon his idea of the 
nature of understanding in the human sciences to which Landgrebe had devoted a lecture 
while still a professor in Kiel in 1951.495 The problem of understanding in the human 
sciences and in particular the contemporary understanding of texts and philosophical 
questions in view of their descent (Herkunft) from a long tradition, served as the guiding 
problematic for the most significant younger philosophers. Although tradition played a 
central role in philosophical hermeneutics and the teaching practices of Landgrebe and 
 
493 Ibid., 571-2. 
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495 Ludwig Landgrebe, “Vom Geisteswissenschaftlichen Verstehen,” Zeitschrift für Philosophische 
Forschung, 6, no. 1 (1951): 3-16. 
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Gadamer or in Joachim Ritter’s notion of the compensatory function of the 
Geisteswissenschaften, the works of their best students demonstrated the need to reassess 
many of the assumptions that underlay their teachers’ methods of identifying and relating 
to these traditions. One important way in which they did this was to introduce the 
supposed “alien traditions” of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy and American 
pragmatisem and to reintroduce the displaced ideas of German-speaking émigrés such as 
the Vienna School and some of the important neo-Kantians like Ernst Cassirer. 
 Despite Landgrebe’s ardent protest, the provincial, insular picture presented by 
émigré observers such as Walter Cerf, Walter Kaufmann, and Fritz Heinemann was 
certainly not an inaccurate picture of at least the teaching of philosophy in the university, 
and even the public statements of the prominent academic philosophers. Landgrebe, in 
his widely-cited 1957 work, Philosophie der Gegenwart did in fact organize his synopsis 
of contemporary philosophy around perennial problems, rather than schools of thought; 
however, this was still a narrative that ran over the phenomenological and historicist 
traditions, from Dilthey and Husserl on to Heidegger. Heidegger’s philosophy still 
marked the limits of the contemporary philosophical discussion. As he declared in his 
rebuff to Cerf, contemporary West German philosophy was only understandable as the 
culmination and crisis of what Langrebe defined as the German tradition, which excluded 
the discussion of “exemplary thinkers” in non-German regions—again, the 
representatives of analytic and other ‘positivistic’ philosophies. In particular, he distanced 
continental philosophy both from the Anglo-American dominance of a philosophy of the 
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objective and the exact sciences and, ironically, the logical positivism and critical 
rationalism, which had been forcibly ‘exported’ from Vienna in the 1930s.496 
Although Heidegger’s students like Hans-Georg Gadamer and Walter Bröcker 
were engaging in subtle critiques of their teachers thought, and other philosophers like 
Helmut Kuhn and Otto Friedrich Bollnow were calling for an overcoming of 
existentialism, particularly of Heidegger’s strain, it is easy to see how foreign observers 
would interpret this as a dominance of Heidegger and Jaspers in an almost uninterrupted 
continuity of German philosophical thought from the 1920s and 1930s. 
A strong belief in the originality of German culture and intellectual life remained 
a powerful, albeit jeoprodized, cultural force that found its way into the discussions 
around the design of philosophical instruction and the abiding ‘spirit’ of the German 
univeristy. This is, in a way, analogous to the unfavorable comparisons that were made 
between the culturally avant-garde Jugendbewegung with the seemingly practical and 
“sober” post-1945 youth. Paradoxically, the supposed vulnerability of the young students 
of philosophy and the humanities in the 1940s and 1950s only caused greater concern that 
the influence of potentially nihilistic ideas of figures like Heidegger continued and even 
increased in potency.  
We have already seen how Otto Freidrich Bollnow interpreted the language of 
Heidegger’s “neue Kehre” as potentially problematic if it led to imitation on the part of 
students. In 1950, he had already called for Heidegger to come up with a clearer 
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statement, to come out of his long-term silence and reserve and finally to continue the 
development of a more substantial and systematic philosophical foundation.497 More and 
more, for academic philosophers, even the students of Heidegger, and especially their 
students, it became important to distance themselves from what was called the 
“Heiddeger Wirkung”—the “Heidegger effect.” Dieter Henrich later recalled that in the 
context of the new prosperity of the economic miracle, 
die Philosophie stand weiterhin unter dem Anspruch, die Lebensfragen der Zeit 
aufzunehmen und ihrezeits eine universale Perspektive des Verstehens 
anzubieten. Heidegger hatte ihn genügt, freilich in eine Weise, die sich nun nicht 
mehr akzeptieren ließ. Er hatte dabei die Grundlage der Tradition hintergefragt 
und mit subtilen Grunden bestritten, daß systematisches philosophieren in 
Zukunft noch möglich ist. So entstand die eigentümliche Aufgabe, sich Heidegger 
zu entziehen, ohne den Versuch eines philosophischen Entwurfs von vornherein 
preiszugeben, und sich zugleich seine Destruktion der Tradition – seine 
bedeutendsten Leistung – in der Kritik gewachsen zu zeigen.498 
 
This period represented what Henrich identified as the third phase of postwar German 
philosophy in which the younger figures like himself in cooperation with their teachers, 
in his case, Gadamer, sought to take up a more historically-oriented and meaningful 
relationship to philosophical traditions and to the ideas of the great thinkers, the system-
builders of the past, of German Idealism, and the German historicist tradition. The 
Philosophische Rundschau became a forum for these attempts. Also the Allgemeine 
Gesellschaft für Philosophie by 1960 had come under the control of Gadamer’s friend 
and co-editor of the Rundschau, the Munich professor Helmut Kuhn, which meant that 
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the conferences began to showcase the work of their students: the talented contributors to 
their journal such as Hans Blumenberg, Hermann Lübbe, Hans-Robert Jauß, Dieter 
Henrich, and Jürgen Habermas in whose career Gadamer had taken particular interest 
since Habermas left Frankfurt in 1958. 
 
Thinking after Heidegger, against Heidegger 
Even before the 1960s there had been substantial critiques both of Heidegger’s 
later philosophy and even of his Nazi past. We dealt briefly with the reception of 
Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” and the critiques it spawned in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. But in order to understand the true effects on the younger generation of 
philosophers, it is instructive if we look at the political critiques, which came not only 
from émigrés and older philosophers who knew first hand of Heidegger’s Nazi past, but 
from younger figures like Jürgen Habermas. 
In a now famous intervention,  in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 25 July 
1953, Habermas reviewed the republication of Heidegger’s Einleitung in der Metaphysik 
by Max Niemeyer Verlag of Tübingen.499 The 24-year-old Habermas objected to the 
exact reprinting of Heidegger’s lectures from 1935 without any contextual explanation or 
clarification of a sentence in which Heidegger extolled the “inner truth and greatness of 
 
499 Jürgen Habermas, “Mit Heidegger gegen Heidegger Denken. Zur Veröffentlichung von Vorlesungen aus 
dem Jahre 1935,” in FAZ Nr. 170, 29 July 1953. I will cite from the unaltered version republished in 
Habermas, Philosophisch-Politische Profile, 3rd, expanded edn. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1984), 65-72. 
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the [National Socialist] movement.”500 Habermas could draw only one conclusion: “Da 
diese Sätze 1953 ohne Anmerkung erstmals veröffentlicht wurden, darf unterstellt 
werden, daß sie unverändert Heideggers heutige Auffassung wiedergeben.”501 Although 
caught somewhat by surprise by the controversy that ensued, Habermas justified the 
political review of Heidegger’s work at the outset by observing that “the philosopher 
Martin Heidegger concerns us here not as philosopher, but rather in his political 
proclamation [Ausstrahlung], in his effect [Wirkung] not on the internal discussion of 
scholars, but on the formation of the political will of students who are able to be fired-up 
and easily excited.”502 Heidegger had opened the door to this political critique by 
reproducing an overtly political statement. While older observers would accuse 
Habermas of failing to understand the meaning of Heidegger’s words in the context of the 
mid 1930s—a tactic used by ‘inner émigrés’ for some time—it is undeniable that the 
young, recently promoted Dr. Dozent could imagine very clearly the effect these words 
would have on a lecture hall full of impressionable young students. 
Yet the parole of the repression of the past won out, and within a few weeks 
Habermas and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung came under attack. The conservative 
cultural critic, Christian Lewalter responded to Habermas’ article in Die Zeit on 13 
 
500 Martin Heidegger, Einführung in der Metaphysik, 152. Although the published version only referred to 
“the movement,” Otto Pöggeler was able to uncover that the words that Heidegger actually spoke were “the 
inner truth and greatness of National Socialism” in his lecture, during the summer semester of 1935 at 
Freiburg (see Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, 293-94.) 
501 Habermas, “Mit Heidegger gegen Heidegger Denken,” in Philosophisch-Politische Profile, 66. 
502 “Der Philosoph Heidegger beschäftigt uns hier nicht als Philosoph, sondern in seiner politischen 
Ausstrahlung, in seiner Wirkung auf  entzündbarer und begeisterungsfähiger Studenten” ibid., 65. 
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August 1953.503 Along with providing an apologia for Heidegger’s statements—that they 
could only be understood with “the ears of 1935”—Lewalter attempted to discredit 
Habermas and the FAZ by exposing a dependency on the neo-Marxist vocabulary of 
Theodor Adorno in Frankfurt, who sought nothing less than to publically defame all 
“supposed ‘fascists’ from Richard Wagner to Ernst Jünger.”504 Lewalter’s accusations 
provoked Karl Korn, the cultural editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, who had 
assigned Habermas the review, to produce an answer the following day in an article 
entitled “Warum schweigt Heidegger?”505 Along with objecting to Lewalter’s attempt to 
link the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung with Theodor Adorno and the politics of the 
Frankfurt School, from which Korn himself kept his distance, he also pointed out the fact 
that Habermas was a doctoral student of philosophy in Bonn under Erich Rothacker. “Es 
mütet grotesk an,” wrote Korn, “daß der Kulturpolitiker der ‘Zeit’ [Lewalter] dem 
vierundzwanzigjährigen Studenten Habermas Verfolgungsucht vorwirft und den 
Versucht macht, H[abermas] ohne sachlichen Anlaß ins ‘neo-marxistische ghetto zu 
stoßen.’”506 Of greater concern for Korn was the apparent implication of Lewalter’s 
dismissive claim that a capable representative of the younger generation had no right to 
demand that Heidegger clarify the meaning of his republished statement in the public 
press. Lewalter’s sentiment militated against and refused to recognize the legitimacy of 
 
503 Christian Lewalter, “Wie liest man 1953 die Sätze von 1935?” in Die Zeit Nr. 33, 13 Aug. 1953.  
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Habermas’ reactions to the presence of National Socialism in an ostensibly scholarly text. 
Lewalter never seemed to consider the shock of a younger person like Habermas at 
reading this blatant statement of support for the National Socialist’s political regime in a 
set of lectures which had been given to students as an introduction to philosophy. 
The debate registered the dissonance of generations. Of course, Korn understood 
ahead of time the potentially provocative element in Habermas’ politically-directed 
review; sensing this significance, he gave the young author nearly an entire page of the 
FAZ’s prominent Saturday section, “Bilder und Zeiten.”507 To be sure, Korn was 
outraged at the implication that the great Heidegger was somehow immune to criticism, 
particularly from such a junior academic. However, equally disturbing, in Korn’s view, 
was the resentment of Lewalter and some of Korn’s colleagues that he had offered 
Habermas the public forum to air his generation’s grievances.508 This was a direct 
challenge to the intellectual authority of the press to question the political actions of 
important intellectuals and academics. 
It seemed that the young Habermas had broken a code of silence about which he 
was unaware. Habermas recalls that, shortly after the publication of his review essay, his 
Doktorvater in Bonn, Erich Rothacker, invited him to his house, something that 
Rothacker had never done before. There Rothacker engaged the young Habermas in a 
very nebulous and, as Habermas recalls, awkward conversation about his academic plans 
 
507 Marcus M. Payk, Der Geist der Demokratie: intellektuelle Orientierungsversuche im Feuilleton der 
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and obliquely referred to the Heidegger essay. Habermas understood this meeting only in 
retrospect; for at the time, he knew very little about his teacher’s own dubious past. It was 
more than likely an attempt on Rothacker’s part to ascertain whether the young Habermas 
intended to write an exposé-like essay on him.509 Habermas’ recollections are supported 
by a letter sent by Erich Rothacker to prominent publisher, Dolf Sternberger at the 
beginning of November 1953 in which the former refers to the conversation with his 
young student about Heidegger’s work: 
Ich habe Habermas, nachdem ich seinen Aufsatz gefragt [sic]. Weshalb er 
eigentlich bei dieser Gelegenheit nicht auch auf den Passus im 
Humanismusbrief hingedeutet habe, wo Heidegger über den 
Kommunismus etwas ziemlich Aehnliches sagt wie über den Nazismus in 
den Vorlesungen. Es bleibt dabei, dass er sich den Ereignissen ausgeliefert 
hat mit seiner Entselbstung.510 
 
 Here Rothacker used the common tactic of relativizing guilt before questions of his own 
culpability. Sternberger knew quite well that Rothacker was in many respects more 
compromised than Heidegger by his Nazi past. Rothacker had sought in 1933 to take up 
the leadership of the department of Volksbildung in Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry in 
connection with the study, “Aktion Wider den Undeutschen Geist.”511 Figures like 
Rothacker were the true “Edel-Nationalsozialisten,” or “aristocracy of National 
Socialism.” In the same letter to Dolf Sternberg shortly after the Habermas review, 
 
509 Interview with Habermas, Starnberg near Munich, May 2007. 
510 Erich Rothacker to Dolf Starnberg, November 10, 1953, p.2. Rothacker-Nachlass Teil I, Archiv der 
Universitäs- und Landesbibliothek Bonn. 
511 George Leaman, Heidegger im Context, 73; see also Volker Böhnigk, Kulturanthropologi als 
Rassenlehre. 
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Rothacker tried to distance himself from Heidegger’s case by pointing to the latter’s 
provincial origins as the basis for his politics: 
Die Sache hängt mit Heidegger zusammen. Einerseits ist er ein Bauer, und 
das hat zur Folge, dass er ganz reizvoll an einigen ewigen Werten der 
sozialen Urschicht hängt. Anderseits ist er dem, was ich die bürgerliche 
Substanz unserer Weltgeschichte nenne, doch völlig entfremdet und 
insofern, wie alle Bohémiens einschliesslich der Ski-Bohémiens, 
wurzellos. . . . Ich selbst bin einem sehr skeptisch gegen Revolutionen und 
halte praktisch mehr von Renaissancen und Reformationen. Heidegger 
aber macht alles von ‘Grund auf’ (Grrund mit rollendem ‘r’). Und in 
diesem Falle sind es recht häufig private Dämonen, die an die Stelle des 
angeblich überindividuellen ‘Seins’ [start second page] treten. Das steht 
nur in einem scheinbaren Widerspruch mit seinem Kampf gegen das 
Subjekt. . . .512 
 
This suggests something very significant about the presence of the Nazi past for postwar 
intellectuals and academics. Naturally, dialogue about the actions of fellow colleagues 
occurred mainly in private. What is more, even in the private domain, rhetorical strategies 
were used to deflect blame from oneself onto one’s more prominent colleagues; and 
those, like Sternberger—an outsider to the philosophy profession and certainly outspoken 
in his publications for Die Wandlung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung—had the 
sense of propriety not to question Rothacker’s hypocrisy. This also gets back to the 
common comparison made by historians between the reticence and suppression of the 
Nazi past during the ‘restorative’ 1950s and the relatively frank discussion in the years 
immediately following 1945. In the 1940s, Germany was occupied. The journals in which 
the most critical statements about the Nazi past were made had been licensed and in some 
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cases directed by the Allied Occupational Authorities. The editors and contributors to Die 
Wandlung, Die Neue Zeitung, or Der Monat were relatively secure if they wanted to 
publish articles or documents that incriminated particular individuals. Furthermore, this 
was the period of the Nuremberg Trials and denazification proceedings. The last thing the 
accused would want is for their past to become a legal or political case. In the early 
1950s, when Karl Korn published Habermas’ review of Heidegger’s 1935 lectures, 
philosophers and academics in general had reestablished what we can only call with 
Bourdieu the “field of academic power.” By 1953 the philosophers’ guild mentality, or 
“Zunftwesen” was firmly back in place. The former Nazis within the profession like 
Rothacker were highly placed and protected in the academic community. Heidegger 
could be challenged because he was an outsider. His self-stylization as the Einzelgänger, 
or solitary thinker now worked against him. It meant that he was fair game for such a 
political attack, though even in his case the publication of Habermas’ article caused a 
scandal; however, as we have seen, the main objection of those—other than Lewalter or 
Müller, who came to the Master’s rescue out of loyalty—concerned the right of a 
‘popular’ newspaper, FAZ to publish such a piece in the Saturday feuilleton, where one 
expected to see only the frivolous commentary of journalists, not the David and Goliath 
scenario of a mere Doktor designatus taking on an Emiritus professor.513 Again, the 
controversy subsided because Heidegger’s case was well-known, and his ‘colleagues’ in 
the academic profession already considered him a liability because of his stubborn refusal 
 
513 Habermas’ dissertation had been excepted, but he was not officially a Ph.D. in the summer of 1953. 
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to behave like a professional. Of course, the professional philosophers also resented 
Heidegger’s popularity and fame, which was based on his link to the superficial, but 
dangerous literary ideas coming from France. 
It would have been an altogether different affair if someone had tried to take on a 
figure such as Rothacker. First, no one spoke openly of his Nazi past, and though his 
works of the 1930s were republished after the war still containing the racialized idiom of 
that period, it was unlikely to cause the same reaction as the blatant endorsement of the 
National Socialist movement found in Heidegger’s Einführung in der Metaphysik. 
Second, Rothacker was a disliked, but still active member of the philosophical 
community as leading member of the AGPD, a founding member of the Akademie der 
Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, editor of the Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, on 
the editorial board of Studium Generale, and many other journals; an attack upon him 
would have been seen as an attack on the philosophical profession. Finally, one must 
admit that Rothacker, despite his institutional power, was virtually unknown to the wider 
public. Put simply, no editor of a widely-circulated newspaper like the FAZ would see 
any gain in publishing an exposé of his political past, particularly if the only evidence 
was based on hearsay at that point. 
How then can one justifiably argue that the intellectual youth of the 1950s was in 
a position to effectively question the past actions of their elders? One could have 
evidence to suspect these past misdeeds only if the older teachers and culture figures 
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spoke of them specifically and openly.514 It was altogether a different matter to be 
surrounded by a culture that talked incessantly about collective guilt, as was the case 
briefly in the few years directly following the war; but this had only fortified the youth’s 
silence if in their private dealings, while these same cultural commentators sought to 
relativize their guilt and deflect blame onto others. In other words, only an event as 
blatant and public as the most famous philosopher in Germany republishing lectures that 
explicitly endorsed National Socialism could offer the chance for a young intellectual to 
take a firm public stance.  
Of course, there were statements made by philosophers of the teachers’ 
generation, younger than Heidegger but older than Habermas. In an important article that 
appeared in Merkur, Helmut Kuhn reacted to Heidegger’s Einführung in der Metaphysik, 
pointing to a crisis which he described as “Philosophie in Sprachnot.”515 Where one finds 
in Sein und Zeit and the Einführung in der Metaphysik the presence of a conceptual 
structure, in Heidegger’s later work Kuhn found merely the “spröden Auslassungen der 
Nachkriegszeit, die einer baumeisterlichen literarischen Zusammenfassung zu 
widerstreben scheinen.”516 Here Kuhn expressed worries very similar to those articulated 
 
514 Even more sympathetic figures like Gadamer only addressed this issue much later. It was typical that 
Gadamer only discussed the Nazism of former colleagues much later, indeed decades after their deaths (and 
reluctantly even then), as was the case with figures like Erich Rothacker, Joachim Ritter, and Oskar Becker 
with whom Gadamer worked closely. See Gadamer’s interview with Dörte von Westernhagen from 1989, 
“The Real Nazis had No Interest in Us at All…” in Gadamer in Conversation: Reflections and 
Commentary, ed. and trans. Richard E. Palmer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 118-19. 
515 Helmut Kuhn, “Philosophie in Sprachnot: zu Marin Heideggers ‘Einführung in die Metaphysik,’” in 
Merkur 68, no. 10 (Oct. 1953): 935-49. 
516 Ibid., 935. 
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by Otto Friedrich Bollnow in regard to Heidegger’s Humanismusbrief. Kuhn likewise 
feared Heidegger’s new language had become “an enticement for buffoonery and 
imitators.”517 We discover that the “Sprachnot”—the poverty of language—was 
epitomized by Heidegger’s “dichtendes Denken,” a style in which etymological allusion 
substituted for philosophical argument. By the mid 1930s, obscure wordplay with 
Hölderlin and the early Greeks had already started to overtake the Kierkegaardian 
“pathos in death” of the thinker’s earlier works. In this way, argued Kuhn, “Heidegger 
hat sich auf einen Punkt gestellt, von dem her Sprechen kaum noch möglich ist.”518 Kuhn 
already expressed his consternation as a reviewer of Heidegger’s Holzwege in 1952. The 
Munich philosopher was at pains to separate himself from“[d]as Schauspiel von Leuten, 
die in den abgelegten Kostümen ihres philosophischen Meisters umherwandlen,” Kuhn 
observed how “Man kann nicht, ohne sich lächerlich zu machen, Heideggers 
Bildausdrücke übernehmen, und sei es auch nur zu Besprechungszwecken.” Rather, 
serious philosophical analysis required “Ein Herübersetzen zu dem fremdartig Gedachten 
und dessen Rückholung in die Sprache der Philosophie.”519 
However, the Introduction to Metaphysics was not merely further documentary 
evidence of Heidegger’s descent into stylistic obscurity. The republication of the lectures 
from 1935, in Kuhn’s view, served as an occasion to critique Heidegger’s attempt to 
undermine and discredit the history of Western philosophy as a “history of the Fall” from 
 
517 Ibid., 936. 
518 Ibid. 
519 Helmut Kuhn, “Heideggers ‘Holzwege,’” in Archiv für Philosophie 4, no. 3 (July 1952): 255. 
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some sort of originary knowledge of Being among the pre-Socratic Greeks. Moreover, 
Kuhn insisted that Heidegger’s decision to include and reproduce the political remarks 
made in the 1935 lectures placed the fundamental ontologist within present-day historical 
and political concerns. Kuhn observed how already in 1935, Heidegger saw a central 
world conflict between Russia and the United States unleashed by the narrow focus on 
technology and organization. In the middle of this conflict stood Germany, the only 
power that offered an alternative able to prevent these two forms of decay that 
represented “dieselbe trostlose Raserei der entfesselten Technik und der bodenlosen 
Organisation des Normalmenschen.”520 Finally, Kuhn comes to Heidegger’s statement 
about the “truth and greatness” of National Socialism. Kuhn wrote,  
hier schliesst sich innerlich das Bekenntnis zum Nationalsozialismus an, 
niedergeschrieben und gesprochen im Jahre 1935, durch Druck 
veröffentlicht 1953, vermutlich als Beleg dafür daß Heidegger nicht durch 
die Geschichte “wankt,” sondern in ihr steht und stehen bleibt. Die 
Bescheinigung der “inneren Wahrheit und Große der Bewegung” (d. i. das 
Nationalsozialismus) wird auf Seite 152 damit begründet, daß hier “die 
Begegnung der planetarisch bestimmten Technik und des neuzeitlichen 
Menschen” stattgefunden habe. Was immer daß heissen möge – der an den 
Maßstäben von 1935 gemessene mütige Panegyrikus auf den Geist als das 
“tragende und herrschende” zeigt daß Heidegger zu den Edel-
Nazionalsozialisten gerechnet werden will.521 
 
Although Kuhn partly expressed the view that Heidegger’s panegyric about National 
Socialism needed to be read in its context, he certainly did not welcome it as did others 
like Max Müller, who lauded the reproduction of the lectures of 1935 as an act of courage 
 
520 Heidegger, Einführung, 28; quoted in Kuhn, “Philosophie in Sprachnot,” 948. 
521 Ibid., 948. 
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and intellectual honesty.522 Instead, the presentation of such statements, without 
explanation, fit together with the equivocal nature of Heidegger’s  postwar work. For 
Kuhn, reading Heidegger’s lines in praise of National Socialism triggered the frightful 
recognition that such a phrase was once ordinary and could become so again if it was 
allowed to be explained away: “Das Loblied auf den Geist klingt bereits hohl, aber das 
erneuerte Lob des Nationalsozialismus, so gespenstisch auch seine Erscheinung wirkt, hat 
heute wieder reale Bedeutung.”523 In this way, wrote Kuhn, “Heidegger’s thinking would 
remain a warning sign” for the future.524  
As with the issue of generations, the important point in analyzing the debates of 
the 1950s about Heidegger is not to view them through the lens of the much more 
vociferous and informed conflicts which occurred subsequently, particularly in the 1980s. 
It would be wrong to see the intervention by the 24 year-old Habermas in 1953 as a 
conscious attempt to engage as a public intellectual dealing with the Nazi Past. If 
anything this event shows how little Habermas and other members of his generation 
knew about the misdeeds of German intellectuals, but also their naïveté in thinking that 
they could take part in free public debate about the past without incurring the disapproval 
of other figures—not simply of cultural critics such as Christian Lewalter on the 
periphery of the philosophical field, but also an important figure like Rothacker who in 
 
522 Max Müller, “Besprechung von Martin Heideggers Einführung in die Metaphysik,” reprinted in Martin 
Heidegger: Briefe an Max Müller und andere Dokumente, 82-92; originally appeared in Universitas 9 
(1954): 301-304; 409-413; see esp. 91. 
523 Kuhn, “Philosophie in Sprachnot,” 948. 
524 Ibid., 949. 
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his conversation with Habermas and his discussions with other colleagues, exerted a 
more subtle form of pressure.  
 
Overcoming Insecurity with Tradition: from Heidegger to Hegel and Back Again 
An important starting point for  younger philosophers and their teachers was the 
critical return to nineteenth-century traditions—to the problems of historicism and the 
historicity of the philosopher and the Geisteswissenschaftler. For the teachers, like 
Gadamer, Landgrebe, Ritter, or Bollnow this meant taking up anew the crisis of 
philosophy after Hegel, often by way of the philosophy of older figures like Edmund 
Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey. This signaled not a return to Lebensphilosophie, the 
philosophical Weltanschauungenlehre, and the Neo-Kantian schools that dominated the 
pre-World War One era, or even the path that the young Heidegger had traversed. Rather, 
by the late 1950s and early 1960s, the confrontation with tradition occurred above all 
through philosophical arguments about the character of truth and method in the 
Geisteswissenschaften. The claims of the ‘human sciences’ to objectivity and conceptual 
clarity vis-à-vis the natural sciences were the most important challenges facing 
philosophers wary of their apparent loss of relevance.525 It is important to note in this 
 
525 Throughout this chapter we will continually refer to Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960); references will be to the second English edition, Truth and Method, 2nd, rev. 
edn., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co. [Continuum], 
1989); see also Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “Die Objektivität der Geisteswissenschaften und die Frage nach 
dem Wesen der Warheit,” in Mass und Vermessenheit des Menschrn: philosophische Aufsätze. Neu Folge 
(Go?ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 131-159; and Landgrebe, “Zum geisteswissenschaftlichen 
Verstehen.” 
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context that a resurgent humanism, though it could take on the compensatory and 
sometimes quaint language of “einfache Sittlichkeit” and Bollnow’s “neue 
Geborgenheit,” was part of a general return to the richness of the German philosophical 
and philological-hermeneutical tradition that sought to understand and to teach the 
classical texts in the history of philosophy with a more critical awareness of limits of 
objectivity and scientific method. Alongside the concerns raised by Heidegger’s language 
and hermeticism for professional academic productivity or pedagogy and the wider threat 
that Heidegger’s mode of thinking and his anti-humanism presented to the security 
(Geborgenheit) of the youth and of philosophy, there was also a strong move to reassert a 
philosophically-grounded basis for research and teaching in the Geisteswissenschaften. 
 
Neutralizing Heidegger’s Effect through Tradition 
There was never the same investment in Heidegger’s philosophy as a basis for 
political activism as there was in the case of Sartre. The German reviewers of his work 
were more concerned to place Heidegger within, or to define his work against a particular 
tradition and, thereby, to render it more intelligible and potentially surpassable. Often this 
meant revealing how Heidegger’s new concern with the history of Being was simply a 
rhetorical gesture to bring philosophy as metaphysics to an end. Gerhard Krüger went so 
far as to claim that his teacher’s attempts to overcome metaphysics had nonetheless 
succumbed to a new kind of humanist metaphysics. Krüger argued, “Gerade indem er die 
Metaphysik des Seienden überwinden und eine sich anbahnende Wende der 
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Weltgeschichte denken will, humanisiert er, wie sich zeigte, das übermenschlich und 
übergöttlich gemeinte Sein und trägt die unüberwundene moderne Not der 
Geschichtlichkeit des Menschen mit alle daran haftenden Relativierung der wandelbar 
gewordenen Wahrheit in jenes Sein selbst hinein.”526 For Krüger, Heidegger’s attempt to 
quarantine man and beings in their historicity by means of the elevated notion of Sein 
was nothing new. German Idealists, above all Hegel, had already been drawn to the task 
of resolving the modern experience of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). Many would equate 
the negation of the factical in Hegel’s concept of Absolute Spirit with Heidegger’s phrase 
Lichtung des Seins (clearing of Being).527 Krüger contended that “Heidegger stands like 
every current thinker before the fact that history has passed over Hegel’s eschatological 
pronouncement of the perfection of history in absolute philosophy.”528 Here it may seem 
that Krüger tried to assimilate Heidegger to the familiar narrative in which no German 
philosopher ever succeeds in surpassing Hegel. However, Krüger’s point was more 
subtle. Heidegger’s philosophy of “Ek-sistenz” becomes an unworkable variation on 
Hegel’s identification of history with the development of Absolute Geist. 
Heidegger may have removed any notion of rational progress from the history of 
philosophy, but Heidegger nonetheless treated the history of metaphysics as so many 
attempts to raise the question of Being. The supposed “overcoming of metaphysics” 
proclaimed by Heidegger in “The Age of the World Picture,” a lecture given in 1938 and 
 
526 Krüger, “Martin Heidegger und der Humanismus,” Theologische Rundschau 18 (1950): 173.  
527 Cf. Helmut Kuhn,  “Heideggers ‘Holzwege’,” in Archiv für Philosophie 4, no.3 (July 1952): 267-68. 
528 Krüger, “Martin Heidegger und der Humanismus,” 176. 
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republished in Holzwege (1950), was merely the simplification of Hegel’s notion of the 
historical actualization of spirit to a potential “advent” of Being. Now, “Being” took the 
place of absolute spirit as that which distinguished human being-in-the-world. However, 
whereas for Hegel there was a rational plan underlying the movement of Geist that found 
concrete actualization in universalizing processes such as human Bildung and the 
formation of a more inclusive state, in Heidegger’s case, Being eluded the efforts to 
pinpoint instances of meaning in its historical development. The actuality of the idea, 
which, for Hegel, derived from the rationality or “reasonableness” of its determinations 
(Bestimmungen), found no correlate in Heidegger’s thinking through language as the path 
to Being. Thus, Heidegger’s “thinking” did nothing to ameliorate the aporias of human 
facticity, or “Geschichtlichkeit” (historicity). In his yearly review of German philosophy 
for the journal Philosophy, Fritz Heinemann expressed the “anticlimax” of the Holzwege 
collection and dismissed Heidegger’s late thought as “a sort of inverted Hegelianism 
transformed into an ontological mysticism. The Absolute which appears in different 
historical forms is now ‘nothing,’ whereas each of its appearances claims to represent 
true reality.”529 Helmut Kuhn expressed the same argument in his review of Holzwege for 
the Archiv für Philosophie. In reference to Heidegger’s important essay on “The Word of 
Nietzsche ‘God is Dead’,” Kuhn observed, “Wie bei Hegel die Weltgeschichte das Zu-
sich-kommen des Geistes ist, so ist sie bei Heidegger die Selbstoffenbarung des Nichts. 
 
529 F. H. Heinemann, “German Philosophy,” in Philosophy 25, no. 95 (Oct. 1950): 342. Of course, 
Heidegger would never make the claim that the truth of Being was “represented true reality,” in the way 
that Hegel imputed greater reality and reason to the idea than appearance.  
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Theologisch ausgedrückt ist die Weltgeschichte bei Hegel die in Christus 
vorwegenommene Re-inkarnation Gottes. Bei Heidegger, ebenfalls theologisch 
ausgedrückt, ist sie das das fortschreitende ‘Töten Gottes’.”530 Kuhn observed, a 
secularized “Nachleben” of Hegel’s Absolute Geist in Heidegger’s apparent 
reintroduction of mysticism: “In kühner Verkehrung wird an die Stelle des absoluten 
Geistes das Nichts gesetzt. Wie aber die Hegelische Philosophie selbst, so hat auch deren 
Umformung durch Heidegger ihre Würzeln in der deutschen Mystik.”531 
Hegel’s systematic philosophy sought to encompass all fields of Wissenschaft 
while maintaining the identity of Geist and history, and the connection between 
transcendence and finitude, being as the rationality of the idea and its concrete 
actualization, as for example, in the relation between universalizing potential of the state 
and law and the other modalities of the person as ethical member of the family and self-
interested bourgious in the heteronomy of civil society. Before Hegel’s great system, 
Heidegger’s ‘thinking’ was quite a let-down. 
Heidegger’s late philosophy set out the task of “thinking” through the history of 
Being as the history of metaphysics, which was in any case a history of the 
forgetfulness/forgetting of Being (“Seinsvergessenheit”), which would seem to condemn 
human Dasein to the “fate” (das Geschick) of nihilism, rather than a Geschichtlichkeit 
that nonetheless has reason in its moment of unfolding. As Gadamer argued, “Heidegger 
 
530 H. Kuhn, “Heideggers ‘Holzwege’,” 267. 
531 Ibid., 268. Kuhn compares Heidegger’s late ‘mystical’ thought to that of Meister Eckart. Cf. John D. 
Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986). 
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quite intentionally avoids the expressions, history (Geschichte) and historicity 
(Geschichtlichkeit) . . . Instead, he speaks of ‘fate’ (Geschick) and ‘our being fated’ 
(Geschicklichkeit) as if to underscore the fact that here is not a matter of possibilities of 
human existence which we ourselves seize upon . . . Rather it is a matter of what is 
allotted to man and by which he is so very much determined that all self-determination 
and self-consciousness remains subordinate.”532 With the turn to Being “before all beings 
(Seinde),” Heidegger’s thought had simply sidestepped the issue of Geschichtlichkeit 
altogether and certainly precluded any possible role for philosophy as a guiding factor in 
the future development of human knowledge and practical dealings. For Heidegger, 
philosophy did not comprehend the rational in the real as in Hegel; rather, “the 
forgetfulness of Being” ensured that an unreflective historicism prevailed in which, as 
Heidegger claimed, “Die Historie ist die ständige Zerstörung der Zukunft und des 
geschichtlichen Bezuges zur Ankunft des Geschickes” and where “Die technische 
Organisation der Weltöffenheit durch den Rundfunk und die bereits nachhinkende Presse 
ist die eigentliche Herrschaftsform des Historismus.”533 Such a statement ran counter not 
only to Hegel’s view of the progress of reason in history, but also to the reflective 
potential of philosophy introduced through German idealism, which was so vital for the 
contemporary philosophical hermeneutics practiced by Gadamer as well as the critical, 
communicative rationality later developed by Habermas. At the same time, philosophy 
 
532 Gadamer, “Hegel and Heidegger,” 109. 
533 Martin Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximander,” in Holzwege, 301. 
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seemed to reach a point of crisis in which it had lost any claim to competence in 
‘worldly’ affairs because of the radical “derealization” of its practice, which the struggle 
with Heidegger’s thought and the dominance of ‘positivism’ threw into sharp relief. 
 
The Relation to Tradition as a Hermeneutical Problem 
In many of the statements and recollections made by younger philosophers, one 
can observe the problem of the displacement of their relation to the German philosophical 
and cultural tradition. This is perhaps a more ‘abstract’ relation on the level of discourse 
than the political and institutional relations we have explored; however, no consideration 
of the thought and professional activities of the younger figures we encounter like 
Habermas, Dieter Henrich, Hermann Lübbe, and Hans Blumenberg can procede without 
first accounting for this rift in experience.  
Gadamer stated the problem for us quite clearly when he observed how “[t]he 
hermeneutical problem only emerges clearly when there is no powerful tradition present 
to absorb one’s own attitude into itself and when one is aware of confronting an alien 
tradition to which he has never belonged or one he no longer unquestionably accepts.”534 
We could then specify the hermeneutic problem for the West German intellectual youth 
after the war by means of the three moments in the relation to tradition suggested in 
Gadamer’s definition: absence, confrontation, and questioning/skepticism. First, the 
 
534 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Problem of Self-Understanding (1962),” in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 
trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1976), 46. 
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absence of a “powerful tradition” that would “absorb one’s own attitude,” for younger 
students of philosophy, would be the broken, or at least ‘displaced’ tradition of German 
philosophy that few would deny was most represented by German idealism consummated 
in Hegel’s systemic philosophy. Next, the confrontation with an “alien tradition” might as 
well be the putative imposition of positivism, or, at the political level, a kind of provincial 
attitude towards supposedly non-German traditions like those represented by the analytic 
schools of philosophy, the various strains of the philosophy of science, Wittgenstein, 
Carnap, Popper, Reichenbach, and a host of others. Landgrebe in his response to Walter 
Cerf clearly saw these forcibly exiled thinkers as “alien to the German tradition.” But 
there is a more important notion of “alienation” at work here: the kind one feels towards a 
tradition that one “no longer unquestionably accepts.” Gadamer often employs the terms 
Entäuschung or Verfremdung together, though not interchangeably, to designate this 
distance from past interpretations in the contemporary praxis of philosophy and the 
Geisteswissenschaften.  
In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the explication (Erklärung) of texts is made more 
complex by the understanding (Verstehen). Understanding in the human sciences 
required more than an application of method to clarify meaning. As Gadamer clarified in 
a late interview, 
In contrast to the natural sciences, the humanistic disciplines have no 
methodologically ‘assured results that we can pass along free of questions. 
Rather, in the Geisteswissenschaften we are constantly learning new things from 
what has been passed down to us. A genuine readiness for experience goes along 
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with this also, an openness to the claim to truth that confronts us in what is 
handed down to us.535 
 
Understanding in the human sciences requires an openness to “what is handed down to 
us.” Often Gadamer calls it a “conversation” or Gespräch that one initiates with the text, 
or indeed with another interlocutor that occurs against the background of tradition 
(Überlieferung). We can raise the question of the difference between “conversing” with a 
text and communicating with another human being below. For now, it is important not 
only to clarify Gadamer’s position, but also the basis for its continued influence on the 
thought of his students. Gadamer modeled his philosophical hermeneutics on the practice 
(Praxis) of teaching. Gadamer maintained that “Hermeneutik ist vor allem eine Praxis, 
die Kunst des Verstehens und des Verständlichmachens. Sie ist die Seele allen 
Unterrichts, der Philosophieren lehren will.”536 The germ for Truth and Method 
developed largely from Gadamer’s lectures from the 1930s onward, and the imagery and 
examples used to portray the key concepts of his philosophical hermeneutics come from 
the spoken word rather than written or formal language—thus he maintains a distinction 
similar to the French structuralists between parole and langue.537 
Tradition or “Überlieferung”—literally “what has been handed down”—framed 
the background for understanding and was comprised of so many past interpretations and 
conversations that had sedimented in the language in which any hermeneutical 
 
535 Gadamer, “Conversations with Carsten Dutt: Part I: Hermeneutics,” in Gadamer in Conversation, 53. 
536 Gadamer, Beitrag in Pongratz, Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen, 3:79. 
537 Gadamer, “Interview: Writing and the Living Voice,” in On Education, Poetry, and History: Applied 
Hermeneutics, 63-64. 
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engagement must be inscribed. This often unthematized and pretheoretical level of 
meaning functioned as the “foreunderstanding” and “prejudgment” that any human being 
brought to the interpretation of a text, or to a conversation. Gadamer’s formulation was 
admittedly very close to Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world, and the tendency of 
Dasein to “cover things up.” However, whereas Heidegger was interested in a modality 
of Dasein in a very general, ontological sense, Gadamer focused on Dasein reading a text, 
or conversing with another. What is more, while Gadamer took the turn to language as 
the “house of Being” very seriously, he did not endorse the enigmatic way that his 
teacher had of expressing this basic point. Heidegger in his late works viewed Being as a 
kind of “fate” and “sending”—a Schicksal and Geschicht. For Gadamer, this was a very 
imprecise formulation of what was once referred to as the historicality of Dasein. Unlike 
his teacher, Gadamer did not shy away from using the term ‘Mensch.’ “The human being 
was that life form that had language.”538 Rather than speaking of language as “the house 
of Being,” Gadamer referred to it as “the house of the human being.”539 In this way, one 
could argue, Gadamer succeeded in rendering Heidegger’s late philosophy more 
intelligible and relevant to the practice of the Geisteswissenschaften. “Being” may have 
been the possibility of thinking; however, it becomes in Heidegger’s work a kind of 
empty, or, at least, ambiguous signifier. It is “das Nichts”; in other words, the possibility 
 
538 Gadamer, “Mensch und Sprache,” in Kleine Schriften I: Philosophie – Hermeneutik (Tübingen:J. C. B. 
Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1967), 93; in English, Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 60. 
539 Gadamer, “Die Aufgabe der Philosophie, in Das Erbe Europas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1989), 172-73; also discussed in Gadamer, “Conversations with Carsten Dutt,” 57-58. 
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for having a world of beings (Seinde) and also the kind of riddle, or paradox that comes 
with the realization that Being is also not having a world.540 Being was necessarily a very 
difficult signifier precisely because Heidegger tried to create a place holder for the idea 
that what Dasein has in the way of understanding can no longer be conceived in 
philosophy as one with the real. The reality of the idea, which, for Hegel, was based on 
its rationality had proven ephemeral in Heidegger’s view because of the 
scientific/technical world picture of the age. Being was the sign of this loss of identity 
and unity; it is in fact “nothing” because the philosophical-scientific language that 
predominated in the modern age could no longer account for it. 
Gadamer, however, gave a much clearer explanation for this problem in his 
distinction between truth and method with regard to the interpretation of a text. Because 
of the historicity of understanding in the Geisteswissenschaften, one approached a text 
always under the influence of the history of prior interpretations and inherited 
assumptions. What Gadamer called “wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein” was simply 
the idea that the interpreter (or participant in conversation) was linked both to the 
immediate context in which the hermeneutic praxis took place as well as to the history of 
effects that served as the horizon of fore-understanding for this praxis. “Hermeneutic 
work,” Gadamer contended, “is based on a polarity of familiarity and strangeness. . . . It 
is the play between the traditionary text’s strangeness and familiarity to us, between 
 
540 One is reminded of Max von Brück’s allusion to the Sphinx, where after all the answer to the riddle is 
man—and even more appropriately, man through all the stages and limitations of life, i.e., in his finitude. 
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being a historically intended, distanced object and belonging to a tradition. The true locus 
of hermeneutics is this in-between.”541 Most importantly, however, was the reference to 
consciousness. To be sure, Gadamer did not intend to side-step Heidegger’s project by 
referring back to the metaphysical notion of a subjective consciousness, or Kant’s 
“understanding [that] thinks the connections of things a priori.”542 Rather, Gadamer 
followed Heidegger’s analysis in Sein und Zeit, suggesting that “Understanding too 
cannot be grasped as a simple activity of the consciousness that understands, but is itself 
a mode of the event of being.” “Nevertheless,” Gadamer suggested, “it seems to me that 
it is possible to bring to expression within the hermeneutical consciousness itself 
Heidegger’s statements concenring ‘being’ and the line of inquiry he developed out of the 
experience of the ‘turn.’ I have carried out this attempt in Truth and Method.”543 
Language was not some ancillary by-product of a consciousness and grounded in 
a transparent, logical structure; nor was it merely an instrument or tool.544 “Language is 
the real mark of our finitude. It is always out beyond us.” Therefore, Gadamer stated, 
“there is no individual consciousness at all in which a spoken language is actually 
present.”545 The notion that the logic of scientific method could do away with or close the 
“in-between” of our distance and proximity to language was an illusion—one brought 
 
541 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295. 
542 Immanuel Kant, “Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft eintreten 
können,” in Kants Werke-Akademie Textausgabe, vol. 4 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1968), 260. 
543 Gadamer, “On the Problem of Self-Understanding,” in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 50. 
544 Gadamer, “Man and Language,” in Philosophical Herneneutics, 62. 
545 Ibid., 64. 
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about by the gesture of detachment from tradition inaugurated by the self-assertion of 
modern scientific method. Gadamer and many others of his generation complained of the 
predominance of this instrumental relation to language, which in many respects was the 
linguistic counterpart to the dominance of specialization in the applied sciences. Gadamer 
publically expressed his concerns about the fate of philosophy and the humanities in the 
age of positivistic science in his opening speech before the Congress of the AGPD in 
1966 over which he presided as president. He declared, 
Die Sprache des technischen Zeitalters, die mehr und mehr die Sprache der 
jüngeren Generation wird und die uns Ältere mit der leise komische Attitude des 
altmodisch-kunstvollen Redegebrauchs zeichnet, bleibt noch Sprach. 
Unzweifelhaft ist die Verfremdung, die mit der technischen Begriffsapparatur in 
die Sprache eindringt, selber ein Ausdruck und Abdruck unsere Wirklichkeit, in 
der wir leben. Aber diese Verfremdung zu einer rein funktionalen Sprache, die 
aus technischer Nomenklatur und exakt klingenden Feststellungen und 
Folgerungen besteht, geht in die Sprache, die wir alle sprechen, ein und erleidet 
damit die Dialektik der Präzision.546 
 
Here, in quite a rhetorical turn, Gadamer reversed the arguments that had been raised 
against the language of Heidegger and existentialism, which had recently been 
recapitulated by Theodor Adorno in Jargon der Eigentlichkeit.547 Now, it was the jargon 
of Marxism and “positivist theory” that posed the greatest threat to conceptual precision 
in philosophy and the human sciences as a whole. The issue was not the different 
“terminology” used in the specialized sciences; this was a necessary outcome of creating 
 
546 Gadamer, “Die Stellung der Philosophie in der heutigen Gesellschaft,” Opening Address of the Eighth 
German Congress for Philosophy, Heidelberg 1966, in Gadamer, ed., Das Problem der Sprache (Munich: 
Fink Verlag,1967), 14. 
547 Theodor Adorno, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1965). 
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specific areas of research and the need for competence. Rather, Gadamer argued, the 
“Jargon der Technik” militated against the character of language (Sprechen) itself; by 
closing down the interplay between past interpretations and the “consciousness of 
effects” in living speech, it rendered communication and understanding impossible. In 
light of the unbridgeable gap between “specialists and enthusiasts” (“Fachleute und 
Liebhabern”), Gadamer maintained that it was “die allgemeine Aufgabe des 
philosophischen Denkens . . . diesen Verfremdung zu widerstehen, sie 
zurückzuschmelzen in echte, denkende Anstrengung.”548 This was a gesture towards a 
renewed public resonance for philosophy, and obviously a response to the fear the, 
particularly the young were either being alienated by the technical language of a 
rationally administerd society, or seduced by the philosophemes of Marxism or, even of 
“Eigentlichkeit.” He might have felt the need to take it upon himself to stimulate greater 
interest in the organized public conferences of philosophy, which, since Plessner’s 
“Symphilosophien” of 1950, had at least claimed a desire for the participation of non-
specialists and lay “enthusiasts.” However much Gadamer tried to convince his audience 
that the AGPD was “kein Fachverband,” there was no question that the practice of 
philosophy and the human sciences occurred within the universities and institutes, where 
understanding occurred only in the small circles and research groups that Gadamer and 
his closest students and colleagues helped to found. The important questions for these 
figures were the viability of their discipline and its independence from the external 
 
548 Gadamer, “Die Stellung der Philosophie,” 15. 
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demands of social change. “Jargon” of all kinds would dominate the public discourse of 
the mid to late 1960s, while the philosophers and Geisteswissenschaftler intensified their 
focus on attaining clarity and precision in their own terminology and above all in research 
projects related to the history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte) and philosophy that 
operated, as Gadamer himself must have realized because of an intellectual tradition to 
which only the elite of initiates had access. 
For Gadamer, understanding in philosophy, the human sciences, and in any 
meaningful conversation had to rely upon the “enabling prejudgments” handed down 
from tradition. This was most apparent in the converstation, in living speech where “[t]he 
real event of understanding goes beyond what we can bring to the understanding of the 
other person’s words through methodical effort and self control. . . . It is not really 
ourselves who understand,” Gadamer argued, “it is always a past that allows us to say, ‘I 
have understood.’”549 
 But what happened to conversation when this relation to the past was broken? 
More importantly, what if this living relation to tradition that makes possible the moment, 
or “event” of understanding possible is disrupted, or displaced, how can it be recovered? 
This was the concern of the teachers like Gadamer, when confronted with the eager 
young students of philosophy after the Second World War. These young people had not 
only been deprived of this living relation to the German intellectual past by the political 
suppression and censorship of culture, they also came with the strong need to catch up. 
 
549 Gadamer, “The Scope of Hermeneutical Reflection,” in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 58. 
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This Nachholbedürfnis was intensified not only by the impoverished times following the 
war, but because the modern condition itself had pushed the “needy consciousness” 
towards future goals to be achieved by the imposition of political programs which in turn 
relied on a crass, instrumental relation to science. As Gadamer’s long-time friend, 
Gerhard Krüger observed, 
Wir können heute – nach allem, was geschehen ist – nicht in derselben Weise 
Tradition haben wie die Philosophen in der Antike, im Mittelalter, oder auch so 
wie noch in der ersten Hälfte der Neuzeit, – vor dem verhängnisvollen Verlust der 
Tradition, oder genauer gesagt: vor dem Verlust der Sache, in deren immer 
wiederholter Erforschung sich ganz von selbst die lebendige, sachlich erfüllte 
Tradition bildet und fortsetzt.550 
 
The relation of philosophers to tradition had not been the same since the cataclysmic 
events of revolution and war that ushered in the modern experience of time. Philosophy 
began at a loss because of the crisis caused by the failure of German idealism in which 
die geschichtlichen Wandlungen, die sich früher immer noch auf dem Grunde  
und in den Grenzen der festgehaltenen Tradition vollzogen hatten, und die 
eigentlich immer nur als Modifikationen und Reinigungen der Tradition selbst 
gemeint worden waren, sie gewannen jetzt das Übergewicht über die Tradition. . . 
. und nun began mit Hegel die eigentliche und rein modern, die Geschichte der 
Philosophie einbeziehende Art des Denkens, die uns . . . in die Situation der Krise 
hineingeführt hat.551 
 
The idea of a crisis in modern consciousness after Hegel was a notion that many young 
figures like Reinhart Koselleck, Jürgen Habermas, and even Hans Blumenberg would 
take over from the work and ideas of older figures like Krüger and Löwith. For the 
 
550 Gerhard Krüger, “Die Bedeutung der Tradition für die philosophische Forschung,” Studium Generale 4, 
no. 6 (June 1951): 328. 
551 Ibid., 325. 
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moment, however, we must understand the practical ways in which the teachers 
attempted to bridge this gulf between generations and their unequal relationships to 
tradition. 
 Gadamer would seem to have been the most successful. The loss of tradition 
manifested itself in an inability for fruitful conversation and mutual understanding; thus, 
the answer was simple. One had to engage this youth in conversation, but under the most 
favorable conditions. Here Gadamer followed the practices of his teachers. He gathered 
students and interested outsiders together in small groups and focused them first on the 
explication of key texts from the philosophical tradition. In true German form, one began 
with the Greeks. Gadamer’s earliest experiment was with the so-called “Alpbacher 
Kreis,” a group of students and assistants, who gathered together in the picturesque ski 
resort in Alpbach, Austria in the late 1940s. Dieter Henrich and Hans-Robert Jauß among 
others attended these intellectual conversations with Gadamer and several other 
instructors from Heidelberg. Gadamer recollected these early attempts at intellectual 
renewal with great fondness. In a letter to Jauß on his 60th birthday in 1981, Gadamer 
recalled, 
Ich erinnere mich noch sehr genau, wie Sie mir in den Anfängen meiner 
Heidelberger Tätigkeit über den Weg gelaufen sind. Sie und Ihre Gattin gehörten 
ja zu dem Alpbacher Kreis, der teils von Schülern von Hess, teils von meinen 
eigenen Schülern gebildet war und damals zu jenen Versuchen gehörte, neue 
studentische Lebensformen zu entwickeln. Wie weit liegt das alles zurück. 
Inzwischen sind die Universitäten aus allen Nähten geplatzt, und man kann kaum 
noch vorstellen, daß eine so zwanglose Kameradschaft zwischen Professoren und 
Studenten einmal existiert hat, wie wir sie in jenen Jahren erlebten. 
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Gewiß war es auch die besondere Stauung und Entladung, die das Kriegsende 
gebracht hatte, was damals sehr verschiedene Jahrgänge, frühere Soldaten und 
blutjunge Anfänger, in eine Art akademischer Gleichzeitigkeit versetzt hatte. Mir 
rief diese Erfahrung, die auch für den akademischen Lehrer ihren rechten Reiz 
hatte, die entsprechende Erfahrung ins Gedächtnis, die ich selber am Ende des 
ersten Weltkrieges in der Rolle eines Studenten machen durfte. Vielleicht war die 
Zeit nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg bei aller Schwierigkeit des Wiederaufbaus von 
einem größeren Optimismus erfüllt als die Zeit meiner eigenen akademischen 
Jugend. Aber harte Zeiten waren es gewiß für Ihre Generation. Wenn Sie heute 
zurückdenken, mag Ihnen Ihr jetziger Wirkungsort und Ihr eigener Rang, den Sie 
sich im Felde der Forschung erobert haben viel Freude und Befriedigung 
gewähren. Ich selber möchte [Ende S. 1] zum Ausdruck bringen, daß der starke 
Widerhall, den Sie als Forscher und Lehrer erzeugt haben, auch für much selber 
eine rechte Freude ist.552 
 
Gadamer and his students focused on the close reading of texts and the 
clarification of language, taking up Hegel or Kant anew and, in many cases, challenged 
the interpretations of the Master, Heidegger with detailed, careful hermeneutical 
studies.553 This was accompanied by the Hegel revival, and what was interesting about 
the Hegel reception was that it bridged so many of the schools. Again, these were not 
‘schools’ in the traditional sense, but groups of thinkers at different levels of their careers 
The four main areas that fostered this rich intellectual activity were Heidelberg (around 
Löwith and Gadamer), Münster (around Ritter), and Frankfurt with Habermas and the 
younger Schnädelbach certainly influenced by Adorno. 
 
552 Hans-Georg Gadamer to Hans-Robert Jauß, Heidelberg, September 21, 1981. Gadamer Nachlass, DLA 
Marbach am Nekar. 
553 See, for example, Dieter Henrich, “Über die Einheit der Subjektivität (Review of M. Heidegger, Kant 
und das Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd edn [Frankfurt, 1951]),” in Philosophische Rundschau 3, no. 1-2 
(1955): 28-69. 
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The discussion of Hegel’s philosophy, particularly the relation between the 
rational and the real, nature and history, and the philosopher’s relationship to the French 
Revolution and the Prussian Restoration represented the most influential and meaningful 
reconsideration of German Idealism and the expectations for philosophy in the 1950s. 
The ‘Zusammenbruch’ of Hegelian philosophy and with it the critical project of German 
Idealism in the 1840s was viewed as a watershed in the history of modern philosophy and 
in German intellectual history. All the great, formative works of the history of philosophy 
in the 1940s and 1950s structured the narrative of modern thought according to the 
formula of before and after Hegel.554 This is not to say that the key thinkers of the 
German tradition before Hegel, Fichte or Kant, played no role in the reconsideration of 
the character of modern philosophy; however, Kantianism, especially the Neo-
Kantianism that followed the collapse of Hegelianism in the late nineteenth century had 
exhausted itself in the crisis of the sciences and philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s. Many 
of the leading philosophers of the 1950s saw the Neo-Kantian “Schulphilosophien” of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century as the embodiment of the stagnation of 
German philosophy. Neo-Kantianism was caricatured as a dogmatic movement narrowly 
focused on questions of epistemology and method. Certainly, figures like Herman Cohen, 
Heinrich Rickert, or Wilhelm Windelband were respected, but they became 
overshadowed by the more radical philosophies of Existenz, Lebensphilosophie, the 
 
554 Foremost was Karl Löwith, Von Hegel bis Nietzsche: der revolutiona?re Bruch im Denken des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts: Marx und Kierkegaard, 2nd edn. (Zurich and Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1950 
[orig. 1941]). 
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renaissance of Kierkegaard in the theology of the interwar years, Husserl’s 
phenomenology, and of course by Heidegger’s assault on subject-centered, logocentric 
philosophies. Though a figure like Ernst Cassirer remained greatly influential into the 
early 1930s, the students were being produced by Husserl, Heidegger, and those 
influenced by Dilthey and the Historische Schule. 
Yet even though, as many commentators pointed out, Heidegger’s students and 
also those strongly influenced by his thinking dominated the philosophy departments in 
the post-1945 West German universities, something rather astounding happens when 
their students begin to come into their own: the older traditions come back to the fore, but 
in renewed and highly constructive forms. The teachers like Gadamer, Löwith, and Ritter 
encouraged their students to study the primary texts, starting with the Greeks, naturally, 
but moving on to the German idealists. One finds amazing dissertations and habilitations 
on Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. To the outside observer, one might find this 
further proof of German provincialism; however, when these young students turned back 
to the foundational texts of modern German philosophy, they also ‘discovered’ as it were 
the thinkers like Dilthey, Cassirer, and Cohen: the thinkers who had truly sought to build 
upon these old systems. Heidegger’s works were little help in understanding Kant or 
Hegel. If one read these texts, produced from Heidegger’s lectures of the early 1930s, one 
learned about Heidegger, not about the thinkers he appropriated. The anachronism in the 
publication of Heidegger’s earlier lectures alongside the enigmatic postwar lectures 
caused serious problems for those younger thinkers, who wanted not only to understand 
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Heidegger’s path of thinking, but solid, reliable explication of the key figures of the 
German intellectual tradition. The ones who could give them this were in some cases 
their teachers; but they also returned to the original sources, many of which were being 
republished in new critical editions and complete works. These projects made it possible 
to retrace the paths of scholarship on Kant and Hegel, for example, which opened up a 
larger store of thinking on tradition than what the ‘radical’ thinking of the 1920s could 
provide. Much of this scholarship had been lost during the 1930s because of suppression 
and emigration of key thinkers, alternatives that would have not been so greatly eclipsed 
by Heidegger’s figure had it not been for the Nazi Machtergreifung.  
This said, one cannot discount Heidegger’s own pupils as part of this process of 
renewal. Karl Löwith’s work, particularly his two books published in exile, Hegel bis 
Nietzsche (1950) and Meaning in History (1953) were required reading for many of the 
young students, who would later become leading professional philosophers.555 One then 
moved from Löwith’s Hegel to Nietzsche back to the work of Franz Rosenzweig and 
Richard Kroner. The period after Hegel was no longer a kind of no man’s land of 
positivists and Neo-Kantians, as students discovered the Young Hegelians, the Right 
Hegelians, and even Karl Marx. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche had remained popular; but 
 
555 Karl Löwith, The Meaning of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); the first German 
edition appears as Karl Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Die theologischen Voraussetzungen 
der Geschichtsphilosophie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1953). Hanno Kesting and Reinhart Koselleck, both 
students at Heidelberg, assisted in translating the English text into German, and their close friend, Niclaus 
Sombart was assigned Meaning in History as well as Von Hegel biz Nietzsche in his courses with Alfred 
Weber. 
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the mystique of the radical appropriations of the 1920s was lost on the younger 
philosophers. In a sense, the burden of the legend of the 1920s produced a kind of 
dialectical response, an antithesis and new synthesis from the apprentices of the teachers, 
who had been so animated by the pathos of the interwar years. Gadamer, Löwith, 
Spranger, Ritter could speak of the great impact that Spengler’s Decline of the West or 
Karl Barth’s Epistle to the Romans had on their generation; one heard too of the George-
Kreis, or the old, more radical Frankfurt School, of a more revolutionary Lukács of 
History and Class Consciousness. But these texts were no longer read in their most living 
moment. The “wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein” of the students was irrevocably 
displaced by the drastic events of the intervening years. For the postwar youth, these 
rediscovered texts were not revolutionary events, as they had been for their teachers. 
Rather, the students read these works, not without interest and admiration to be sure, but 
they were artifacts of a different epoch that were studied, but not ‘lived’ as events. 
 
Joachim Ritter’s ‘Collegium Philosophicum’ in Münster 
Possibly no other grouping of thinkers sought to reinvest the human sciences with 
renewed intellectual and practical relevance than the circle of younger students that 
gathered around Joachim Ritter in Münster by the mid 1950s. Ritter’s “Collegium 
Philosophicum” was a semi-official—in that it was an unannounced seminar—group of 
advanced Hochschüler, Dozenten, and Habilitants that gathered together to discuss 
philosophical texts and present Referate and sometimes even to hear the occasional guest 
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speaker. What has come to be known only later at the “Ritter Schüle” was comprised not 
only of those advised by Ritter in Münster, but of young philosophers from around West 
Germany seeking intellectual community and philosophical discussion in a somewhat 
informal, though critical atmosphere. Hermann Lübbe, perhaps the most accomplished of 
the scholars to have attended Ritters Collegium, viewed Ritter’s influence retrospectively 
as an effective response to the needs of his generation. Many came to Ritter’s group in 
search of intellectual orientation and to share ideas with other young scholars, who shared 
to material and psychological burdens of the immediate postwar years. Ritter’s approach 
was to focus on this age group’s strong desire for reconnection to past learning and to 
harness their diligence, which so many of his, the teachers’ generation, found so 
envigorating. Lübbe recalled how “Joachim Ritter machte daraus über beiläufige 
Bemerkungen einen Grundsatz akademischer Moralistik, nämlich den des schuldigen 
Respekts der Angehörigen wissenschaftlicher Kommunitäten für die fulle dessen, was 
bereits getan und herbeigeschafft sein mußte, und zwar zumeist von anderen Leuten, 
bevor überhaupt Wissenschaft einschließlich der Philosophie wieder stattfinden 
konnte.”556 
 Lübbe and other members of the Collegium such as Odo Marquard stressed 
Ritter’s openness to alternative viewpoints, much more extreme than his own. Above all 
 
556 Hermann Lübbe, “Affirmationen. Joachim Ritters Philosophie im akademischen Kontext der zweiten 
deutschen Demokratie,” in Ulrich Dierse, ed., Joachim Ritter zum Gedanken, in Akademie der 
Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 
no. 4 (2004): 90. 
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the group focused on the interpretation and teaching of classic texts in the Greek and 
German philosophical tradition. In this sense, the meetings were very conventional and in 
substance no different from what occurred in small circles around figures like Hans-
Georg Gadamer in Heidelberg or Ludwig Landgrebe in Kiel. Although direct political 
discussion of the recent political past, the confrontation with National Socialism, did not 
take place, Lübbe and other ‘Ritter Schüler’ insist that the subject was not actively 
suppressed.557 Likewise, even at the height of the supposed restorative 1950s, Ritter’s 
discussion group and his own work did not indulge in the widespread anti-Marxism of 
these years. Apparently, no subject was deemed taboo, and Ritter’s Collegium became a 
kind of refuge and “place of freedom.”558 
 By 1960, Ritter and his circle exerted a great influence over the direction of 
research in academic philosophy, institutional renewal, and the reconceptualization of 
philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften. In the early 1960s, Ritter, along with Gadamer 
were influencial members of the German Research Community (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz. 
Ritter and Gadamer took over the editorship of the Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte after the 
illness and sudden death of Erich Rothacker in 1965. Rothacker had conceived of the 
journal as a “Bausteine zu einem historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie.” Though 
Gadamer was also part of the planning for the future Wörterbuch, it was Ritter who 
 
557 Ibid., 90-91. 
558 Jürgen Siefert, “Joachim Ritters ‘Collegium Philosophicum’ in Münster,” 194-95. 
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assumed control of the project and used his assistants and the members of the Collegium 
as the administrative and scholarly basis for what became the Historisches Wörterbuch 
der Philosophie, the first volume of which appeared in 1971.559 
 For Ritter, the project of replacing the old “Wörterbuch der philosophischen 
Begriffe” edited by Rudolf Eisler in 1899 and republished from 1927-1930. Like the old 
“Eisler,” as it was referred to, the new Wörterbuch was meant to serve philosophy as a 
means of clarifying its terminology, though not within a static system of unchanging 
scientific concepts, as was thought to exist at the turn of the century. Rather, the new 
project took a decidedly historical approach. “Dazu gehört,” Ritter insisted, “daß die 
Zuwendung zur Geschichte der Philosophie nicht mehr nur als antiquarische Forschung 
verstanden wird, sondern positive zur erinnernden Vergegenwärtigung geworden ist.” 
Ritter also recognized the changed position of philosophy vis-à-vis the other sciences and 
the importance of the focus on the history of philosophy in a time when philosophers 
could no longer aspire to the completeness of a system. As Ritter observed, “[d]ie 
Scheidewand zwischen System und Philosophiehistorie is durchlässig geworden.”560 This 
was apparent to Ritter and his students in the new studies of Hegel. 
Hegel’s thought was appropriated more readily than other major thinkers of the 
German tradition, as an alternative to the prevailing world views after 1945: positivism, 
Marxist materialism, and the many forms of existentialism. Hegel figured prominently in 
 
559 Joachim Ritter, ed., Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co. 
Verlag, 1971-). The Historisches Wörterbuch was completed in 2007 and comprises 13 volumes. 
560 Joachim Ritter, “Vorwort,” in ibid., 1:vi. 
311 
 
                                                
Gadamer’s distinction between method and truth. Hegel’s thought represented the 
revolutionary break in modern thought (Löwith). Not the least because he was the 
quintessential thinker of the events that ruptured the modern consciousness: The French 
Revolution. As Joachim Ritter stated in 1957: “For Hegel, the French Revolution is that 
event around which all the determinations of philosophy in relation to its time are 
clustered, with philosophy marking out the problem through attacks and defenses of the 
Revolution.” In the lines that followed, Ritter the elaborated the meaning and lineage of 
Hegel’s relating thought to reality. This the heritage and the starting point of modern 
philosophy taken hold of by Ritter’s students and other younger readers: “There is no 
other philosophy that is a philosophy of revolution to such a degree and so profoundly, in 
its innermost drive, as that of Hegel.”561 Identifying the origins, usually in Greek thought, 
or German Idealism and the radical ‘breakdown’ of this tradition in the nineteenth 
century were the tasks that the older, established thinkers set themselves in the 1940s and 
1950s. It was less important for them to produce their own original work. More 
importantly, there was a need for synthetic and didactic works that identified the living 
options, and perhaps the blind alleys, for contemporary philosophy. Likewise, in the case 
 
561 Joachim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution [1957], tans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, 
Mass: The MIT Press, 1982),43. 
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of Ritter, Hegel studies became the source for the redefinition of the 
Geisteswissenschaften and the programmatic idea of their compensatory function.562 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
562 Joachim Ritter, “Die Aufgabe der Geisteswissenschaften in der modernen Gesellschaft,” in 
Subjektivität: sechs Aufsätze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), 105-171. This important work 
was first given as a lecture in August 1961 in Münster and published in expanded form in 1963. 
313 
 
Conculsion 
 
The question we set out to answer is how a discipline, or set of disciplines, in this case, 
philosophy and the humanities redefined their role within the university and society in a 
period that all agreed was a time of ‘crisis’ for the traditional form of the German 
university. Of course, the philosophers had spoken of crises for as long as they engaged 
in a truly self-reflective kind of thinking. Idealism was the name for this, and every 
German thinker would agree that self-reflexive philosophy reached its apogee with 
Hegel’s system. After the death of the last system builder, German philosophers were 
said to have lost their primacy and relevance within the university, within culture, and 
among the other, specialized sciences. The latter continued to assert their independence 
with greater intensity as an expanding industrial society produced the need for more 
professionals, experts, technitians and bureaucrats. The “idea” of philosophy lost its 
claim to reality. 
By 1960, the interests of the philosophy profession had shifted to questions of 
tradition and the history of philosophy, the relationship of philosophy to the sciences, and 
not necessarily in opposition to the natural or empirical sciences. As the next generation 
came into place, the practices of philosophers began to change. Conferences became 
more serious intellectual affairs, which were focused on one large theme for which there 
would be a limited number of lectures, but more colloquia, or panels dedicated to a 
particular aspect of the greater problem at hand. The meetings of the AGPD in 1960 in 
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Munich, 1962 in Münster, and 1966 in Heidelberg were truly interdisciplinary exchanges 
that brought together specialists from fields outside of traditional philosophy: the 
Heidelberg historian, Werner Conze, Helmut Schelsky, Arnold Gehlen, and the Göttingen 
physicist, C. F. von Weisacker—as well as some philosophers, considered to be social 
theorists or cultural critics like Adorno. The conference of 1962 on “Das Problem des 
Fortschritts” was clearly meant to appeal to a wider audience of non-academics by 
headlining Karl Löwith and Theodor Adorno as key-note speakers. Many were simply 
interested in the juxtaposition of two thinkers of such very different demeanor, image, 
habitus, distance in the field, but whose work did reach a wider audience of non-
specialists, if not a good deal of the educated, bourgeois public. However, the conference 
could also be seen as a showcase for younger philosophers who not only began to 
challenge the accepted narratives of the German tradition and modernity as a whole, but 
who also sought to take head on the problem of the loss of relevance in the practice of the 
philosopher.  
The crisis of the sciences and Kulturkritik of the 1920s that still defined the realm 
of the conceivable in their teachers’ responses to the idea of progress and the latter’s 
unfavorable accounts of all proscriptive philosophies of history, gave way to real efforts 
to understand and to reinvestigate the history of philosophical concepts. Although this 
lead to greater collaboration and the formation of new interdisciplinary institutes like the 
Zentrum für interdiziplinäre Forschung at Bielefeld founded in 1968, greater professional 
exchange between philosophers, historians, and social scientists at this elite level could 
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not accommodate the persistent problems of the changing needs of the student body and 
expanding administrative duties required of professors in “reform” universities of the 
1960s. Hans Blumenberg would later express disappointment with the reform university 
of Bochum to which he moved with high hopes in 1966.563 Administrative duties and the 
new university’s limitations prevented the realization of Blumenberg’s ideal of Bildung 
and the view of the university he set out when he arrived in Bochum. In an unpublished 
lecture given shortly after his arrival, Blumenberg posed the problem clearly, 
Welche Erwartungen erweckt die Universität, und welche Erwartungen erfüllt 
sie?  Ohne Frage leben wir in einer Zeit der tiefenden Entäuschung an der 
Universität.  Der Unwille, oft auch das Mißverständnis, die ihr in der Kritik der 
öffentlichen Meinung entgegengebracht werden, haben tiefere Wurzeln als das 
Versagen, das ihr hisichtlich ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit für die moderne 
Gesellschaft und gegenüber ihren Anforderungen an Ausbildungseffektivität 
vorgeworfen wird.564 
 
Employing the concept of the scientific “Weltmodell,” Blumenberg expressed the 
inability of the individual subject to master the idea and reality of the university, “Zu 
sagen, daß wir ein wissenschaftliches Weltmodell besitzen, heißt von einer Objektivität 
zu sprechen, die kein Subject mehr hat.”565 It was a point of view reminiscent of Freyer 
 
563 Blumenberg to Gadamer, Blankenstein, August 16, 1967, p. 2. Nachlass Blumenberg. DLA Marbach 
564 Blumenberg, “Weltmodell und Lebenswelt,” unpublished lecture. There is no date attached to this 
document.  Its similarity to the following two manuscript drafts indicates a development in the same period.  
The similarity of its subject matter to the themes of Legitimität (1966), the lecture “Die Bedeutung der 
Philosophie für unsere Zukunft”delivered within the context of the Europa-Gespräch 1961 and “Weltbilder 
und Weltmodelle” delivered in 1961 and published in Nachrichten der Giessener Hochschulgesellschaft 
[30 (1961): 67-75] as well as “Lebenswelt und Technisierung” (1963) and “Die Vorbereitung der 
Aufklärung als Rechtfertigung” (1967), lead me to place its formulation in the mid 1960s, as well as a entry 
in Blumenberg’s Notizbuch that lists a lecture entitled “Weltmodell und Lebenswelt” 29.9.1966, on the 
occasion of the opening “Feier der Ruhr-Universität Bochum.” 
565 Ibid., 9. 
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and Gehlen’s notion of the human being in the age of technology caught up in the effects 
of “secondary” processes. However, Blumenberg seemed to express a view not very 
different from Gadamer in the latter’s belief that university could no longer realize its 
classical ideal except in elite groups of students around a particular instructor, or in 
specialized institutes.566 The last attempt of Blumenberg and others of his generation to 
realize a new ideal of interdisciplinary exchange was the founding of the ZiF at Bielefeld 
in 1968. Reinhart Koselleck wrote to Blumenberg in 1973 to express his disappointment 
that the latter had not accompanied him to the new university in 1968, after being 
instrumental in its founding. Koselleck wrote, 
Freilich haben Sie sich vermutlich richtig entschieden, denn die geplanten 
Vorzüge von Bielefeld schrumpfen dahin. Dauernd werden neue Reformen über 
die noch nicht angelaufenen gestülpt und wenn sich alles unter dem Dach einer 
Gesamthochschule versammelt hat, werden wir alle Studienräte im 
Hochschuldienst sein. Eine neue Hierarchie des Ehrgeizes wird gezüchtet werden, 
es werden Oberstudienräte im Hochschuldienst wachsen, Oberst-, -General- 
Generaloberstudienräte, alles unter dem Deckmantel paritätischer Professoren. 
Die Studierenden werden in Klassen gezwängt und nach strengen Lehrpläne für 
die Praxis präpariert. . . . Die Soziologen in Bielefeld sind zerfallen, die Juristen 
un Linguisten haben sich durch das Blockstudium -vorerst- isoliert und wir 
Historiker versuchen nach, die Kluft zwischen den Ständen so überbrückbar wie 
möglich zu halten. Wenn auch noch der Wechsel zwischen Forschung und Lehre 
entfällt, sind wir auf dem Boden der Provinz angelangt.567 
 
Koselleck expressed the disillusionment of his and perhaps even his teachers’ generations 
in the wake of 1968. Although the philosophers and Geisteswissenschafter had made 
good on the intention of changing the “attitude” of the Mandarin Ordinarienuniversität, 
 
566 Gadamer, “The University of Leipzig, 1409-1959: A Former Rector Commemorates the 550th 
Anniversary of its Founding [1959],” in Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and Histroy, 35. 
567 Reinhart Koselleck to Blumenberg, Nussloch, July 18, 1973. Nachlass Koselleck. DLA Marbach. 
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they found their projects pushed to the extreme by the political generation that could no 
longer abide the separation of politics and science. 
Ultimately, the high-minded goals of humanistic education and critical Bildung 
were relegated, much like Koselleck’s ZiF, to a province within the every-expanding 
university devoted to professional training and specialized expertise. The classic ideal of 
the university as the realm of free teaching and research as well as the more modern 
belief that the university could serve a social function if not a political one are given up 
on as the philosophers followed along in the “mass professionalization” of science and 
intellectual culture. Philosophers, students and teachers were caught in a dilemma. The 
learning process in which they believed depended on isolation (Einsamkeit) and also 
freedom—a negative freedom from intrusion that also necessitated the support of the 
state—and, at the same time, many, particularly among the younger generation 
recognized the need for greater inclusion, which by the mid 1960s had become deeply 
politicized by the demand for student involvement in university reform, curriculum and 
leadership. This seemed to mandate a duty and vocation to the scholar to address social 
concerns. Unfortunately, institutional constraints and a clash in the view of the political 
past between the youth of the late 1940s and early 1950s and the youth of the mid to late 
1960s created confusion on the part of the philosophy professors as to how to address the 
genuine social concerns of their students and a reluctance on the part of the students to 
extend consideration to an age group that was never in a position to fully fathom the 
political experiences of their youth except intellectually, perhaps, through the mediation 
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of tradition. The so-called 45er generation’s contact with their teachers, the relationship 
that was so key to overcoming the trauma of the lost and empty years of the Third Reich, 
could not be reproduced in the learning process of the following generations. Only further 
analysis of the experiences and ideas of the first postwar philosophical generation can 
offer ways of mending this problematic gap, which I believe represents a new 
disinheritance caused not by an overt political catastrophe, but by a loss of the ability to 
communicate and accommodate difference. 
  
 
 
